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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Huffman v. State (04/03/2009) sp-6354

Huffman v. State (04/03/2009) sp-6354, 204 P3d 339

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

PATRICK C. HUFFMAN, N.D., and )
AMY REEDY-HUFFMAN, C.P.M., ) Supreme Court No. S- 12846
)
Appellants, ) Superior Court No. 3AN-06- 12969 CI
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, ) No. 6354 April 3, 2009
)
Appellee.)
)
          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Third   Judicial    District,
          Anchorage, Craig F. Stowers, Judge.

          Appearances:  Tim  Cook, Cook  &  Associates,
          Anchorage,  Paul H. Bratton,  Law  Office  of
          Paul  H.  Bratton, Talkeetna, for Appellants.
          James  E.  Cantor,  Chief Assistant  Attorney
          General,  Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General,
          Anchorage, for Appellee.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices.

          MATTHEWS, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          All   public   school  children  must  be  tested   for
tuberculosis.   State regulations require the use of  a  purified
protein  derivative (PPD) skin test for this purpose.   The  test
may  be  waived if, in the opinion of a physician,  it  would  be
injurious for a particular child.
          The  appellants, Patrick Huffman and Amy Reedy-Huffman,
believe  that the PPD test would be injurious for their children.
They submitted an affidavit so stating signed by Patrick, who  is
a naturopathic doctor.  The Kenai Peninsula School District found
the  waiver  affidavit  insufficient  because  state  regulations
require  such affidavits to be signed by a physician entitled  to
practice  medicine  or  osteopathy.   Accordingly,  the  district
notified the Huffmans that their children would be excluded  from
school unless they took PPD tests.
          The Huffmans sued the school district and the State  of
Alaska.   They  contended that the children were  entitled  to  a
waiver and alternatively that the test requirement violated their
religious  and  liberty  interests.   From  a  summary   judgment
rejecting these claims, they now bring this appeal.  We hold that
although their waiver application was correctly rejected and they
did  not show that their objections were religiously based,  they
did  present  a  plausible claim that their  fundamental  liberty
interests  were infringed.  We therefore remand with instructions
to  determine  whether  the Huffmans fundamental  right  to  make
decisions  about  their  childrens  medical  treatment   can   be
accommodated  by other tests that are acceptable  to  them  while
also  satisfying  the compelling public health interests  of  the
State.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          In  August  2006 Patrick Huffman and Amy  Reedy-Huffman
enrolled  their sons Stone and Elias Huffman in fourth grade  and
kindergarten,  respectively,  in  public  schools  in  the  Kenai
Peninsula  Borough  School District.1  The schools  informed  the
Huffmans  that, pursuant to a state regulation, Stone  and  Elias
could  only  attend  if the children had  a  PPD  skin  test  for
tuberculosis or qualified for a medical exemption.   A  PPD  skin
test  involves  injecting a solution containing purified  protein
into  the  skin on the forearm; a reaction signifies a latent  or
active  tuberculosis  infection rather than the  active  disease.
The Huffmans submitted affidavits to the school district intended
to  fulfill the requirements for medical exemptions for each son.
These  documents were signed by Dr. Dawn Lamb, a  naturopath,  as
well  as  Patrick  Huffman.2   The  Huffmans  also  submitted  an
objection  to  the  tuberculosis test  requirement  on  religious
grounds.3
          In   November  the  school  districts  health  services
department  informed  the  Huffmans  that  their  children   were
excluded  from  school as of December 15 or  16  for  failure  to
comply  with the state regulation regarding tuberculosis testing.
The   department  sent  an  additional  letter  to  the  Huffmans
explaining  that  [w]e as a School District  are  not  given  any
latitude  within which to respond to your concern  regarding  the
PPD  skin  test  because the regulation, 7 Alaska  Administrative
Code  27.213, requires a statement from an MD or DO and does  not
include any provision for religious exemption.
          The  Huffmans filed suit in the superior court alleging
that  (1)  they had complied or substantially complied  with  the
requirement to obtain a medical exemption; (2) they had a liberty
interest,  protected  by the due process, equal  protection,  and
privacy  clauses  of  the  state and  federal  constitutions,  to
determine  matters affecting the health and well-being  of  their
          minor children; and (3) the regulation violated their religious
freedom  by  excluding their children from public schools  unless
they  allowed  their  children  to undergo  a  medical  procedure
contrary  to  their  religious beliefs.4  Both parents  submitted
short affidavits to the court; these affidavits contain the  only
evidence  in  this  case  regarding their  free  exercise  claim.
Patrick Huffman stated in his affidavit that he sees religion not
