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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier (8/8/2014) sp-6935

Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier (8/8/2014) sp-6935

         Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC  REPORTER .  

         Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

         303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email  

                                                                                      

         corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.  



                   THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  



ALASKA TRUSTEE, LLC,                                   )  

ROUTH CRABTREE OLSEN, PS,                              )        Supreme Court No. S-13978  

                                                          

and RICHARD N. ULLSTROM,                               )  

                                                       )        Superior Court No. 3AN-09-08695 CI  

                  Petitioners,                         )  

                                                       )        O P I N I O N  

         v.                                            )  

                                                       )        No. 6935 - August 8, 2014  

ELISABETH B. BACHMEIER,                                )
  

                                                       )
  

                  Respondent.                          )
  

                                                       )
  



                  Petition for Review from the Superior Court of the State of  

                  Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Sharon Gleason,  

                                                  

                  Judge.  



                  Appearances:  Richard Ullstrom, Routh Crabtree Olsen, PS,  

                                                                 

                  Anchorage, for Petitioners. Debra J. Fitzgerald and Jonathon  

                                                                  

                  A. Katcher, Pope & Katcher, Anchorage, for Respondent.  

                  Joe  Solseng,  Robinson  Tait,  PS,  Seattle,  Washington,  for  

                  Amicus  Curiae  United  Trustee's  Association.                        Todd  J.  

                  Timmermans,   Hartig,   Rhodes,   Hoge   &   Lekisch,   P.C.,  

                  Anchorage,         for     Amicus       Curiae       Alaska      Land       Title  

                  Association.  



                  Before:  Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and  

                                               

                  Bolger, Justices.  



                  STOWERS, Justice.
  

                  BOLGER, Justice, with whom FABE, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

I.        INTRODUCTION
  



                                                                                            

                    In 2009 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of  



trust against her home, and a nonjudicial foreclosure was initiated.  Bachmeier requested  



                                                                                                            

a reinstatement quote in order to halt the foreclosure, as is permitted by the foreclosure  



           1  

                                                                                          

statute.   Alaska Trustee, the trustee under the deed of trust, replied with a quote which  



                                                                                               

included foreclosure costs that were not attorney's fees or court costs, the only items the  



foreclosure  statute  expressly  mentions  as  recoverable  in  a  reinstatement  amount.  



Bachmeier brought suit against Alaska Trustee, Routh Crabtree Olsen (the law firm  



aiding  in  the  foreclosure),  and  Richard  Ullstrom  (an  attorney  employed  by  Routh  



                        2 

Crabtree Olsen),  alleging that the inclusion of the disputed foreclosure costs violated the 

                                              



foreclosure statute and was a deceptive practice in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices  

                                                                                            

and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA).3  Bachmeier also argued that her deed of trust did  

                                                                                                                   



not provide that all foreclosure costs could be recovered in the reinstatement amount.  



                                                                

Both sides moved for summary judgment.  The superior court ruled that the inclusion of  



                                                     

the  foreclosure  costs  violated  the  foreclosure  statute  and  that  the  UTPA  applied  to  



                                                                                    

nonjudicial foreclosures.  Alaska Trustee petitioned for review.  We granted review on  



two questions:  (1) the scope of permissible charges to be included in the reinstatement  



amount given to homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(b); and  



(2) whether the UTPA applies to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures.  



                                                                                                                          

                    We hold that because the beneficiary of a deed of trust has a right to be  



               

returned  to  its  status  quo  ante  when  the  borrower  reinstates  after  a  default,  Alaska  



                                                                                          

Trustee can include in Bachmeier's reinstatement amount all reasonable costs it incurred  



          1         AS 34.20.070(b).  



          2         These parties will be collectively referred to as Alaska Trustee.  



          3         AS 45.50.471-.561.  



                                                              -2-                                                            6935  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

pursuing the foreclosure under the foreclosure statute, regardless of whether Bachmeier's  



deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs.  We further hold that  



the UTPA does not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures.  



      

II.       FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  



                                                                                           

                   In 2007 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier executed a note and deed of trust in favor  



of Richard Waner to secure the $80,000 balance due on her purchase of a residential  



                                                  

condominium  from  Waner.                    In  March  2009  Bachmeier  defaulted  on  her  payment  



                                                                                                

obligations under the note and deed of trust.  At Waner's request, Alaska Trustee began  



                                   

a  nonjudicial  deed  of  trust  foreclosure.    Bachmeier  contacted  Alaska  Trustee  and  



                                                                            

requested a quote for the amount she needed to pay to stop the foreclosure and reinstate  



                                                                                   

her loan under the foreclosure statute.  This statute gives a defaulting borrower the right  



to cure the default anytime before the sale "by payment of the sum in default other than  



                                                              

the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or  

court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default."4  



                                                                                                              

                   Alaska Trustee responded with a quote that included all the costs it had  



incurred pursuing the nonjudicial foreclosure.  The reinstatement quote itemized the  



costs and showed that most of them were not attorney's fees or court costs.  The total  



                                                                           

reinstatement amount was $6,720.40, $2,315.40 of which was for foreclosure expenses.  



                                                                                     

Of these expenses, $1,500 was labeled as attorney's fees, but these fees were for work  



done by Alaska Trustee, not by an attorney.  



                   Bachmeier  paid  the  sum  under  protest  and  then  sued  Alaska  Trustee.  



                                                                                    

Bachmeier requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages.  She argued that  



Alaska Trustee had violated the UTPA and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices  



          4        Former AS 34.20.070(b) (2003).  



                                                             -3-                                                          6935  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                    5 

                                                  

Act (FDCPA)  by:  (1) including fees that were not attorney's fees or court costs as  



permitted by the foreclosure statute; (2) failing to provide Bachmeier with the correct  



amount needed for reinstatement; (3) not adequately describing Bachmeier's breach  



                                        

when informing her it was foreclosing on her home; and (4) not informing Bachmeier  



that  she  had  a  right  to  stop  the  foreclosure  by  paying  the  reinstatement  amount.  



