Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions


Touch N' Go
, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother.

  This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
www.gottsteinLaw.com

You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Wolff v. Cunningham (07/08/2008) sp-6285

Wolff v. Cunningham (07/08/2008) sp-6285, 187 P3d 479

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


JANAY WOLFF, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 12263
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 3KN-04-889 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
RALPH CUNNINGHAM, )
individually and d/b/a IGLOO ICE, ) No. 6285 - July 11, 2008
)
Appellee. )
)
          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of  Alaska,  Third Judicial District,  Kenai,
          Charles T. Huguelet, Judge.

          Appearances:  Kenneth P. Jacobus, Kenneth  P.
          Jacobus,   P.C.,  Anchorage,  for  Appellant.
          William D. Artus, Anchorage, for Appellee.
                         
          Before:     Fabe,  Chief  Justice,  Matthews,
          Eastaugh, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          EASTAUGH, Justice.
          MATTHEWS, Justice, dissenting.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          In  2002  Janay  Wolff,  Ralph Cunningham,  and  Ronnie
Clanton  agreed that a $25,000 payment from Cunningham  to  Wolff
would  settle  a  business debt between Cunningham  and  Clanton,
remove a Child Support Enforcement Division lien from Cunninghams
real  property  in Soldotna, and satisfy Clantons  child  support
obligation.  When Cunningham failed to pay, Wolff filed  suit  to
enforce the agreement.
          The  superior court dismissed Wolffs complaint  because
it  held that enforcing the agreement would modify Clantons child
support  obligations in violation of Alaska Civil Rule  90.3  and
public  policy.   Because Clantons child support  obligation   is
distinct from Cunninghams obligation to pay Wolff, we reverse the
judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          Janay  Wolff  and Ronnie Clanton are the parents  of  a
child born in June 1978.  Wolff and Clanton divorced in 1980  and
Clanton was ordered to pay Wolff child support of $200 per month.
Clanton failed to stay current with his support payments, and  by
late  August 1991 his arrearages totaled $15,504.59.   In  August
1991   the  Alaska  Child  Support  Enforcement  Division  (CSED)
asserted a lien against Clantons real and personal property in an
effort to recover the child support arrearages.
          Ralph  Cunningham is Wolffs brother and Clantons former
business  partner.   Cunningham and Clanton  operated  Igloo  Ice
Inc.,  an ice-making business in Soldotna, as a partnership until
August 1992.  CSEDs lien covered Clantons interest in Igloo  Ice.
On  August  27, 1992 Clanton signed a Waiver of Claim whereby  he
waived  all  claims  he might have to any of the  real  property,
personal property, stocks or any other interest in any assets  of
IGLOO  ICE,  INC.  Also on August 27, 1992 Clanton and Cunningham
signed  an agreement not to compete that prohibited Clanton  from
competing against Cunningham and Igloo Ice.1  Clanton agreed  not
to  compete  against  Cunningham and Igloo Ice  in  exchange  for
Cunninghams  promise to pay CSED $15,504.59 plus interest  on  or
before  February  1,  1993, to satisfy CSEDs  August  1991  child
support lien.  Cunningham did not pay CSED per this agreement and
CSED did not remove the lien from Clantons property.
          In  June  1995  Clanton and Wolff sued  Cunningham  for
breach  of the non-competition agreement.  Before trial  on  this
suit was to begin, Clanton, Wolff, and Cunningham settled.  Their
settlement agreement was not filed with the court. Cunningham did
not pay in accordance with the settlement agreement.
          In  2002  Cunningham, Clanton, and Wolff signed  a  new
agreement,  titled  Promissory Note.  The  2002  promissory  note
states:
               As per agreement I, Ralph E. Cunningham,
          agree  to  pay Janay B. [Wolff]  twenty  five
          thousand  ($25,000) dollars by  the  31st  of
          October  2002.  Payments or portions  can  be
          made  before then and will be subtracted from
          any  balance  owing at that time.   When  the
          balance  has been paid, all obligations  from
          me  to Ronnie R. Clanton will have been  met,
          and   Ronnie   R.   Clantons  child   support
          obligations  to  Janay B. [Wolff]  will  also
          have  been met.  Any liens, encumbrances,  or
          judgments  involving myself or my  properties
          will  be dismissed, considered paid in  full,
          and  all conditions met.  If problems  should
          arise  with the release of any of the  liens,
          encumbrances,  or judgments involving  myself
          or my properties, Ronnie R. Clanton and Janay
          B.  [Wolff]  will make reasonable  effort  to
               facilitate that release.
          
