Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions

Touch N' Go
®, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother.

  This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.

You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. DeNardo v. Cutler (09/21/2007) sp-6171

DeNardo v. Cutler (09/21/2007) sp-6171, 167 P3d 674

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,


) Supreme Court No. S-11976
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-04-05427 CI
Appellees. ) No. 6171 - September 21, 2007
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, John E. Suddock, Judge.
Appearances:    Daniel
          DeNardo,  pro  se,  Anchorage.   Jennifer  M.
          Coughlin,   Preston  Gates   &   Ellis   LLP,
          Anchorage,  for  Appellees Louisiana  Cutler,
          Preston   Gates  &  Ellis  LLP   and   Alaska
          Cleaners,   Inc.   James  Cantor,   Assistant
          Attorney  General, Anchorage,  and  David  W.
          M rquez,   Attorney  General,   Juneau,   for
          Appellee Mark Rindner.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          CARPENETI, Justice

          I.   In this case Daniel DeNardo, for the third time, seeks a
determination that Superior Court Judge Mark Rindner  incorrectly
dismissed his lawsuit in DeNardo v. Alaska Cleaners, Inc.1 (first
lawsuit).   When that dismissal was on direct appeal before  this
court,  DeNardo failed to post a cost bond, and we dismissed  the
appeal  sua sponte in July 2004.  Two years later, in July  2006,
we  affirmed  the dismissal of DeNardos Alaska Civil  Rule  60(b)
motion to set aside the judgment in the first lawsuit.2  DeNardos
2006 claim was that the actions of Alaska Cleaners constituted  a
fraud  upon  the  court.   We rejected  DeNardos  claim  as  both
untimely  and inadequate on the merits.  In the present  lawsuit,
the third iteration of this case, DeNardo argues that the rulings
in the first lawsuit constituted an abuse of process, and DeNardo
has  named as parties Alaska Cleaners, Inc., the lawyer  and  law
firm  that  represented Alaska Cleaners in the first lawsuit,  as
well  as Judge Rindner, the presiding judge in the first lawsuit.
DeNardo  also  argues that he has a valid 42 U.S.C.   1983  claim
against everyone but Judge Rindner, whose dismissal from the case
is  not  at issue in this appeal.  DeNardo also argues  that  the
superior court erred in awarding attorneys fees to Judge Rindner.
We  conclude that DeNardo failed to establish the elements of  an
abuse  of  process or a 1983 claim, and that the  superior  court
properly  awarded  attorneys fees.  Accordingly,  we  affirm  the
superior courts decision in all respects.
     A.   Facts
          A.   Daniel DeNardo filed a previous lawsuit in federal court
against  his  employer, Alaska Cleaners, Inc.  alleging  unlawful
termination  due  to age discrimination. In that lawsuit,  Alaska
Cleaners  retained  Preston Gates & Ellis LP  (Preston)  for  its
defense,  and Louisiana Cutler, a Preston partner, was  primarily
responsible for the case. Because DeNardo did not wish to divulge
his address to opposing counsel (or provide a fax number), Cutler
and  DeNardo  stipulated  in a signed order  that  Preston  could
notify  DeNardo  by  phone of a document to be  served.   DeNardo
would  then  come to the Preston offices in Anchorage to  receive
hand delivery.  Under the agreement, service was deemed completed
as of 5 p.m. on the day the phone call was made.  Preston alleges
that  in  July 2003 the phone number provided by DeNardo  was  no
longer  in  service and DeNardo refused to provide  a  new  phone
number  or  a  physical  address.   DeNardo  sought  a  voluntary
dismissal of his federal case against Alaska Cleaners and refiled
the case in state court under Case No. 3AN-03-13497.
          DeNardos  state age discrimination claim was  heard  by
Judge  Rindner.   Alaska Cleaners filed a  motion  to  enforce  a
provision  similar to the service stipulation that  had  been  in
effect in the federal case, requiring DeNardo to provide either a
telephone  number  or  physical address.   DeNardo  opposed  this
          request, citing his right to privacy.  In January 2004 Judge
Rindner  issued  an  order requiring DeNardo  to  provide  Alaska
Cleaners with his physical address and a working telephone number
within  five days.  Judge Rindner noted that Civil Rule 76(d)(1)3
requires  parties  to  provide both a  telephone  number  and  an
address  and that, because it contemplates personal service,  the
requirement  of  a physical address is reasonable.   In  February
2004 Judge Rindner denied DeNardos motion for reconsideration  of
the Order Regarding Telephone Contact and Address.  Judge Rindner
advised DeNardo to dismiss the case or file a petition to  review
the  courts  order with the supreme court if he did not  wish  to
obey  the court order.  The judge warned that barring a reversal,
DeNardos  failure to comply with the court order would result  in
