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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Jackson v. Sey (12/27/2013) sp-6860

Jackson v. Sey (12/27/2013) sp-6860

         Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC  REPORTER .  

         Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

         303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, e-mail  


WILLIE K. JACKSON,                                       )  

                                                         )    Supreme Court No. S-14496  

                          Appellant,                     )  

                                                         )    Superior Court No. 3AN-08-04884 CI  

         v.                                              )  

                                                         )   O P I N I O N  

AMIE SEY,                                                )  

                                                         )   No. 6860 - December 27, 2013  

                          Appellee.                      )  


                  Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third  


                  Judicial District, Anchorage, Peter M. Michalski, Judge.  

                  Appearances: Willie Jackson, Seagoville, Texas, pro se.  No  

                  appearance by Appellee.  

                  Before:  Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and  


                  Bolger, Justices.   

                  MAASSEN, Justice.  


                  In 2008 the superior court granted a default divorce to Amie Sey after her  


husband Willie Jackson, who was incarcerated at the time, failed to appear telephonically  


at a hearing.  Jackson filed a motion for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule  

60(b), arguing that Sey had made misrepresentations and withheld information about  

marital property.  The court allowed Jackson to conduct discovery in support of the  

motion, but it later dismissed the motion for lack of prosecution under Alaska Civil Rule  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------



41(e).  The court  also determined that the time to appeal or to request Rule 60(b) relief  

was  long  past.    Jackson  appeals  this  dismissal  and  raises  several  challenges  to  the  

underlying divorce decree. We reverse the dismissal of Jackson's Rule 60(b) motion and  


remand for consideration of its merits.  


                    Willie Jackson was incarcerated soon after he and Amie Sey married in  


2003.  Sey filed for divorce in February 2008.1  

                                                                        In his answer, Jackson contested Sey's  


description of the marital property, and he asserted that she had "probably obscured"  


property that should have been part of the marital estate.  He also informed the superior  

court that he was incarcerated in federal prison in California.  

                    After Jackson failed to appear telephonically at a trial-setting conference,  

the court scheduled another hearing for May 29, 2008.  Although the court sent notice,  


Jackson alleges on appeal that he did not receive it, and he did not appear at that hearing  


either.  The calendaring order had described the hearing as a settlement conference, but  


the  court  heard  testimony  from  Sey  and  then  granted  a  default  divorce.    The  court  

interpreted Jackson's answer to the complaint as indicating that he did not disagree with  


Sey's description of the marital property, and the judge informed Sey that Jackson could  


take action later if he wished to contest the property's disposition.  

                    The day after the hearing, on May 30, the court received two motions from  


Jackson dated three days before.  The first motion was a request that Jackson be allowed  


to participate telephonically in any future hearings.  The second was a request that the  

court compel disclosure of information about a Key Bank account that Jackson believed  


          1         Both Jackson and Sey acted pro se throughout the proceedings.


                                                            -2-                                                            6860

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Sey held, as well as her employment information and tax returns.  A court clerk found  


the filings deficient and returned them both to Jackson.   

                    The court issued its written divorce decree on June 9, 2008.  The decree  


stated  that  "[b]ecause  Mr.  Jackson  did  not  .  .  .  make  arrangements  to  appear  


telephonically, or for a continuance, the court defaulted him and heard the matter."  The  


court established the date of separation as "sometime after Mr. Jackson was arrested" and  


found there was no marital property to be divided.  

                    On  June  18,  2008,  Jackson  requested  an  extension  of  time  to  file  the  

motions that had been returned due to procedural deficiencies.  The court denied the  


request for extension on grounds that the divorce had already been granted.  The court  

notified Jackson, however, that "[i]f the defendant believes that the property division  


needs to be further considered, application may be made pursuant to Civil Rule 60."  

                    Jackson accordingly filed a Rule 60(b) motion in August 2008, claiming  

that Sey  had made both unintended and fraudulent misrepresentations during the divorce  


trial.  The court held a hearing on this motion in December 2008, and Jackson appeared  

telephonically.  The court directed Sey to provide the requested financial information.  

The court also gave Jackson 20 days to look over this information and to file a proposed  


order either withdrawing the Rule 60(b) motion or setting out the precise modification  

to the divorce decree that he was requesting.  

                    Sey provided the financial information Jackson requested.  In January 2009,  

Jackson moved for expanded discovery in order to determine whether Sey had dissipated  


any marital property during the separation period.  Jackson also asked that Sey pay for  


the  production  of  these  documents.    The  court  denied  the  request  that  Sey  pay  for  


production and stated that "[t]he remainder of the motion is, with all due respect, unclear  

and  denied  without  prejudice."    Jackson  next  made  what  he  termed  a  "motion  in  


                                                           -3-                                                          6860

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clarification,"  in  which  he  attempted  to  explain  to  the  court why  he  was  asking  for  


expanded discovery.  He asserted that the financial documents disclosed by Sey did not  

provide details about transfers; such information would, he argued, help him discern  

whether Sey had other bank accounts, such as with Key Bank.  The court treated the  

motion in clarification as a motion for reconsideration and denied it in June 2009.  