only  as  a  stated view of the world, but also as a practice  in
which my beliefs are part of every aspect of my lifestyle choices
and  that one of his fundamental beliefs is that the body [is]  a
sacred  vessel of the soul.  Thus, he wrote, [i]t therefore  runs
in stark opposition to our religion to introduce a substance into
the  body  which could potentially cause harm without  any  known
benefit to, and in the absence of any known . . . danger  to  our
childrens  health  status.  In her affidavit,  Amy  Reedy-Huffman
said  that  it  was  her  deeply held religious  belief  that  to
introduce a potentially harmful substance into a healthy body  is
wrong and irresponsible.
          The State filed a motion to dismiss the Huffmans claims
or,  in the alternative, for summary judgment; the Huffmans  also
filed  a  motion  for  summary  judgment.   The  State  filed  an
opposition  to  the Huffmans summary judgment motion.5  In  their
reply  to  the  States motion, the Huffmans indicated  that  they
would  be  willing  to have their children  take  either  of  two
alternative  tests  for  the presence of tuberculosis:  a  sputum
test,  which shows the presence of active tuberculosis,  and  the
QuantiFERON-TB  Gold test, which they claimed  was  at  least  as
effective as the skin test in detecting latent TB.  The  superior
court  granted  summary judgment in favor of the  State,  holding
that  as  a  matter of law (1) the Huffmans had not  complied  or
substantially complied with the regulation requiring a  PPD  test
or  waiver from a physician; (2) naturopaths were not physicians;
and (3) the Huffmans constitutional claims were invalid.
          In  December  2006, before their children  were  to  be
suspended  from  school,  the Huffmans  requested  a  preliminary
injunction  prohibiting the school district from excluding  Stone
and  Elias  pending the outcome of the suit.  They withdrew  that
demand  four days later because the State and district agreed  to
allow the children to continue to attend school.
          The  Huffmans  appeal,  raising the  same  claims  they
presented below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We  review a grant of summary judgment with independent
judgment.6     Questions   of   statutory   interpretation    and
constitutional law are likewise reviewed de novo.7
IV.  DISCUSSION
          7  Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 27.213 requires, in
relevant  part, that all students new to a public school district
take  a  PPD  skin test for tuberculosis within  ninety  days  of
enrolling.8   The  district shall suspend a child  who  does  not
submit  to such a test or provide a health care providers written
and  signed  statement  that the child  is  not  infectious  from
tuberculosis to others.9  The regulation allows an exemption  for
          any child who provides the affidavit of a physician lawfully
entitled to practice medicine or osteopathy in this state stating
the  opinion that the PPD skin test to be administered  would  be
injurious  to the health and welfare of the child or  members  of
the family or household.10
          The  Huffmans claim that their waiver from a naturopath
fulfills  the  requirements  of  this  regulation  and  that  the
regulation  violates their religious freedom, as  well  as  their
liberty  and  privacy  interests, under  the  state  and  federal
constitutions.
     A.   Waiver   from   a  Naturopath  Does  Not  Fulfill   the
          Requirements of 7 AAC 27.213.
          The  Huffmans  contend  that the district  should  have
treated  the  waiver they submitted, signed by a  naturopath,  as
sufficient to comply with 7 AAC 27.213(f).  They argue  that  the
regulations  reference  to  waiver by a  physician  includes  the
statement  of  a  naturopath.  They rely on  Thoeni  v.  Consumer
Electronic Services,11 in which we held that a psychologist could
be  a  physician under a statute that stated  physician  includes
doctors   of   medicine,  surgeons,  chiropractors,   osteopaths,
dentists, and optometrists because that list was not exclusive.12
The  State believes the text of the regulation at issue here  the
waiver  must  be  signed  by  a physician  lawfully  entitled  to
practice medicine or osteopathy13  excludes naturopaths.
          The  statutory  framework and  language  governing  the
practice   of  medicine  and  naturopathy  make  clear   that   a
naturopaths signature is not sufficient for purposes of a  7  AAC
27.213(f)  waiver.   Chapter  64 of the  states  statutory  code,
Medicine,  defines  the   practice of  medicine  or  practice  of
osteopathy  as providing diagnosis of or treatment for  a  mental
or  physical condition for a fee or other consideration, as  well
as  to  use  or  publicly display a title in  connection  with  a
persons  name including doctor of medicine, physician,  M.D.,  or
doctor of osteopathic medicine or D.O. 14  Chapter 45 of the code,
Naturopaths,  defines  naturopathy as the  use  of  hydrotherapy,
dietetics, electrotherapy, sanitation, suggestion, mechanical and
manual  manipulation  for the stimulation  of  physiological  and
psychological action to establish a normal condition of mind  and
body.15   The  legislature has forbidden  any  person  practicing
naturopathy from us[ing] the word physician  in his title.16  The