Bachmeier moved for partial summary judgment.  Alaska Trustee filed a cross-motion  



                                                                       

for complete summary judgment, arguing that its actions were "governed by neither the  



                      

[UTPA] [n]or [the] FDCPA," and that both the deed of trust and the foreclosure statute  



permitted the inclusion in the reinstatement amount of all foreclosure costs.  



                   Superior Court Judge Sharon Gleason heard oral arguments and issued both  



oral and written decisions granting partial summary judgment in favor of Bachmeier.  



The court ruled that the inclusion of foreclosure costs was impermissible because "[i]t  



                                                                                      

is a violation of AS 34.20.070(b) for [Alaska Trustee] to  add on to a homeowner's  



                                                                                                      

'reinstatement' amount fees that are not due and payable to a lawyer or law firm."  The  



court further held that the UTPA applies to "non-judicial foreclosures of a borrower's  



                                                                         

residence."  The court ultimately denied  summary judgment on the other issues because  



it believed genuine issues of material fact existed.  



                                          

                   Alaska Trustee petitioned this court for review, and we granted review on  



                                                                         

two issues:  "the scope of permissible charges to be included in the 'cure' (reinstatement  



amount) given to homeowners facing non-judicial foreclosures under AS 34.20.070(b)"  



                                                                   

and "whether Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act ([UTPA])  

applies to non-judicial foreclosures."6  



          5        15 U.S.C.  1692-1692p (2012).  



          6        Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier , 3AN-09-08695 CI (Alaska Supreme  



Court, Nov. 4, 2010).  We are not called upon in this appeal to decide whether the Fair  

                                            

                                                                                                        (continued...)  



                                                           -4-                                                         6935  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

       

III.	     STANDARD OF REVIEW  



                    A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, viewing the evidence  



                 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and making all reasonable inferences  



                 7  

in its favor.   Summary judgment will be upheld if there is no genuine issue of material  



      8  

                                                             

fact.   Issues of statutory interpretation  are  questions of law to which we apply our  



                                  9 

                                                                           

independent judgment.   "We interpret Alaska law 'according to reason, practicality, and  



                                                                                                        

common sense, taking into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as  

the intent of the drafters.' "10  



IV.	      DISCUSSION  



                                                                                                                  

          A. 	      Alaska Statute 34.20.070(b) Allows  For  The  Inclusion Of All  

                    Reasonable Foreclosure Costs In The Reinstatement Amount. 



                                                                                                      

                     A borrower who defaults has a right to cure the default anytime before the  



                            

sale "by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be  



                                                      

due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the  



                                        11  

                                                                                                

trustee due to the default."                Bachmeier argues that this statute does not allow for the  



          6(...continued)  



Debt  Collection  Practices  Act  (FDCPA),  15  U.S.C.    1692-1962p,  applies  to  

nonjudicial foreclosures.  



          7         Witt v. State, Dep't of Corr., 75 P.3d 1030, 1033 (Alaska 2003) (citing   



Spindle v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 61 P.3d 431, 436 (Alaska 2002)).  



          8         Parson v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp. , 189 P.3d 1032,  

                                                                       

1036 (Alaska 2008) (citing Parker v. Tomera , 89 P.3d 761, 765 (Alaska 2004)).  



          9        Alderman v. Iditarod Props., Inc. , 32 P.3d 373, 380 (Alaska 2001).  



          10        Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936, 939 (Alaska 2006) (quoting Native Vill.  



of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1999)).  



          11        Former AS 34.20.070(b) (2003).  



                                                              -5-	                                                       6935
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

inclusion in the reinstatement amount of any costs besides attorney's fees or court costs                      



and  that  Alaska  Trustee  violated  the  statute  by  including   costs  that  were  neither  



attorney's fees nor court costs.  Alaska Trustee contends that the phrase "sum in default               



other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred" includes               



the costs the trustee incurred in processing the foreclosure before the reinstatement.  



                     In     Hagberg           v.    Alaska        National          Bank ,       a    bank       challenged           the  



                                      

constitutionality of the foreclosure statute's redemption provision on the grounds that,  



as applied, it violated the United States Constitution's Contract Clause, which forbids  



                                                                                                             

any state from passing a law that alters existing contracts in ways that "unreasonably  



                                                                      12  

affect the value" of the  contractual rights.                             We held the statute did not violate the  



                                                                                                                          

Contract Clause as applied because the borrower "must still pay the principal and interest  



                                                                                                                                         13  

                                                                                                                         

and, in case of default, the beneficiary is still entitled to foreclosure and to his costs." 



We concluded that the foreclosure statute's redemption provision "does not reduce the  

                                      



value of a beneficiary's note or the security ensuring payment in any perceptible way"  

                                                                                                     



because the lender is only "deprived of his right to insist on payment of the entire debt  

                                                                 



as a condition to stopping the non-judicial foreclosure process where the overdue amount  

                                                                                                                   

is brought current and costs are paid."14  



                     Though Hagberg does not explicitly state which costs must be paid to  



reinstate a loan, logically, in order for the uncompleted foreclosure not to financially  

                                                                                            



harm the beneficiary, all of the reasonable costs the beneficiary incurred in pursuing the  

          



           12         585 P.2d 559, 561 (Alaska 1978).  The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o                              



State   shall   .   .   .   pass   any   .   .   .   Law   impairing    the   Obligation   of   Contracts."  

U.S. C 

           ONST . art. I,  10, cl. 1.  



