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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Katz v. Murphy (08/24/2007) sp-6149

Katz v. Murphy (08/24/2007) sp-6149, 165 P3d 649

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

REVA LEE KATZ, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 11886
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-04-13356 CI
)
CHARLES KENNETH MURPHY, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) No. 6149 August 24, 2007
)
Appeal    from     the
          Superior Court of the State of Alaska,  Third
          Judicial  District, Anchorage,  Mark  Rindner
          and John Suddock, Judges.

          Appearances:   Reva   Lee   Katz,   pro   se,
          Anchorage.  Charles Kenneth Murphy,  pro  se,
          Summerville, South Carolina.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh,  and Bryner, Justices.  [Carpeneti,
          Justice, not participating.]

          BRYNER, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          After   Charles   Murphy   petitioned   for   expedited
registration  and enforcement of a South Carolina custody  order,
the  superior  court  issued  an ex parte  warrant  and  writ  of
assistance authorizing Murphy, as provided in the custody  order,
to  take immediate custody of his son Zachary, who then lived  in
Anchorage  with his mother, Reva Katz.  The warrant also  allowed
Murphy to delay serving notice of his action on Katz until  three
days  after  executing the warrant.  Murphy obtained  custody  of
Zachary  and removed him from Alaska before Katz received  notice
of  his action.  Katz challenges the ex parte warrant and insists
that   Murphys  custody  order  is  unenforceable  because  South
Carolina  lacked  custody jurisdiction and  failed  to  give  her
adequate  notice.   We  hold  that the warrant  violated  Alaskas
Uniform  Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act  (UCCJEA)
because  it  was not based on a finding that Katz was  imminently
likely  to remove Zachary from Alaska and failed to provide  Katz
with an opportunity to contest registration before Murphy removed
Zachary from Alaska.  But since Katz later consented to the South
Carolina orders registration, we further conclude that the  order
was   properly  confirmed  and  that,  under  the   UCCJEA,   its
confirmation  precludes  Katz  from  contesting  enforcement   on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction or adequate notice.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          Reva  Katz  and  Charles Murphy married in  Georgia  in
1987.  Their adopted son Zachary was born in October 1991.   Katz
and  Murphy  divorced  in  1998.   A  Georgia  court  approved  a
settlement agreement in their divorce proceeding under which they
shared  legal  custody  while  Katz maintained  primary  physical
custody.   Murphy left Georgia after the divorce and  settled  in
South Carolina by 2002.  In the winter of 2003-2004 Katz moved to
Alaska  and  enrolled Zachary in the sixth grade at  Gladys  Wood
Elementary  school.   The  parties  dispute  exactly  when   Katz
established  residency in Alaska but agree that she arrived  here
no later than February 2004.
          In  June  2004  Murphy traveled to Alaska  to  pick  up
Zachary  and  take  him to South Carolina for visitation.   After
returning to South Carolina with Zachary, Murphy, represented  by
attorney  Gregory  S. Forman, filed a complaint  with  the  South
Carolina  Family  Court,  seeking  modification  of  the  Georgia
custody order to award sole custody of Zachary to Murphy.   South
Carolina  attorney James Brauchle filed a limited  appearance  on
Katzs  behalf to contest South Carolinas jurisdiction  to  modify
custody.   Family  Court  Judge Nancy C. McLin  held  an  initial
hearing  on  Murphys complaint in August 2004.  On September  25,
2004,   Judge   McLin   entered   an   order   addressing   Katzs
jurisdictional challenge and the issue of interim  custody.   The
court ruled that Zachary had sufficient ties to South Carolina to
give  the  court  jurisdiction  over  Murphys  motion  to  modify
Georgias  original custody order, finding that Georgia no  longer
had  jurisdiction  and  that  his ties  to  South  Carolina  were
stronger than his ties to Alaska.
          Although the court declined to award interim custody to
Murphy,  it  expanded  his  visitation  during  school  holidays,
directed  Katz  to  provide  him  with  Zacharys  current  school
schedule,  and  ordered Katz to pay for Zacharys flights  to  and
from  Alaska.   The court specified that [t]his  temporary  order
shall be without prejudice and each party may seek further relief
at  the  Final  Hearing.  It also appointed a guardian  ad  litem
(GAL),  Bobbie  Smith,  to  conduct a custody  investigation  and
prepare  a  report on the issue.  Soon after, Smith  traveled  to
Anchorage  to  interview Katz and visit  with  Zachary;  in  mid-
November  she submitted a report to the court expressing concerns
about  Zachary and recommending counseling for Zachary  and  both
parents.
          In  early  November, Murphy filed  a  motion  in  South
Carolina   for   an  order  establishing  firm  dates   for   his
Thanksgiving  visitation and compelling Katz to send  Zachary  to
South  Carolina during that time.  Murphy alleged that the  order
was  necessary because Katz had sent an e-mail informing him that
she   would  not  be  sending  Zachary  to  South  Carolina   for
Thanksgiving.  Family Court Judge William J. Wylie, Jr. conducted
an  expedited hearing on the motion on November 19.  Katzs  South
Carolina  attorney,  James Brauchle, attended  the  hearing.   On
November  22 Judge Wylie issued an order directing Katz  to  make
Zachary  available for visitation in South Carolina from November
25  to November 28 and to pay Zacharys transportation costs.  The
order  further specified that if Katz failed to comply, the court
would consider an immediate change of custody.
          Katz  failed  to  send Zachary to  South  Carolina  for
Thanksgiving visitation.  On November 29, 2004, Murphy moved  for
an  expedited order granting him sole physical and legal  custody
of Zachary.  Judge Wylie held a hearing on the motion on December
15,  2004.  Murphy appeared at the hearing with his attorney  but
neither  Katz  nor her attorney attended, though they  were  both
served  with  the motion.  At the conclusion of the hearing,  the
court  stated  that  it  intended to  grant  Murphys  motion  for
custody.   In  a written order issued the same day,  Judge  Wylie
began  by noting that the court had earlier determined that South
Carolina  had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the  original
Georgia  custody  order.  Judge Wylie then  determined  that  the
court  also had personal jurisdiction over Katz.  Citing a  South
Carolina  procedural rule that requires a motion  to  dismiss  to
specify all grounds relied on for dismissal,1 the judge concluded
that  Katz  had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction  by
appearing at the original hearing and contesting only the  courts
subject-matter  jurisdiction.  Based on Katzs failure  to  comply
with  visitation orders and evidence of her apparent  failure  to
address  Zacharys behavioral problems, Judge Wylie found that  an
immediate  change of custody to Murphy would be in Zacharys  best
interests.  Accordingly, the judge modified the existing  custody
order by awarding sole physical custody of Zachary to Murphy with
supervised visits within South Carolina to Katz.
          Meanwhile,  the day before Thanksgiving,  November  24,
2004, Katz had filed paperwork with the Alaska Superior Court  in
Anchorage,  seeking  to  register the  original  Georgia  divorce
decrees  custody and support provisions.  Katz served  Murphy  by
mail  with a copy of her pleadings and a form notice and  request
that  allowed  him to request a hearing to contest  registration.
On  December  13, acting pro se, Murphy signed and  returned  the
hearing  request, shortly before the South Carolina court  issued
its  order  granting  Murphys expedited  motion  for  custody  of
Zachary.   In  the  space allotted on the form  for  stating  his
defense to Katzs request to register the Georgia order in Alaska,
Murphy  wrote:  I  have  never lived in Alaska.   Alaska  has  no
jurisdiction.   Georgia order[] needs to be registered  in  South
Carolina for child support.
          On  December 16, 2004  the day after the South Carolina
court   granted  Murphy  immediate  custody  of  Zachary   Alaska
          attorney S. J. Lee filed an ex parte action on Murphys behalf
with   the   superior  court  in  Anchorage,  seeking   expedited
registration  and  enforcement of South Carolinas  three  custody
orders,  including  the  December 15 order  awarding  custody  of
Zachary  to  Murphy.   Murphy also sought an  ex  parte  writ  of
assistance authorizing law enforcement officials to assist in the
transfer  of  custody of the minor from Ms.  Katz  to  him.   His
motion for the ex parte warrant alleged:
          Mr.   Murphy  has  a  reasonable  belief   or
          expectation  that Ms. Katz will  flee  Alaska
          with  the  minor should she obtain notice  of
          this  action on his part.  She has many times
          threatened to disappear with the minor should
