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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Vanvelzor v. Vanvelzor (11/13/2009) sp-6435

Vanvelzor v. Vanvelzor (11/13/2009) sp-6435, 219 P3d 184

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,


) Supreme Court No. S- 13272
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-08-05253 CI
Appellee. ) No. 6435 - November 13, 2009
          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Third   Judicial    District,
          Anchorage, Stephanie E. Joannides, Judge.

          Appearances:  Kenneth M. Wasche,  Kenneth  M.
          Wasche,  P.C., Anchorage, for Appellant.   No
          appearance by Appellee.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Eastaugh,
          Carpeneti, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.

          CARPENETI, Justice.
          A  husband  moved to Alaska and filed for annulment  of
his  marriage  or divorce from his wife, who lives in  Ohio,  and
alleged  a number of personal claims against her.  Acting without
a   lawyer,  she  responded  that  the  superior  court  had   no
jurisdiction over her.  She also filed a motion to change  venue,
which  in substance argued that Alaska lacked jurisdiction.   The
wife also counterclaimed for spousal support.  The superior court
granted  the  wifes motion and dismissed the case on the  grounds
that Alaska lacked personal jurisdiction over her.
          The  husband appeals on the grounds that (1) the  court
erred  in  treating  the  venue motion as a  jurisdiction  motion
without  giving  him the opportunity to brief  jurisdiction;  (2)
Alaska  had  jurisdiction  because  the  wife  requested  spousal
support;  (3) the wife waived her jurisdictional defense  by  not
raising it with her motion to change venue; and (4) even  if  the
court  had  no jurisdiction over the wife, it erred in dismissing
the  action  to terminate the marriage.  We agree only  with  his
final  argument, and remand for the superior court to  adjudicate
the annulment or divorce claim alone.
     A.   Facts
          Mark and Jessica Vanvelzor married in 2004 in New York.
They  made  their  marital  home  in  Mount  Vernon,  Ohio.   The
Vanvelzors  separated sometime in 2007.  Mark moved to  Anchorage
where he took a job, and Jessica remained in Ohio.
     B.   Proceedings
          In  early 2008 Mark filed a complaint for annulment  or
divorce  in  Alaska.  He was represented by counsel.  The  couple
has  no  real  property, but he requested  division  of  personal
property.   He demanded Jessica return some of his sons  personal
property that he alleged was in her possession.
          Jessica answered the complaint pro se by filling out  a
form  provided by the court.  In the section entitled Affirmative
Defenses,  Jessica checked the box reading: I have never  resided
or  been  present  in  the  State of Alaska.   This  Court  lacks
personal jurisdiction over me.  She also checked the box  in  the
same  section reading The venue of this action is improper.  This
case  should have been filed at the Courthouse in (City or  Town)
and in the blank space she handwrote Mount Vernon, Ohio.
          At the end of the form, Jessica had the option to check
five  boxes  which read: I have attached the following documents:
Property and Debt Worksheet  Motion for Attorneys Fees  Motion to
Change Venue  Motion for Spousal Support  Other _______.  Jessica
checked Motion to Change Venue and Motion for Spousal Support.
          On  the same day, Jessica filed her motions for spousal
support  and change of venue, both handwritten on forms  provided
by  the  court.  In her motion for change of venue, she requested
that the venue to hear this divorce case be moved to the State of
Ohio,  because I do not believe the Plaintiff has the  intent  to
stay  in Alaska . . . .  She said that Mark still rented a house,
a storage unit, and a P.O. Box in Ohio.
          Mark  responded to Jessicas motion for change of venue.
He  asserted that he resides in Alaska and intends to remain.  He
then  thoroughly discussed the substantive law of venue, but  did
not  mention  jurisdiction.   With  the  response  he  filed   an
affidavit  stating that he works and rents his home in Anchorage,
but  that  he  still rents some property in Ohio as storage.   He
also  explained that he rents a post office box in Anchorage  and
has  informed important correspondents of his change in  address,
but  that  he  did not put a change of address on his  Ohio  post
office box because he did not want to receive Jessicas mail.
          The  superior court granted Jessicas motion for  change
of   venue   on  the  grounds  that  it  did  not  have  personal
jurisdiction  over  her.   The  court  noted  that   Alaska   has
jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage if at least one spouse is  in
Alaska and intends to remain.  The court wrote:
          Although  the court does have subject  matter
          jurisdiction to grant a dissolution  in  this