           13        Hagberg , 585 P.2d at 561.  



           14        Id. at 561-62.  



                                                                   -6-                                                             6935
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

foreclosure must be repaid.  Otherwise, each time the borrower redeems a defaulted loan,     

which the statute allows twice before the borrower loses the right of redemption,                                                   15 the  



lender would lose money spent on the uncompleted foreclosure.  Before the foreclosure  



                                                                                                               

statute was enacted, a lender would have to pay the costs for only one foreclosure during  



                                                                                                                          

the life of a loan; now under AS 34.20.070(b) it might have to pay the costs for as many  

                                                                                    16   Thus, as we held in Kuretich v.  

                                                                                                              

as three foreclosures - a more expensive prospect.  



Alaska Trustee, LLC , because Hagberg established that parties must be returned "to their  

                                                                                                                  



status  quo  prior  to  the  default,"  "the  costs  of  non-judicial  foreclosure,  other  than  



                                 

attorney's fees and court costs," may be included in the sum in default, "in so far as it is  

                                                                                        17  In Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee,  

necessary to return the parties to their status quo ante."                                  



LLC , we reaffirmed this holding, explaining that "relief from forfeiture by reinstatement  

                                                      



places the lender and borrower in the 'position they were before default,' " and that "only  

                                                       



through the inclusion of [nonjudicial] foreclosure fees in the reinstatement amount would  

the parties be in 'their status quo prior to default.' "18  



                      Kuretich and Albrecht involved situations very similar to Bachmeier's.  In  

                                                                                                                                         



both cases a borrower whose mortgage had entered default challenged the inclusion in  

                      



the reinstatement amounts of foreclosure costs that were neither attorney's fees nor court  

                                                                                  



           15         AS 34.20.070(b).  



           16         See Kuretich v. Alaska Tr., LLC, 287 P.3d 87, 93-94 (Alaska 2012) (noting  



that "a borrower's default is not a cost-free occurrence to the lender").  



           17         Id. at 94.  



           18         286 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Kuretich , 287 P.3d at 89)  



(internal alteration omitted).  



                                                                    -7-                                                             6935
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

         19  

costs.       We held these foreclosure costs were properly included in the reinstatement   



             20  

amount. 



                     Notwithstanding these similarities, Bachmeier argues that  Kuretich and  



Albrecht are not controlling here because in both cases the deeds of trust "expressly  



                                                                                                              

permitted  recovery  of  all  non-judicial  foreclosure  costs  as  part of  the  reinstatement  



                                                                                

amount," (emphasis in original) and Bachmeier's deed of trust does not provide for the  



reinstatement  amount  to  include  anything  besides  "monthly  mortgage  payments,  



                                                                                            

attorney's fees, and court costs."  Bachmeier contends that because there are "no express  



                                                          

terms in the Bachmeier deed of trust and promissory note that allow anything more than"  



                                                                

these limited costs, no other costs from the uncompleted foreclosure can be included in  



her reinstatement amount.  



                     Bachmeier's argument misconstrues our holdings in Kuretich and Albrecht .  



Assuming without deciding that Bachmeier's deed of trust does not expressly allow all  



nonjudicial foreclosure costs to be included in the reinstatement amount, Alaska Trustee  



                                                                               

may still include all reasonable foreclosure costs because the beneficiary has a right to  

                                                                                                                              21   The  

be returned to its "status quo  ante" each time a borrower's loan is reinstated. 



foreclosure costs do not need to be contracted for in the deed of trust because their  

                                                                                                                    



                                                                                  22  

inclusion is provided for by the foreclosure statute.                                 In Hagberg we did not find the  



statute to be constitutional because the parties could, if they desired, contract for their  

                                                                                                                             



status quo ante.  Rather, we held that the law itself restores parties to their status quo ante  

                                                                                                       



and "does not reduce the value of a beneficiary's note or the security ensuring payment  

                                                  



           19        Id. at 1061-62; Kuretich , 287 P.3d at 90.  



           20        Kuretich , 287 P.3d at 89; Albrecht , 286 P.3d at 1063-64.  



           21        Kuretich , 287 P.3d at 87-88, 94.  



           22        AS 34.20.070(b).  



                                                                  -8-                                                            6935
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                                   23  

in any perceptible way."               Indeed, because the deed of trust in Hagberg did not provide  



for   reinstatement   at   all,   it   did   not   specify    which    costs   could   be   included   in  

reinstatement.24  We nonetheless held that the foreclosure statute's redemption provision  



                                                              

would not affect the value of the contract because in order to reinstate the loan, "costs  



                                        25  

                                            Therefore, whether the parties included  a  provision in  

are paid" by the borrower.                                                                                   



Bachmeier's deed of trust allowing all reasonable foreclosure costs to be included in the  

                                       



reinstatement amount is irrelevant.  



                                                

                   Bachmeier further argues that even if she is liable for all foreclosure costs  



in the case of default, because her deed of trust does not state that these costs can be  



                                                                              

included in her reinstatement amount, Alaska Trustee must allow her to reinstate her loan  



                                                       

without paying the foreclosure costs, and then it can initiate a lawsuit in court to collect  



them.  But this arrangement would defeat the purpose of the nonjudicial foreclosure  



statute - avoiding expensive legal costs and alleviating congestion in the courts.  We  



reiterate that AS 34.20.070(b) and our decisions in Hagberg , Kuretich , and Albrecht  



                                           

allow for the inclusion of all reasonable foreclosure costs in a reinstatement amount.  It  



                                                                                                            

was  error  for  the  superior  court  to  grant  partial  summary  judgment  on  this  issue  to  



Bachmeier, and we reverse that decision.  



                                                                                                            

          B.	      The   UTPA   Does   Not   Apply   To   Alaska   Trustee's Nonjudicial  

                   Foreclosure Of Bachmeier's Deed Of Trust.  