          Mr.  Murphy  ever  pursue or obtain  custody.
          She has dual citizenship with Israel and is a
          flight  risk  due  to these and  other  facts
          outlined   in   more  detail  in  petitioners
          attached affidavit and Exhibit 4 [a  copy  of
          the GALs report].
          In  an accompanying affidavit, Murphy briefly recounted
the  procedural  history  of  the  case  in  South  Carolina  and
professed  to  believe  and fear that if Reva  is  given  advance
warning of this action, that she will take Zachary and flee.   To
support  this  belief, Murphy asserted that Reva  has  repeatedly
told  me that if I ever tried to move for custody of Zachary,  or
got it, she would disappear and Ill never see Zachary again.   He
further  claimed  that Katz had the means and the  motivation  to
take  Zachary  away because she had relatives  in  New  York  and
Florida and dual citizenship in the United States and Israel.  In
addition, Murphy attached a copy of GAL Smiths report.
          Although Murphys motion for an ex parte warrant claimed
to be supported by applicable Alaska statute, the UCCJA, it cited
no  specific  provision of Alaska law authorizing  the  ex  parte
relief  he  sought.  Nor did Murphy reveal in his pleadings  that
Katz  had recently filed a petition in Anchorage to register  the
original  Georgia  custody order.  Without this  information  the
superior court apparently had no immediate way to recognize  that
two  competing registration actions involving custody of the same
child were simultaneously pending.
          In  a  proposed  Order Regarding Ex  Parte  Motion  for
Enforcement  & Writ of Assistance, Murphy sought leave  to  serve
all  relevant documents on Katz after the transfer of custody  to
him  of  the minor; the proposed order left a blank line for  the
court  to  determine the exact number of days after the  transfer
when service on Katz would be required.  An accompanying Writ  of
Assistance  &  Order  of  Enforcement  proposed  to  direct   law
enforcement  officers to assist Murphy, or any of his  designated
agents  or  attorneys in enforcing the State of  South  Carolinas
Order of 12/15/04, which specifically awards Mr. Murphy immediate
physical  custody of his son, the minor Zachary Murphy.   Neither
of  these  proposed  orders included any provision  for  a  post-
seizure  hearing on Murphys request to enforce the South Carolina
orders;  nor  did they impose any conditions designed  to  ensure
Zacharys   continued   presence  in  Alaska   pending   a   final
determination of that issue.
          On  December 17, 2004, the day after Murphy  filed  his
action,  Anchorage  Superior  Court Judge  Mark  Rindner  granted
Murphys  requests for expedited enforcement and an ex parte  writ
of  assistance.   The  court found that good  grounds  exist  for
granting  Mr.  Murphys request for ex parte relief  and  directed
Murphy  to  serve all documents filed by him . . . on  Reva  Katz
within 3 days after the transfer of custody.
          Anchorage  police officers took custody of  Zachary  on
December  19  and  immediately transferred  him  to  Murphy,  who
returned  the  child to South Carolina.  Murphy  served  Katz  by
mailing a form notice of registration and other pleadings to  her
on  December  22,  2004, the third day after he took  custody  of
Zachary.   Katz  did  not receive notice of Murphys  registration
action until the documents were delivered several days later.  It
is undisputed that by then, Zachary had left Alaska.
          Upon  receiving the notice of registration from Murphy,
Katz filed a timely request with the superior court for a hearing
to  contest  registration.  Katzs request revealed that  she  was
separately seeking to register the Georgia decree.  The  superior
court  consolidated the two cases and assigned both  for  hearing
before Superior Court Judge John Suddock on February 16, 2005.
          Katz   attended  the  February  16  hearing   and   was
represented  by attorney Allen Bailey.  Murphys Alaska  attorney,
Lee,   appeared   for  him  in  Anchorage;  Murphy   participated
telephonically,  along with his South Carolina attorney,  Forman.
At the outset, Judge Suddock asked the parties to summarize their
positions.   Bailey  indicated that  Katz  wanted  the  court  to
register  both  the  South Carolina and Georgia  custody  orders,
giving the South Carolina order priority for the time being.   He
explained  that  South Carolina had already assumed  jurisdiction
over the issue of custody but that Katz was pursuing an appeal of
that  ruling  in South Carolina; accordingly, Bailey  wanted  the
Georgia  order to be registered so that it could be  enforced  if
Katz prevailed in her appeal:
          It  would  be  our suggestion then  that  the
          court  register the orders in date  order  so
          that  the  South  Carolina is  the  effective
          order  since it was last entered  until  such
          time  if,  as,  and when the  South  Carolina
          court  of  appeals reverses the trial  court.
          If it is not reversed, then the order remains
          the more recent court order and is subject to
          enforcement  here  if  Mr.  Murphy  needs  to
          enforce something here.
          In   response,  Murphys  attorneys  pointed  out   that
Georgias order had already been superceded by South Carolinas and
therefore  could  no  longer be registered.  Judge  Suddock  then
asked Bailey, Why should I register a relic?  When Bailey replied
that we believe theres a high likelihood that [the South Carolina
order] will be reversed on jurisdiction, the judge inquired,  Why
not  come  back  to  me  when that occurs? Bailey  accepted  this
invitation, answering, We can do that.
          Based   on  Baileys  response,  Judge  Suddock  granted
Murphys  request to register South Carolinas order and  dismissed
Katzs  competing request to register the original Georgia  order,
but  specified  that  the  order of dismissal  would  be  without
prejudice.   The  judge  later issued written  orders  confirming
these on-record rulings.
          About   two   weeks  after  the  hearing,   Katz,   now
representing herself, asked the court to reconsider  its  ruling.
Katzs  pro  se motion for reconsideration argued that  the  South
Carolina  courts  custody orders should not have  been  enforced,
because South Carolina lacked subject matter jurisdiction and had
failed  to  give  her  adequate notice of its  proceedings.   Her
motion  also  challenged the ex parte order authorizing  Zacharys
seizure  and  transfer  to Murphys custody,  arguing  that  these
actions  violated  the protections established in  AS  25.30.490.
The superior court denied reconsideration summarily, stating that
Ms. Katz should make her arguments to the South Carolina court.
          Katz then filed this appeal, renewing the points raised
in her motion for reconsideration.
          While  Katzs appeal was pending, Murphys South Carolina
modification action proceeded to trial on the issue  of  Zacharys
permanent custody.2  On August 2, 2006, the South Carolina Family
Court  issued  its final order on the matter.  After  summarizing
the  procedural  history of the case, Judge Wylie  revisited  the
issue  of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that, [b]ecause
both  at  the  time of filing, and at the time  of  trial,  South
Carolina had at least as significant a connection with the  child
as  Alaska did, and because the child was physically present here
when  this action was filed, the court believes that jurisdiction
and  venue are proper in Dorchester County, South Carolina.   The
court  then entered findings of fact and conclusions of law  that
awarded  sole  legal and physical custody of Zachary  to  Murphy,
granted  Katz reasonable supervised visitation in South Carolina,
and directed Katz to pay child support.
III.      DISCUSSION
          In  appealing the superior courts decision to  register
and  enforce  South Carolinas custody orders, Katz  raises  three
points   two jurisdictional and one procedural.  Initially,  Katz
asserts  that  the  South  Carolina  orders  were  defective  and
unenforceable  because  the South Carolina  Family  Court  lacked
subject  matter and personal jurisdiction.  She argues  that  the
court should have permitted her to contest these issues in Alaska
because  she  received inadequate notice of  the  South  Carolina
proceedings  and  therefore never fully litigated  issues  there.
Katz  additionally  asserts  that  the  superior  court  violated
procedural   protections  established   under   Alaska   law   by
immediately  transferring custody of Zachary  to  Murphy  without
giving  her  prior  notice or an opportunity to  contest  Murphys
motion  to register the South Carolina order.  Katz urges  us  to
vacate  the  registration of those orders, to  assert  home-state
jurisdiction  over  custody  and  support,  and  to  restore  the
provisions of the original Georgia orders.
          In response, Murphy accuses Katz of perjury and blatant
misrepresentations.  He disputes many details of her descriptions
of  the  parties marital history, their conduct after separation,
          Katzs move to Alaska, Zacharys upbringing and needs, and the
procedural history of their custody dispute.  Relying on his  own
