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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. In the Matter of Tracy C. (4/22/2011) sp-6555
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303
K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
In the Matter of the Necessity ) Supreme Court No. S-13719
for the Hospitalization of )
) Superior Court No. 3AN-09-01389 PR
TRACY C. )
) O P I N I O N
)
) No. 6555 - April 22, 2011
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, Stephanie E. Joannides, Judge.
Appearances: Douglas Moody, Assistant Public Defender,
and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for
Tracy C. Megan R. Webb, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, and Daniel S. Sullivan, Attorney General, Juneau,
for Alaska Psychiatric Institute.
Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Christen, and
Stowers, Justices.
FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tracy C. was committed involuntarily for 30 days to the Alaska Psychiatric
Institute (API).1 She appeals the commitment order, arguing that because her condition
had stabilized as a result of treatment between the time of her admission to API and her
commitment hearing, it was error for the superior court to find that she was gravely
1 Pseudonyms have been used to protect the privacy of the parties.
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
disabled. Although Tracy's claim is moot, the public interest exception applies because
Tracy raises a question of statutory interpretation that would benefit from resolution. We
conclude (1) that an order granting a petition for involuntary commitment must be based
on the patient's condition at the time of the commitment hearing rather than at the time
of the patient's admission to the treatment facility; (2) that in determining the patient's
condition at the time of the commitment hearing the trial court can consider the patient's
recent conduct and conditions as well as the patient's symptoms at the time of the
hearing; and (3) that the superior court correctly applied the involuntary commitment
statute in this case. We thus affirm the order of the superior court granting the petition
for Tracy's 30-day involuntary commitment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On October 22, 2009, Tracy's husband filed a petition to initiate involuntary
commitment proceedings against Tracy. Tracy's husband stated in the petition that his
wife had been diagnosed with "psychotic disorder not otherwise specified" and that her
refusal to take medication for this disorder was leading to increasingly erratic and
dangerous behavior. Among other allegations, he reported that Tracy had been fired
from her job; was spending large sums of money erratically; was leaving the house
during the middle of the night; was making repeated phone calls to 911 and federal
government agencies alleging that she was being watched; and was claiming that her
doctors and husband were trying to poison her.
On October 23, in response to the petition, the superior court ordered that
Tracy be taken to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) and that API conduct a screening
evaluation of Tracy and report its findings to the court within 48 hours. Later that day
Dr. Dan Muschevici, a psychiatrist at API, filed a petition for 30-day commitment after
evaluating Tracy. The petition stated that Tracy was gravely disabled and likely to cause
harm to herself or others, and that there was not a less restrictive treatment alternative
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that would be adequate. Where the petition asked for "facts and specific behavior"
supporting these allegations, Dr. Muschevici wrote that Tracy had a history of bipolar I
disorder and had been hospitalized at API three times in the previous month. He went
on to explain that Tracy had previously refused treatment, that she was having "a new
manic and psychotic episode" with "disorganized behavior" and "impaired judgment,"
that she could not care for herself, and that she "need[ed] inpatient stabilization." The
superior court scheduled a commitment hearing for October 27 and appointed the Alaska
Public Defender Agency to represent Tracy.
At the hearing on October 27, a probate master heard testimony from
Dr. Muschevici, as well as Tracy's husband and Tracy herself. On direct examination,
Dr. Muschevici testified that he had diagnosed Tracy with "[b]ipolar I disorder: [m]ost
recent episode manic, severe with psychotic features" and that this diagnosis qualifies as
a mental illness.2 Dr. Muschevici noted that the October 23 hospitalization was Tracy's
third admission to API in the past month, that he had evaluated her on all three occasions,
and that Tracy was experiencing a manic episode of bipolar I disorder. Dr. Muschevici
described the symptoms that led to his conclusion, including Tracy's agitation; her
conduct of speaking in a rambling and tangential manner and laughing inappropriately;
her impaired judgment; and her paranoid delusions about her family, her former
employer, and her doctors. Dr. Muschevici noted that upon this admission, unlike her
other admissions to API, Tracy agreed that she needed treatment for her bipolar disorder.