licensing  requirements  for practicing medicine  and  practicing
naturopathy are distinct and contained in these separate chapters
of  the  code.17  Whereas a medical doctor must have attended  an
accredited  medical school and completed a hospital residency  or
internship  of  sufficient length,18 naturopaths need  only  have
graduated from an accredited school of naturopathy and  passed  a
licensing    examination.19    Because   of   these   significant
distinctions  in  the  training and practice  of  physicians  and
naturopaths,  in  addition  to  the  specific  language  of   the
regulation,  we conclude that the regulations requirement  cannot
be  fulfilled by a naturopath.  Thus the Huffmans did not  comply
with 7 AAC 27.213(f).20
     B.   7  AAC  27.213  Does Not Infringe on the Huffmans  Free
          Exercise of Religion.
          The  First  Amendment  of  the  U.S.  Constitution  and
article I, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution protect religious
freedom.21    The   Huffmans  argue  that  the   application   of
7  AAC  27.213  to their family violates these protections.   The
Huffmans claim that their religious beliefs prohibit harming  the
body,  and the regulation unconstitutionally burdens the practice
of  that tenet by preventing their children from attending school
unless  they  submit to a test that inserts a  foreign  substance
into their childrens skin.
          A  valid,  neutral,  generally  applicable  law  cannot
violate  the  free exercise clause of the federal constitution.22
The  regulation at issue here falls into that category and so  is
not invalid under the First Amendment.
          We  apply  the Alaska free exercise clause differently.
In Frank v. State,23 we articulated a threshold test for finding a
violation  of  religious freedom under the  Alaska  Constitution,
writing that [t]he free exercise clause may be invoked only where
there  is a religion involved, only where the conduct in question
is  religiously based, and only where the claimant is  sincere.24
Our  opinion  in  Frank did not directly address the  preliminary
question of whether a religion was involved; our analysis focused
on  the  second prong of the test, relying on impressive evidence
concerning the religion of the Central Alaskan Athabascan  people
to  determine that moose hunting was a necessary component  of  a
religious ceremony.25
          Federal  cases have considered whether a nontraditional
belief  system is sufficient to constitute a religion  under  the
free  exercise clause and so are instructive here.26  The  United
States Supreme Court has emphasized that a personal philosophy is
not  equivalent to a religion.27  Subsequent United States Courts
of  Appeals  cases  have endeavored to provide  a  more  concrete
definition,  focusing on how broad and fundamental an individuals
set  of  expressed  beliefs are by considering  factors  such  as
whether the premises of the religion relate to ultimate questions
and whether there are rituals or other activities associated with
it.28   The Huffmans do not profess to subscribe to any organized
religion.   They rely solely on their affidavits as  evidence  of
their nontraditional religious beliefs.  Their statements use the
terms  religion and religious beliefs, but they discuss  only  an
opposition  to  putting harmful substances into  the  body.   The
record  provides  no  indication that the Huffmans  feelings  are
connected to a comprehensive belief system, set of practices,  or
connection  to  ideas  about fundamental matters.   Without  such
assertions or evidence, we believe summary judgment on this issue
was appropriate.29
     C.   Questions   Remain   as  to  Whether   7   AAC   27.213
          Unconstitutionally  Infringes on the  Huffmans  Privacy
          Interest  in  Making  Decisions About  Their  Childrens
          Medical Treatments.
          The  Huffmans  also argue that 7 AAC 27.213  interferes
with  their  liberty  and  privacy  interests  under  article  I,
sections  1  and 22 of the Alaska Constitution.30   The  analysis
required  to resolve an individual rights claim depends upon  the
type  of  right asserted.  We described the appropriate inquiries
          in Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,31 a case contesting on
liberty  and  privacy  grounds the  states  power  to  administer
psychotropic medications without a patients consent:
               We    determine   the   boundaries    of
          individual rights guaranteed under the Alaska
          Constitution  by balancing the importance  of
          the   right  at  issue  against  the   states
          interest in imposing the disputed limitation.
          When a law places substantial burdens on  the
          exercise  of a fundamental right, we  require
          the  state to articulate a compelling [state]
          interest and to demonstrate the absence of  a
          less  restrictive  means  to  advance  [that]
          interest.   But when the law interferes  with
          an individuals freedom in an area that is not
          characterized as fundamental, we require  the
          state  to  show a legitimate interest  and  a
          close  and  substantial relationship  between
          its   interest  and  its  chosen   means   of
          advancing that interest.[32]
          