          case,  it  has  no  personal jurisdiction  to
          adjudicate  the distribution of  the  parties
          marital  property.  Because  distribution  of
          marital  property appears to be a substantial
          issue  in  this  case,  the  court  would  be
          limited  in  its ability to grant the  relief
          requested by Plaintiff.
          The court dismissed all of Marks claims.  Mark promptly
moved  for reconsideration on the grounds that he did not  get  a
chance to brief jurisdiction, and that, even if the court did not
have personal jurisdiction over Jessica, it should still give him
an  annulment or divorce.  The superior court denied this motion.
Mark appeals.
          We  review the granting of a motion to change venue for
abuse  of  discretion.1   We review a determination  of  personal
jurisdiction  de  novo.2  Although the court purported  to  grant
change  of venue, in substance it dismissed for lack of  personal
jurisdiction over Jessica.  Therefore, we review this  appeal  de
novo.   When  a superior court resolves a matter under  different
substantive  law  than  that argued by the  parties,  the  action
raises due process concerns, which we review de novo.3
     A.   Any  Due Process Violation in Granting Jessicas  Motion
          for  Change  of  Venue on Lack of Jurisdiction  Grounds
          Without  Briefing on Jurisdiction from  Mark  Has  Been
          Cured in this Court.
          Mark  argues  that the superior court should  not  have
dismissed  for  lack  of  jurisdiction  without  giving  him   an
opportunity  to brief jurisdiction.  He also argues that  he  did
not  have  notice  that jurisdiction would  be  an  issue.   Mark
compares this case to cases in which the superior court erred  by
converting  motions to dismiss on the pleadings  to  motions  for
summary judgment.4  In those cases, the superior court looked  at
one  partys  evidence or argument without giving the other  party
the opportunity to present evidence or argument.5
          But  Mark does not argue that he did not get sufficient
opportunity  to present evidence.  In fact, Mark argues  that  he
presented sufficient facts for the court to decide in his  favor,
but   that  he  did  not  get  the  opportunity  to  present  the
substantive law.  He does not point to any additional evidence he
would  have  presented to the superior court, nor  do  his  legal
arguments rely on any facts not already part of the record before
this court.
          Both the United States and Alaska Constitutions provide
that  no  person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or  property
without due process of law.6  Due process of law requires that  a
party  have notice of the nature of a proceeding and a reasonable
opportunity to be heard.7  We have, on occasion, found this right
violated when a superior court disposed of a case on grounds that
the  parties reasonably did not expect to be at issue.8   But  in
those  cases, the parties demonstrated they would have  presented
their  evidence  differently had they known what  law  the  court
          would use in deciding those matters.9
          Here,   Mark   does  not  request  further  evidentiary
development.   His sole argument is that he should  have  had  an
opportunity to present the substantive law of jurisdiction to the
superior court.  He makes his jurisdictional arguments now before
this  court,  and we review the superior courts ruling  de  novo.
Therefore, we find any error at the superior court level cured by
the proceedings in this court. Whether or not Mark had sufficient
opportunity  to  be heard on the law of jurisdiction  before  the
superior court, he has that opportunity now.
     B.   It Was Error To Dismiss Marks Claims for Termination of
          the Marriage.
          Mark advances three arguments to support his claim that
Alaska  has  jurisdiction in this case.  First,  he  argues  that
Alaska  has  jurisdiction  over  Jessica  because  she  filed   a
counterclaim  for  spousal  support.  Second,  Mark  argues  that
Jessica   waived  her  personal  jurisdiction  defense   by   not
mentioning  it  in her motion for change of venue.   Third,  Mark
argues that, even if the superior court did not have jurisdiction
over his personal claims against Jessica, it should have retained
jurisdiction over his annulment and divorce claims.  We  disagree
with Mark that Jessicas actions, as a pro se litigant, waived her
jurisdictional defense, but we agree that the superior court  did
not  need  personal jurisdiction over Jessica to terminate  Marks
marriage to her.
          1.   Jessica  did  not waive her personal  jurisdiction
               defense  by  filing  a  counterclaim  for  spousal
          Mark  argues that Alaska acquired personal jurisdiction
over Jessica when she filed her counterclaim for spousal support.
Mark  argues  that Alaskas jurisdictional statute  allows  Alaska
courts  to exercise jurisdiction in every situation in  which  it