account of the disputed events, Murphy defends the South Carolina
orders  and  urges  us  to  affirm the superior  courts  decision
allowing those orders to be registered and enforced in Alaska.
          We  turn first to Katzs procedural challenge, and  then
consider her jurisdictional claims.
     A.   The Unconditional Transfer of Custody to Murphy Without
          Giving Katz Prior Notice and an Opportunity To Be Heard
          Violated the UCCJEA.
          1.   Statutory background
          Katz  challenges the superior courts December 17, 2004,
ex   parte  orders,   which  enforced  South  Carolinas   custody
determinations   by  granting  Murphy  immediate,   unconditional
custody  of Zachary and directed Alaska law enforcement  officers
to  assist  Murphy in obtaining custody.  She insists that  these
orders  lacked  an  adequate  factual  basis  and  violated   the
procedural protections guaranteed under AS 25.30.490 by depriving
her  of  prior  notice and an opportunity to  contest  the  South
Carolina  custody  orders  before  Murphy  removed  Zachary  from
Alaska.
          To  help frame our analysis of Katzs claim, we begin by
describing   the  provisions  of  Alaskas  UCCJEA3  that   govern
enforcement  of  child  custody orders issued  by  other  states.
These  provisions strive to establish a simple,  dependable,  and
orderly  process  allowing  out-of-state  custody  orders  to  be
enforced  in  Alaska when they are validly issued and  remain  in
effect.   The  process established in the UCCJEA comprises  three
distinct    requirements:   registration,    confirmation,    and
enforcement.
          Under  AS  25.30.410, Alaska courts must recognize  and
enforce a child custody determination of a court of another state
so long as the other state had jurisdiction and its determination
has  not been modified by another properly entered order.4   When
the  other  states order is found to meet these criteria,  Alaska
courts may use any enforcement remedy available under Alaska  law
to enforce the other states custody order.5
          To  determine whether an out-of-state order  meets  the
UCCJEAs  enforcement criteria, the act requires  the  parent  who
seeks  enforcement to register the order in an Alaska  court  and
requires the court in which the registration occurs to notify the
responding  parent  and  provide an opportunity  to  contest  the
registration.6
          Alaska  Statute  25.30.430 defines this basic  process.
Under subsection .430(a), the parent seeking to register an  out-
of-state  order must send a letter of request to the  appropriate
Alaska  court, together with two copies of the order, a statement
attesting that it remains current, and the names and addresses of
both  the  requesting parent and the parent  or  person  who  has
custody under the order.7
          Subsections .430(b) and (c) require the court  to  file
the  out-of-state judgment and its accompanying documentation and
to  serve  notice on all persons named in the request,  providing
them  with  the  opportunity to contest the  registration.   This
          notice must specify that a registered out-of-state order is
enforceable  upon registration in the same manner  as  an  Alaska
court  order,  that  a  hearing to contest registration  must  be
requested  within twenty days, and that failure  to  contest  the
registration will result in the orders confirmation and will  bar
any   later  challenge  that  could  have  been  asserted  before
confirmation.8
          Subsection  .430(d)  gives the  responding  parent  the
burden  of proving that a challenged custody order should not  be
confirmed.   It also limits the scope of a permissible  challenge
to  three  narrow  issues:  whether the  out-of-state  court  had
jurisdiction  to  enter the order; whether the  order  was  later
modified  by  another court having jurisdiction; and whether  the
out-of-state court gave the responding parent adequate notice  of
its proceedings.9
          Subsection .430(e) specifies that in the absence  of  a
timely  request  for  a  hearing, the  registered  order  becomes
confirmed  as a matter of law and that the court must inform  all
persons  served of the confirmation.10  Last, subsection  .430(f)
provides  that, once confirmed  whether by operation  of  law  or
after a hearing  the registered order may no longer be challenged
on  any  ground  that could have been asserted  at  the  time  of
registration.11  Once registered and confirmed, the  out-of-state
order  becomes  enforceable in the same manner as a determination
issued by a court of this state.12
          Although section .430 lays out the procedural framework
to  be  used in a typical registration case, other provisions  of
the  UCCJEA  allow  these procedures to be streamlined  when  the
requesting parent establishes circumstances calling for expedited
enforcement  or  placing a child in imminent danger  of  harm  or
removal from the state.
          Alaska  Statute  25.30.460 adopts expedited  procedures
for   enforcing   out-of-state   custody   orders.    Under    AS
25.30.460(a), when a parent files a petition requesting expedited
enforcement of a foreign custody determination, the petition must
be  verified and must attach a certified copy of the out-of-state
order   and  any  prior  Alaska  order  confirming  that   orders
registration.13   In  addition,  under  subsection  .460(b),  the
petition must provide detailed information concerning the out-of-
state  orders procedural background and the nature of the  relief
that the petitioner seeks from the court.14
          Once   the  expedited  petition  is  filed,  subsection
.460(c)  requires the court to issue (and usually  to  serve)  an
order directing the respondent to appear at a hearing on the next
judicial  day  after service of the order or,  if  that  date  is
impossible,  on  the  first judicial day possible.15   Subsection
.460(d)  further requires the court to specify the time and  date
set  for  the hearing and to advise the respondent that,  at  the
hearing, unless the respondent establishes that the custody order
is  unenforceable, the court will order that the  petitioner  may
take immediate physical custody of the child.16
          At the hearing on expedited enforcement, the court must
grant  immediate custody to the petitioner unless the  respondent
shows  the  out-of-state  order to  be  unenforceable.17   Alaska
          Statute 25.30.480(a) describes two alternative methods to defeat
enforcement:  the first method, which applies if the out-of-state
order has not yet been confirmed, matches the method specified in
AS  25.30.430(d)18 for defeating confirmation at a  non-expedited
confirmation hearing; the second method, which applies if the out-
of-state  order has already been confirmed, allows the respondent
to   defeat  enforcement  only  by  showing  that,  since   being
confirmed, the order has been modified, vacated, or stayed  by  a
court having jurisdiction.19
          One  other  enforcement provision  of  the  UCCJEA  has
crucial  importance here:  AS 25.30.490 authorizes Alaska  courts
to  take  immediate ex parte protective measures when the  moving
party  establishes a serious risk to the child.   This  provision
allows  a parent seeking to enforce an out-of-state child custody
order  to  file  a  verified application for the  issuance  of  a
warrant  to  take physical custody of the child if the  child  is
imminently likely either to suffer serious physical harm or to be
removed  from this state.20  Once the application is filed,  [i]f
the court, on testimony of the petitioner or other witness, finds
that  the  child is imminently likely to suffer serious  physical
harm or to be removed from this state, it may issue a warrant  to
take physical custody of the child.21
          But  while the warrant authorizes the police  to  seize
the  child  without prior notice to the respondent,  the  seizure
does  not  eliminate the need for a prompt, adversary hearing  to
decide  if  the  out-of-state custody order  is  eligible  to  be
confirmed and enforced.  Specifically, when a court issues an  ex
parte  warrant  and writ of assistance under section  .490,  that
provision unequivocally requires that, just as in any other  case
involving  a  petition for expedited enforcement, [t]he  petition
must  be  heard  on the next judicial day after  the  warrant  is
executed  unless  that date is impossible.  In  that  event,  the
court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible.22
Section  .490  requires  the court to ensure  that  all  relevant
paperwork  in  the  case  is served on the  respondent  when  the
seizure  occurs: The respondent must be served with the petition,
warrant,  and  order immediately after the child  is  taken  into
physical custody.23  Likewise, section .490 further requires that
the  application  for  the warrant must  include  the  statements
required for petitions under AS 25.30.460(b)24  that is, it  must
set  out the same background information required when a petition
seeks expedited enforcement of an out-of-state custody order.25
          Section .490 commands that the warrant must
          (1)    recite the facts on which a conclusion
          of  imminent serious physical harm or removal
          from the state is based;
          