          Cunningham did not pay Wolff the $25,000 as promised in
this  document.  Although  titled a  promissory  note,  the  2002
agreement  contains mutual promises and was signed by  all  three
parties.  Even though we refer to this document as the promissory
note, it was a contract.
          In September 2004 Wolff sued Cunningham in the superior
court  in Anchorage to enforce the 2002 promissory note.2  Wolffs
complaint  sought  damages  for emotional  distress,  back  child
support, and attorneys fees, and asked the court to foreclose  on
the  Igloo Ice property to satisfy the child support obligation.3
Cunningham responded, raised affirmative defenses, and moved  for
a  change  of  venue  to  Kenai.   The  court  ordered  the  case
transferred to the superior court in Kenai.
          Following transfer, Cunningham moved to dismiss  Wolffs
emotional  distress  claim; to dismiss  Wolffs  entire  claim  as
barred  by res judicata; and to quash CSEDs lien on the  Soldotna
property.  Cunninghams motion to quash CSEDs lien argued that the
lien  had  expired.   Wolff filed a motion  for  partial  summary
judgment  on  the  issue  of  Cunninghams  liability  under   the
promissory  note;  she  also  conceded  that  dismissal  of   her
emotional   distress  claim  was  appropriate  because   it   was
unsupported by Alaska law.
          In  May 2005 the court issued a memorandum decision and
order that dismissed Wolffs complaint in its entirety.  The court
held that res judicata did not apply to Wolffs claims; that CSEDs
lien  on  the  Soldotna  property was still  valid;  that  Wolffs
emotional    distress   claim   was,   as   Wolff   acknowledged,
appropriately dismissed given prevailing Alaska law; and that the
promissory  note  was unenforceable due to lack of  mutuality  of
obligation and consideration.

          In  May 2005 Wolff moved for partial reconsideration of
the  ruling that the promissory note is unenforceable because  it
lacks  consideration  and  mutuality of  obligation.   The  court
granted  the  reconsideration motion and asked both  parties  for
additional  briefing  on  contract  law.   After  receiving   the
supplemental  briefing, the court affirmed  its  May  2005  order
dismissing  Wolffs complaint.  The court based  its  reconsidered
decision  on  Alaska  Civil Rule 90.3 and public  policy  grounds
rather than on contract law.
          Because the court interpreted the promissory note as an
agreement  to  waive Mr. Clantons past and future  child  support
obligations,  it  held  that the promissory  note  could  not  be
enforced  without prior judicial approval and that entering  into
agreements  for the purpose of avoiding child support obligations
is a violation of public policy.  In August 2005, after the court
dismissed    Wolffs   complaint,   Wolff   filed   motions    for
reconsideration and for judicial approval of the promissory note.
The  court  did not respond to either motion.  Per  Alaska  Civil
Rule  77(k)(4),  the reconsideration motion was  deemed  denied.4
The superior court entered final judgment in February 2006.
          Wolff appeals.
III.      DISCUSSION
     A.   Standard of Review
          The  superior court dismissed Wolffs complaint  because
it  held  that  enforcement of the promissory note  would  modify
Clantons  child support obligations in violation  of  Civil  Rule
90.35  and  public policy.  We review the grant or  denial  of  a
motion  to  dismiss de novo.6  The superior courts interpretation
of  the civil rules presents a question of law that we review  de
novo.7  We also review the superior courts interpretation of  the
promissory note de novo.8
     B.   Neither  Civil  Rule 90.3 nor the Public Policy  Behind
          Civil   Rule  90.3  Bars  Wolffs  Enforcement  of   the
          Promissory Note Against Cunningham.
          