would be constitutional to do so, and that Jessicas act of filing
her counterclaim was sufficient minimum contacts10 with Alaska to
make personal jurisdiction over her constitutional.
          But  we  disagree  with  Mark that  the  constitutional
inquiry  is  relevant.   The only grounds for  jurisdiction  over
personal  claims in divorce and annulment actions are  statutory.
Alaska Statute 09.05.015 (Alaskas long arm statute) states:
          A  court  of  this state having  jurisdiction
          over the subject matter has jurisdiction over
          a person served in an action according to the
          rules  of  civil procedure . . . (12)  in  an
          action for annulment [or] divorce . . .  when
          a  personal  claim  is asserted  against  the
          nonresident party if (A) the parties  resided
          in  this state in a marital relationship  for
          not  less than six consecutive months  within
          the  six years preceding the commencement  of
          the  action;  (B)  the  party  asserting  the
          personal  claim has continued  to  reside  in
          this  state;  and  (C) the nonresident  party
          receives notice as required by law.
          The    grounds   for   jurisdiction   listed   in    AS
          09.05.015(a)(12) are not met. Mark does not argue that they are
met,  and  the  record does not suggest that he and Jessica  have
ever resided together in a marital relationship in Alaska.
          Mark   attempts  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that   the
jurisdictional grounds set out in subsection .015(a)(12) are  not
met  by  arguing  that section .015 is not  exclusive.   In  many
situations,  AS  09.05.015  allows courts  to  exercise  personal
jurisdiction  whenever constitutional to do so by virtue  of  its
catch-all provision.11  But that catch-all provision does not  to
apply  to  subsection (a)(12).  The catch-all  provision  states:
The  jurisdictional grounds stated in (a)(2)-(10) of this section
are  cumulative and in addition to any other grounds provided  by
the  common  law.12   The catch-all provision  does  not  include
subsection  (a)(12), leading us to conclude that section  is  not
cumulative and in addition to any other grounds.
          We  follow the doctrine of statutory construction  that
when  the  legislature expressly enumerates included  terms,  all
others  are impliedly excluded.13  We sometimes refer to this  in
the  Latin, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.14  Using  this
canon  of  construction, we conclude that by expressly  including
subsections   (a)(2)-(10)   in  its  catch-all   provision,   the
legislature did not intend to include subsection (a)(12).   Thus,
the  statutory  grounds  for jurisdiction  over  personal  claims
against  a  nonresident  party in  a  divorce  or  annulment  are
exclusive, and Marks constitutional law argument is irrelevant.
          Although  Mark does not raise the issue of  waiver,  we
generally frame similar questions in terms of waiver.15  Thus, we
consider whether, by counterclaiming for spousal support, Jessica
waived her objection to the courts jurisdiction over her.
          We   have   not  before  addressed  whether  filing   a
counterclaim for spousal support in a divorce action  waives  the
defense  of  lack  of  personal jurisdiction,  and  there  is  no
consensus  among  other jurisdictions on the law  governing  this
question.16   But  Jessica acted pro se, made her  objections  to
personal   jurisdiction   promptly,  and   acted   according   to
instructions provided by the Alaska Court System.   We  hold  the
pleadings  of  pro se litigants to less stringent standards,  and
this  reflects  a  policy against finding  unintended  waiver  of
claims  in  technically  defective  pleadings  filed  by  pro  se
litigants.17  Therefore, we hold that Jessica did not  waive  her
          Jessica  answered using a pre-printed form provided  by
the  court system.18  The form had a box she could check  saying:
This  Court lacks personal jurisdiction over me, and another  one
saying:  I  have  attached the following  documents:  Motion  for
Spousal Support.  A pro se litigant reading the form could easily
assume  that  it  is proper to file a motion for spousal  support
with  the answer without realizing that by doing so she might  be
giving   up   her   earlier  statement  that  the   court   lacks
jurisdiction.  Jessica followed the forms instructions carefully,
and stated her arguments clearly and promptly.19  We view pro  se
litigants filings leniently, and hold that Jessica did not  waive
her  personal  jurisdiction defense by  also  requesting  spousal
          2.   Jessica  did  not waive her personal  jurisdiction
               defense  by  not  mentioning jurisdiction  in  her
               motion for change of venue.
          Mark  argues  that  Jessica  waived  her  objection  to
personal  jurisdiction by failing to assert it in her motion  for