sanctions including, potentially, dismissal of the case.
          DeNardo did not comply with the court order and did not
appeal the order.  On February 23, 2004, Alaska Cleaners filed  a
motion  to  compel  compliance with  the  courts  order  and  for
sanctions.  In mid-March Judge Rindner dismissed the case without
prejudice  as  a  sanction for failing to comply with  the  court
order.   Judge  Rindner  entered a final  judgment  of  dismissal
without  prejudice on March 23, 2004.  On April  28,  2004  Judge
Rindner  granted  Alaska Cleanerss motion for Rule  82  attorneys
fees  in  the amount of $1,315.  DeNardo appealed to the  supreme
court  and  moved  to  waive the cost bond.  We  denied  DeNardos
motion  to  waive  the  cost bond, and when  he  failed  to  pay,
dismissed  the  appeal sua sponte for want  of  prosecution.   We
denied DeNardos subsequent petition for rehearing.
          In  July 2006 we heard a second iteration of this  case
when  we  affirmed the dismissal of DeNardos separate Civil  Rule
60(b) motion to set aside the judgment in the first lawsuit.4  We
held  that  his  motion was both untimely and inadequate  on  the
          DeNardos present lawsuit alleges that the dismissal  of
his  first lawsuit was a result of abuse of process and  violated
his rights to due process.
     B.   Proceedings
          A.   DeNardo filed the present lawsuit on March 22, 2004, before
his  motion for reconsideration of dismissal of the first lawsuit
had  been  ruled  upon.  DeNardo sued Alaska  Cleaners,  Preston,
Cutler,  and  Judge Rindner.  His central claims, as advanced  in
his amended complaint, alleged abuse of process, stating that the
defendants  conspired . . . to delay and dismiss  plaintiffs  age
discrimination action.  DeNardo also argued that he had  a  valid
42  U.S.C.   1983  claim  against Alaska Cleaners,  Preston,  and
Cutler,  and  that Civil Rule 5 did not require him to  give  his
telephone  number  and  thus  his  first  lawsuit  was   unfairly
dismissed.   DeNardos case was assigned to Superior  Court  Judge
John E. Suddock.
          On  April  6,  2004, Judge Rindner filed  a  motion  to
dismiss  the  action with respect to himself because of  judicial
immunity.   On  April  26, 2004, DeNardos answer  to  the  motion
apparently conceded that Judge Rindner did indeed have  immunity.
Judge Suddock issued a court order granting Judge Rindners motion
to  dismiss  on May 5, 2004, and issued a final judgment  on  all
          claims against Judge Rindner on July 6, 2004. The superior court
awarded Judge Rindner $1,275 in attorneys fees on August 5, 2004,
and denied reconsideration.
          In  February  2005 the remaining defendants  moved  for
summary judgment.  In April 2005 Judge Suddock granted the motion
for  summary  judgment  on  the basis of  (1)  res  judicata  and
collateral  estoppel, (2) a finding that DeNardos  complaint  did
not satisfy the elements of an abuse of process claim, and (3)  a
finding that the 42 U.S.C.  1983 claim failed as a matter of  law
because  the defendants were not acting under color of law.   The
order  noted  that any one of the above reasons would  have  been
sufficient  to  require  dismissal  of  DeNardos  claims.   Judge
Suddock  denied reconsideration of summary judgment  on  May  23,
2005.   DeNardo appealed to this court on June 22, 2005,  stating
that he was appealing the summary judgment of April 2005 and  the
denial  of  reconsideration of May 2005.  He  also  appealed  the
denial of his recusal motion and motion to compel discovery.   On
August  1, 2005, DeNardo amended his points on appeal to  include
the  grant  of  attorneys fees to Judge Rindner.   Judge  Rindner
included in his brief to this court a proposition that we  should
take  some  preventative  action  to  control  DeNardos  repeated
          At  issue on appeal is: (1) whether the superior  court
properly  dismissed DeNardos abuse of process claim; (2)  whether
the  superior court properly held that attorneys using the courts
are  not acting under color of law for the purpose of a 42 U.S.C.
1983  suit; (3) whether Judge Suddock (and Judge Dan A.  Hensley,
the  Third  Judicial Presiding Judge who reviewed Judge  Suddocks
decision)  erred in denying DeNardos motions to disqualify  Judge
Suddock; (4) whether the superior court erred in denying DeNardos
motion to compel discovery; (5) whether the superior court abused
its  discretion in awarding attorneys fees to Judge Rindner;  and
(6)  whether  this  court should take action to control  DeNardos
repeated filings.
          We   independently  review  the  decision  to   dismiss
DeNardos  42 U.S.C.  1983 and abuse of process claims on  summary
judgment,  drawing  all reasonable inferences  in  favor  of  the
nonmoving  party.6  We will uphold summary judgment  only  if  no
genuine  issue  of material fact exists and the moving  party  is
entitled  to  judgment  as a matter of  law.7   Additionally,  we
review  de  novo the question of  whether collateral estoppel  or
res judicata applies.8