          (2)   direct law enforcement officers to take
          physical  custody  of the child  immediately;
          and
          
          (3)   provide for the placement of the  child
          pending final relief.[26]
          
Last, in addition to requiring the court to make provision in the
warrant  for  the placement of the child pending final  relief,27
section .490 specifically empowers the court to impose conditions
on placement of a child to ensure the appearance of the child and
the childs custodian at the hearing on confirmation.28
          As  can  be  seen, then, section .490 allows courts  to
issue ex parte warrants authorizing immediate seizure of children
in  UCCJEA registration disputes, but only as an interim  measure
to  protect them from imminent danger of serious harm or  removal
from   the  state  pending  final  relief.29   The  final  relief
contemplated  by  this  provision  is  an  order  of  enforcement
issuable  only  after  the responding party (1)  receives  notice
immediately after the child is taken into physical custody;30 and
(2)  has the opportunity to contest enforcement at a hearing that
must be held on the first judicial day possible after the warrant
is  executed.31 And in the interim between the childs seizure and
the ensuing hearing, the court must provide for the placement  of
the child,32 bearing in mind the need to ensure the appearance of
the child and the childs custodian at the hearing.33
          In  short, nothing in section .490 or elsewhere in  the
UCCJEAs enforcement provisions authorizes the court to approve an
ex  parte  seizure  and  transfer of custody  that  is  seemingly
permanent,  imposes no requirement to appear  at  a  post-seizure
hearing,  and  thus  leaves  the new  custodial  parent  free  to
immediately  remove the child from the state.34  Indeed,  besides
undermining   the   UCCJEAs   orderly   three-step   process   of
registration,  confirmation, and then enforcement,  an  order  of
this  sort would fundamentally subvert section .490s core purpose
of  protecting against the childs immediate removal  from  Alaska
pending final relief.35
          2.   The  ex  parte  orders granting  Murphy  immediate
               unconditional custody and enabling him  to  remove
               Zachary from Alaska before Katz received notice of
               his action violated the UCCJEA.
          With this statutory framework in mind, we turn to Katzs
claim  that  the  superior court erred in authorizing  Murphy  to
seize  custody  of  Zachary and remove him  from  Alaska  without
giving  Katz  notice of Murphys registration action or  affording
her the opportunity to be heard.
          As  we  detailed above in the statement  of  facts  and
proceedings,  on  December 16, 2004,  the  day  after  the  South
Carolina  court  issued its order awarding  him  custody,  Murphy
petitioned   the  superior  court  in  Anchorage  for   expedited
registration and enforcement of that order and applied for an  ex
parte warrant directing law enforcement officers to assist him in
obtaining immediate custody.  Murphys pleadings failed to  comply
with the requirements of the UCCJEA in several respects.
          Although  Murphy expressly moved for expedited  relief,
his proposed notice of registration used the notice form required
in a non-expedited registration proceeding: it called for service
by  mail and a confirmation hearing to be scheduled only if  Katz
asked  for a hearing within twenty days.  Murphys proposed notice
thus   failed   to  recognize  that,  in  expedited   enforcement
proceedings,  AS 25.30.460(c) requires the court  to  immediately
issue  an order providing notice of the action and directing  the
          respondent to appear in person before it on the next judicial day
after service.
          Similarly, although Murphys application for an ex parte
warrant  purported to be supported by applicable Alaska  statute,
the UCCJA, Murphy failed to cite any specific provision of Alaska
law  supporting  the  relief he requested.  Rather,  his  warrant
application  completely  disregarded  AS  25.30.490s   provisions
requiring  that notice of the action be served immediately  after
execution of the warrant;36 that a hearing on confirmation be held
on the next judicial day after the warrant is executed;37 and that
the  court  provide  for  placement of the  child  pending  final
relief.38
          By  the  same  token, because Murphy  also  disregarded
these requirements in the proposed order and warrant he submitted
to  implement  his  warrant application, his proposed  order  and
warrant  forms impermissibly allowed delayed service  of  notice,
failed  to  provide for an immediate hearing  on  the  day  after
execution,  and seemingly authorized an immediate and  apparently
permanent  transfer of custody, establishing no interim placement
provision  to  bar Murphy from immediately removing Zachary  from
Alaska.
          In  addition  to incorporating these procedural  flaws,
Murphys  application for ex parte relief articulated an  improper
substantive standard for granting relief.  The UCCJEA  allows  an
ex  parte  warrant  to  be issued only [i]f  the  court,  on  the
testimony  of  the petitioner or other witness,  finds  that  the
child is imminently likely to suffer serious physical harm or  to
be  removed  from this state.39  Here, Murphy did not allege  any
potentially serious physical harm to Zachary and did not claim or
purport  to  show any imminent likelihood that Katz would  remove
Zachary  from Alaska.  He simply asserted a reasonable belief  or
expectation that Ms. Katz will flee Alaska with the minor  should
she obtain notice of this action.  And he based this belief on  a
brief  and  mostly  conclusory affidavit.  The  only  recent  and
specific   information  Murphy  provided  were   the   statements
attributed  to  Katz in GAL Smiths report.  Smith  reported  that
Katz had told her that what was happening [in Alaska] was none of
the  [South Carolina] Courts business, that no body was going  to
take  [Zachary] away, and no matter what [the GAL] wrote or  what
the Court said that he would not have to leave her.
          Despite his reliance on these statements, Murphy failed
to  disclose  the complete context in which they were  made.   In
November 2004 Katz had petitioned the superior court in Anchorage
to  register  the original Georgia custody order,  which  awarded
physical custody of Zachary to her.  Although GAL Smith  may  not
have known at the time she wrote her report that Katz intended to
file  a  registration petition in Alaska, by  mid-December,  when
Murphy  filed  his  ex parte application for enforcement,  Murphy
unquestionably  knew  of  Katzs  competing  registration  action.
After  all,  he had responded to Katzs petition for  registration
just  two  days before filing his own application  for  ex  parte
relief.   The  UCCJEA  provisions  governing  Murphys  ex   parte
pleadings  expressly obliged him to disclose whether a proceeding
has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding . . .
          and, if so, [to] identify the court, case number, and the nature
of  the proceeding.40  Yet Murphy failed to disclose and identify
Katzs competing claim.
          Had the superior court been aware of Katzs recent steps
to assert her custodial rights through appropriate legal channels
in  Alaska,  it might reasonably have viewed this information  as
undermining Murphys ex parte allegations of reasonable grounds to
believe  that  Katz  would flee Alaska  if  she  learned  of  his
application   to  enforce  the  South  Carolina   orders.    More
important, the information could have added vital context to  the
hostile statements attributed to Katz in GAL Smiths report, since
knowledge of Katzs competing claims could have prompted the court
to  view  her  comments  to  GAL Smith as  expressions  of  Katzs
confidence  in  her  Alaska registration action  rather  than  as
threats to flee if the South Carolina courts took adverse action.
          Murphys  apparently knowing or negligent nondisclosures
and  his disregard of the UCCJEAs requirements governing ex parte
relief  have troubling implications.  It is especially  troubling
that Murphy filed his ex parte application with the assistance of
an  Alaska  attorney, who had an independent duty to  investigate
the  basis of Murphys claims, to be aware of and comply with  the
requirements of Alaska law, and to be candid with the court.41  In
our  view,  the  combined effect of the deficiencies  in  Murphys
pleadings may well have misled the superior court by prompting it
to  grant  unwarranted relief that it might  not  otherwise  have
approved.
          We  do  not  mean  to  suggest that Murphys  misleading
pleadings  excuse  the  superior courts  decision  to  grant  his
application  for  ex  parte  relief.   The  relief  that   Murphy
requested was not colorably authorized under the UCCJEA and would
not  have been proper under any conceivable circumstances.  As  a
result   of  the  seemingly  uncritical  acceptance  of   Murphys
pleadings,  the  court  issued a form warrant  that  included  no
finding of imminent risk and made no provision for timely notice,