                                                                            

                   Bachmeier argues that Alaska Trustee violated the UTPA by "deceptively  



padding her reinstatement amount."  Alaska Trustee counters that the UTPA does not  



          23       Hagberg v. Alaska Nat'l Bank , 585 P.2d 559, 562 (Alaska 1978).  



          24       Id. at 560.  



          25       Id. at 561-62.  



                                                             -9-                                                          6935  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

apply to nonjudicial foreclosures.  The superior court agreed with Bachmeier and granted  



partial summary judgment on the issue.  



                    For the past thirty years we have consistently held that "the sale of real  



                                                                                         26  

                                                                                             In State v. First National  

                                                                                                              

property is not within the regulatory scope of the [UTPA]." 



Bank of Anchorage , we held that the UTPA does not apply to "real property" because  

                                                                                               



"the Act is directed solely at regulating transactions involving products and services sold  

                                                                                                                

to consumers in the popular sense."27  

                                                           



                    In Barber v. National Bank of Alaska , we held that a home loan is not a  

                                     



good or a service.  In that case, the borrower stopped making payments on his loan and  

                                                                                                            



                                                                                28  

the  servicer  eventually  foreclosed  on  the  property.                             The  borrower  sued,  alleging  

                                                            

violations of the UTPA.29   The borrower argued that "the mortgage . . . was a 'good,' or  

                                        



alternatively,  that  the  mortgage  and  the  subsequent  servicing  arrangements  were  a  

provision of 'services.' "30  We held that the UTPA did not apply to the borrower's home  

                                                



                                                                                            31  

loan because a "loan . . . is not a 'good' under the [UTPA]."                                   Because the servicer's  



"principal business [was] not debt collection," the servicer was not an independent debt  

                                                                            



          26        State  v.  First  Nat'l Bank of Anchorage , 660 P.2d 406, 414 (Alaska 1982);  



see also Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., LLC , 249 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska  

2011).  



          27        660 P.2d at 413 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  



          28        815 P.2d 857, 859-60 (Alaska 1991).  



          29        Id . at 860.  



          30        Id . at 861.  



          31        Id .  



                                                              -10-                                                         6935
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                                                   32  

                                           

collector providing a service either.                  Accordingly, we held as a matter of law that the  



                                                           

loan  was  neither  a  good  nor  a  service  and  that  "the  [UTPA]  does  not  apply  to  .  .  .  

mortgage[s]."33  



                                                                                    

                   We reiterated our holding that the Act covers only "goods or services," not  



                                                                                                  34  

real property, in Aloha Lumber Corporation v. University of Alaska .                                  In  Western Star  



Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Services, Inc., we explained again that "sales and  



services  involving  real  estate  [are  distinct]  from  those  involving  other  property  and  



services"  and  that  "real  estate  transactions  were  not  intended  to  be  covered  by  the  



              35  

[UTPA]."           



                   In  2011 we held, once again, that the UTPA does not cover real estate  

                        



                  36  

transactions.         We noted that "the legislature responded to our holding in Barber and  



chose to include certain mortgage practices within the UTPA," but that "the legislature  



has not amended [the UTPA] to include real estate transactions . . . despite our clear  



statement in  Western Star Trucks that real estate transactions fall outside the UTPA's  

           37   We  rejected  the  argument  that  a  landlord  is  a  "provider  of  consumer  

scope."                                                                                                  



          32       Id .  



          33       Id .  



          34       994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999) (holding that the UTPA does not cover  



a timber sale).    



          35       101 P.3d 1047, 1048 (Alaska 2004).  



          36         Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs. , 249 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska  



2011).  



          37       Id . at 1062-63.  



                                                           -11-                                                      6935
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

              38 

                                

services,"        and  held  that  a  lease  is  more  akin  to  a  real  property  transaction  than  a  



           39  

service.       



                   Despite this abundance of precedent, Bachmeier contends that two recent  

                                                                                                            



                                                       40                         41 

amendments to the UTPA, one in 2004                       and one in 2007,   overturned our holding in  



Barber and extended the protections of the UTPA to some nonjudicial foreclosures.  But  

                                                                                                  



the 2007 amendment - which extended the UTPA's definition of an unfair practice to  

include violations of AS 06.60.340, the Mortgage Lending Regulation Act42 - does not  



                                  43  And the 2004 amendment, which defined goods or services  

apply to Alaska Trustee.                                                     



to include "goods or services provided in connection with . . . a transaction involving an  

                                                                       44 also does not help Bachmeier.  The  

indebtedness secured by the borrower's residence,"                                           



2004 amendment elaborated what types of goods and services are covered by the Act,  

                          



         38        Id . at 1062.  



         39        Id .  



         40        Ch. 55,  9, SLA 2004 (codified at AS 45.50.561(a)(9)).  



         41        Ch. 50,  8, SLA 2007 (codified at AS 45.50.471(b)(52)).  



         42        Id.  



         43        The  Mortgage  Lending  Regulation  Act  regulates  the  activities  of  "[a]  



person who is required to be licensed under this chapter and a person who is licensed  

under AS 06.20." AS 06.60.340.  The Act requires mortgage lenders, mortgage brokers,  

mortgage loan originators, loan processors, and certain loan underwriters to be licensed.  

                                                              

AS 06.60.010(a); AS 06.60.012(a); AS 060.60.013(a).  Alaska Statute 06.20, the Alaska  

                          

Small Loans Act, requires those issuing loans valued at $25,000 or less, and with an  

interest   rate   over   the   normal   statutory   limit,   to   apply   for   a   special   license.  

AS 06.20.010(a).  Alaska Trustee does not fall into either category, and the Act itself has  

no implication for non-judicial deed of trust foreclosures.  



         44        AS 45.50.561(a)(9); see also Ch. 55,  9, SLA 2004.  



                                                          -12-                                                    6935
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

but did not change the longstanding definition of goods and services itself - a definition  

                                                                               



that has never encompassed real property transactions.  