          The  independent standard of review . .  .  applies  to
considering whether the trial court properly applied the law when
awarding attorneys fees,9 while we review for abuse of discretion
a  trial courts fact-based decisions as to whether attorneys fees
are reasonable and should be awarded.10  We will overturn an award
only when the award is manifestly unreasonable.11
     A.   The Superior Court Properly Dismissed DeNardos Abuse of
          Process Claim.
          A.   The abuse of process tort comprises two elements: (1) an
ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of the  process
not  proper  in  the  regular conduct of the  proceeding.12   The
ulterior  purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain  a
collateral  advantage, not properly involved  in  the  proceeding
itself,  such  as  the surrender of property or  the  payment  of
money,  but  the use of the process as a threat or a club.13   In
Kollodge v. State,14 we emphasized that the second element of the
tort  contemplates  some  overt  act  done  in  addition  to  the
initiating  of  the  suit,15  and noted  that  threatening  suit,
initiating  suit,  and requesting discovery did  not  qualify  as
overt  acts even if done for an ulterior purpose.  Similarly,  we
held  in  Meidinger v. Koniag Inc.,16 that actions taken  in  the
regular  course of litigation . . . cannot be a proper basis  for
an abuse of process claim.17
          DeNardo  claims that the appellees ulterior motive  was
retribution  because DeNardo had sued Alaska  Cleaners.   DeNardo
argues  further  that the appellees wanted to coerce  DeNardo  to
abandon his cause of action while they also, allegedly, wanted to
create  a  multiplicity  of  actions  and  appeals  substantially
increasing  the  costs and expenses of DeNardos  pursuit  of  his
[r]ight  of  action.   It  is clearly  incorrect  to  argue  that
appellees  sought  to have DeNardos case dismissed  in  order  to
create  more  appeals.   Additionally,  DeNardos  claim  is   not
sufficient  to  support  any inference that  the  appellees  were
attempting  anything  other than the successful  dismissal  of  a
lawsuit, which is not an ulterior motive.  For this reason alone,
the superior courts dismissal of the claim was proper.
          DeNardo  never asserts a clear willful act  other  than
the  filing  of  motions which were ruled  upon  favorably.   The
superior court did not err in holding that an action taken in the
regular course of litigation without an ulterior motive, such  as
the  defendants  filing of a motion to compel compliance  with  a
court  order, cannot serve as the basis for an abuse  of  process
     B.   The Superior Court Properly Dismissed DeNardos 42 U.S.C.
          1983 Claims Because No Defendant Was Acting Under Color of State
          DeNardo  also sued Alaska Cleaners, Cutler, and Preston
under  42 U.S.C.  1983.  That section provides a cause of  action
for  deprivation of rights against persons acting under color  of
any  statute,  ordinance, regulation, custom  or  usage,  of  any
State.18   In  West v. Atkins19 the United States  Supreme  Court
explained that [t]he traditional definition of acting under color
of  state law requires that the defendant in a  1983 action  have
exercised  power  possessed  by virtue  of  state  law  and  made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of  state  law. 20  The Supreme Court has also held that  lawyers
representing clients are not acting under color of state law:  It
is often said that lawyers are officers of the court. But . . . a
lawyer  representing  a  client is not, by  virtue  of  being  an
officer  of  the court, a state actor under color  of  state  law
within the meaning of  1983.21  Additionally, the court noted that
          the absolute immunity traditionally accorded judges [is]
preserved under  1983.22
          Private  parties may come under the reach of   1983  if
they conspire with a state actor.23  But where that association is
the  basis  for  the  necessary  state  action,  mere  conclusory
allegations   with   no   supporting   factual   averments    are
insufficient;  the  pleadings  must  specifically  present  facts
tending to show agreement and concerted action.24
          Alaska Cleaners is a private corporation, Cutler  is  a
private  citizen  not employed by the state,  and  Preston  is  a
private  law  firm organized as a limited liability  partnership.
As  appellees Cutler, Preston, and Alaska Cleaners note in  their
brief,  lawyers using a courtroom to engage in private litigation
are  not  acting  under color of state law, and  nothing  in  the
record  supports  the  notion that they conspired  with  a  state
actor.   Cutler  filed an affidavit specifically denying  any  ex