Dr. Muschevici also testified that he believed Tracy posed a risk of harm
to herself because she was disconnected from reality and could easily be exploited or
harmed by others. He clarified that he did not believe that Tracy was suicidal or that she
posed a risk to others. He noted that although Tracy had improved since beginning
2 Dr. Muschevici also diagnosed Tracy with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder.
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treatment upon her admission to API, he believed that she was still gravely disabled. He
explained that when Tracy was admitted "[s]he was not able at that time to take care of
herself. She was not able to socialize appropriately to have a normal family life, personal
life," and that this would inhibit her ability to survive safely in the community.
Dr. Muschevici further testified that Tracy had refused medication during her past two
admissions at API, that without medication she "cannot function appropriately," and that
given her acute state there was not a less restrictive treatment alternative than her current
psychiatric medication.
On cross-examination, Tracy's attorney pressed Dr. Muschevici on whether
Tracy was still exhibiting the psychotic symptoms that Dr. Muschevici had observed on
the day of the initial evaluation. Dr. Muschevici agreed that on the day of the hearing
and the previous day, he had not observed symptoms of paranoid delusion in Tracy and
that she was improving. He stressed, however, that he still considered Tracy to be in an
acute state and that she did not fully understand her need for treatment. Although
Dr. Muschevici conceded that Tracy could receive psychotherapy and medication outside
of API, he maintained that outpatient therapy was not a good option "at an acute state."
Dr. Muschevici further testified that Tracy was cooperating with treatment, socializing,
sleeping, and eating better since her admission to API, but said that he believed Tracy
should stay at API because her "acute condition could relapse any time" and without
medication in "one, two days she could be back [i]n the same psychotic condition."
On redirect, Dr. Muschevici clarified that although Tracy's symptoms on
the day of the hearing were only "hypomanic," he still considered her to be in an "acute
state" because she had presented manic symptoms only days before. He testified that he
believed Tracy was "still . . . in need [of] therapy for acute psychotic manic symptoms"
and that without medication, he would expect Tracy to return to API with psychotic
symptoms within a week.
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Tracy's husband also testified, recounting the same events that he had
detailed in his petition to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings. He reported,
among other things, that in the previous week Tracy had left the house in the middle of
the night, had smashed a sliding glass door when she locked herself out of the house, had
accused her husband of trying to poison her, and had refused to take medication.
Tracy testified on her own behalf. Tracy admitted that she had been
suffering from paranoia when she was admitted to API the previous Friday, but promised
that she would continue to take medication and see a psychiatrist if she left API. But
Tracy's testimony also demonstrated that her thought process was still somewhat
paranoid and disjointed. For instance, Tracy explained that she had been admitted to API
because her husband "basically needed the house alone for the weekend"; that she had
smashed the glass door because her husband "or someone else in my best interest had
hidden all of my keys, drained my gas so many times"; and that API "is a free hotel, an
excellent place to visit, great food and an amazing amount of geniuses that are inmates
along with me."
In closing, Tracy's attorney argued that Tracy's condition had stabilized
since her admission and that, based on her symptoms on the day of the hearing, API
could not show by clear and convincing evidence that Tracy was either gravely disabled
or likely to cause harm to herself or others.
The master issued oral findings and a recommendation based primarily on
the testimony of Dr. Muschevici. The master first made a finding that Tracy was
suffering from mental illness in the form of bipolar I disorder. The master also found that
although Tracy did not present a risk of harm to herself or others, she was gravely
disabled, basing his finding on Dr. Muschevici's testimony that despite some
improvement, Tracy's condition remained acute and her judgment remained impaired.
The master also stated that Dr. Muschevici testified that Tracy was "very psychotic, very
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----------------------- Page 6-----------------------
manic" on the day of the hearing. The master concluded that although Tracy had
improved, she had not stabilized, and that there was no less restrictive treatment because
"the doctor says that if [Tracy] is discharged in her current acute state that she would be
re-hospitalized shortly." The master recommended that the commitment petition be
granted.
When Tracy's attorney questioned whether Dr. Muschevici had testified
that Tracy was psychotic and manic on the day of the hearing, the master responded that
he would put his findings in writing so that Tracy could file written objections. The
master's written findings stated:
Dr. Muschevici diagnosed the respondent as suffering
bipolar I disorder, most recent episode manic, severe, with
psychotic features. The doctor said he observed consistent
symptoms including manic, pressured and agitated speech
and behavior. He said the respondent has problems
expressing herself, exhibits mood swings and laughs
inappropriately. He said respondent's psychotic symptoms
include paranoid delusions regarding spouse, family and job.
