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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Huffman v. State (04/03/2009) sp-6354
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| PATRICK C. HUFFMAN, N.D., and | ) |
| AMY REEDY-HUFFMAN, C.P.M., | ) Supreme Court No. S- 12846 |
| ) | |
| Appellants, | ) Superior Court No. 3AN-06- 12969 CI |
| ) | |
| v. | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) No. 6354 April 3, 2009 |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Craig F. Stowers, Judge.
Appearances: Tim Cook, Cook & Associates,
Anchorage, Paul H. Bratton, Law Office of
Paul H. Bratton, Talkeetna, for Appellants.
James E. Cantor, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General,
Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
All public school children must be tested for
tuberculosis. State regulations require the use of a purified
protein derivative (PPD) skin test for this purpose. The test
may be waived if, in the opinion of a physician, it would be
injurious for a particular child.
The appellants, Patrick Huffman and Amy Reedy-Huffman,
believe that the PPD test would be injurious for their children.
They submitted an affidavit so stating signed by Patrick, who is
a naturopathic doctor. The Kenai Peninsula School District found
the waiver affidavit insufficient because state regulations
require such affidavits to be signed by a physician entitled to
practice medicine or osteopathy. Accordingly, the district
notified the Huffmans that their children would be excluded from
school unless they took PPD tests.
The Huffmans sued the school district and the State of
Alaska. They contended that the children were entitled to a
waiver and alternatively that the test requirement violated their
religious and liberty interests. From a summary judgment
rejecting these claims, they now bring this appeal. We hold that
although their waiver application was correctly rejected and they
did not show that their objections were religiously based, they
did present a plausible claim that their fundamental liberty
interests were infringed. We therefore remand with instructions
to determine whether the Huffmans fundamental right to make
decisions about their childrens medical treatment can be
accommodated by other tests that are acceptable to them while
also satisfying the compelling public health interests of the
State.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In August 2006 Patrick Huffman and Amy Reedy-Huffman
enrolled their sons Stone and Elias Huffman in fourth grade and
kindergarten, respectively, in public schools in the Kenai
Peninsula Borough School District.1 The schools informed the
Huffmans that, pursuant to a state regulation, Stone and Elias
could only attend if the children had a PPD skin test for
tuberculosis or qualified for a medical exemption. A PPD skin
test involves injecting a solution containing purified protein
into the skin on the forearm; a reaction signifies a latent or
active tuberculosis infection rather than the active disease.
The Huffmans submitted affidavits to the school district intended
to fulfill the requirements for medical exemptions for each son.
These documents were signed by Dr. Dawn Lamb, a naturopath, as
well as Patrick Huffman.2 The Huffmans also submitted an
objection to the tuberculosis test requirement on religious
grounds.3
In November the school districts health services
department informed the Huffmans that their children were
excluded from school as of December 15 or 16 for failure to
comply with the state regulation regarding tuberculosis testing.
The department sent an additional letter to the Huffmans
explaining that [w]e as a School District are not given any
latitude within which to respond to your concern regarding the
PPD skin test because the regulation, 7 Alaska Administrative
Code 27.213, requires a statement from an MD or DO and does not
include any provision for religious exemption.
The Huffmans filed suit in the superior court alleging
that (1) they had complied or substantially complied with the
requirement to obtain a medical exemption; (2) they had a liberty
interest, protected by the due process, equal protection, and
privacy clauses of the state and federal constitutions, to
determine matters affecting the health and well-being of their
minor children; and (3) the regulation violated their religious
freedom by excluding their children from public schools unless
they allowed their children to undergo a medical procedure
contrary to their religious beliefs.4 Both parents submitted
short affidavits to the court; these affidavits contain the only
evidence in this case regarding their free exercise claim.
Patrick Huffman stated in his affidavit that he sees religion not
only as a stated view of the world, but also as a practice in
which my beliefs are part of every aspect of my lifestyle choices
and that one of his fundamental beliefs is that the body [is] a
sacred vessel of the soul. Thus, he wrote, [i]t therefore runs
in stark opposition to our religion to introduce a substance into
the body which could potentially cause harm without any known
benefit to, and in the absence of any known . . . danger to our
childrens health status. In her affidavit, Amy Reedy-Huffman
said that it was her deeply held religious belief that to
introduce a potentially harmful substance into a healthy body is
wrong and irresponsible.