                                                                                                            

                   "When interpreting a statute, [we] look[] to three factors:  the language of  



                                                                                                                   45  

                                                                                                                       We  

the statute, the legislative history, and the legislative purpose behind the statute." 



have "rejected a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule," and adopted an  



                                                                                                            

approach where "the plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence  

of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be."46  



                                       

                   Notably, the 2004 amendment includes only "goods or services provided  



                                                                  

in connection with . . . a transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower's  

residence."47  Confirming UTPA coverage for "goods or services" transactions involving  



indebtedness secured by the borrower's residence does not eliminate the requirement that  



                                                                         48 

                                                                             And we have consistently defined  

the transaction must still be for "goods or services." 



          45        W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1050  



(Alaska 2004).  



          46       Id .  



          47       AS 45.50.561(a)(9) (emphasis added); see also Ch. 55,  9, SLA 2004.  



          48       The   2004   amendment   only   expanded   the   UTPA   to   cover   certain  



transactions involving "goods or services" that might otherwise be thought of as outside  

                                                

the scope of the UTPA because they include the use of residential property as security.  

                                                                       

The amendment makes clear that a "goods or services" transaction that involves an  

associated debt secured by a deed of trust covering the debtor's residence, i.e., using a  

                                                                                 

deed  of  trust  as  security  for  a  "goods  or  services"  transaction,  does  not  turn  the  

transaction into a real estate transaction outside the coverage of the UTPA.  



                                                           -13-                                                      6935
  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                                                                                                            49  

"goods  or  services"  as  excluding  transactions  involving  real  property.                                     Thus,  the  



amendment does not expand UTPA coverage to real property transactions.  



                                            

                    The legislative history does not lead us to conclude otherwise.  The 2004  



                                                             

amendment originated in House Bill 15, which was intended to establish a "no-call" list  



                 50  

for Alaska.          The original title for the Bill was:  



                                                                                       

                    An  Act  relating  to  establishing  the  Alaska  No-Call  list,  a  

                                                      

                    database of residential telephone customers who do not wish  

                    to receive telephone solicitations; requiring telephonic sellers  

                    and  paid  solicitors  to  purchase  the  database;  requiring  

                    telephonic sellers to identify themselves; requiring telephonic  

                    solicitors  who  are  otherwise  exempt  from  registration  as  

                    telephonic solicitors to file with the Department of Law and  

                                                                                            

                    pay the database access fee; and providing for an effective  

                           [51] 

                    date.  



                                                             

This draft did not contain the definition of goods and services now at issue. The only  



mention of home loans was in a sentence in the last paragraph of the sponsor statement:  



                                                                                      

"House Bill 15 will begin the process of eliminating those unsolicited phone calls asking  



                                                                                              52  

you about your mortgage rate or if you want aluminum siding."                                        



          49        Roberson  v.  Southwood  Manor  Assocs. ,  249  P.3d  1059,  1063  (Alaska  



2011);  W. Star Trucks, Inc., 101 P.3d at 1048; Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska,  

                                                                                                      

994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999); Barber v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska , 815 P.2d 857, 861  

                                                                              

(Alaska 1991); State v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 414 (Alaska 1982).  

                                                                                              



          50        Ch. 55, 10-24, 28-33, SLA 2004.  



          51        Rep.  Hugh  Fate,  Sponsor  Statement  for  H.B.  15,  23d  Leg.,  1st  Sess.,  



available at Alaska Leg. Microfiche Collection No. 2484-86.  



          52        Id .  



                                                             -14-                                                        6935
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                    The Bill was put on hold after Congress passed its national "do-not call"  



                 53  

legislation.         But in 2004 the Bill was revived in order to "complete the process for   



             54  

Alaska."         New House Bill 15 was written to "accomplish what the original version  



                                                                                                            55  

                                                                                                                The sponsor  

sought to do, without the need for Alaskans to sign up again in state."  



                 

statement  again touted a "quieter dinner hour for Alaskans" and stated that the Bill  

"sen[t] a clear message to telemarketers that these people do not wish to be called."56  



The new version of the Bill contained the goods and services definition.  



                                                                  

                    On March 1, 2004, the House Finance Committee changed the name of the  



                                                                    

Bill from the unwieldy designation quoted above to, "AN ACT relating to fair trade  



                                                                                                                   

practices  and  consumer  protection;  relating  to  telephonic  solicitations;  relating  to  

                                                                                           57  This unanimous change  

                                                                                                        

charitable solicitations; and providing for an effective date."  

was made with no discussion.58  



                                                                                     

                    The Bill was passed by the House and was transmitted to the Senate, where  



                                                                                          59  

                                                                                                 In  the  Senate  Labor  &  

it  was  considered  by  the  Labor  &  Commerce  Committee. 



Commerce Committee there was extensive discussion regarding whether the Bill would  

                                                                                                                    



          53        Do-Not-Call  Implementation  Act,  Pub.  L.  No.  108-10,  117  Stat.  557  



(2003);  Minutes,  H.  Finance  Comm.  Hearing  on  H.B.  15,  23d  Leg.,  2d  Sess.  

(Feb. 19, 2004) (opening remarks of Rep. Hugh Fate).  



          54        Rep. Hugh Fate, Sponsor Statement for CS for H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 2d Sess.,  



available at Alaska Leg. Microfiche Collection No. 11178-79.  



          55        Id .  



          56        Id . 
 



          57
       2004 House Journal 2791-92.
  



          58        Id .
  



          59
       2004 House Journal 2824-26, 2834; 2004 Senate Journal 2403.  



