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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Williams v. Fagnani (11/23/2007) sp-6205
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| LEE WILLIAMS, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12192 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 3AN-02-12541 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| LARRY FAGNANI, | ) |
| ) No. 6205 - November 23, 2007 | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Mark Rindner, Judge.
Appearances: Hal P. Gazaway, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Randall Simpson and Cheryl
Mandala, Jermain, Dunnagan & Owens, P.C.,
Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Matthews, Eastaugh, Bryner, and
Carpeneti, Justices. [Fabe, Chief Justice,
not participating.]
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lee Williams and Larry Fagnani own adjacent parcels of
land, which were originally owned by Charles Harrison, a
homesteader. To obtain access to a nearby public road, Harrison
and other homesteading families constructed a small private road
from what is now Williams's property through part of a parcel now
owned by Fagnani. Although this road begins on a public section
line easement, a significant portion of it is on Fagnani's land.
No written easements grant Williams the right to use the portion
of the road on Fagnani's land. After Fagnani claimed that the
portion of the road on his land belonged to him, Williams sued
for access, claiming an easement under various legal theories.
The superior court concluded after trial that Williams has no
easement. Williams appeals. We conclude that because the road
was the only route to the Williams parcel when it was originally
severed from Harrison's estate, Williams is entitled to an
implied easement. We therefore reverse.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Lee Williams and Larry Fagnani each own parcels of land
that were once part of a Wasilla-area homestead settled by
Charles Harrison in 1959 and patented in 1964.1 Williams owns
what is now known as tax parcel C3 and Fagnani owns tax parcels
C5, C6, C7, and C8.2 In 1960, to obtain practical access to
their homesteads, Harrison and several other homesteading
families hired William Elkins to improve and widen an existing
wagon trail to make it drivable; as thus improved, this road
connected their properties to a trail that became Hollywood Road.
Part of the disputed road was built on a public section line
easement, but as Elkins later testified at trial, part was built
on Harrison's land because a steep ridge along the section line
prevented the entire road from following the section line
easement exactly. Elkins also testified that Harrison and the
other families knew that part of the road was on Harrison's land.
Following trial, the superior court found that "[t]he road was
built on Harrison's property with his permission and with the
clear intent that all of the original homesteaders would use the
road. At the time the road was built, all involved in its
construction recognized the road as the only practical way to
access the homesteads."
In March 1964 Harrison sold parcel C3 to the Blisses.
In 1997 the Blisses sold C3 to the Brookses, and in 2000, the
Brookses sold it to Williams. Harrison sold the rest of his land
(parcels C5, C6, C7, and C8) to the VanRyswyks in 1970. Fagnani
acquired C6 in 1978, C5 and C7 in 1992, and C8 in 1998. Parcel
C3 (the Williams parcel) is located north of C5, C6, C7, and C8
(Fagnani's land). The disputed road runs due south from the
southwest corner of C3 along the section line easement on the
western border of C5, and to the east of the section line
easement near the southern extent of C5 and for almost the entire
length of C8 until it connects to Hollywood Road.
Appendix A depicts the lots, the public section line
easement, and the disputed road. Lots 6, 7, and 8 are tax
parcels C6, C7, and C8. The curved, dotted line across parcel C8
represents the disputed road.
In 2002 Fagnani asserted that he owned the portion of
the disputed road that was located on his property. Fagnani
offered to give Williams and other neighbors temporary access to
the road if they would sign a written easement agreement. Two
months after Fagnani offered him a written easement, Williams
sued for access to the road.
Following a four-day trial in September 2005, the
superior court determined that Williams was not entitled to an
easement across Fagnani's land. The superior court found that
when the disputed road was built in 1960, "all involved in its
construction recognized the road as the only practical way to
access the homesteads," but concluded that Williams was not
entitled to an implied easement because his parcel "is not"
landlocked. (Emphasis in original.) The superior court also
concluded that Williams was not entitled to a prescriptive
easement, an oral easement by estoppel, an easement by necessity,
or an easement based on public dedication under RS 2477.
Williams moved unsuccessfully for a new trial.
Williams appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The dispositive question here - whether Williams has an
implied easement for the part of the disputed road on Fagnani's
property - presents a question of law. "We review questions of
law de novo and adopt the rule of law most persuasive in light of
precedent, reason, and policy."3
B. Williams Is Entitled to an Implied Easement To Use the
Disputed Road Across Fagnani's Property.