          Thus,  the  threshold question is whether the  Huffmans
are  asserting a fundamental right.  They argue that there is  no
more  fundamental  right than that of a  person  to  choose  what
substances will be taken or introduced into the body.33  The State
does not expressly dispute that claim, but it does emphasize  the
distinction  between  Myers, in which  there  was  evidence  that
psychotropic medications could be harmful, and the Huffmans case,
which does not include such evidence.
          In Myers we held that [b]ecause psychotropic medication
can have profound and lasting negative effects on a patients mind
and  body,  .  .  . statutory provisions permitting nonconsensual
treatment  with  psychotropic medications  implicate  fundamental
liberty  and privacy interests.34  The potential harm to patients
was  not necessary to our analysis, however.  We had already also
held  that the Alaska Constitution protects as fundamental rights
the ability of every individual to control her hairstyle35 and to
make her own reproductive choices.36  We believe controlling ones
medical  treatment  falls  into the  same  category  of  personal
physical  autonomy.  We now hold that the right to make decisions
about  medical  treatments for oneself  or  ones  children  is  a
fundamental liberty and privacy right in Alaska.37
          Because  we  are considering a burden on a  fundamental
right,  we next inquire whether the State has met its substantial
burden  of  establishing  that the  abridgment  in  question  was
justified  by  a compelling governmental interest.38   The  State
contends  that  it  has a compelling interest in  preventing  the
spread  of tuberculosis and believes that its goal outweighs  the
Huffmans interest in avoiding the PPD skin test.  The Huffmans do
not appear to contest that a compelling interest exists,39 instead
focusing  on  whether the regulation uses the  least  restrictive
means to achieve its objective.  We believe that the State has  a
compelling  interest in preventing schoolchildren from  spreading
tuberculosis.40
           The  final  step in a privacy analysis is  to  inquire
whether the State has demonstrated that no less restrictive means
could advance the compelling interest it has articulated.41   The
State has argued that [t]esting for latent TB infection through a
PPD  skin  test  is the least restrictive means to  achieve  this
interest  because, at present, it is the only means available  to
test  for  that  latent infection.  The Huffmans claim,  however,
that  7  AAC  27.213 does not meet this standard, describing  two
alternative tuberculosis tests that do not require inserting  any
substance  into the body.  They first refer to the  sputum  test,
which indicates the presence of an active tuberculosis infection.
Because PPD skin tests, by contrast, reveal latent infections and
can thus prevent exposure to other children before a tuberculosis-
infected student becomes contagious, we are unsure if the  sputum
test  achieves  the purposes of 7 AAC 27.213.  The Huffmans  also
discuss  the  QuantiFERON-TB Gold (QFT-G) test, which  tests  for
latent  tuberculosis infections in a blood sample  taken  from  a
patient.  The QFT-G test, though approved by the federal Food and
Drug Administration, is apparently not available in Alaska.   The
Huffmans express a willingness to travel with their children  out
of state to have it administered.
          We  do not have sufficient facts regarding the efficacy
of the QFT-G test to rule on this question.  The only information
about  the  test in the record before us is a short  fact  sheet,
available on the internet, from the Centers for Disease  Control.
We  recognize that it is a less restrictive alternative from  the
perspective  of  the  Huffmans but cannot say  whether  it  falls
importantly short of the goals achieved by administration of  the
PPD  skin  test.  If it does, the superior court should  consider
evidence  regarding other accommodations, such as  annual  sputum
tests,  to  determine if they adequately meet  the  States  needs
without unnecessarily infringing on the Huffmans rights.  If  the
QFT-G  test  or another type of test does not fail  to  meet  the
States  goals, the superior court must conclude that the relevant
test is an acceptable accommodation the Huffmans children can use
to  fulfill  the  tuberculosis  testing  requirement  for  school
attendance.
V.   CONCLUSION
          We AFFIRM the superior courts grant of summary judgment
to  the  State  regarding the Huffmans regulatory  and  religious
freedom claims.  We REVERSE and REMAND for consideration of  less
restrictive  alternatives its grant of summary  judgment  to  the
State regarding the Huffmans liberty and privacy claim.42
_______________________________
     1      The   record  in  this  case  provides  only  minimal
information about the relevant facts.  Because the Huffmans  lost
their  case  on summary judgment, we treat them as the non-moving
party  and draw all reasonable inferences of fact in their favor.
Cf. Scott v. Briggs Way Co., 909 P.2d 345, 346 n.3 (Alaska 1996).