                                                              -15-                                                         6935
  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

apply to magazine subscriptions in cases where the customer placed the telephone call  

                                                                                                            



                         60  

to the magazine.             There was even testimony from the Magazine Publishers of America  

                                                                       



                                61  

on this narrow issue.                No other issues of consequence were discussed before the Bill  

                                                                                        



left the Senate Labor & Commerce Committee in April 2004.  After passing the Senate  

                                  



Judiciary and Finance Committees in May 2004 the Bill was promptly passed by the  

House and the Senate.62  



                     It is clear that the Alaska Legislature did not anticipate the argument that  



Bachmeier makes.  Nowhere in the committee minutes, committee files, or bill drafts is  

                                                                                                                     



there any discussion of goods and services or any discussion of the UTPA.  Critically,  

                                      



there was no discussion, or even the hint of a suggestion, that the amendments were  

                                                      



intended to include nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures in the UTPA.  In this situation  

                                                                                                                



the court must "guess what [the legislature] would have intended on a point not presented  

                                                                   

to its mind, if the point had been presented."63  



                     Amending the UTPA to include nonjudicial foreclosures would have been  

                                                                                                             



a significant and controversial change to existing law.  There would have been extensive  

                                                            

debate  reflected  in  the  committee  minutes;64  instead  there  was  a  brief  debate  about  

                                



          60         Minutes, Sen. Labor & Commerce Comm. Hearing on H.B. 15, 23d Leg.,               



2d Sess. (Mar. 25, 2004).  



          61        Id .  (testimony  of  Mr.  Robert  Flint,  Direct  Marketing  Association  and  



Magazine Publishers of America).  



          62         2004 Senate Journal 3632; 2004 House Journal 4249-50.  



          63  

                                                                                               

                    Beck v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 837 P.3d 105, 117 (Alaska  

1992) (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY ,  THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW , 173 (2d   

ed. 1972)).  



          64         Gillis v. Aleutians East Bor., 258 P.3d 118, 123 (Alaska 2011) (noting that  

                                                                                        

                                                                                                                 (continued...)  



                                                                -16-                                                          6935
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                                    65  

                                                                     

magazine subscriptions.                 There would have been testimony from banks, trustees, and  



                                                                 

homeowners; instead there was testimony from the Magazine Publishers of America,  



                                                                      

AARP (formerly the American Association of Retired Persons), and the Older Persons  



                      66  

Action Group.              



                    The purpose, sponsor statement, and sectional analysis of House Bill 15 do  

                                                                                                                   



not support Bachmeier's argument that the 2004 amendment expanded the UTPA to  



                          

cover real estate transactions, as well as transactions for goods and services.  At most,  



the legislative history and purpose evince an intent to bring telephonic solicitation of  



                                                                

mortgage origination under the purview of the UTPA.  Moreover, the plain language of  



                                                

the amendment, that the UTPA now covers "goods or services provided in connection  



                                                                                                                              67  

                                                                                             

with . . . a transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower's residence," 



does not eliminate the requirement that the transaction must still be one for goods or  

                                                                                                   



services.  We have consistently held that real property transactions are neither a good nor  

                                                                                                                     



          64(...continued)  



if  a  statutory  provision  were  intended  to  be  a  significant  change  in  legislative  land  

disposal policy "we would expect a more thorough legislative debate . . . and a much  

                                                                               

richer legislative history supporting [that] position").  



          65        Minutes, Sen. Labor & Commerce Comm. Hearing on H.B. 15, 23d Leg.,  

                                                                                                      

2d Sess. (Mar. 25, 2004).   



          66        Id .  (testimony  of  Mr.  Robert  Flint,  Direct  Marketing  Association  and  



Magazine Publishers of America); Minutes H. Labor & Commerce Comm. Hearing on  

H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 7, 2003) (statements of Rep. Hugh Fate and testimony  

                                                               

of Marie Darlin, Coordinator, Capital City Task Force, AARP; Rosalee Walker, Older  

                                                          

Persons Action Group; James Carroll, Juneau Retired Teachers Association, AARP; John  

Furuness,  Juneau  Chapter  Number  2088,  National  Association  of  Retired  Federal  

Employees, AARP).  



          67        Ch. 55,  9, SLA 2004 (emphasis added).  



                                                             -17-                                                        6935
  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

                                                                                                                   68 

                                                     

a service, and the 2004 amendment did not change that longstanding definition.                                         Thus,  



                                                                                                       

we hold that the 2004 amendment did not bring non-judicial deed of trust foreclosures  



                                                           

by trustee into the ambit of the UTPA.  Consequently, it was error for the superior court  



to grant Bachmeier partial summary judgment on this issue.  



V.        CONCLUSION  



                                                                                    

                    We REVERSE the superior court's rulings that AS 34.20.070(b) does not  



permit the beneficiary to include all foreclosure costs in the reinstatement amount and  



                                                                                                       

that the UTPA applies to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures.  We REMAND to the  



superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  



          68        Shea v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Ret. & Benefits, 267 P.3d 624, 636  



n.33 (Alaska 2011) (citing  Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936, 945 (Alaska 2006)) ("We  

                                                                                                             

assume the legislature is aware of the common law when it passes legislation."); see also  

                                              

Joseph v. State , 293 P.3d 488, 492 (Alaska App. 2012) ("[T]he legislature is presumed  

                                                                         

to be aware of pertinent court decisions when it amends a statute.") reh'g denied (Dec.  

                                                                                                    

31, 2012).  We said specifically in Barber v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska that "as a matter of  

                        

law . . . the [UTPA] does not apply to . . . mortgage[s]," 815 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska  

                                                                  

 1991),  and  the  legislature  gave  no  indication  in  the  2004  amendment  that  it  was  

intending to overrule Barber .  



                                                             -18-                                                       6935
  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

BOLGER, Justice, with whom FABE, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting in part.  



                                                             

                    I agree with the portion of the court's opinion that explains the foreclosure  



fees and costs that may be demanded by a beneficiary as a condition of reinstatement  



under AS 34.20.070(b).  But I respectfully disagree with the court's holding that the  



            

Unfair  Trade  Practices  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  (UTPA)  does  not  apply  to  



nonjudicial  foreclosures.    In  my  opinion,  the  plain  language  of  the  Act  covers  



transactions related to a debt secured by residential real estate.  