an  expedited hearing, or interim placement pending final  relief
all  of  which  expressly are required under  AS  25.30.490.   As
issued,  the  ex  parte orders effectively authorized  Murphy  to
permanently  remove Zachary from Alaska without giving  Katz  any
opportunity  to  contest  the  jurisdictional  basis  for   South
Carolinas custody orders.42
          For all of these reasons, we conclude that the ex parte
warrant  and  underlying  order were impermissible  and  violated
Katzs   procedural  rights  under  UCCJEA  section   .490.    Our
conclusion requires us to consider what remedy, if any, would  be
appropriate  to  correct the error.  Because the answer  to  this
question  depends  largely  on our  resolution  of  Katzs  claims
directed  against the validity of the South Carolina  orders,  we
next consider those claims.
     B.   Katz  Is  Barred  from Contesting  the  South  Carolina
          Orders  on  Grounds of Lack of Jurisdiction and  Notice
          Because She Consented to Their Registration in Alaska.
          As  already mentioned, besides contesting the ex  parte
orders  issued  in Alaska, Katz asserts that the  South  Carolina
custody  orders  were defective, contending that  they  therefore
could  not properly be enforced in Alaska.  Katz further  asserts
that  she was entitled to contest those orders in Alaska  because
she   did  not  receive  proper  notice  of  the  South  Carolina
proceedings  and never fully litigated jurisdiction  there.   But
Katzs effort to appeal on these points is problematic.
          Katz  was afforded an opportunity to raise these points
at  the  joint registration hearing held before Judge Suddock  on
February  16, 2005.  The  hearing was scheduled and held  at  the
request  of  both Katz and Murphy, and its twin  purpose  was  to
allow  each party to contest the others petition for registration
of  the  competing out-of-state orders they sought to enforce  in
Alaska   the original Georgia custody orders that Katz had  filed
and the more recent South Carolina orders that Murphy had filed.
          Under the UCCJEA, Katz had the right to contest Murphys
petition  to  register  the South Carolina  orders  on  the  same
grounds  she  asserts  here, lack of  jurisdiction  and  lack  of
notice.   Alaska Statute 25.30.430(d) provides that, at a hearing
to  contest  the  validity  of  a registered  order,  the  person
contesting   registration  may  prevent  the  order  from   being
confirmed by asserting and establishing any of three grounds; one
of  those  grounds  is  that  the  issuing  court  did  not  have
jurisdiction  under  provisions  substantially  similar  to  [the
UCCJEA],43 and another is that the person contesting registration
was  entitled  to notice, but notice was not given in  accordance
with  provisions  substantially similar to AS  25.30.840  in  the
proceedings  before  the court that issued the  order  for  which
registration is sought.44
          Despite  her  right  to contest confirmation  on  those
grounds at the hearing before Judge Suddock, Katz did not do  so.
Instead,  as  previously noted, the attorney who then represented
Katz,  Allen Bailey, agreed that the South Carolina orders  could
be  registered in Alaska, stating that Katz would challenge their
validity  by  pursuing  an appeal in South  Carolina.   Initially
Bailey asked Judge Suddock to register the Georgia custody orders
as  well,  so that their registration could take effect  if  Katz
prevailed  in  the South Carolina appeal.  But Bailey  ultimately
dropped  this request, agreeing to dismiss Katzs own  motion  for
registration  on  the  understanding that Katz  could  renew  her
request if and when she prevailed in South Carolina.
          By  expressly  agreeing  to allow  the  South  Carolina
orders  to be confirmed at the February 16 hearing, Bailey waived
Katzs  right  to contest jurisdiction and notice in Alaska.   The
UCCJEA  provides  that  once  an  out-of-state  order  has   been
registered and confirmed in Alaska, its enforcement is subject to
later  challenge  on only one ground:  that the  order  has  been
vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do
so  under [the UCCJEA or provisions substantially similar to  the
UCCJEA].45
          About   two   weeks   after  Judge  Suddock   confirmed
registration  of  the South Carolina orders with  Katzs  consent,
Katz,  appearing  pro  se,  moved  for  reconsideration  of   the
          confirmation order.  In her motion, Katz attacked the South
Carolina  orders  on  the  grounds of lack  of  jurisdiction  and
notice.  But Katz offered no excuse for Baileys failure to  raise
these claims at the February 16 hearing; nor did she assert  that
Bailey  lacked  authority to represent her at the  time.   Alaska
Civil Rule 77(k), which governs motions for reconsideration, does
not  allow  the moving party to raise new grounds as a basis  for
reconsideration; instead the rule only allows reconsideration  of
points  that were overlooked or misconceived despite having  been
properly raised.46  Given these circumstances, we see no basis for
concluding  that Judge Suddock erred in denying Katzs motion  for
reconsideration.47
          Katz   briefly  argues  on  appeal  that   Bailey   was
unprepared at the February 16 hearing, and suggests that  he  had
no  authority  to  waive  her right to contest  jurisdiction  and
notice  in  the  Alaska proceeding.  But her argument  relies  on
conclusory  and  unverified assertions that were  not  raised  or
heard in the superior court.  Moreover, Katz fails to explain why
she could not have raised these arguments sooner, before her case
reached appeal.  We have consistently recognized that a party may
not  raise an issue for the first time on appeal and that cursory
treatment of an issue amounts to a waiver.48  On the record before
us, we must conclude that, absent plain error, Baileys consent to
registration of the South Carolina orders waived Katzs  right  to
challenge  them in Alaska on the basis of inadequate jurisdiction
and notice.49
          We  have previously recognized that plain error  occurs
when   an  obvious  mistake has been made which  creates  a  high
likelihood  that  injustice has resulted. 50  In cases  involving
enforcement  of other states orders, we have also indicated  that
even when jurisdiction has been fully litigated in another state,
subject  matter jurisdiction may still be collaterally challenged
when  the other states order is patently void  that is,  when  it
goes  plainly beyond [that] courts jurisdiction. 51  In this case,
however,  we  are  unable to say that the South  Carolina  Family
Courts assertion of jurisdiction to modify Zacharys custody  went
plainly beyond the UCCJEAs jurisdictional standards.
          It  is  undisputed  that when South Carolina  made  its
initial  determination of jurisdiction, Murphy and Katz had  both
permanently  severed their ties to Georgia and that  Zachary  had
recently  moved  with  Katz  to Alaska.   In  response  to  Katzs
jurisdictional  challenge,  Judge McLin  concluded  that  Georgia
could  no  longer exercise home-state  jurisdiction over Zachary;
that he had not yet acquired a new home state; and that
          Zacharys connections with South Carolina  are
          mo[re] substantial than his connections  with
          Alaska.   As  of the date of filing,  he  had
          spent  almost as much time here as he had  in
          Alaska.   The Plaintiffs connection to  South
          Carolina is much stronger than the Defendants
          connection   to   Alaska.    The   Defendants
          relocation to Alaska was sudden and initially
          represented as temporary.  For all  of  these
          reasons, the court believes that jurisdiction
          and  venue  are proper in Dorchester  County,
          South Carolina.
          Even  though  the evidence supporting this analysis  is
disputed  and  could reasonably be viewed as weak,  the  analysis
itself  facially comports with the requirements of South Carolina
law and substantially tracks the jurisdictional standards set out
in  Alaskas UCCJEA.52  In short, the South Carolina courts  order
may  not  seem convincing, but it does not strike us as obviously
void, or plainly beyond that courts jurisdiction.53
          Accordingly, despite the unfortunate error in  allowing
Zacharys ex parte removal from Alaska, we must conclude that Katz
waived  her right to raise jurisdiction and notice as grounds  to
contest registration of South Carolinas orders in Alaska and that
the  superior  courts  order confirming their  registration  must
therefore   stand.    We  further  conclude   that   the   proper
registration  of  those  orders leaves no remedy  available  that
could  permissibly be granted in the context of this registration
proceeding to correct Zacharys premature removal from Alaska.
IV.  CONCLUSION
          Although  we  hold that the December  17,  2004,  order
granting  ex parte relief was erroneously entered, we AFFIRM  the
superior courts subsequent order confirming registration of South
Carolinas custody orders.
_______________________________
     1    See S.C. R. Civ. P. 12(g) and (h).