Williams advances various theories to support his claim
that he is entitled to an easement across Fagnani's land. He
argues, among other things, that because the disputed road
provided the only access to his property when Harrison sold the
parcel to the Blisses in 1964, he is entitled to an implied
easement. Fagnani seems to argue in response that the easement
was never "reasonably necessary" to the enjoyment of Williams's
property. Fagnani also argues that "the easement ceased to exist
when other means of accessing the property arose," and cites
Methonen v. Stone as support for this proposition.4
This case is resolved by our analysis of Williams's
claim of implied easement. An implied easement arises when there
is "(1) a quasi-easement at the time of contract of sale or
conveyance, (2) which is apparent, (3) reasonably necessary for
the enjoyment of the land retained or the land conveyed, and (4)
continuous in nature."5 Addressing the first and third elements,
Fagnani asserts that "there was no quasi-easement at the time of
the sale to Bliss," and that even if there was an easement at one
time, it was extinguished by the time Williams purchased the land
"because it was no longer `reasonably necessary.' " Fagnani does
not dispute the existence of the second and fourth elements of an
implied easement, so we will address only the first and third
elements.
As to the first element, a quasi-easement arises if a
person "make[s] use of one part of his land for the benefit of
another part."6 Williams argues that Harrison created a quasi-
easement because Harrison could only access the land that later
became the Williams parcel by using the disputed road. Williams
also argues that a quasi-easement arose because Elkins used the
road to clear what is now the Williams parcel for Harrison to
qualify for his homestead. Fagnani responds that no quasi-
easement existed when Harrison sold the parcel to the Blisses.
To support that assertion, Fagnani argues that Patrick Bliss
asked one of Harrison's successors in interest in parcel C8 for
permission to use the disputed road.
The superior court resolved the quasi-easement dispute
by concluding that "[t]here was no evidence presented of any . .
. quasi-easement granted by Harrison to Bliss."
We disagree with that legal conclusion. We do so based
on our review of the superior court's factual findings. The
superior court made two critical findings: that when it was
built, the disputed road was "the only practical way to access
the homesteads," and that the Blisses used the disputed road as
"their route of travel to the road and highway system." The
court made no finding that, as of 1964, there was any other
practical means of accessing the parcel (C3) that was sold to the
Blisses in that year. The court's only other potentially
relevant findings regarding access do not imply that between
1960, when the disputed road was built, and 1964, when the parcel
was sold to Williams's predecessor, there was any additional way
to gain practical access to the homesteads.7
Based on the superior court's factual findings, we
conclude that a quasi-easement existed as a matter of law when
Harrison sold the parcel to the Blisses in 1964 at a time when
the disputed road provided the only practical access to the
Blisses' parcel. This case is controlled by Freightways Terminal
Co. v. Industrial & Commercial Construction, Inc., in which we
held that the landowner, by building a road over one part of his
land so that another part of his land was connected to the road
system, had created a quasi-easement.8
That Bliss may have sought permission to use the
disputed road, as Fagnani contends, is irrelevant. Assuming that
Bliss did ask for permission to use the disputed road and
assuming that doing so reflected his subjective belief he had no
right of passage, that subjective belief would not defeat his
legal right to an implied easement. As to the third
element of the implied easement test, the easement must be
"reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the land . . .
conveyed."9 Williams argues that the easement was reasonably
necessary when Harrison sold the land to the Blisses because the
disputed road "provided the only route of travel" to what became
the Williams parcel. Fagnani responds that, according to our
holding in Methonen, an implied easement only continues as long
as it is "reasonably necessary."10 In his reply brief, Williams
argues that Norken Corp. v. McGahan should control.11 In Norken,
we held that "[h]aving once arisen, the implied easement is not
extinguished merely because the reasonable necessity ceases to
exist."12
We agree with Williams that Norken controls here.
Although Methonen is more recent than Norken, it is not on point.
It addressed an easement for access to a well, not an easement
needed for access to a landlocked parcel.13 Norken concerned a
road that provided access to a parcel that might have been
landlocked when the parcel was originally sold.14 In Norken, a
landowner named McGahan had used the disputed road to access
working gravel pits on his homestead.15 Based on the record in
Norken, we concluded that the parcel McGahan retained might have
been landlocked when he sold the rest of his land.16 Because the
superior court, reasoning that the property was not landlocked at
the time of trial, had denied McGahan an implied easement, we
remanded so the superior court could determine whether the parcel
had been landlocked at the time of severance.17 We held: "[T]he
existence of reasonable necessity is determined as of the time of
severance, because it is at that time that the implied easement
either does or does not arise. Having once arisen, the implied
easement is not extinguished merely because the reasonable
necessity ceases to exist."18
Here, the superior court found that the disputed road
was the practical means of access to the homesteads, including
what became parcel C3, in 1960 and did not find any change in
access as of 1964, at the time of severance.19 We therefore
conclude that the easement was "reasonably necessary" to the
enjoyment of the land.