     2     The record contains only unsigned copies of affidavits
indicating  they  are the statements of Patrick  Huffman  and  no
documents  signed by, or naming as their author, Dr.  Lamb.   The
State discussed the submission of affidavits from each individual
to  the  school district in a motion to dismiss that it filed  in
the superior court and does not argue now that the Lamb affidavit
does  not  exist  or  that Patrick Huffmans statement  was  never
signed.  We assume for purposes of this appeal that the documents
as  described  by  the  Huffmans were  submitted  to  the  school
district.

     3     This document is not in the record, but the State does
not  argue that the school district did not receive it,  and  the
districts  response to the Huffmans suggests it was  aware  of  a
religious objection.

     4     The  Huffmans  originally named  the  Kenai  Peninsula
Borough  School District as the only defendant; they  also  named
the  State  in  their amended complaint.  On appeal,  the  school
district  argued  it was improperly joined as  a  party  to  this
action,  and  we granted that unopposed request to  be  dismissed
from the case.  Thus the State is now the sole defendant.

     5    The school district also filed a response, opposing the
Huffmans  motion  only to the extent that it  could  be  read  to
compel the School District to violate state law.

     6    Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 181 P.3d 1084,
1089  (Alaska  2008) (citing DeNardo v. Bax, 147  P.3d  672,  676
(Alaska 2006)).