The State filed a motion to dismiss the Huffmans claims
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; the Huffmans also
filed a motion for summary judgment. The State filed an
opposition to the Huffmans summary judgment motion.5 In their
reply to the States motion, the Huffmans indicated that they
would be willing to have their children take either of two
alternative tests for the presence of tuberculosis: a sputum
test, which shows the presence of active tuberculosis, and the
QuantiFERON-TB Gold test, which they claimed was at least as
effective as the skin test in detecting latent TB. The superior
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, holding
that as a matter of law (1) the Huffmans had not complied or
substantially complied with the regulation requiring a PPD test
or waiver from a physician; (2) naturopaths were not physicians;
and (3) the Huffmans constitutional claims were invalid.
In December 2006, before their children were to be
suspended from school, the Huffmans requested a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the school district from excluding Stone
and Elias pending the outcome of the suit. They withdrew that
demand four days later because the State and district agreed to
allow the children to continue to attend school.
The Huffmans appeal, raising the same claims they
presented below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment with independent
judgment.6 Questions of statutory interpretation and
constitutional law are likewise reviewed de novo.7
IV. DISCUSSION
7 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 27.213 requires, in
relevant part, that all students new to a public school district
take a PPD skin test for tuberculosis within ninety days of
enrolling.8 The district shall suspend a child who does not
submit to such a test or provide a health care providers written
and signed statement that the child is not infectious from
tuberculosis to others.9 The regulation allows an exemption for
any child who provides the affidavit of a physician lawfully
entitled to practice medicine or osteopathy in this state stating
the opinion that the PPD skin test to be administered would be
injurious to the health and welfare of the child or members of
the family or household.10
The Huffmans claim that their waiver from a naturopath
fulfills the requirements of this regulation and that the
regulation violates their religious freedom, as well as their
liberty and privacy interests, under the state and federal
constitutions.
A. Waiver from a Naturopath Does Not Fulfill the
Requirements of 7 AAC 27.213.
The Huffmans contend that the district should have
treated the waiver they submitted, signed by a naturopath, as
sufficient to comply with 7 AAC 27.213(f). They argue that the
regulations reference to waiver by a physician includes the
statement of a naturopath. They rely on Thoeni v. Consumer
Electronic Services,11 in which we held that a psychologist could
be a physician under a statute that stated physician includes
doctors of medicine, surgeons, chiropractors, osteopaths,
dentists, and optometrists because that list was not exclusive.12
The State believes the text of the regulation at issue here the
waiver must be signed by a physician lawfully entitled to
practice medicine or osteopathy13 excludes naturopaths.
The statutory framework and language governing the
practice of medicine and naturopathy make clear that a
naturopaths signature is not sufficient for purposes of a 7 AAC
27.213(f) waiver. Chapter 64 of the states statutory code,
Medicine, defines the practice of medicine or practice of
osteopathy as providing diagnosis of or treatment for a mental
or physical condition for a fee or other consideration, as well
as to use or publicly display a title in connection with a
persons name including doctor of medicine, physician, M.D., or
doctor of osteopathic medicine or D.O. 14 Chapter 45 of the code,
Naturopaths, defines naturopathy as the use of hydrotherapy,
dietetics, electrotherapy, sanitation, suggestion, mechanical and
manual manipulation for the stimulation of physiological and
psychological action to establish a normal condition of mind and
body.15 The legislature has forbidden any person practicing
naturopathy from us[ing] the word physician in his title.16 The
licensing requirements for practicing medicine and practicing
naturopathy are distinct and contained in these separate chapters
of the code.17 Whereas a medical doctor must have attended an
accredited medical school and completed a hospital residency or
internship of sufficient length,18 naturopaths need only have
graduated from an accredited school of naturopathy and passed a
licensing examination.19 Because of these significant
distinctions in the training and practice of physicians and
naturopaths, in addition to the specific language of the
regulation, we conclude that the regulations requirement cannot
be fulfilled by a naturopath. Thus the Huffmans did not comply
with 7 AAC 27.213(f).20
B. 7 AAC 27.213 Does Not Infringe on the Huffmans Free
Exercise of Religion.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
article I, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution protect religious
freedom.21 The Huffmans argue that the application of
7 AAC 27.213 to their family violates these protections. The
Huffmans claim that their religious beliefs prohibit harming the
body, and the regulation unconstitutionally burdens the practice
of that tenet by preventing their children from attending school
unless they submit to a test that inserts a foreign substance
into their childrens skin.
A valid, neutral, generally applicable law cannot
violate the free exercise clause of the federal constitution.22
The regulation at issue here falls into that category and so is
not invalid under the First Amendment.