change of venue, which the civil rules required her to do.   Mark
also  notes  that  Jessica  did not expressly  request  that  the
superior court dismiss the case.
          Civil Rule 12(h) states:
          A  defense of lack of jurisdiction  over  the
          person  [or] improper venue . . .  is  waived
          (A)   if   omitted  from  a  motion  in   the
          circumstances  described in subdivision  (g),
          or  (B) if it is neither made by motion under
          this   rule  nor  included  in  a  responsive
          pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by
          Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.
          Civil Rule 12(g) states:
          A party who makes a motion under the rule may
          join   with  it  any  other  motions   herein
          provided for and then available to the party.
          If  a  party makes a motion under this  rule,
          but  omits therefrom any defense or objection
          then  available to the party which this  rule
          permits  to  be raised by motion,  the  party
          shall  not thereafter make a motion based  on
          the defense or objection so omitted . . . .
          We  have held that when a party appears and defends  an
action,   the   party  cannot  later  argue  lack   of   personal
jurisdiction.20   But  we have also substantially  relaxed  these
rules for pro se litigants.  For example, in S.B. v. State,21  we
held  that a pro se party did not waive her personal jurisdiction
defense  because she stated at a status conference  I  dont  even
think Alaska has jurisdiction because . . . California does and a
few  months  later argued that her child should  not  be  in  the
custody  of Alaska because the child has no family ties up  there
and that she  the mother  lived in California.22
          We  hold  that  Jessica did not waive her objection  to
personal  jurisdiction.  She objected to jurisdiction immediately
in  her answer, and her motion for change of venue recited  facts
relevant  to  jurisdiction.23 The distinction between  venue  and
jurisdiction  is  not apparent to a lay person  from  the  normal
usage  of  those words, and was not explained on the  pre-printed
form  provided by the court system.   The form did  not  indicate
that a pro se party would waive objections to jurisdiction if she
did  not  move  to dismiss on those grounds when  she  filed  her
motion  to  change  venue.   Jessica  did  her  best  to  respond
according to the Alaska Court Systems form, and communicated  the
substance  of her argument promptly and clearly.  We  decline  to
find her defense waived.
          3.   Although  the superior court did not have personal
               jurisdiction over Jessica, it had jurisdiction  to
               grant annulment or divorce.
          Finally,  Mark  argues that even if the superior  court
          properly found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over
Jessica,  it still had jurisdiction to terminate their  marriage,
and should have exercised it.  He argues that an Alaska court has
jurisdiction over a marriage if at least one of the parties is in
Alaska  with  the intent to remain.  Mark swore in his  affidavit
that  he  lives in Alaska and intends to remain.  We  agree  with
          We  have held that Alaska courts have jurisdiction over
the  termination of a marriage if one of the parties is in Alaska
and  intends to remain, even if the court does not have  personal
jurisdiction  over  the other party.24  In  that  situation,  the
Alaska court has jurisdiction only over the marriage; Alaska does
not  have  jurisdiction over spousal support,  child  custody  or
support,  property  division issues,  or  other  personal  claims
between the parties.25
          And  we  have held that divorce or annulment may remain
before  an Alaska court even if personal claims must be dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction.26  In Crews v. Crews27 we held
that  the  superior court erred in dismissing an Alaska residents
divorce  action against her nonresident husband when it dismissed
her  personal  claims  against him for  lack  of  jurisdiction.28
Although the Alaska court could not adjudicate the child  support
and  division  of  property issues, it could still  grant  her  a
          As in Crews, the superior court in this case should not
have dismissed the annulment and divorce claims when it dismissed
Marks personal claims against Jessica.30  If Mark wanted an Alaska
annulment  or  divorce, even if he would have to  adjudicate  his
other  claims  in Ohio, there is no reason that the Alaska  court
should  refuse to hear it.  Therefore, we hold that it was  error
to dismiss Marks claim for annulment or divorce.
          We  AFFIRM  the  dismissal  of  Marks  personal  claims
against   Jessica,   and   REVERSE   the   dismissal    of    his
annulment/divorce claim.  We REMAND for the court to consider the
annulment/divorce claim.