                    Jackson next pursued discovery directly from Key Bank, which informed  

him that it would not release any information without a court order.  Following several  


additional communications between the court and Jackson, the court granted Jackson  


access to Sey's bank records.  

                    The record reveals no further filings or correspondence from Jackson to the  


court over the course of the next year.  On February 4, 2011, the court issued a notice of  


dismissal for lack of prosecution pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 41(e)(1)(A).2  



responded by filing what he termed a motion for partial summary judgment.  He asked  

that the court award him judgment in the amount of $14,750 based on the information  

he had received about Sey's car, tax return, and credit union bank account.  He claimed  


that he sent Sey a letter on March 8, 2010, requesting that she give a deposition on  


written interrogatories, but that she never responded.  

                    The court denied Jackson's motion and closed the  case, reasoning that  


"[t]he burden  is  on  the  defendant to show that the judgment of the court should be  


reversed.  The time for appeal would appear to have run long ago.  The period for relief  


          2         The rule provides: "The court on its own motion or on motion of a party to  


the action may dismiss a case for want of prosecution if . . . the case has been pending  


for more than one year without any proceedings having been taken."   

                                                           -4-                                                              6860  

----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

from  judgment  [pursuant  to  Civil  Rule  60(b)(6)]  seems  similarly  to  be  long  past."3  

Jackson  moved  for  reconsideration,  pointing  out  that  he  had  not  participated  in  the  

divorce trial and that the court had afterwards allowed him  to  conduct discovery in  


support of his Rule 60(b) motion.  After the court denied the motion for reconsideration,  


Jackson filed another motion, termed "motion to recall the mandate" (in essence another  


request for reconsideration), asking the court to reopen the case for consideration of his  


post-trial discovery.  The court denied the motion, stating that "[t]he motion for partial  


summary judgment did not establish good cause for lack of prosecution, thus the case  

was properly dismissed."   

                    Jackson appeals, challenging the Rule 41(e) dismissal, the court's finding  


that his Rule 60(b) motion was untimely, and several aspects of the underlying divorce  


decree.  He also asks that the divorce decree be vacated.  Sey does not participate in this  




                    We  review  de  novo  a  superior  court's  interpretation  of  court  rules,  


exercising our independent judgment.4  

                                                             "Under the independent judgment standard we  



adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy." 

          3         The court's reference to Rule 60(b)(6) appears to be mistaken, as the focus                         

of Jackson's motion shows that it was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3).  

          4         Shea v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Ret. & Benefits, 204 P.3d 1023, 1026  

(Alaska 2009).  

          5         Id. (footnotes omitted).  

                                                             -5-                                                            6860

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          A.	       It Was Error Not To Consider Jackson's Rule 60(b) Motion On The  



                    Jackson challenges the superior court's refusal to consider the merits of his  


Rule 60(b) motion. The court dismissed the motion pursuant to  Rule 41(e)(1) for failure  

to prosecute, finding in addition that the motion was barred because of the passage of  

time since the entry of judgment.  We conclude that the superior court erred on both  



                    Rule 41(e)(1) and (3), read together, provide that "[t]he court on its own  


motion . . . may dismiss a case for want of prosecution if . . . the case has been pending  


for more than one year without any proceedings having been taken"6 and "good cause  



to the contrary is not shown. . . ."   We do not believe that a post-judgment Rule 60(b)  


motion, like the one at issue here, is itself a pending "case" that is subject to dismissal  


under Rule 41(e).  Jackson's motion was filed in a divorce case that had been concluded  


by the entry of final judgment; the motion sought, unsuccessfully, to reopen that closed  

case.  At the time of the Rule 41(e) dismissal, there was no pending case to which Rule  

41(e) could apply.  

                    The court's secondary conclusion that Jackson's Rule 60(b) motion was  

time barred also does not justify the court's failure to consider the motion on the merits.  


Motions  like  Jackson's  that  are  made  pursuant  to  Rule  60(b)(3)  -  alleging  fraud,  

misrepresentation, or "other misconduct of an adverse party" - must be brought within  


          6         Alaska R. Civ. P. 41(e)(1).  

          7         Alaska R. Civ. P. 41(e)(3).  

                                                           -6-                                                             6860  

----------------------- Page 7-----------------------



a year of the challenged judgment or order.   Jackson filed his original Rule 60(b) motion  

in August 2008, just two months after entry of the final divorce decree and thus clearly  

within the time allowed.  At the December 2008 hearing the superior court appeared to  


accept the Rule 60(b) motion, though giving Jackson an opportunity to withdraw or  


clarify it within 20 days of receiving Sey's discovery.  Jackson responded by pursuing  


further discovery instead.  While some of Jackson's discovery efforts were misdirected,  


the  superior  court  did  appear  to  authorize  this  course,  particularly  when  it  granted  

Jackson's later request for direct access to Sey's bank records.  By allowing additional  


discovery  without  imposing  any  new  deadlines  for  Jackson's  supplementation  or  

clarification  of  his  pending  Rule  60(b)  motion,  the  court  left  him  without  a  clear  

timetable for the motion's consideration and decision.9  

                                                                                                   Jackson also had no apparent  


reason to believe that the 60(b) motion, whether adequately supported or not, had not  


been timely filed.  Having authorized Jackson's pursuit of additional discovery on the  

motion,  the  superior  court  should  have  imposed  a  new  deadline  for  Jackson  to  

supplement or clarify his motion in light of that discovery, then decided the motion on  

its merits.  It was error to dismiss the motion as untimely on this record.  