          Wolff argues that it was error to dismiss her complaint
because  the  promissory  note does  not  modify  Clantons  child
support obligations or violate public policy.  Cunningham  argues
in  response  that the promissory note is void because  it  lacks
mutual consideration, runs contrary to the relevant case law  and
statu[t]es,  and  allows  Clanton . . .  to  avoid  paying  child
support.  Because Cunninghams performance does not alter Clantons
child support obligations or violate public policy, we hold  that
Civil  Rule  90.3 does not bar either Cunningham  or  Wolff  from
enforcing the promissory note.
          Civil   Rule   90.3.    Cunninghams   argument     that
enforcement  of  the promissory note will modify  Clantons  child
support in violation of Civil Rule 90.3  is unavailing because it
does  not  correctly interpret the parties reasonable contractual
expectations  and  because it misconceives  Cunninghams  promised
$25,000  payment  to  Wolff  as  a  child  support  payment.   We
interpret  contracts  to  give effect to the  parties  reasonable
expectations  and attempt to give effect to all of the  contracts
terms, if possible.9
          Cunningham  has  three identifiable expectations  under
the  terms of the promissory note.  He can expect that a  $25,000
payment to Wolff will settle his business debt with Clanton; that
Clanton  will not become a competitor of Igloo Ice; and  that  he
will  receive  Clantons interest in Igloo Ice.10  The  promissory
note  also  gives  Cunningham a reasonable expectation  that  his
performance will reduce, and thus potentially discharge, the CSED
lien up to the amount of his payment.  Because neither Wolff  nor
Clanton promised more than their reasonable efforts to remove the
CSED  lien  and  because Cunningham could  not  know  in  advance
whether  the  $25,000  payment would fully  discharge  the  lien,
Cunningham can only expect a dollar-for-dollar reduction  to  the
amount of the lien.
          Cunninghams  identifiable promissory note  expectations
including the expectation of a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the
CSED  lien   do  not  waive  or  modify  Clantons  child  support
obligations.  Cunninghams $25,000 payment to Wolff does not alter
Clantons    child   support   obligations   because   Cunninghams
expectations  can  be  fulfilled  regardless  of  the  status  of
Clantons  arrearages; the $25,000 payment will secure Cunninghams
benefit of the bargain whether or not Clantons support obligation
          continues.  Civil Rule 90.3 therefore does not apply to the terms
of  the promissory note that require Cunningham to pay $25,000 to
Wolff.
          Public  Policy.   The  superior  court  held  that  the
promissory  note is an agreement to waive Mr. Clantons  past  and
future  child  support obligations and that it is a violation  of
public  policy to enter into such agreements for the  purpose  of
avoiding  child  support obligations.  An  agreement  that  would
excuse an obligor from his or her child support obligation would,
without court approval, violate public policy.11  But, because we
do not interpret the agreement between Wolff and Cunningham to be
an agreement to waive Clantons child support obligations, we hold
that  public  policy does not prohibit Cunningham or  Wolff  from
performing  and enforcing their obligations under the  promissory
note.12
          Enforcing  the clause stating [w]hen the [$25,000]  has
been paid, all obligations from [Cunningham] to Ronnie R. Clanton
will  have  been  met,  and  Ronnie  R.  Clantons  child  support
obligations to Janay B. Wolf[f] will also have been met does  not
violate  public policy when the clause is applied to  Cunninghams
obligations.  Because public policy can be applied to this clause
in  a  way that limits the effect of the clause without prejudice
to  Cunningham, Cunningham cannot escape performance.13  In other
words,  even if this clause were unenforceable by Clanton  absent
prior  judicial approval, the value of the bargain to  Cunningham
does  not  turn on the existence of the child support  obligation
portion of the clause.
             Furthermore,  Cunningham  appears  to  have  had  an
adequate commercial interest in making the $25,000 payment  given
his desire to obtain Igloo Ice free and clear of CSEDs lien.  And
given  that Wolff and Clanton promised to make reasonable efforts
to  remove the CSED lien, potentially including, as Wolff argues,