     2     Murphy  has  appended a certified copy  of  the  South
Carolina courts final order to his Notice of Oral Argument, filed
with  this  court on August 3, 2006.  It appears from  the  order
that  Katzs  original  South Carolina  counsel,  James  Brauchle,
continued  to  provide  at least nominal  representation  to  her
throughout  the course of pretrial proceedings and withdrew  from
the  case at the outset of trial, after consulting with Katz  and
receiving her consent.

     3      Alaskas UCCJEA is codified in title 25, chapter 30 of
the  Alaska  Statutes,  AS  25.30.30025.30.910;  its  enforcement
provisions are set out in article 2 of title 25, chapter  30,  AS
25.30.40025.30.590.

     4    AS 25.30.410(a) provides:

          A  court  of  this state shall recognize  and
          enforce  a child custody determination  of  a
          court  of another state if the court  of  the
          other   state   exercised   jurisdiction   in
          substantial conformity with this  chapter  or
          the  determination  was  made  under  factual
          circumstances   meeting  the   jurisdictional
          standards   of   this   chapter    and    the
          determination  has  not  been   modified   in
          accordance with this chapter.
          
     5    AS 25.30.410(b); AS 25.30.430(c)(1).

     6     See  AS  25.30.430(b)(2); AS 25.30.440(b) (A court  of
this  state shall recognize and enforce . . . a registered  child
custody  determination  of a court of another  state.)  (emphasis
added).

     7    AS 25.30.430(a) provides:

          A  child  custody determination issued  by  a
          court  of another state may be registered  in
          this  state,  with or without a  simultaneous
          request  for enforcement, by sending  to  the
          appropriate court in this state
          
               (1)    a   letter   or  other   document
          requesting registration;
          
               (2)  two copies, including one certified
          copy,  of  the  determination  sought  to  be
          registered and a statement, under penalty  of
          perjury,  that  to  the  best  knowledge  and
          belief of the person seeking registration the
          order has not been modified; and
          
               (3)  except as otherwise provided in  AS
          25.30.380, the name and address of the person
          seeking registration and the parent or person
          acting  as  a  parent who  has  been  awarded
          custody  or  visitation in the child  custody
          determination sought to be registered.
          