parte  communication  with  Judge Rindner  and  DeNardo  has  not
presented any evidence whatsoever of a conspiracy.
           DeNardo  alleges  that  Cutler,  Preston,  and  Alaska
Cleaners  acted under color of state law because they  could  not
obtain  dismissal [of the first lawsuit] but for the intervention
of  the state chancellor as a state actor pursuant to state court
procedures.   This  is  not sufficient to support  a  finding  of
conspiracy  with  a state actor and use of the  court  system  by
private  parties for the purpose of litigation is not  sufficient
to bring them under color of state law.  Thus, the superior court
correctly dismissed DeNardos  1983 claims.25
     C.   DeNardos Claims Regarding Judge Recusal and Motions  To
          Compel Discovery Need Not Be Addressed.
          A.   DeNardo also argues that Judge Suddock, the superior court
judge  who  heard this case, erred in failing to  recuse  himself
from  this  case  and abused his discretion in failing  to  grant
DeNardos requests to compel discovery.  Because DeNardos abuse of
process and  1983 claims are insufficient as a matter of law,  we
need  not reach the merits of DeNardos procedural complaints from
the present lawsuit.
     D.   The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding
          Attorneys Fees to Judge Rindner.
          In Hughes v. Rowe26 the United States Supreme Court held
that  in  order  for  attorneys fees  to  be  awarded  against  a
plaintiff  in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.  1983,  [t]he
plaintiffs  action  must be meritless in the  sense  that  it  is
groundless  or without foundation.27  The fact that  a  plaintiff
loses  his  case, standing alone, is not sufficient for  awarding
the  defendant attorneys fees.28 Judge Suddock specifically cited
Hughes  in  his  order  granting attorneys fees  and  found  that
DeNardos  action  more  than  met  the  standard,  declaring   it
vexatious  and  in  bad  faith.   The  Supreme  Court   held   in
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC29 that while bad faith is  not
required for an award of attorneys fees in the analogous  actions
brought  under  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act  of  1964,  its
presence  provides  an  even stronger  basis  for  charging  [the
plaintiff] with the attorneys fees incurred by the defense.30
          DeNardo misreads the law on this point and argues  that
          42 U.S.C.  1988 forbids the award of fees against plaintiffs
seeking to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C.  1983.  In support of
his  proposition he cites DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage.31
In  that case, this court found that although DeNardos action was
barred  by collateral estoppel, the award of attorneys  fees  was
improper  in  a civil rights claim [u]nless DeNardos  action  was
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.32  The court found
nothing   in  the  record  suggesting  that  DeNardos  suit   was
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.33  On the contrary,
the  trial court in that suit remarked in passing that his  claim
appeared to have merit.34
          The  record here is very different.  There is no reason
to  believe  that  the superior court abused  its  discretion  in
deciding that DeNardos claim met the standard of being frivolous,
nor  that  the  award  of  $1,275  was  manifestly  unreasonable.
DeNardo  may not sue a judge merely because he disagrees  with  a
ruling.35   That  he persisted in doing so despite  his  apparent
understanding of the law supports Judge Suddocks conclusion  that
he  initiated the action in bad faith.  We affirm Judge  Suddocks
award of attorneys fees.
     E.   Future  Action  To  Control DeNardos  Repeated  Filings
          Against Judges
          Though  not a formal point on appeal, Judge Rindner  in
his  brief  argues that this court should take action to  control
DeNardos  repetitive  pleadings, and in particular  his  lawsuits
against  judges.   Rindner  lists  nine  separate  lawsuits  that
DeNardo has filed against judges since he was informed in DeNardo
v.  Michalski that judges are immune from lawsuit even when  they
allegedly  violate  a partys rights.36  Judge Rindner  has  since
supplemented the record multiple times with new suits brought  by
          Judge   Rindner  focuses  on  DeNardos  multiple  suits
against judges, though he also notes that as of the time  of  the
filing  of  his brief, DeNardo had filed a total of  thirty-seven
known  cases since 1990 in state and federal court.  These suits,
like the instant case, are often repetitive reiterations of prior
lawsuits. Judge Rindner points out that