                                                                                                     

                    This dispute is focused on the definition of "goods or services" covered by  



                                                                             1  

the UTPA, which was added to the statute in 2004.   According to this definition,  



                                                                  

                    "goods or services" includes goods or services provided in  

                    connection  with  a  consumer  credit  transaction  or  with  a  

                    transaction   involving   an   indebtedness   secured   by   the  

                                                            [2] 

                    borrower's residence . . . .  



                                                    

                    When  we  interpret  a  statute,  we  begin  with  the  plain  meaning  of  its  



               3  

                                                      

language.   The legislative history of a statute can sometimes alter its literal terms, but  



                                                            

"the plainer the language of the statute, the more convincing contrary legislative history  



               4  

                  "Even if legislative history is 'somewhat contrary' to the plain meaning of  

must be."                                                                                                          



                                                           5  

a statute, plain meaning still controls."   And we will not rewrite a statute to promote  

                                                                                    



purposes espoused in the legislative history, even if we think the legislature made a  



          1         Ch. 55,  9, SLA 2004.
  



          2         AS 45.50.561(a)(9).
  



          3
         Ward v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 98 (Alaska 2012).  



          4         Id.  (citation omitted).  



          5         Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe , 295 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2013)           



(citation omitted).  



                                                              -19-                                                         6935
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

             6  

mistake.     Finally,  because  the  UTPA  is  a  remedial  statute,  its  language  should  be  

liberally construed.7  



                                                                                                                

                    It seems clear that a nonjudicial foreclosure is a "transaction involving an  



                                                                             8  

                                                                                Nevertheless, the court concludes  

indebtedness secured by the borrower's residence." 



that,  construed  in  light  of  the  legislative  history  and  our  precedents,  the  statutory  



definition of "goods or services" quoted above cannot mean what it says.  



                    In  reaching  this  conclusion,  the  court's  opinion  asserts  that  "we  have  



consistently  defined  'goods  and  services'  as  excluding  transactions  involving  real  



                                                                                                            

property."   And, because the amendment defines "goods or services" as " 'goods or  



                                                                                

services provided in connection with . . . a transaction involving an indebtedness secured  



by the borrower's residence,' " the court assumes that the legislature's new definition  



incorporates  the  definition  of  "goods  or  services"  established  in  our  earlier  UTPA  



decisions.         The  court  therefore  concludes  that,  although  "[t]he  2004  amendment  



                                                                                             

elaborated what types of goods or services are covered by the act, [it] did not change the  



                                                                                  

longstanding  definition  of  goods  or  services  itself  -  a  definition  that  has  never  



encompassed real property transactions."  



                                                                                                                      

                    But that conclusion misconstrues our precedents. We have never held that,  



                                   

as a matter of English usage, "goods or services" cannot include services provided in  



          6         See State, Dep't of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev. v. Alyeska Pipeline   



Serv. Co., 262 P.3d 593, 598 (Alaska 2011);                        Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v.  

Kritz , 170 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska 2007) ("[T]he extent to which the express language of   

the provision can be altered and departed from and the extent to which the infirmities can  

be  rectified  by  the  use  of  implied  terms  is  limited  by  the  constitutionally  decreed  

                                                                                       

separation of powers which prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting  

defective statutes." (citations omitted)).  



          7 

                                                                                                      

                    State v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 412 (Alaska 1982).  



          8  

                    AS 45.50.561(a)(9).  



                                                              -20-                                                         6935
  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                                                                                                    

connection with real estate transactions.  Rather, in First National Bank of Anchorage ,  



                                 

the case in which this question was first presented, we concluded that the UTPA did not  



cover real estate transactions because its list of "unfair methods of competition" and  



"deceptive  acts  or  practices"  did  not  mention  real  property,  "[n]or  [did]  any  other  



provisions of the Act suggest that the legislature intended the sale of real property to  



                                                 9  

come within the Act's purview."   And each of the other decisions the court's opinion  



                                                                               10  

                                                                                   

cites merely followed First National Bank 's holding. 



                    But when the legislature amended the definition of "goods or services" in  



                                                       

2004, it included within the scope of the UTPA one type of real property transaction not  



                                                                                                            

previously covered:  "a transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower's  



                                                                                                           

residence."  Therefore, the reasoning behind  First National Bank  -  that "goods or  



                         

services" do not include real property transactions because the Act does not mention real  

             11  -  does  not  apply  to  the  statute  as  amended.    Similarly,  in  Roberson  v.  

property     



Southwood Manor Associates, LLC, we recognized that, through a 2007 revision to the  

                                                                                                    



Act, "the legislature responded to our holding in Barber  and chose to include certain  

mortgage practices within the UTPA."12  



          9         660 P.2d at 412-13.  



          10        See Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., LLC                              , 249 P.3d 1059, 1061  



(Alaska 2011) (citing First Nat'l Bank                       of Anchorage , 660 P.2d at 412-13); W. Star  

Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc.                   , 101 P.3d 1047, 1051 (Alaska 2004) (citing  

First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage , 660 P.2d at 412); Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska,  

994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage , 660 P.2d at  

                                                                        

412);  Barber v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska , 815 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska 1991) (citing First  

                                                                          

Nat'l Bank of Anchorage , 660 P.2d at 413);  



          11        First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage , 660 P.2d at 412-13.  



          12        249 P.3d at 1062-63.  



