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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Villaflores v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (11/16/2007) sp-6201
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| CLARITO VILLAFLORES, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12309 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 3AN-05-7699 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| ALASKA STATE COMMISSION | ) |
| FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, | ) No. 6201 - November 16, 2007 |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge.
Appearances: Clarito Villaflores, pro se,
Anchorage. William E. Milks, Assistant
Attorney General, and Talis J. Colberg,
Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Clarito Villaflores applied for a job with an Anchorage
public utility and was not hired. Villaflores filed a complaint
with the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, alleging that
he had been discriminated against based on his age and race. The
commission, through staff, determined that Villafloress complaint
was not supported by substantial evidence because the utility
hired an applicant of the same race and age class as Villaflores,
and because Villaflores was not qualified for the job. In
seeking reconsideration, Villaflores did not dispute the
commissions rulings regarding his race and age discrimination
claims, but continued to argue that he was discriminated against
and that he was the most qualified applicant. The commission did
not reopen his case, and the superior court denied his appeal.
Because it is undisputed that the utility hired an applicant of
the same race and age class as Villaflores, he failed to make out
a prima facie case of discrimination. We therefore affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Clarito Villaflores applied for a job as a human
resources supervisor with Anchorage Water & Wastewater Utility
(AWWU) in April 2004. According to AWWUs job posting, the
minimum qualifications included a bachelors degree in human
resources or a related field and three years of human resources
experience, including one year of experience in conducting
investigations or settling grievances.1 Villaflores was not
interviewed, and another applicant was hired. Villaflores then
filed a complaint with the Alaska State Commission for Human
Rights alleging that he was discriminated against based on his
race (Asian) and his age (forty-five).
AWWU responded that it had hired an applicant who, like
Villaflores, was Asian and over forty years old; that it did not
interview Villaflores because he lacked the minimum
qualifications for the job; and that the analyst who determined
that Villaflores was not qualified did not know Villafloress age
and race. AWWU provided affirmative action data on all of the
candidates who applied, as well as copies of the applications
filed by Villaflores and the two women who received job offers.
The commissions staff determined that Villafloress
complaint was not supported by substantial evidence because the
hired applicant was of the same race and age class as
Villaflores. Commission staff also seemed to agree with AWWU
that Villaflores did not meet the minimum qualifications. The
commission closed Villafloress case.
Villaflores asked the commission to reconsider that
decision and to reopen his case because, although he no longer
disputed the issues of race and age discrimination, he disputed
the commissions ruling that he was unqualified.2 He did not
claim that he was discriminated against based on his membership
in a protected group. The commissions executive director
declined to reopen his case.
Villaflores appealed to the superior court, where he
argued that although he was in the same protected class as the
hired applicant, he could still pursue [his] case that [he was]
intentionally discriminated against by AWWU based on [his]
qualifications and/or credentials. The superior court affirmed
the commissions decision to close Villafloress case, concluding
that AWWUs minimum requirements and its decision that Villaflores
was not the most qualified applicant were reasonable.
Villaflores appeals pro se.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We independently review the merits of administrative
decisions.3 We review an agencys factual findings to determine
whether they are supported by substantial evidence.4 We review
questions of law not involving agency expertise under the
substitution of judgment test.5
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err when It Concluded that
Villafloress Complaint Was Not Supported by Substantial
Evidence.
Villaflores argues that although there are no issues of
race or age discrimination, he is still entitled to legal relief
under Millbrook v. IBP, Inc.,6 a case from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. The commission responds that Villaflores
failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination, that his
allegations of discrimination were not supported by substantial
evidence, and that Millbrook does not support his position.
Alaska Statute 18.80.220(a)(1) in pertinent part
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of a persons
race or age. To prove employment discrimination in a case in
which there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such
as this one, the complaining party must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.7 If the employer has filled the
position, the complainant must prove that (1) the complainant
belongs to a protected class; (2) the complainant applied for and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applications; (3) the complainant was rejected despite the
complainants qualifications;8 and (4) the employer hired an
individual [who was] not within the same protected class as the
complainant.9
Villafloress argument seems to assume that he did not
need to prove that the utility discriminated against him based on
his membership in a protected class. The first element of the
prima facie case is evidence that the complainant belongs to a
protected class.10 Villaflores is Asian and was over the age of
forty when he applied for the position, so he has established the
first element. But the fourth element of his prima facie case
required him to show that the person actually hired did not
belong to the same protected class (or classes) as the
complainant.11 As the commission argues, the applicant who was
hired was also Asian and over the age of forty, so she belonged
to the same protected classes as Villaflores. Because
Villaflores has failed to make out a prima facie case, the
commission did not err when it found that Villafloress complaint
was not supported by substantial evidence, and the superior court
did not err when it affirmed this determination.
Villaflores argues that he is entitled to prevail under
the rule announced in Millbrook.12 He seems to argue that
Millbrook requires an employer to hire the most qualified
applicant. We disagree with this reading of the case. The court
in Millbrook held that to prevail on a discrimination claim, the
employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
[A] jury verdict for the employee [on a discrimination claim]
cannot stand if the jury is simply disagreeing with the company
as to who is best qualified.13 Millbrook extends a great deal of
deference to an employers decisions unless there is evidence of
discrimination beyond the relative qualifications of the
candidates.14 In any event, Millbrook requires a complainant to
make out a prima facie discrimination case before qualifications
can even be discussed,15 and Villaflores failed to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Villaflores did not make out a prima facie case
of discrimination, we AFFIRM.
_______________________________
1 The utility permitted applicants without these
qualifications to substitute pertinent work experience or higher
education on a year-for-year basis.
2 His reconsideration motion stated: While I do not
dispute on the issues of race and age discrimination, the issue
at bar is on qualifications.
3 Raad v. Alaska State Commn for Human Rights, 86 P.3d
899, 903 (Alaska 2004) (stating standard of review in employment
discrimination case in which Lebanese Muslim woman alleged she
was not hired because of national origin, religion, and gender).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 903-04.
6 Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1184-85 (7th
Cir. 2002) (entering judgment as a matter of law against black
applicant who was not discriminated against because company hired
white applicant with better credentials).
7 Raad, 86 P.3d at 904.
8 Id. (citing Alaska State Commn for Human Rights v.
Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d 487, 490 (Alaska 1980) (holding that taxi
company illegally discriminated against women by refusing to hire
them)).
9 Id. at 904-05 (citing Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d at 492).
10 Id. at 904.
11 Id. at 904-05.
12 Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1177. Villaflores argues that
we must follow Millbrook under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Millbrook is not binding precedent in this case because it
involves an interpretation of a federal law, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., not the state
law, AS 18.80.220(a)(1), that we construe here.
13 Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1178.
14 Id. (citations omitted).
15 In Millbrook, the plaintiff made out a prima facie
case, and when the employer claimed it hired the most qualified
applicant, he argued that his qualifications were superior to
those of the person actually hired. Id. at 1174-75.
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