He said respondent's thinking is impaired and is rambling,
tangential and disassociated.
The respondent is not currently a risk of harm to self
or others as there was no evidence of volitional suicidal or
assaultive behavior or threats of harm by the respondent since
her admission.
There is clear and convincing evidence the respondent
is gravely disabled as [Tracy] is currently in a condition
where, as a result of her manic and psychotic symptoms and
behavior as per the doctor's description, she will continue to
suffer emotional, mental and physical distress which
significantly impairs her judgment and causes a substantial
deterioration of her previous ability to function
independently. The doctor testified that the respondent has
improved since her admission and several days of treatment
but said that she is not yet stable or has adequate judgment to
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----------------------- Page 7-----------------------
maintain herself and function safely in a free environment.
The doctor said the respondent's condition is still acute and
her thinking is impaired.
There is not a less restrictive treatment option until the
respondent's condition is improved so her thinking is less
impaired and she is able to utilize outpatient mental health
services and maintain herself safely. The doctor said that if
[Tracy] is discharged without further treatment she would be
rehospitalized shortly as has been the case with her prior
admissions in the last month.
Tracy filed written objections, objecting primarily to all findings that
Tracy's "current condition" included "manic and psychotic symptoms" and that Tracy
would be "rehospitalized shortly" if discharged without further treatment. After
reviewing Tracy's objections, the superior court signed the proposed findings. Tracy
filed this appeal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review factual findings in involuntary commitment proceedings for
clear error and will reverse only if a review of the record leaves us with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.3 We "will grant especially great deference
when the trial court's factual findings require weighing the credibility of witnesses and
conflicting oral testimony."4 Whether factual findings comport with the requirements of
the involuntary commitment statute is a legal issue that we review de novo.5 We apply
our independent judgment to the interpretation of Alaska statutes6 and will interpret
3 Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 375 (Alaska 2007).
4 Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 178 (Alaska 2009).
5 Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 375.
6 Holderness v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 24 P.3d 1235, 1237 (Alaska
-7- 6555
----------------------- Page 8-----------------------
statutes "according to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into account the
plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as the intent of the drafters."7 "We apply
our independent judgment to issues of mootness because as a matter of judicial policy,
mootness is a question of law."8
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Tracy's Appeal Falls Within The Public Interest Exception To The
Mootness Doctrine.
API urges us to dismiss Tracy's appeal as moot. API points out that the
30-day term of Tracy's commitment has long since passed and argues that her appeal
does not fall under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Tracy
responds that the public interest exception applies because her appeal presents a question
of statutory interpretation and that, in the alternative, we should adopt a collateral
consequences exception to mootness for appeals from involuntary commitment orders.
We have held that "[a] claim is moot if it is no longer a present, live
controversy, and the party bringing the action would not be entitled to relief, even if it
prevails."9 Under this standard Tracy's appeal is moot because the commitment order
is no longer in effect and a ruling in her favor would not result in her release. We will,
however, consider the merits of a claim that would otherwise be moot if the claim falls
6(...continued)
2001).
7 Native Village of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1999).
8 Clark v. State, Dep't of Corr., 156 P.3d 384, 386 (Alaska 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
9 Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 380 (quoting Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local
1324 v. City of Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Alaska 2002)).
-8- 6555
----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.10 Whether the public
interest exception applies depends on three factors: "(1) whether the disputed issues are
capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may cause review of
the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) whether the issues presented are so
important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine."11
We have recognized that because "an involuntary commitment is a massive
curtailment of liberty," appeals from involuntary commitment orders raise questions that
are important to the public interest.12 Furthermore, appeals from involuntary
commitment orders will usually evade review because "[i]t is quite unlikely that an
appeal from a 30-day or 90-day commitment, or even a 180-day commitment, could be
completed before the commitment has expired."13
Whether an appeal from a commitment order presents questions capable of
repetition, however, depends on the nature of the issues presented for review. We held
in Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute that where a patient "was committed based
on a specific set of facts" that were "specific to [her] condition immediately before and
at the time of her hearing," the question whether those facts were sufficient to justify
commitment was not capable of repetition.14 A subsequent commitment hearing, or a
commitment hearing involving a different patient, would involve a wholly different set
10 Id. at 380.
11 Id. at 380-81.
12 E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1107 (Alaska 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
13 Id. at 1107.
14 Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 381.