                                                             -21-                                                        6935
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

                    The court's opinion also argues that Roberson , which was published seven  



                  

years after the 2004 amendment, confirms that "the legislature has not amended [the  



                                              

UTPA]  to  include  real  estate  transactions."    But  because  the  transaction  at  issue  in  



                                                                              

Roberson - a lease - is clearly not "a transaction involving an indebtedness secured  



by  the  borrower's  residence,"  the  parties  did  not  raise,  and  we  had  no  occasion  to  

consider, the effect of the 2004 amendment.13  



                    Nor  does  the  legislative  history  support  the  court's  construction  of  the  



amendment.    Evidence  of  legislative  intent  would  have  to  be  quite  convincing  to  



overcome the unambiguous language of this statute, and the legislative history the court  



cites does not satisfy that significant burden.  



                    Although the bill that added this definition of "goods or services" did, in  

                                                   14  there was nothing in the language of the bill that  

                                                                                                               

part, target telephone solicitation, 



reflected an intent to limit "goods or services provided in connection with" mortgage  



                                                                                                            

transactions to services provided over the telephone.  If the legislature had wanted to  



                                                                                         

affect only telephone solicitation, it could have added a new section to AS 45.50.471(b),  



                                                                                                         

which defines violations, rather than modifying the definitions section. Or the legislature  



                                                                                                         

could  have  added  language  to  the  definition  itself  to  clarify  that  it  applies  only  to  



                                                                                    

telephone solicitations.  But the amendment contains no such limitation, and we should  



not assume that the legislature failed to include one by mistake.  



                                                                             

                    The court also notes that the sectional analysis for the 2004 bill states that  



                                            

the new definition of "goods or services" "includes solicitations by credit organizations  



          13        See id. at 1060-63.  



          14        See Ch. 55, 10-24, 28-33, SLA 2004.  



                                                             -22-                                                           6935  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

                                                                 15  

 offering  financing  arra[nge]ments."                                 Although  this  language  recognizes  that  the  



                                                                                                            

 amendment includes certain telephonic solicitations, it does not suggest that the new  



                                                                       16  

                                                                                                           

 definition is limited to such solicitations.                               If the legislature had intended the meaning  



                                                                                       

 suggested by the court, it could have specifically stated that the definition applies only  



                                         

to "services related to the solicitation of mortgage loans."  In context, it seems more  



 likely that the sectional analysis was intended to clarify that the definition was intended  



to cover "goods or services" that were merely solicited in addition to those that were  

 actually provided.17  



                        The draft opinion also relies on the fact that the bill's sponsor statements  



                                                                                          18  

                                                                                              Although "statements made by a  

 focused on the need to limit telephone solicitations. 



bill's sponsor during legislative deliberations are relevant evidence when the court is  

trying to determine legislative intent,"19 "[t]he remarks of a single legislator, even the  



            15          Rep. Hugh Fate, Sectional Analysis of Proposed H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 2d     



 Sess., at 2 (Feb. 24, 2004).  



            16          See AS 01.10.040(b) ("When the words 'includes' or 'including' are used  

                 

 in a law, they shall be construed as though followed by the phrase 'but not limited      

                          

to.' ").  



            17  

                        See AS 45.50.561(a)(9) (" 'goods or services' includes goods or services  

provided in connection with a consumer credit transaction or with a transaction involving  

 an indebtedness secured by the borrower's residence." (emphasis added)).  



            18  

                                                                                                                                                 

                        See Rep. Hugh Fate, Sponsor Statement, H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan  

                                                                                               

 21, 2003); Rep. Hugh Fate, Sponsor Statement, H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 24,  

 2004).  



            19  

                                                                                                           

                       Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz , 170 P.3d 183, 193 (Alaska  

 2007) (citations and alterations omitted).  



                                                                        -23-                                                                  6935
  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history."20  Therefore, we should not  

                                                                                                                



assume that isolated assertions by the bill sponsor accurately represent the intent of the  

                                                                                                             



entire legislature or the purpose of the entire bill.  



                                                                        

                    It is also worth noting that, when the new definition of "goods or services"  



                                  

was added to the bill, its title was amended to include "fair trade practices and consumer  



                  21  

                       This amended title confirms that the focus of the bill had expanded with  

protection."                                                                   



the addition of the new language.  



                    Finally,  my  construction  of  this  definition  is  consistent  with  other  



                                   

authorities suggesting that the UTPA covers the debt collection practices at issue in this  



                                                                                                                   

case.  When we interpret the UTPA, we are required to give great weight to the cases  

                                                                         22  which includes violations of the Fair  

                                                                                                                     

interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act, 



                                                  23  

Debt  Collection  Practices  Act.                       Other  courts  have  recognized  that  nonjudicial  



foreclosure services are among the debt collection services encompassed by these federal  



             24  

statutes.          So  the  case  law  construing  these  federal  statutes  is  consistent  with    the  

                                                                                                                      



legislative amendment to the definition of "goods or services" in 2004.  The UTPA  

                                                                                



applies to debt collection services "involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower's  

                                                                                              



residence," services that include a nonjudicial foreclosure.  



          20         Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979).  



          21        H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 24, 2004).  



          22        AS 45.50.545; ASRC Energy Servs. Power and Commc'ns, LLC v. Golden   



 Valley Electric Ass'n, Inc., 267 P.3d 1151, 1158-59 (Alaska 2011).  



          23        State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc ., 609 P.2d 520, 529-30 (Alaska 1980).  



          24         Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461-63 (6th Cir. 2013);  



 Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, PLLC, 443 F.3d 373, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2006); Shapiro &  

                                                                                             

Meinhold v. Zartman , 823 P.2d 120, 124 (Colo. 1992).  



                                                               -24-                                                         6935
  


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

                   In summary, there is nothing in the legislative history that discusses the  



meaning  of  "goods  or  services"  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  the  language  of  



                                

AS 45.50.561(a)(9).  Therefore, there is no evidence of a contrary legislative intent that  



                               

should  override  the  plain  meaning  of  this  statutory  definition.    I  would  hold  that  



nonjudicial foreclosures are covered by the plain language of the UTPA.  



                                                           -25-                                                      6935
  

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