Clantons  obligation  to  make  reasonable  efforts  to  pay  any
remaining arrearages necessary to discharge the lien, Cunninghams
payment cannot be interpreted as a modification of Clantons child
support obligation.
          Because  Cunninghams obligations under  the  promissory
note do not alter Clantons child support obligation, it was error
to  dismiss  Wolffs complaint based on Civil Rule  90.3  and  the
public policy behind Civil Rule 90.3.
     C.   We Do Not Reach the Parties Other Arguments.
          Wolff argues that the promissory note is enforceable as
either a third-party beneficiary contract or as a promissory note
(negotiable  instrument)  under  AS  45.03.104(a).14   Cunningham
concedes  that  there is no question that the  parties  signed  a
promissory  note  with all of the requisite bells  and  whistles.
Because enforcement of the promissory note does not depend on its
legal  definition, we decline to classify the promissory note  as
either a third-party beneficiary contract or as a promissory note
(negotiable instrument).
          The  parties  raise  numerous  other  arguments.   But,
because the dismissal of Wolffs complaint was founded on a narrow
issue  of  public policy and because we reverse the  judgment  of
dismissal and remand for further proceedings, we do not  need  to
          address these other arguments.  Legal and factual disputes may
arise  on  remand and nothing in our decision today is  meant  to
restrict  the  superior courts consideration of those  issues  or
disputes.15
IV.  CONCLUSION
          Because  neither Civil Rule 90.3 nor the public  policy
behind Civil Rule  90.3 bars Wolffs enforcement of the promissory
note against Cunningham, we REVERSE the judgment of dismissal and
REMAND for further proceedings.
MATTHEWS, Justice, dissenting.
          Todays  opinion concludes that Cunningham did not  have
an   expectation  that  upon  payment  of  the  note  the  amount
underlying the lien on his property would be considered  paid  in
full  and the lien discharged.  I disagree.  The third and fourth
sentences of the promissory note state that
          [w]hen   the  balance  has  been  paid,   all
          obligations from me to Ronnie R. Clanton will
          have  been met, and Ronnie R. Clantons  child
          support  obligations to Janay B.  Wolff  will
          also have been met.  Any liens, encumbrances,
          or   judgments   involving   myself   or   my
          properties will be dismissed, considered paid
          in full, and all conditions met.
The  court  reads  the  promissory note as  giving  Cunningham  a
reasonable expectation that his performance will reduce, and thus
potentially  discharge, the CSED lien up to  the  amount  of  his
payment.1   But this understates the plain meaning of  the  note.
It  says  that  when  the balance ($25,000) has  been  paid  then
Clantons child support obligations to Wolff will . . .  have been
met and [a]ny liens . . . will be dismissed [and] considered paid
in  full.  (Emphasis added.)  The note clearly contemplates  that
the  payment of the $25,000 would fully discharge (and  not  just
reduce or potentially discharge) the CSED lien.2
          In   my  view,  the  superior  court  was  correct   in
considering  the promissory note as an agreement regarding  child
support  and  therefore  not  valid until  it  receives  judicial
scrutiny  under  Rule 90.3.3  In my opinion,  what  the  superior
court  should have done upon making this observation  was  review
the  note  and consider whether it should be approved.4   If  the
superior court had taken this step as of the time of its  initial
ruling  on  May 4, 2005, the record indicates that it would  have
found  that  the  amount necessary to discharge the  lien  was  a
little  less  than the amount of the note plus  interest.5   Thus
there  would have been no reason not to approve the  note  as  an
agreement  regarding support.  Although we do not  know  how  the
account  currently stands, it seems at least reasonably  possible
that  even  now  approval and enforcement of the  note  would  be
appropriate  and  would not retroactively  modify  child  support
arrearages.
          Based  on this rationale, I think the judgment  of  the
superior court should be reversed with directions to the court to
consider approving the note as an agreement regarding support.6
_______________________________
     1    See infra note 10.