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----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
of specific facts.15 In contrast, we held in Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute that
questions "regarding . . . interpretation of the underlying statutory scheme in
[commitment and medication] proceedings" did fall under the public interest exception,
in part because "other patients are likely to raise similar claims in the future."16
API argues that Tracy's claim is not capable of repetition because she
questions only whether there was sufficient evidence to justify her involuntary
commitment. API is correct that Tracy's opening brief argues only that the superior
court's findings supporting Tracy's commitment were clearly erroneous. In her reply
brief, however, Tracy responds to API's mootness argument by asking us to apply the
public interest exception because her appeal "presents a question of statutory
interpretation that is subject to repetition." Tracy does not dispute that she displayed
manic and psychotic symptoms on the date of her admission to API, but she argues that,
due to her compliance with medication and treatment, by the time of the commitment
hearing she was no longer gravely disabled. Tracy argues that her appeal presents the
question whether the involuntary commitment statute "permits the commitment of a
patient who is no longer gravely disabled, but whom the psychiatrist wants to keep at the
hospital longer to return her to baseline." In other words, Tracy asks us to decide
whether AS 47.30.735(c) requires that a patient be gravely disabled at the time of the
commitment hearing, as opposed to at the time of her admission to a mental health
facility, in order to justify a 30-day involuntary commitment order.17
15 Id.; see also E.P., 205 P.3d at 1107 ("When disputed issues turn on unique
facts unlikely to be repeated, we have refused to find an exception to mootness.").
16 208 P.3d 168, 179 (Alaska 2009); see also E.P., 205 P.3d at 1107 ("The
matter of statutory interpretation . . . does not depend on E.P.'s particular facts.").
17 The procedures for a 30-day commitment hearing are specified in
(continued...)
-10- 6555
----------------------- Page 11-----------------------
We agree with Tracy that this presents a question of statutory interpretation
that is capable of repetition. In order to obtain a 30-day commitment order after
evaluating a patient, two mental health professionals must file a petition for commitment
that alleges, among other things, that the patient is "mentally ill and as a result is likely
to cause harm to self or others or is gravely disabled."18 In order to grant that petition,
the court must hold a hearing and find by clear and convincing evidence that the patient
is "mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to [herself] or others or is gravely
disabled."19 It is possible, however, for a significant period of time to elapse between the
filing of the petition and the hearing. Alaska Statute 47.30.715 requires that an
involuntary commitment hearing be held within 72 hours after a patient arrives at the
mental health facility for evaluation; however, this time period does not count Saturdays,
Sundays, holidays, or the time it takes to transport the patient,20 and the patient can elect
17(...continued)
AS 47.30.735. Subsection (c) states:
At the conclusion of the hearing the court may commit the
respondent to a treatment facility for not more than 30 days
if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause
harm to the respondent or others or is gravely disabled.
18 AS 47.30.730(a).
19 AS 47.30.735(c).
20 AS 47.30.805(a)(1).
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to waive the 72-hour time limit.21 If the time limit is waived the hearing must occur
within seven calendar days of the patient's arrival at the treatment facility.22
As a result, the involuntary commitment hearing could take place as much
as one week after the patient is admitted for evaluation. If a patient begins treatment
immediately, it is possible that by the time of the hearing the patient will no longer be
exhibiting the symptoms that led to her admission. Therefore, the question whether the
statute refers to the patient's condition at the time of admission or at the time of the
hearing is an important question of statutory interpretation that is capable of repetition.
Because we apply the public interest exception, we need not reach the question whether
the collateral consequences exception to mootness applies to appeals from involuntary
commitment orders.
B. A Patient May Only Be Committed Involuntarily If She Is Gravely
Disabled At The Time Of The Commitment Hearing, But In Making
That Determination The Court May Consider The Patient's Recent
Behavior And Condition As Well As The Patient's Symptoms At The
Time Of The Hearing.
A petition for a 30-day involuntary commitment may be granted if the trial
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a patient "is mentally ill and as a
result is likely to cause harm to [herself] or others or is gravely disabled."23 Under
AS 47.30.915(7):
"[G]ravely disabled" means a condition in which a person as
a result of mental illness
21 AS 47.30.725(f). In order to waive the time limit the patient must be
represented by counsel. Id.