            [e]ach time DeNardo files another fruitless
          pleading  against  a judge,  the  judge  must
          obtain representation at public expense  from
          the  Office of the Attorney General.   It  is
          sometimes necessary for the judge to  provide
          notice  of that representation to parties  in
          litigation  unrelated to DeNardo because  the
          Attorney  Generals representation  can  raise
          conflicts  in other cases pending before  the
          judge.   This  raises the potential  need  to
          hire conflict counsel at public expense.
          Judge  Rindner makes compelling points about the  costs
to  the  court  system  and to the public of DeNardos  litigation
against  judges.   In many ways, moreover, judges  are  the  more
fortunate  of  DeNardos targets in litigation because  they  have
judicial  immunity  and  can extricate  themselves  from  a  case
          relatively quickly.           While rare, there is support in the
case  law  for court orders prospectively limiting the litigation
of a pro se litigant.  The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in In re
McDonald 37 that:
          Every  paper  filed with the  Clerk  of  this
          Court,   no   matter   how   repetitious   or
          frivolous,  requires  some  portion  of   the
          institutions limited resources. A part of the
          Courts  responsibility is to see  that  these
          resources  are  allocated  in  a   way   that
          promotes   the  interests  of  justice.   The
          continual processing of petitioners frivolous
          requests  for  extraordinary writs  does  not
          promote that end.  Although we have not  done
          so   previously,  lower  courts  have  issued
          orders  intended  to curb serious  abuses  by
          persons proceeding in forma pauperis.[38]
          Similarly,  American Jurisprudence  (Second)  addressed
this  topic in its section on Vexatious, frivolous, or oppressive
               Although  litigiousness alone  will  not
          support    an   injunction   restricting    a
          plaintiffs filing activities, the courts have
          the  authority to enjoin persons  engaged  in
          the  manifest abuse of the judicial  process,
          regardless    of   whether   the   threatened
          litigation   is   legal   or   equitable   in
          character,    or   whether   the    vexatious
          litigation  results from the  prosecution  of
          many  suits by the same individual,  or  from
          many  suits  by  different individuals.   The
          courts   may   take   creative   actions   to
          discourage hyperactive litigators so long  as
          some access to courts is allowed, such as  by
          limiting the amount of filings a litigant may
          make, and prescribing conditions precedent to
          those   filings   so  as  to  determine   the
          propriety of a suit on a case by case basis.
               . . . .
               That  the  plaintiff had objective  good
          faith  in  filing  vexatious  lawsuits  in  a
          Federal  District Court is not  a  factor  in
          determining  the  courts  power  to  exercise
          control  over abuse of that court as a  legal
          forum by enjoining future pro se pleadings  .
          . . .[39]
          While at least five states have statutory solutions  to
the  problem of vexatious litigants,40 courts also have  inherent
power to control this problem.41 The Ninth Circuit has held  that
courts  may  issue  orders restricting a persons  access  to  the
courts so long as they are based on adequate justification in the
record and narrowly tailored to the abuse perceived.42
          Control  of judicial resources is an important  concern
of  our court system.  A request for an injunction or other court
order  should be raised initially in the superior court in  order
to allow all parties the proper due process which must include  a
hearing,  adequate justification in the record,  and  a  narrowly
tailored order.  Because Judge Rindners request for a court order
controlling  DeNardos actions was raised for the  first  time  on
appeal, we decline to reach the merits of that request.
          Because  the superior court properly ruled on  DeNardos
claims,  we   AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment.  Because  the
award of attorneys fees was not an abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM
that award.  But because the request for an injunctive order  was
not  raised  in  the superior court, we decline  to  reach  Judge
Rindners suggestion that DeNardos future filings be restrained.