     7     Bodkin v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 182 P.3d 1072, 1076
(Alaska 2008) (citing Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046,
1049 (Alaska 2002)).

     8    7 AAC 27.213(a).

     9    7 AAC 27.213(e).

     10     7  AAC  27.213(f).  A child is also exempt  from  the
requirement  if  she  has had a negative PPD  skin  test  in  the
previous  six  months or has ever had a positive PPD  skin  test.
Id.

     11    151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

     12    Id. at 1258 (quoting AS 23.30.395(31)).

     13    7 AAC 27.213(f)(2).

     14    AS 08.64.380(6).

     15    AS 08.45.200(3).

     16    AS 08.45.050(3).

     17    See AS 08.64.170 et seq. (medicine); AS 08.45.020-.035
(naturopathy).

     18    AS 08.64.200.

     19    AS 08.45.030.

     20    The Huffmans argue in the alternative that their waiver
is  sufficient for substantial compliance because Dawn  Lamb  and
Patrick  Huffman specialize in family and child health  care,  so
their  qualifications surpass, for example, those  of  M.D.s  who
provide other types of care.  This argument fails.  Regardless of
their  specialties,  naturopaths do  not  have  the  training  of
physicians,  and the regulation requires a person  who  practices
medicine to sign a waiver.

     21     The federal constitution mandates that Congress shall
make   no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,   or
prohibiting  the  free exercise thereof.  U.S. Const.  amend.  I.
The  state  constitution commands that [n]o  law  shall  be  made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the  free
exercise thereof.  Alaska Const. art. I,  4.

     22     See  Employment Div., Dept of Human Res.  of  Or.  v.
Smith,  494  U.S.  872,  878-82 (1990),  superseded  by  statute,
Religious  Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.  103-141,
107 Stat. 1488.

     23    604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).

     24     Id. at 1071 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215, 216 (1972)).

     25    Id. at 1071-73.

     26     These cases predated Employment Division v. Smith and
so  apply  an earlier interpretation of the federal free exercise
clause  on  which we based our opinion in Frank.  See  Employment
Div.,   Dept   of  Human  Res.  of  Or.,  494  U.S.   at   881-82
(distinguishing  and effectively overruling prior  free  exercise
cases,  including Yoder); Frank, 604 P.2d at 1071 (citing  Yoder,
406 U.S. at 215, 216).

     27    See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (Thus, if the Amish asserted
their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much
as  Thoreau  rejected the social values of his time and  isolated
himself  at  Walden  Pond,  their claims  would  not  rest  on  a
religious  basis. Thoreaus choice was philosophical and  personal
rather  than  religious, and such belief does  not  rise  to  the
demands  of the Religion Clauses. . . . [W]e see that the  record
in  this  case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional
way  of  life  of  the Amish is not merely a matter  of  personal
preference,  but one of deep religious conviction, shared  by  an
organized  group, and intimately related to daily living.).   The
United  States  Supreme  Court addressed a  related  question  in
interpreting   a  statutory  provision  that  defined   religious
training and belief as an individuals belief in a relation  to  a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human   relation,  but  (not  including)  essentially  political,
sociological,  or philosophical views or a merely personal  moral
code.   United  States  v. Seeger, 380 U.S.  163,  171-72  (1965)
(alteration  in  Seeger) (citation omitted)  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).  The Court concluded that all sincere  religious
beliefs  which are based upon a power or being, or upon a  faith,
to  which  all  else  is subordinate or upon which  all  else  is
ultimately dependent satisfied the statutory requirement.  Id. at
176.