22 Id.
23 AS 47.30.735(c) (emphasis added).
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(A) is in danger of physical harm arising from such complete
neglect of basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal
safety as to render serious accident, illness, or death highly
probable if care by another is not taken; or
(B) will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe and
abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this
distress is associated with significant impairment of
judgment, reason, or behavior causing a substantial
deterioration of the person's previous ability to function
independently.
Tracy was committed under the definition provided in AS 47.30.915(7)(B),
and we have held that AS 47.30.915(7)(B) "must be construed so that the 'distress' that
justifies commitment refers to a level of incapacity that prevents the person in question
from being able to live safely outside of a controlled environment."24 Tracy does not
dispute that she met this definition at the time of her admission to API for evaluation but
claims that by the time of her commitment hearing she had improved and was no longer
gravely disabled. She argues that the superior court erroneously based its commitment
order on her symptoms at the time of admission rather than on her condition at the time
of the commitment hearing.
We agree with Tracy that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the
superior court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a patient is mentally ill
and gravely disabled or likely to harm herself or others at the time of the commitment
hearing. The superior court may not involuntarily commit a patient based only on the
patient's symptoms at the time of admission to a treatment facility if by the time of the
hearing the patient is no longer mentally ill and gravely disabled or likely to harm herself
or others.
24 Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 378 (Alaska 2007).
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----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
This interpretation is clear from the plain language of the involuntary
commitment statute. Alaska Statute 47.30.735, which specifies the procedures for a
30-day commitment hearing, states:
At the conclusion of the hearing the court may commit the
respondent to a treatment facility for not more than 30 days
if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause
harm to the respondent or others or is gravely disabled.[25]
Other sections of the involuntary commitment statute support this interpretation by
indicating that patients should be released as soon as they are no longer gravely disabled
or likely to harm themselves or others. Alaska Statute 47.30.720, titled "Release before
expiration of 72-hour period," provides:
If at any time in the course of the 72-hour [evaluation] period
the mental health professionals conducting the evaluation
determine that the respondent does not meet the standards for
commitment . . . the respondent shall be discharged from the
facility or the place of evaluation by evaluation personnel and
the petitioner and the court so notified.
Alaska Statute 47.30.780, titled "Early discharge," similarly provides that once
commitment has begun, "the professional person in charge shall at any time discharge
a respondent on the ground that the respondent is no longer gravely disabled or likely to
cause serious harm as a result of mental illness."
The statute thus plainly supports Tracy's contention that a commitment
order must be based on the patient's condition at the time of the commitment hearing.
A patient who is no longer gravely disabled at the time of the hearing may not be
committed involuntarily. This interpretation is also in line with our decision in
Wetherhorn, which emphasized the high standard required to justify the massive
25 AS 47.30.735(c) (emphasis added).
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----------------------- Page 15-----------------------
curtailment of liberty that involuntary commitment represents: "[I]t is not enough to
show that care and treatment of an individual's mental illness would be preferred or
beneficial or even in [the patient's] best interests."26
At the same time, nothing in the statutory framework suggests that, when
deciding whether a patient is gravely disabled, the superior court is limited to considering
only the symptoms exhibited by the patient on the day of the commitment hearing. Tracy
emphasizes throughout her argument that on the day of the hearing she was taking her
medication, sleeping and eating better, and displaying "hypomanic" rather than manic
or psychotic symptoms. But it would defy common sense to ignore Tracy's treatment
history, which supplied context for her symptoms on the day of the hearing. Our
decision in Wetherhorn suggested that the superior court may also consider any "recent
acts" when deciding whether a patient is gravely disabled.27 In that case, Wetherhorn
argued that allowing involuntary commitment for patients who were "gravely disabled"
was unconstitutional because the definition of "gravely disabled" did not require that the
patient be in imminent danger.28 We responded:
We have not yet addressed the question whether the concept
of imminence is compatible with the passive nature of harm
reflected in the "gravely disabled" definition or whether the
"facts and specific behavior of the respondent" required by
AS 47.30.730(a)(7) must include recent acts. But we need
not address those issues here, because the facts alleged in this
case were drawn from the recent past. The petition stated
that Wetherhorn had shown a manic state, a lack of insight,
and non-compliance with her medication for the past three
26 Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 378 (quoting In re Labelle, 728 P.2d 138, 146
(Wash. 1986)).