     2     Wolffs  complaint named Cunningham,  individually  and
doing  business as Igloo Ice, and John Does I-X (unknown  parties
with  a  possible interest in Igloo Ices property) as defendants.
Ronnie  Clanton is not a named party.  The record  is  silent  on
whether Clanton has knowledge of this action.

     3      Wolff  renews her foreclosure request on appeal:  The
judgment  of the trial court should be reversed, and .  .  .  the
property  involved in this action [should] be ordered  foreclosed
and  sold  to  pay  all or part of [the $25,000  plus  interest].
Because   we   reverse  the  judgment  and  remand  for   further
proceedings, we do not need to consider her foreclosure request.

     4     Alaska  R.  Civ.  P.  77(k)(4) (  If  the  motion  for
reconsideration  has not been ruled upon by the court  within  30
days  from the date of the filing . . . the motion shall be taken
as  denied.); cf. Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167  P.3d
1240,  1262  (Alaska 2007) (stating a moving party  forfeits  the
right  to  appeal an issue raised in a motion left unresolved  by
the  trial court unless the party called the motion to the  trial
courts  attention  and  insisted on a  ruling  before  the  court
entered final judgment).

     5     Alaska  R.  Civ.  P.  90.3(h) (modification  of  child
support  awards);  see Nix v. Nix, 855 P.2d  1332,  1334  (Alaska
1993)  (stating  parental agreements waiving  child  support  are
invalid  until  they receive judicial approval under  Civil  Rule
90.3).

     6    McElroy v. Kennedy, 74 P.3d 903, 906 (Alaska 2003).

     7     Miller v. Clough, 165 P.3d 594, 599 n.8 (Alaska  2007)
(citing  Fuller  v.  City of Homer, 113  P.3d  659,  662  (Alaska
2005)).

     8     See  Dunlap v. Dunlap, 131 P.3d 471, 474 (Alaska 2006)
(We  review  a superior courts interpretation of a child  support
agreement  as we would review the interpretation of any contract,
de  novo.)  (citing Gaston v. Gaston, 954 P.2d 572,  574  (Alaska
1998));  cf. Hixson v. Sarkesian, 66 P.3d 753, 757 (Alaska  2003)
(The  interpretation of an agreement between  two  parties  is  a
question  of  law  to  which we apply our independent  judgment.)
(citing Flannery v. Flannery, 950 P.2d 126, 129 (Alaska 1997)).

     9    See Matanuska Elec. Assn v. Chugach Elec. Assn, 99 P.3d
553, 562 (Alaska 2004).

     10    Cunninghams expectations under the promissory note are
likely  similar  to his expectations under the  August  27,  1992
Agreement  Not  To  Compete.  In relevant part  the  August  1992
agreement states:

               THIS  AGREEMENT made this  27th  day  of
          August, 1992, by and between RONNIE CLANTON .
          .  .  hereinafter referred to as CLANTON, and
          RALPH  CUNNINGHAM and IGLOO ICE INC., .  .  .
          hereinafter referred to as CUNNINGHAM/IGLOO.
          
               WHEREAS,  CLANTON and CUNNINGHAM/  IGLOO
          wish   to   enter   into  a   Non-competition
          Agreement in consideration of the sum of .  .
          .  ($15,504.59).  CUNNINGHAM/IGLOO shall  pay
          said  sum  plus any accrued interest  to  the
          State  of  Alaska, Child Support  Enforcement
          Division  on or before February 1,  1993,  in
          payment of that certain Assertion of Lien for
          Child  Support . . . recorded on  August  23,
          1991  .  . . .  CUNNINGHAM/IGLOO acknowledges
          that  failure to pay the sum set forth  above
          shall  constitute a breach of this  agreement
          and  as  a  result  this agreement  shall  be
          deemed null and void.
          
               NOW  THEREFORE, in consideration of  the
          premises, the covenants made herein, the acts
          performed and to be performed by the  parties
          hereto, the parties have agreed and by  these
          presents  do  agree  to  the  following  non-
          competition agreement.
          
The  appellate  record contains only two pages of  the  five-page
1992  non-competition agreement.  It appears that this agreement,
if  fully  performed, would have precluded Clanton from competing
against  Cunningham and would have given Cunningham ownership  of
Igloo  Ice  unencumbered by CSEDs lien.  In August  1992  Clanton
also  signed  a Waiver of Claim that waived all claims  he  might
have  to  any of the real property, personal property, stocks  or
any other interest in any assets of IGLOO ICE, INC.

     11     Contracts  that waive child support  obligations  are
unenforceable  until they receive judicial  approval.   Nix,  855
P.2d  at 1334 (discussing Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Alaska
1989)).