     28    See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483-
84  (10th Cir. 1996) (approving a list of five factors upon which
the  district  court below had relied in evaluating  a  purported
religion under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act,  42
U.S.C.    2000bb   et   seq.:   (1)   [u]ltimate   [i]deas,   (2)
[m]etaphysical  [b]eliefs, (3) [m]oral or [e]thical  system,  (4)
[c]omprehensiveness  of  [b]eliefs, and  (5)  [a]ccoutrements  of
[r]eligion); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir.
1981)  (offering three useful indicia of religion  to  assist  in
identifying it for purposes of constitutional claims: a  religion
(1)  addresses fundamental and ultimate questions  having  to  do
with  deep  and  imponderable matters, (2)  is  comprehensive  in
nature,  and  (3)  often can be recognized  by  the  presence  of
certain formal and external signs such as services, clergy,  etc.
(citing and quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir.
1979)   (Adams,   J.,  concurring))  (internal  quotation   marks
omitted)).

     29     Because we have determined that the Huffmans have not
presented  evidence that their beliefs qualify as a religion,  we
do  not  consider whether their objection to the  PPD  skin  test
arises  from religious convictions.  We do not question, and  the
State does not dispute, the sincerity of the Huffmans beliefs  as
expressed in their affidavits.

     30     Article I, section 1 provides, in relevant part, that
all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness,  and  the  enjoyment  of  the  rewards  of  their  own
industry.  Article I, section 22 states: The right of the  people
to  privacy  is  recognized  and  shall  not  be  infringed.  The
legislature shall implement this section.  Article I,  section  7
also  guarantees a liberty right: No person shall be deprived  of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

     31    138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006).

     32    Id. at 245-46 (citing and quoting Sampson v. State, 31
P.3d 88, 91 (Alaska 2001); quoting Ranney v. Whitewater Engg, 122
P.3d   214,  222  (Alaska  2005))  (internal  citations  omitted)
(alterations in Myers).

     33     The  State  does  not dispute, or even  discuss,  the
Huffmans  implicit  assumption that this right  extends  to  ones
children.

     34    Myers, 138 P.3d at 246.

     35     See  Breese  v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159,  169-70  (Alaska
1972).

     36     See Valley Hosp. Assn v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice,
948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 1997).

     37     Some  medical decisions, such as those  concerning  a
minors  reproductive privacy, may implicate a childs own personal
fundamental liberty and privacy interests.  See State v.  Planned
Parenthood  of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 40 (Alaska 2001)  (recognizing
that  [c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come  into  being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority
and that reproductive decisions have  uniquely personal physical,
psychological,   and  economic  implications   (quoting   Planned
Parenthood  of  Central  Mo.  v. Danforth,  428  U.S.  52  (1976)
(internal quotation marks omitted) and citing Valley Hosp.  Assn,
948 P.2d at 968)).

     38    Breese, 501 P.2d at 171 (requiring also a showing that
government   action   impaired  the  constitutionally   protected
interest).

     39    The Huffmans brief does appear to argue that the State
does  not  have a compelling interest in ensuring that Stone  and
Elias  in  particular receive the PPD skin test, noting that  the
State  allows  exemptions to and delays in  compliance  with  the
regulation.   The  compelling interests we recognize  in  privacy
cases,  however,  are not in restricting an individuals  behavior
but  rather  in accomplishing the general purpose  of  a  law  or
regulation by its broad application.  See infra note 40.

     40     Cf. Lawson v. Lawson, 108 P.3d 883, 887 (Alaska 2005)
(We  conclude  that  the  state  has  a  compelling  interest  in
supporting  children.); Pratt v. Kirkpatrick, 718 P.2d  962,  969
(Alaska 1986) (concluding the state has a compelling interest  in
enforcing  securities regulation statutes, [t]he primary  purpose
of  [which] is to protect the unwary and unsophisticated  members
of  the  general  public  from deceit  and  fraud  in  securities
transactions).

     41    Valley Hosp. Assn, 948 P.2d at 969.

     42     The  Huffmans  also challenge the  award  of  partial
attorneys  fees the superior court entered against them  pursuant
to  Civil Rule 82(b)(2) and AS 09.60.010(c).  We see no error  in
the  courts calculation but must vacate the award in light of the
reversal on appeal.

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