27 Id. at 379.
28 Id. at 378.
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months. And during the hearing, Dr. Kiele testified that
Wetherhorn remained confused and agitated and that her
difficulties with insight had not changed since she had been
at the hospital. . . . Because all these examples of specific
behavior were drawn from the recent past, they were
sufficient to meet the evidentiary standards established by
those states that have addressed the question of imminence.[29]
Although we did not decide whether evidence of recent behavior is required for a finding
that a patient is gravely disabled, we did recognize that recent acts are appropriate for the
superior court to consider. We therefore conclude that although the superior court may
only grant an involuntary commitment petition if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the patient is mentally ill and likely to harm herself or others or is gravely
disabled at the time of the commitment hearing, when making that determination the
court may consider the patient's recent behavior and condition as well as the patient's
symptoms on the day of the hearing.
C. The Superior Court Applied The Statute Correctly In Determining
That Tracy Was Gravely Disabled On The Day Of The Commitment
Hearing.
We now turn to the question whether the superior court complied with the
requirements of the involuntary commitment statute in this case. "Whether factual
findings comport with the requirements of [the involuntary commitment statute] presents
a legal issue, which we review de novo."30
29 Id. at 379 (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted); see also In re
Labelle, 728 P.2d at 145-46 (interpreting a similar statute to allow a finding that a patient
was gravely disabled even if the patient had improved slightly by the time of the
commitment hearing so long as there was "recent proof of significant loss of cognitive
or volitional control" and inpatient care was essential to the patient's health or safety).
30 Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 375.
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Tracy argues that the superior court granted the commitment petition so that
API could continue her treatment and return her to her "baseline," even though she was
no longer gravely disabled. We disagree. The master's written findings, adopted by the
superior court, expressly concluded that Tracy was gravely disabled on the day of the
commitment hearing. In his written findings, the master summarized Dr. Muschevici's
observations of Tracy's recent behavior, including her manic and psychotic symptoms
at the time of her admission, and determined that Tracy was "currently in a condition
where . . . she will continue to suffer emotional, mental and physical distress which
significantly impairs her judgment and causes a substantial deterioration of her previous
ability to function independently."31 (Emphasis added.) The master's findings recognized
that Tracy had improved somewhat since her admission but specifically determined that
Tracy was "not yet stable," that she did not have "adequate judgment to maintain herself
and function safely in a free environment," and that her "condition [was] still acute and
her thinking [was] impaired." The findings also explained that Tracy could not properly
access outpatient treatment while her thinking was so impaired, and that without further
treatment she would likely be hospitalized again.32
31 Tracy argues that this finding is clearly erroneous because the master's oral
findings mistakenly stated that Dr. Muschevici testified that Tracy was manic and
psychotic on the date of the hearing. The question whether specific facts are sufficient
to justify involuntary commitment is not capable of repetition and therefore moot.
Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 381. We note in passing, however, that the master's written
findings did not contain this mistaken assertion and that when oral and written findings
are inconsistent, the written decision normally prevails. See Ogden v. Ogden, 39 P.3d
513, 518 (Alaska 2001).
32 Tracy also argues that the evidence only showed that she was likely to be
hospitalized again if she stopped taking her medication. This argument is also moot,
Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 381, but we note that the probate master heard testimony from
both Dr. Muschevici and Tracy's husband that Tracy had repeatedly stopped taking her
(continued...)
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In summary, the superior court properly applied the involuntary
commitment statute when it granted the petition based on Tracy's condition at the time
of the hearing and considered Tracy's recent symptoms and behavior in making that
determination.
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude that although Tracy's claims are moot, the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine applies because Tracy presents a question of statutory
interpretation that is capable of repetition. A finding that a patient is mentally ill and
likely to harm herself or others or is gravely disabled must be based on the patient's
condition at the time of the commitment hearing. But in making that finding, the trial
court can consider the patient's recent behavior and symptoms, as well as the symptoms
exhibited at the time of the commitment hearing. In this case, the superior court properly
applied the involuntary commitment statute. For these reasons, the order of the superior
court granting the petition for involuntary commitment is AFFIRMED.
32(...continued)
medication in the past. The probate master also heard Tracy's own testimony and had
the opportunity to judge her credibility.
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