     12    See Matanuska Elec. Assn, 99 P.3d at 562.

     13     Cunningham  argues that Evans v.  Jeff  D.  prohibits
enforcement  of  the promissory note because the context  of  the
note  cannot be separated from its contents, which violate public
policy.   475 U.S. 717, 727 (1986) (quoting Restatement  (Second)
of  Contracts   184 cmt. a (1981)).  Evans is not  applicable  in
this  case because it involved an interpretation of Federal  Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(e), and a federal statute, The Civil Rights
Attorneys Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.  1988, not the  state
rule, Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, that we construe here.  Evans,  475
U.S. at 727.

     14    AS 45.03.104 (negotiable instruments definition).

     15    At oral argument on appeal Wolffs attorney stated that
it  would be appropriate for this court to approve the promissory
note  as  an  agreement  regarding  support,  presumably  per  AS
25.27.065 and Nix, 855 P.2d at 1334.  Considering that the  child
was  over  eighteen  when  the promissory  note  was  signed  and
considering  that the difference between the amount necessary  to
discharge the lien and the amount owed under the promissory  note
may   now  be  relatively  small,  the  superior  court,  in  its
discretion,  might  determine  on remand  that  approval  of  the
promissory  note satisfies AS 25.27.065, Nix, and public  policy.
See Nix, 855 P.2d at 1334.

     1    Slip Op. at 8.

     2      The  court  relies  on  the  fifth  sentence  of  the
promissory  note which promises reasonable effort  to  facilitate
the  release  of any of the liens as proof that Cunningham  could
not  have  expected  that the $25,000 would fully  discharge  the
lien.  Slip  Op.  at 8; Slip Op. at 10.  But this sentence  seems
best read as a promise on behalf of Clanton and Wolff to help out
in  obtaining a lien release, not as a statement that  Cunningham
must  pay  the amount of the note even if the payment  would  not
result  in  the states lien being released.  Under this  reading,
the   third,  fourth,  and  fifth  sentences  in  the  note   are
reconcilable rather than conflicting.

     3      Nix  v.  Nix,  855  P.2d  1332,  1334  (Alaska  1993)
(discussing Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045 (Alaska 1989)).

     4     Instead, the superior court simply concluded that  the
agreement  was not enforceable because it was never presented  to
the  court  for approval.  A few days after the court  made  this
ruling  Wolff  moved  for approval of the note  as  an  agreement
related  to  child  support.  She contended that  the  note  with
interest  would when paid fully discharge arrearages.  The  court
made no ruling on this motion.

     5     See  Child  Support State of Account as of  April  30,
2005.  Despite the fact that the note is silent on the subject of
interest, Cunningham appears to have admitted that the note bears
interest.   Thus when asked by the superior court about liability
for  excess accounts due, Cunningham answered:  Defendant  admits
that the promissory note states plus interest, however denies the
note is collectable by Janay Wolff in this case.

     6     Could the court on remand approve the note if doing so
would  forgive a part of the outstanding arrearages?  Civil  Rule
90.3(h)(2), which prohibits the retroactive modification of child
support  arrearages, would seem to bar any such action.   On  the
other  hand,  one  may  question whether  a  slight  discount  in
arrearages  should  necessarily stand in  the  way  of  obtaining
substantial  satisfaction, given the age of the  arrearages   the
child  reached the age of majority in 1996  and the  difficulties
encountered in collecting them.  It is often a foolish policy  to
reject a very good result in pursuit of a perfect one.  It may be
that  the case would be seen as sufficiently compelling that  the
prohibition  on retroactive modification could be  relaxed  under
Civil  Rule  94.  In any event, this issue is only a hypothetical
possibility  at  this  point because payment  of  the  note  plus
interest might fully satisfy the outstanding arrearages.

This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
www.gottsteinLaw.com
Case Law
Statutes, Regs & Rules
Constitutions
Miscellaneous


IT Advice, Support, Data Recovery & Computer Forensics.
(907) 338-8188

Please help us support these and other worthy organizations:
Law Project for Psychiatraic Rights
Soteria-alaska
Choices
AWAIC