     1     Case  No.  3AN-03-13497 CI (Alaska Super.,  March  11,

     2     DeNardo v. Alaska Cleaners, Inc., Mem. Op.  &  J.  No.
1256, 2006 WL 1868489 (Alaska, July 5, 2006).

     3    Civil Rule 76(d)(1) provides:

          Attorney Information.  The name, address  and
          telephone  number  of the attorney  appearing
          for a party to an action or proceeding, or of
          a   person  appearing  in  propria  personal,
          should be typewritten or printed in the left-
          margin of the first page of the document .  .
          . .
     4     DeNardo v. Alaska Cleaners, Inc., Mem. Op.  &  J.  No.
1256 2006 WL 1868489 (Alaska, July 5, 2006).

     5    Id. at *1.

     6     Fuller  v.  City of Homer, 113 P.3d 659,  662  (Alaska

     7    Id.

     8     Renwick v. State, Bd. of Marine Pilots,  971 P.2d 631,
633 (Alaska 1999).

     9     Ellison  v. Plumbers & Steam Fitters Union Local  375,
118 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Alaska 2005).

     10    Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 998 (Alaska 2005).

     11    Id.

     12    Kollodge v. State, 757 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Alaska 1988).

     13    W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts  121, at 897 (5th ed. 1984).  See also Barquis v. Merchants
Collection Assn, 496 P.2d 817, 825 (Cal. 1972) (collection agency
abused process where it instituted suits in improper county  with
ulterior  purpose  of  making action more  difficult  to  defend,
thereby  forcing  adversary to default  or  to  settle  on  terms
favorable to agency).

     14    757 P.2d 1024 (Alaska 1988).

     15    757 P.2d at 1026.

     16    31 P.3d 77 (Alaska 2001).

     17    Id. at 86.

     18    42 U.S.C.  1983.

     19    487 U.S. 42 (1988).

     20     Id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 326 (1941)).

     21    Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).

     22     Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622,  637

     23     See  Sooner Prods. Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510,  512
(10th Cir. 1983).

     24    Id.

     25    Because we affirm the superior courts grant of summary
judgment  and  dismissal of DeNardos abuse of process  and   1983
claims,  we need not address the superior courts alternative  res
judicata and collateral estoppel grounds for decision.  See  M.J.
S.  v. State, Dept of Health and Soc. Servs., 39 P.3d 1123,  1126
n.12 (Alaska 2002) (Our decision affirming the superior court  on
this  ground makes it unnecessary to address the courts  findings
on alternative grounds . . . .).

     26    449 U.S. 5 (1980).

     27    Id. at 14.

     28    Id.

     29    434 U.S. 412 (1978).

     30    Id. at 422.

     31    775 P.2d 515 (Alaska 1989).

     32    Id. at 518.

     33    Id.

     34    Id.

     35     See  DeNardo v. Michalski, 811 P.2d 315, 317  (Alaska
1991)  (holding  that judicial immunity applies to  all  judicial
actions   within   the   scope  of  a   judges   subject   matter

     36    See id.

     37    489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989).

     38    Id.

     39     42  Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions  191 (electronic edition,
updated May 2006) (citing as examples of creative actions  courts
have  taken  Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329 (3d  Cir.  1990)
(require  prior leave of the court to file); In re  Vincent,  105
F.3d  943 (4th Cir. 1997); Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145  (6th
Cir.  1987); In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988);  Bd.  of
County  Commrs of Morgan County v. Winslow, 862 P.2d  921  (Colo.
1993) (litigant could no longer appear pro se); Howard v. Sharpe,
266  Ga.  771, 470 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1996) (require prior  judicial
approval);  Spickler  v. Dube, 644 A.2d 465 (Me.  1994)  (require
prior judicial approval) (other footnotes omitted).

     40     Cal. Civ. Proc. Code  391 (2006); Fla. Stat.   68.093
(2006);  Haw.  Rev.  Stat.   634J (2006);  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.
2323.52 (2006); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.  11.054 (2005).

     41     See  Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th  Cir.
1989)  (There is strong precedent establishing the inherent power
of federal courts to regulate the activities of abusive litigants
by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate

     42     De  Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1149 (9th  Cir.

This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
Case Law
Statutes, Regs & Rules

IT Advice, Support, Data Recovery & Computer Forensics.
(907) 338-8188

Please help us support these and other worthy organizations:
Law Project for Psychiatraic Rights