     1     Sever  v.  Alaska Pulp Corp., 931 P.2d  354,  360  n.7
(Alaska 1996).

     2     S.B.  v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs.  Div.  of
Family & Youth Servs., 61 P.3d 6, 10 (Alaska 2002).

     3     See  Price  v. Eastham, 75 P.3d 1051, 1055-57  (Alaska

     4    See Alaska R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Alaska R. Civ. P. 56.

     5     See  Demmert  v. Kootznoowoo Inc., 960 P.2d  606,  611
(Alaska  1998);  Shooshanian  v. Wagner,  672  P.2d  455,  460-61
(Alaska 1983).

     6    U.S. Const. amend. XIV,  1; Alaska Const. art. I,  7.

     7    Price, 75 P.3d at 1056.

     8     Id.  (holding due process violation where court  found
easement  based on statute that parties reasonably  believed  was
not  at  issue); Cushing v. Painter, 666 P.2d 1044, 1046  (Alaska
1983)  (holding  due  process  denial  where  mother  would  have
prepared  case and evidence differently had she known that  court
would  determine  permanent custody of child at  interim  custody

     9     Price,  75 P.3d at 1056 (parties not given opportunity
to  present evidence on relevant statutory factors); Cushing, 666
P.2d at 1046.

     10     See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
(1985); Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

     11     Parker  v.  State,  Dept of  Revenue,  Child  Support
Enforcement  Div., ex. rel. R.A.W., 960 P.2d 586, 587-88  (Alaska
1998);  Alaska  Telecom, Inc. v. Schafer,  888  P.2d  1296,  1299
(Alaska 1995).

     12    AS 09.05.015(c).

     13    Ranney v. Whitewater Engg, 122 P.3d 214, 218-19 (Alaska

     14    Id.

     15    Heppinstall v. Darnall Kemna & Co., 851 P.2d 78, 79 n.2
(Alaska    1993)   (Because   [the   defendant]   answered    and
counterclaimed  without objecting to the courts jurisdiction,  it
waived  any challenge to personal jurisdiction.); see also Strong
v.  Castellanos, Mem. Op. & J., No. S-9174, 2000 WL 34545814,  at
*1  (Alaska  July 26, 2000) ([A] nonresident who  appears  in  an
Alaska  court asking for relief waives any claim that  the  court
lacks personal jurisdiction.).

     16     Most  courts hold that a defendant does not waive  an
objection  to  personal  jurisdiction  if  the  counterclaim   is
compulsory.  See, e.g., Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen,  743  F.2d
1325,  1330  n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).  This is sensible,  considering
that the civil rules require filing both the counterclaim and the
objection  to  personal  jurisdiction  at  the  outset   of   the
litigation.  See Alaska R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1); Alaska  R.  Civ.  P.
13(a).  Some courts also hold that a defendant does not waive the
objection  even  when the counterclaim is permissive,  but  other
courts  disagree.   See Gates Learjet Corp.,  743  F.2d  at  1330
(recognizing  federal court disagreement over whether  permissive
counterclaim  waives personal jurisdiction defense,  and  holding
that  it does not).  A compulsory counterclaim is one that arises
out  of  the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of  the  opposing  partys  claim and does  not  require  for  its
adjudication  the  presence of third parties of  whom  the  court
cannot  acquire  jurisdiction.   Alaska  R.  Civ.  P.  13(a).   A
permissive  counterclaim  is any other claim  the  defendant  has
against  the plaintiff. Alaska R. Civ. P. 13(b).  We  have  never
addressed   whether  a  counterclaim  for  spousal   support   is
permissive  or compulsory; the question is not settled.   Compare
Walker  v.  Walker, 695 So. 2d 58 (Ala. App. 1997)  (counterclaim
for  alimony  in  divorce  action compulsory)  with   Newsome  v.
Newsome,  259 S.E.2d 577, 583 (N.C. App. 1979) (counterclaim  for
alimony in divorce action permissive).