We apply the Alaska free exercise clause differently.
In Frank v. State,23 we articulated a threshold test for finding a
violation of religious freedom under the Alaska Constitution,
writing that [t]he free exercise clause may be invoked only where
there is a religion involved, only where the conduct in question
is religiously based, and only where the claimant is sincere.24
Our opinion in Frank did not directly address the preliminary
question of whether a religion was involved; our analysis focused
on the second prong of the test, relying on impressive evidence
concerning the religion of the Central Alaskan Athabascan people
to determine that moose hunting was a necessary component of a
religious ceremony.25
Federal cases have considered whether a nontraditional
belief system is sufficient to constitute a religion under the
free exercise clause and so are instructive here.26 The United
States Supreme Court has emphasized that a personal philosophy is
not equivalent to a religion.27 Subsequent United States Courts
of Appeals cases have endeavored to provide a more concrete
definition, focusing on how broad and fundamental an individuals
set of expressed beliefs are by considering factors such as
whether the premises of the religion relate to ultimate questions
and whether there are rituals or other activities associated with
it.28 The Huffmans do not profess to subscribe to any organized
religion. They rely solely on their affidavits as evidence of
their nontraditional religious beliefs. Their statements use the
terms religion and religious beliefs, but they discuss only an
opposition to putting harmful substances into the body. The
record provides no indication that the Huffmans feelings are
connected to a comprehensive belief system, set of practices, or
connection to ideas about fundamental matters. Without such
assertions or evidence, we believe summary judgment on this issue
was appropriate.29
C. Questions Remain as to Whether 7 AAC 27.213
Unconstitutionally Infringes on the Huffmans Privacy
Interest in Making Decisions About Their Childrens
Medical Treatments.
The Huffmans also argue that 7 AAC 27.213 interferes
with their liberty and privacy interests under article I,
sections 1 and 22 of the Alaska Constitution.30 The analysis
required to resolve an individual rights claim depends upon the
type of right asserted. We described the appropriate inquiries
in Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,31 a case contesting on
liberty and privacy grounds the states power to administer
psychotropic medications without a patients consent:
We determine the boundaries of
individual rights guaranteed under the Alaska
Constitution by balancing the importance of
the right at issue against the states
interest in imposing the disputed limitation.
When a law places substantial burdens on the
exercise of a fundamental right, we require
the state to articulate a compelling [state]
interest and to demonstrate the absence of a
less restrictive means to advance [that]
interest. But when the law interferes with
an individuals freedom in an area that is not
characterized as fundamental, we require the
state to show a legitimate interest and a
close and substantial relationship between
its interest and its chosen means of
advancing that interest.[32]
Thus, the threshold question is whether the Huffmans
are asserting a fundamental right. They argue that there is no
more fundamental right than that of a person to choose what
substances will be taken or introduced into the body.33 The State
does not expressly dispute that claim, but it does emphasize the
distinction between Myers, in which there was evidence that
psychotropic medications could be harmful, and the Huffmans case,
which does not include such evidence.
In Myers we held that [b]ecause psychotropic medication
can have profound and lasting negative effects on a patients mind
and body, . . . statutory provisions permitting nonconsensual
treatment with psychotropic medications implicate fundamental
liberty and privacy interests.34 The potential harm to patients
was not necessary to our analysis, however. We had already also
held that the Alaska Constitution protects as fundamental rights
the ability of every individual to control her hairstyle35 and to
make her own reproductive choices.36 We believe controlling ones
medical treatment falls into the same category of personal
physical autonomy. We now hold that the right to make decisions
about medical treatments for oneself or ones children is a
fundamental liberty and privacy right in Alaska.37
Because we are considering a burden on a fundamental
right, we next inquire whether the State has met its substantial
burden of establishing that the abridgment in question was
justified by a compelling governmental interest.38 The State
contends that it has a compelling interest in preventing the
spread of tuberculosis and believes that its goal outweighs the
Huffmans interest in avoiding the PPD skin test. The Huffmans do
not appear to contest that a compelling interest exists,39 instead
focusing on whether the regulation uses the least restrictive
means to achieve its objective. We believe that the State has a
compelling interest in preventing schoolchildren from spreading
tuberculosis.40
The final step in a privacy analysis is to inquire
whether the State has demonstrated that no less restrictive means
could advance the compelling interest it has articulated.41 The
State has argued that [t]esting for latent TB infection through a
PPD skin test is the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest because, at present, it is the only means available to
test for that latent infection. The Huffmans claim, however,
that 7 AAC 27.213 does not meet this standard, describing two
alternative tuberculosis tests that do not require inserting any
substance into the body. They first refer to the sputum test,
which indicates the presence of an active tuberculosis infection.