     8    AS 25.30.430(b) and (c) provide:

          (b)  On receipt of the documents required  by
          (a)  of  this section, the registering  court
          shall
          
               (1)  cause the determination to be filed
          as a foreign judgment, together with one copy
          of    any    accompanying    documents    and
          information, regardless of their form; and
          
               (2)   serve notice on the persons  named
          under (a)(3) of this section and provide them
          with   an   opportunity   to   contest    the
          registration under this section.
          
          (c)   The  notice required by (b)(2) of  this
          section must state that
          
               (1)    a  registered  determination   is
          enforceable   as   of   the   date   of   the
          registration  in  the  same   manner   as   a
          determination  issued  by  a  court  of  this
          state;
          
               (2)   a  hearing to contest the validity
          of   the  registered  determination  must  be
          requested  within  20 days after  service  of
          notice; and
          
               (3)  failure to contest the registration
          will  result  in confirmation  of  the  child
          custody  determination and  preclude  further
          contest of that determination with respect to
          a matter that could have been asserted.
          
     9    AS 25.30.430(d) provides:

          A person seeking to contest the validity of a
          registered  order  must  request  a   hearing
          within  20 days after service of the  notice.
          At  that hearing, the court shall confirm the
          registered order unless the person contesting
          registration establishes that
          
               (1)   the  issuing court  did  not  have
          jurisdiction  under provisions  substantially
          similar to AS 25.30.30025.30.390;
          
               (2)   the  child  custody  determination
          sought  to  be  registered has been  vacated,
          stayed,   or  modified  by  a  court   having
          jurisdiction   to  do  so  under   provisions
          substantially       similar       to       AS
          25.30.30025.30.390; or
          
               (3)   the person contesting registration
          was  entitled to notice, but notice  was  not
          given    in    accordance   with   provisions
          substantially similar to AS 25.30.840 in  the
          proceedings before the court that issued  the
          order for which registration is sought.
          
     10    AS 25.30.430(e) provides:

          If  a timely request for a hearing to contest
          the validity of the registration is not made,
          the registration is confirmed as a matter  of
          law,  and  the person requesting registration
          and  all  persons served must be notified  of
          the confirmation.
          
     11    AS 25.30.430(f) provides:

          Confirmation  of a registered order,  whether
          by  operation  of  law or  after  notice  and
          hearing,  precludes further  contest  of  the
          order  with  respect to a matter  that  could
          have   been   asserted   at   the   time   of
          registration.
          
     12    AS 25.30.430(c)(1); see also AS 25.30.410(b).

     13    AS 25.30.460(a) provides:

          A  petition under AS 25.30.40025.30.590  must
          be  verified.  A certified copy, or a copy of
          a  certified copy, of the orders sought to be
          enforced  and of an order, if any, confirming
          registration   must  be   attached   to   the
          petition.
          
     14    AS 25.30.460(b) provides:

          A petition for enforcement of a child custody
          determination must state
          
               (1)   whether the court that issued  the
          determination  identified the  jurisdictional
          basis it relied on in exercising jurisdiction
          and, if so, what the basis was;
          
               (2)  whether the determination for which
          enforcement  is  sought  has  been   vacated,
          stayed, or modified by a court whose decision
          must  be enforced under this chapter and,  if
          so, must identify the court, the case number,
          and the nature of the proceeding;
          
               (3)    whether  a  proceeding  has  been
          commenced  that  could  affect  the   current
          proceeding, including proceedings relating to
          domestic    violence,   protective    orders,
          termination of parental rights, and adoptions
          and, if so, must identify the court, the case
          number, and the nature of the proceeding;
          
               (4)  the present physical address of the
          child and the respondent, if known;
          
               (5)   whether relief in addition to  the
          immediate  physical custody of the child  and
          attorney fees is sought, including a  request
          for assistance from law enforcement officials
          and, if so, the relief sought; and
          
               (6)   if the child custody determination
          has  been  registered and confirmed under  AS
          25.30.430,    the   date   and    place    of
          registration.
          
     15    AS 25.30.460(c) states:

          On  the filing of a petition, the court shall
          issue  an  order directing the respondent  to
          appear in person with or without the child at
          a hearing and may enter an order necessary to
          ensure  the  safety of the  parties  and  the
          child.  The hearing must be held on the  next
          judicial  day  after  service  of  the  order
          unless  that  date  is impossible.   In  that
          event,  the  court shall hold the hearing  on
          the  first judicial day possible.  The  court
          may extend the date of hearing at the request
          of the petitioner.
          
          Under AS 25.30.470, the court must also serve the order
unless  a  writ of assistance is issued directing the  police  to
serve it:

               Except  as  otherwise  provided  in   AS
          25.30.490,  the petition and order  shall  be
          served, by a method authorized by the law  of
          this  state, on the respondent and  a  person
          who has physical custody of the child.
          
     16    AS 25.30.460(d) provides:

          An  order  issued under (c) of  this  section
          must  state the time and place of the hearing
          and   advise  the  respondent  that,  at  the
          hearing,  the  court  will  order  that   the
          petitioner   may   take  immediate   physical
          custody of the child and the payment of fees,
          costs,  and  expenses under AS 25.30.500  and
          may  schedule a hearing to determine  whether
          further  relief  is  appropriate  unless  the
          respondent appears and establishes that
          
               (1)  the child custody determination has
          not  been  registered and confirmed under  AS
          25.30.430, and that
          
               (A)   the  issuing court  did  not  have
          jurisdiction  under provisions  substantially
          similar to AS 25.30.30025.30.390;
          
               (B)  the child custody determination for
          which enforcement is sought has been vacated,
          stayed,   or  modified  by  a  court   having
          jurisdiction   to  do  so  under   provisions
          substantially       similar       to       AS
          25.30.30025.30.390; or
          
               (C)   the  respondent  was  entitled  to
          notice,   but   notice  was  not   given   in
          accordance   with  provisions   substantially
          similar  to  AS 25.30.840 in the  proceedings
          before  the court that issued the  order  for
          which enforcement is sought; or
          
               (2)  the child custody determination for
          which  enforcement is sought  was  registered
          and  confirmed  under  AS 25.30.430  but  has
          been  vacated, stayed, or modified by a court
          having jurisdiction to do so under provisions
          substantially       similar       to       AS
          25.30.30025.30.390.
          