     17    See DeNardo v. Calista Corp., 111 P.3d 326, 330 (Alaska

     18    See Answer and Counterclaim to Divorce Without Children
(Jan. 2008), (last
visited June 25, 2009).

     19    In an unpublished case, we held that a pro se litigant
did  not waive his right to request an evidentiary hearing  where
the  litigant used a pre-printed form provided by the court  that
did  not  provide for such a request. Davidson v. Lafferty,  Mem.
Op.  &  J,  No. S-10013, 2002 WL 1943661, at *2 (Alaska Aug.  21,
2002); see also D.L.C. v. C.A.H., 764 So. 2d 562 (Ala. App. 1999)
(pro se litigant did not waive objection to personal jurisdiction
when he followed judges instruction to enter general denial if he
did not agree with complaint).

     20     Matthews v. Matthews, 739 P.2d 1298, 1299 n.1 (Alaska
1987)  (Jack opposed the motion [for reimbursement of past  child
support]  on  the ground that the superior court lacked  personal
jurisdiction  over him when it entered the divorce  decree.   The
court  entered  the decree by default while Jack  was  living  in
Singapore.  However, whether or not the court had jurisdiction at
the  time  of the divorce, it obtained jurisdiction in 1986  when
Jack appeared to defend the present action.)

     21     S.B. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., Div.  of
Family & Youth Servs., 61 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2002).

     22    Id. at 14.  See also Internet Archive v. Shell, No.  C
06-00397  JSW,  2006 WL 1348559, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May  17,  2006)
(holding  pro  se  litigant did not waive objection  to  personal
jurisdiction  when she only objected to venue: It is  clear  that
[this  pro  se litigant] does not recognize the legal distinction
between an objection to personal jurisdiction and an objection to
venue . . . . [B]ut she has consistently maintained her objection
to this Court exercising personal jurisdiction over her.).

     23    Jessicas motion addressed whether Mark is a resident of
Alaska, which goes to the question of jurisdiction. See Crews  v.
Crews,  769  P.2d 433, 435-36 (Alaska 1989) (holding that  Alaska
courts  have  jurisdiction to grant divorce or  annulment  if  at
least  one party lives in Alaska and intends to remain).  Jessica
did not discuss facts relevant to venue.  See AS 22.10.040.

     24     Crews, 769 P.2d at 435-36 (holding that Alaska  court
had  jurisdiction to issue divorce to wife who left husband  (who
had  never  been  to Alaska), moved to Alaska,  and  intended  to
remain, although Alaska court did not have jurisdiction over  her
personal  claims against husband for property division and  child
support).  This is true of annulment as well as divorce.  See  AS
25.24.080  (residence  requirement for  plaintiff  in  action  to
declare  marriage  void).   See  also  Restatement  (Second)   of
Conflict  of  Laws  76  (A state has power to  exercise  judicial
jurisdiction to nullify a marriage from its beginning  (a)  under
the  circumstances  which would give the  state  jurisdiction  to
dissolve the marriage by divorce . . . .).

     25    Crews, 769 P.2d at 435-36.

     26     See  id.   (affirming  superior  court  dismissal  of
personal  claims,  but  reversing  superior  court  dismissal  of
divorce claim).

     27    Id.

     28    Id.

     29    Id.

     30    In fact, the court recognized that it had jurisdiction
over  termination of the marriage, but dismissed on  the  grounds
that  it  could  not  grant the full relief,  including  property
division, requested by the plaintiff.  But, as noted, Alaska  law
does   not  require  that  full  relief  can  be  granted  before
jurisdiction to grant a divorce will be found.

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