            B.	        Jackson's Argument That The Divorce Decree Is Void Must First Be  

                       Addressed To The Superior Court.  

                       Jackson asks this court to hold that the divorce decree is void because of  


his lack of participation in the May 29, 2008 evidentiary hearing, pointing to his alleged  


lack of notice and his request for telephonic participation (received by the court the day  

            8          Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b).  

            9          See Mitchell v. Teck Cominco Alaska Inc., 193 P.3d 751, 758-60 (Alaska                                

2008) (holding that superior court erred in granting summary judgment without ruling       

on  the  other  party's  timely  filed  Rule  56(f)  request  for  additional  time  to  conduct  


                                                                      -7-	                                                                     6860

----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

after  the  hearing).          Civil  Rule  60(b)(4)  allows  for  relief  from  judgment  where  the  


underlying judgment is void.  A movant may argue that a judgment is void based on the  


court's  lack  of  personal  jurisdiction  or  a  denial  of  due  process.10  

                                                                                                       Unlike  the  other  

subsections of Rule  60(b), Rule 60(b)(4) has no time limit.11  

                                                                                              Jackson's Rule 60(b)  

motion, however, did not seek to void the judgment due to his lack of participation, and  


we do not interpret any of his other filings in the superior court as articulating such a  


request.  Although Jackson does not appear to be time barred from bringing another Rule  


60(b) motion  pursuant to subsection (4), such a motion must be brought first in the  


superior court.12  

                          We do not consider it here, nor do we express any view of its merit.  

          C.        Jackson Failed To Timely Appeal The Underlying Divorce Decree.  

                    Jackson raises other arguments that we read as direct attacks on the June  


2008 divorce decree, such as that the superior court erred in defaulting him and that it  


erred in its determination of the date the parties separated.  These arguments, however,  

are in the nature of an appeal from the decree, and as such they are untimely.  

                    A divorce decree is a final and appealable order.13  

                                                                                             A notice of appeal must  



be filed within thirty days of the judgment that is being appealed.                             Jackson filed a notice  


of appeal in July 2011.  Although this immediately followed the superior court's denial  

          10       Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co. , 520 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1974).  

          11       Kennecorp Mortg. & Equities v. First Nat. Bank of Fairbanks , 685 P.2d  

1232, 1236 (Alaska 1984) (quoting 11 WRIGHT &  A.  MILLER ,  FEDERAL PRACTICE AND  

PROCEDURE   2862, at 197 (1973)).  

          12        See Juelfs v. Gough, 41 P.3d 593, 598 (Alaska 2002) (holding that party           

was not entitled to raise grounds for Rule 60(b) relief for the first time on appeal).  

          13       Husseini v. Husseini , 230 P.3d 682, 686 (Alaska 2010).  

          14        Alaska R. App. P. 204(a)(1).  

                                                           -8-                                                          6860

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of Jackson's request for reconsideration of the Rule 41(e) dismissal of his pending Rule  

60(b) motion, Jackson asserted that the appeal also concerned his "denial of participation  


in hearing of May 29, 2008."  Jackson submitted another, more detailed notice of appeal  


and statement of points on appeal in October 2011.  These notices of appeal were filed  


over three years after the divorce decree was entered, long after the 30-day deadline for  


filing an appeal had passed.  

                    Alaska  Appellate  Rule  521  provides  that  the  appellate  rules  "may  be  


relaxed or dispensed with by the appellate courts where a strict adherence to them will  


work surprise or injustice."  The considerations that should be weighed in determining  


whether to relax the rules include "the right to appellate review, the willfulness and  


extent of the rules violation and the possible injustice that might result from dismissal."15  


Jackson initially chose to address his grievances solely through the Rule 60(b) process.  


Over three years passed between entry of the decree and Jackson's first notice of appeal.  

We conclude that the deadline for appeal should not be relaxed in this case.  

V.        CONCLUSION  


                    We REVERSE the superior court's dismissal of Jackson's Civil Rule 60(b)  


motion and REMAND for consideration of the motion in accordance with this opinion.  

          15        Smith's Estate v. State, 635 P.2d 465, 467 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Ballard  


v. Stich, 628 P.2d 918, 921 (Alaska 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

                                                             -9-                                                               6860  

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