     17    AS 25.30.460(d).

     18    See note 9 supra (quoting AS 25.30.430(d)).

     19    AS 25.30.480(a) provides:

          Unless the court issues a temporary emergency
          order under AS 25.30.330, on a finding that a
          petitioner is entitled to immediate  physical
          custody  of the child, the court shall  order
          that   the   petitioner  may  take  immediate
          physical  custody  of the  child  unless  the
          respondent establishes that
          
               (1)  the child custody determination has
          not  been  registered and confirmed under  AS
          25.30.430 and that
          
               (A)   the  issuing court  did  not  have
          jurisdiction  under provisions  substantially
          similar to AS 25.30.30025.30.390;
          
               (B)  the child custody determination for
          which enforcement is sought has been vacated,
          stayed,   or  modified  by  a  court   having
          jurisdiction  to  do  so under  AS  25.30.300
          25.30.390 or provisions substantially similar
          to AS 25.30.30025.30.390; or
          
               (C)   the  respondent  was  entitled  to
          notice,   but   notice  was  not   given   in
          accordance  with AS 25.30.840  or  provisions
          substantially       similar       to       AS
          25.30.30025.30.390 in the proceedings  before
          the  court  that issued the order  for  which
          enforcement is sought; or
          
               (2)  the child custody determination for
          which  enforcement is sought  was  registered
          and confirmed under AS 25.30.430 but has been
          vacated,  stayed,  or  modified  by  a  court
          having   jurisdiction  to  do  so  under   AS
          25.30.300     25.30.390     or     provisions
          substantially           similar            to
          AS 25.30.30025.30.390.
          
     20    AS 25.30.490(a).

     21    AS 25.30.490(b).

     22    Id.

     23    AS 25.30.490(d) (emphasis added).

     24    AS 25.30.490(b).

     25    See AS 25.30.460(b).

     26    AS 25.30.460(c).

     27    Id. (emphasis added).

     28    AS 25.30.490(f).

     29    AS 25.30.490(c)(3).

     30    AS 25.30.490(d).

     31    AS 25.30.490(b).

     32    AS 25.30.490(c)(3).

     33    AS 25.30.490(f).

     34    Nor is it conceivable that any non-UCCJEA provisions of
Alaska  law  governing enforcement of custody  orders  in  Alaska
authorize  granting  such  relief  to  a  petitioner  seeking  to
register  an unconfirmed order, since the UCCJEA empowers  courts
to  enforce  an  out-of-state order using remedies  available  in
Alaska only after the out-of-state order has been registered  and
confirmed   under   the   UCCJEA.   See   AS   25.30.410(b);   AS
25.30.430(c)(1).

     35    AS 25.30.490(c)(3).

     36    AS 25.30.490(d).

     37    AS 25.30.490(b).

     38    AS 25.30.490(c)(3).

     39    AS 25.30.490(b).

     40    AS 25.30.460(b)(3); see also AS 25.30.490(b) (requiring
application  for  ex  parte warrant to take physical  custody  to
include   the   statements  required  for  petitions   under   AS
25.30.460(b)).

     41     See,  e.g., Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct  1.3
(diligence);  3.1  (meritorious  claims  and  contentions);   3.3
(candor).

     42     As  submitted  by  Murphy and  ultimately  issued  on
December 17, 2004, the  courts order granting Murphys motion  for
an  ex parte writ of assistance found that good grounds exist for
granting Mr. Murphys request and allowed Murphy three days  after
transfer  of custody to serve notice on Katz.  The simultaneously
issued ex parte writ of assistance unconditionally commanded Katz
to surrender custody of the minor Zachary Murphy and directed law
enforcement authorities to assist Petitioner, Charles Murphy,  or
any  of his designated agents or attorneys in enforcing the State
of  South Carolinas Order of 12/15/04, which specifically  awards
Mr.  Murphy  immediate physical custody of  his  son,  the  minor
Zachary Murphy.

          On  the  record  before  us it remains  somewhat  of  a
mystery  how Murphys nonconforming ex parte motions and  proposed
orders managed to fly under the superior courts usually sensitive
radar.   In handling prior appeals involving out-of-state custody
orders,  we  have seen no indication of a problem in interpreting
and  enforcing the requirements of the UCCJEA.  To the  contrary,
the    extraordinary   knowledge,   diligence,   and   discretion
demonstrated  on a daily basis by Alaskas trial  judges  in  such
cases  inclines  us to suspect that this case  might  reflect  an
uncharacteristic  systemic  error  rather  than  a   mistake   in
considered  judgment  or  discretion.  We  further  realize  that
accurate  detection  of pleading errors in expedited  cases  like
this can be caused by a variety of factors that are difficult  to
control.   But when the interests at stake are as fundamental  as
the  custodial  rights  impacted here, we believe  that  systemic
safeguards  must be undertaken to avoid even rare occurrences  of
error.

     43    AS 25.30.430(d)(1).

     44    AS 25.30.430(d)(3).

     45    AS 25.30.480(a)(2).

     46    Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(k)(1).

     47     Cf.  Stadnicky v. Southpark Terrace Homeowners  Assn,
Inc.,  939 P.2d 403, 405 (Alaska 1997) (observing that  an  issue
raised  for  the  first time in a motion for  reconsideration  is
untimely and insufficient to preserve a claim for appeal); Neal &
Co.,  Inc. v. Assn of Vill. Council Presidents Regl Hous.  Auth.,
895  P.2d  497, 506 (Alaska 1995) (holding no abuse of discretion
when  trial  court  declined  to  reconsider  ruling  based  upon
evidence  that  was  not before it at the time  it  rendered  its
decision, and moving party offered no explanation for failing  to
present evidence earlier).

     48     See,  e.g.,  Hoffman Constr. Co. of  Alaska  v.  U.S.
Fabrication  &  Erection, Inc., 32 P.3d 346, 355  (Alaska  2001);
Brandon v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 280 (Alaska 2001).

     49    See Hoffman Constr. Co. of Alaska, 32 P.3d at 355 n.29
(indicating that claim waived by being raised for the first  time
is still subject to review for plain error).

     50     D.J. v. P.C., 36 P.3d 663, 668 (Alaska 2001) (quoting
Sosa v. State, 4 P.3d 951, 953 (Alaska 2000)).

     51     Wall  v.  Stinson, 983 P.2d 736,  742  (Alaska  1999)
(quoting   Restatement  (Second)  of  Judgments   12(1)   (1982))
(alteration   in  original);  see  also  State,   Child   Support
Enforcement Div. v. Bromley, 987 P.2d 183, 187 (Alaska 1999).

     52     Compare  S.C. Code Ann.  20-7-788(a)(2) (if no  other
state  is the home state, court may assume jurisdiction if it  is
in  the  best  interest of the child that a court of  this  State
assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the
child  and at least one contestant, have a significant connection
with  this  State  and  (ii) there is  available  in  this  State
substantial  evidence  concerning the childs  present  or  future
care,  protection, training and personal relationships), with  AS
25.30.300(a)(3) (if no other state is the home state,  court  may
assume  jurisdiction if (A) the child and the childs parents,  or
the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent,
have  a  significant connection with this state other  than  mere
physical  presence; and (B) substantial evidence is available  in
this state concerning the childs care, protection, training,  and
personal relationships).

     53     We further note that the South Carolina courts recent
permanent   custody   determination  revisited   the   issue   of
jurisdiction  under  current circumstances, concluding  that  its
jurisdiction   over  Zacharys  custody  had  grown   considerably
stronger,  whereas  Zacharys ties to Alaska  are  obviously  much
weaker than they were when Murphy originally filed his motion for
modification.   Although we recognize that Zacharys  presence  in
South  Carolina  occurred because Murphy improperly  removed  him
from Alaska, it would nonetheless be difficult to conclude by any
realistic and practical measure that as matters now stand  Alaska
would  be a desirable location to meaningfully determine Zacharys
current best interests.

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