Because the first and third elements have been
established, and the second and fourth elements are not
contested, we hold that it was error to conclude that Williams
did not have an implied easement permitting him to use the
portion of the disputed road on Fagnani's property. Having held
that Williams is entitled to an implied easement based on
undisputed facts, we need not consider whether he would be
entitled to an easement under any of the other legal theories he
advances.
Although the issue was not briefed, Williams's attorney
conceded at oral argument on appeal that the easement was limited
to thirty feet. Williams's attorney also stated at argument:
"He's not entitled to a bigger easement. He's not entitled to an
easement that allows him more intensive use than he now has."
Having concluded that Williams was not entitled to an easement,
the superior court did not consider what scope any easement
should have. We will therefore not address the scope of the
implied easement here.20
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that Williams is entitled to an
implied easement over the disputed road, we REVERSE and REMAND
for entry of judgment in Williams's favor.
_______________________________
1 Harrison's homestead is described in the findings of
fact as follows:
Seward Meridian, Township 17 North,
Range 2 West, of the Southeast 1/4 Southeast
1/4 (SE 1/4 SE 1/4) of Section 20 and the
North 1/2 Southwest 1/[4] Southwest 1/4
Northwest 1/4 (N 1/2 SW 1/4, SW 1/4 NW 1/4)
of Section 21.
2 Williams's parcel, C3, is described in a deed to the
prior owners as follows:
The Southwest one-quarter (SW 1/4) of
the Northwest one-quarter (NW 1/4) of Section
Twenty-one (21), Township Seventeen (17)
North, Range Two (2) West, Seward Meridian,
Alaska.
Fagnani's property is described in the findings of
fact as including tax parcels C5-C8 "of Section 21, Township 17N,
Range 2W."
3 Enders v. Parker, 125 P.3d 1027, 1029 (Alaska 2005)
(citation omitted).
4 Methonen v. Stone, 941 P.2d 1248, 1253 (Alaska 1997)
(stating that implied easement runs with the land "so long as it
. . . remains reasonably necessary" where landowner claimed
easement for water well) (citations omitted).
5 Demoski v. New, 737 P.2d 780, 783-84 (Alaska 1987)
(holding that superior court did not err by concluding that
implied easement existed where road was reasonably necessary to
enjoyment of homestead) (citations omitted).
6 Freightways Terminal Co. v. Indus. & Commercial
Constr., Inc., 381 P.2d 977, 983 (Alaska 1963).
7 See infra note 19.
8 Freightways Terminal Co. v. Indus. & Commercial
Constr., Inc., 381 P.2d 977, 983, 985 (Alaska 1963).
9 Demoski, 737 P.2d at 784.
10 Methonen, 941 P.2d at 1253.
11 Norken Corp. v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1991).
12 Id. at 631.
13 Methonen, 941 P.2d at 1249.
14 Norken, 823 P.2d at 630-31.
15 Id. at 624-25, 630-31.
16 Id. at 631.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Although the superior court did not expressly find that
the disputed road was the "only" practical means of access to the
parcel at the time of severance in 1964, this conclusion is
implicit because the court found that the disputed road was the
Blisses' "route of travel to [Hollywood] road and [the] highway
system." The court's findings describe the other routes to
access the Williams parcel, including the "Elkins Road," in the
present tense - there is no finding that these other routes
existed at the time of severance in 1964. Two of these routes
are easements, not roads, the third was built well after 1964 (in
2000 or 2001), and the fourth was Elkins Road, a road to the east
of the disputed road. Fagnani never argued at trial or on appeal
that Elkins Road existed in 1964 or that it gave practical access
to the Williams parcel in 1964, and Williams argued at trial and
on appeal that the Elkins road did not provide access to his
land.
20 We previously addressed the issue of the scope of
implied easements:
Easements appurtenant are readily
apportionable upon a subdivision of the
original dominant tenement. This means that
each part of the dominant tenement is
entitled to claim the benefit of the easement
for the service of his special segment. Some
increase in burden can result from the
increase in the number of users, but such
increase in burden is kept within limits by
the fact that any easement appurtenant has
its total extent defined by the needs of the
dominant estate.
Laughlin v. Everhart, 678 P.2d 926, 932 (Alaska 1984)
(adopting 3 Richard Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, The Law of Real
Property 418, at 34-218 (rev. ed. 1979)). See also Restatement
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes 4.10 (2000); R.W. Gascoyne,
Annotation, Right of Owners of Parcels Into Which Dominant
Tenement Is or Will Be Divided to Use Right of Way, 10 A.L.R.3d
960 (1966).
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