Because PPD skin tests, by contrast, reveal latent infections and
can thus prevent exposure to other children before a tuberculosis-
infected student becomes contagious, we are unsure if the sputum
test achieves the purposes of 7 AAC 27.213. The Huffmans also
discuss the QuantiFERON-TB Gold (QFT-G) test, which tests for
latent tuberculosis infections in a blood sample taken from a
patient. The QFT-G test, though approved by the federal Food and
Drug Administration, is apparently not available in Alaska. The
Huffmans express a willingness to travel with their children out
of state to have it administered.
We do not have sufficient facts regarding the efficacy
of the QFT-G test to rule on this question. The only information
about the test in the record before us is a short fact sheet,
available on the internet, from the Centers for Disease Control.
We recognize that it is a less restrictive alternative from the
perspective of the Huffmans but cannot say whether it falls
importantly short of the goals achieved by administration of the
PPD skin test. If it does, the superior court should consider
evidence regarding other accommodations, such as annual sputum
tests, to determine if they adequately meet the States needs
without unnecessarily infringing on the Huffmans rights. If the
QFT-G test or another type of test does not fail to meet the
States goals, the superior court must conclude that the relevant
test is an acceptable accommodation the Huffmans children can use
to fulfill the tuberculosis testing requirement for school
attendance.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior courts grant of summary judgment
to the State regarding the Huffmans regulatory and religious
freedom claims. We REVERSE and REMAND for consideration of less
restrictive alternatives its grant of summary judgment to the
State regarding the Huffmans liberty and privacy claim.42
_______________________________
1 The record in this case provides only minimal
information about the relevant facts. Because the Huffmans lost
their case on summary judgment, we treat them as the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences of fact in their favor.
Cf. Scott v. Briggs Way Co., 909 P.2d 345, 346 n.3 (Alaska 1996).
2 The record contains only unsigned copies of affidavits
indicating they are the statements of Patrick Huffman and no
documents signed by, or naming as their author, Dr. Lamb. The
State discussed the submission of affidavits from each individual
to the school district in a motion to dismiss that it filed in
the superior court and does not argue now that the Lamb affidavit
does not exist or that Patrick Huffmans statement was never
signed. We assume for purposes of this appeal that the documents
as described by the Huffmans were submitted to the school
district.
3 This document is not in the record, but the State does
not argue that the school district did not receive it, and the
districts response to the Huffmans suggests it was aware of a
religious objection.
4 The Huffmans originally named the Kenai Peninsula
Borough School District as the only defendant; they also named
the State in their amended complaint. On appeal, the school
district argued it was improperly joined as a party to this
action, and we granted that unopposed request to be dismissed
from the case. Thus the State is now the sole defendant.
5 The school district also filed a response, opposing the
Huffmans motion only to the extent that it could be read to
compel the School District to violate state law.
6 Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 181 P.3d 1084,
1089 (Alaska 2008) (citing DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672, 676
(Alaska 2006)).
7 Bodkin v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 182 P.3d 1072, 1076
(Alaska 2008) (citing Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046,
1049 (Alaska 2002)).
8 7 AAC 27.213(a).
9 7 AAC 27.213(e).
10 7 AAC 27.213(f). A child is also exempt from the
requirement if she has had a negative PPD skin test in the
previous six months or has ever had a positive PPD skin test.
Id.
11 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).
12 Id. at 1258 (quoting AS 23.30.395(31)).
13 7 AAC 27.213(f)(2).
14 AS 08.64.380(6).
15 AS 08.45.200(3).
16 AS 08.45.050(3).
17 See AS 08.64.170 et seq. (medicine); AS 08.45.020-.035
(naturopathy).
18 AS 08.64.200.
19 AS 08.45.030.
20 The Huffmans argue in the alternative that their waiver
is sufficient for substantial compliance because Dawn Lamb and
Patrick Huffman specialize in family and child health care, so
their qualifications surpass, for example, those of M.D.s who
provide other types of care. This argument fails. Regardless of
their specialties, naturopaths do not have the training of
physicians, and the regulation requires a person who practices
medicine to sign a waiver.
21 The federal constitution mandates that Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. Const. amend. I.
The state constitution commands that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. Alaska Const. art. I, 4.
22 See Employment Div., Dept of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488.
23 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
24 Id. at 1071 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215, 216 (1972)).
25 Id. at 1071-73.
26 These cases predated Employment Division v. Smith and
so apply an earlier interpretation of the federal free exercise
clause on which we based our opinion in Frank. See Employment
Div., Dept of Human Res. of Or., 494 U.S. at 881-82
(distinguishing and effectively overruling prior free exercise
cases, including Yoder); Frank, 604 P.2d at 1071 (citing Yoder,
406 U.S. at 215, 216).
27 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (Thus, if the Amish asserted
their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much
as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated
himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a
religious basis. Thoreaus choice was philosophical and personal
rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the
demands of the Religion Clauses. . . . [W]e see that the record
in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional
way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal
preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an
organized group, and intimately related to daily living.). The
United States Supreme Court addressed a related question in
interpreting a statutory provision that defined religious
training and belief as an individuals belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but (not including) essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1965)
(alteration in Seeger) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court concluded that all sincere religious
beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith,
to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent satisfied the statutory requirement. Id. at
176.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483-
84 (10th Cir. 1996) (approving a list of five factors upon which
the district court below had relied in evaluating a purported
religion under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.: (1) [u]ltimate [i]deas, (2)
[m]etaphysical [b]eliefs, (3) [m]oral or [e]thical system, (4)
[c]omprehensiveness of [b]eliefs, and (5) [a]ccoutrements of
[r]eligion); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir.
1981) (offering three useful indicia of religion to assist in
identifying it for purposes of constitutional claims: a religion
(1) addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do
with deep and imponderable matters, (2) is comprehensive in
nature, and (3) often can be recognized by the presence of
certain formal and external signs such as services, clergy, etc.
(citing and quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir.
1979) (Adams, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
29 Because we have determined that the Huffmans have not
presented evidence that their beliefs qualify as a religion, we
do not consider whether their objection to the PPD skin test
arises from religious convictions. We do not question, and the
State does not dispute, the sincerity of the Huffmans beliefs as
expressed in their affidavits.
30 Article I, section 1 provides, in relevant part, that
all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their own
industry. Article I, section 22 states: The right of the people
to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The
legislature shall implement this section. Article I, section 7
also guarantees a liberty right: No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
31 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006).
32 Id. at 245-46 (citing and quoting Sampson v. State, 31
P.3d 88, 91 (Alaska 2001); quoting Ranney v. Whitewater Engg, 122
P.3d 214, 222 (Alaska 2005)) (internal citations omitted)
(alterations in Myers).
33 The State does not dispute, or even discuss, the
Huffmans implicit assumption that this right extends to ones
children.
34 Myers, 138 P.3d at 246.
35 See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169-70 (Alaska
1972).
36 See Valley Hosp. Assn v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice,
948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 1997).
37 Some medical decisions, such as those concerning a
minors reproductive privacy, may implicate a childs own personal
fundamental liberty and privacy interests. See State v. Planned
Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 40 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing
that [c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority
and that reproductive decisions have uniquely personal physical,
psychological, and economic implications (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(internal quotation marks omitted) and citing Valley Hosp. Assn,
948 P.2d at 968)).
38 Breese, 501 P.2d at 171 (requiring also a showing that
government action impaired the constitutionally protected
interest).
39 The Huffmans brief does appear to argue that the State
does not have a compelling interest in ensuring that Stone and
Elias in particular receive the PPD skin test, noting that the
State allows exemptions to and delays in compliance with the
regulation. The compelling interests we recognize in privacy
cases, however, are not in restricting an individuals behavior
but rather in accomplishing the general purpose of a law or
regulation by its broad application. See infra note 40.
40 Cf. Lawson v. Lawson, 108 P.3d 883, 887 (Alaska 2005)
(We conclude that the state has a compelling interest in
supporting children.); Pratt v. Kirkpatrick, 718 P.2d 962, 969
(Alaska 1986) (concluding the state has a compelling interest in
enforcing securities regulation statutes, [t]he primary purpose
of [which] is to protect the unwary and unsophisticated members
of the general public from deceit and fraud in securities
transactions).
41 Valley Hosp. Assn, 948 P.2d at 969.
42 The Huffmans also challenge the award of partial
attorneys fees the superior court entered against them pursuant
to Civil Rule 82(b)(2) and AS 09.60.010(c). We see no error in
the courts calculation but must vacate the award in light of the
reversal on appeal.
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