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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. v. State, Loren Leman, Lieutenant Governor (02/23/2007) sp-6103

Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. v. State, Loren Leman, Lieutenant Governor (02/23/2007) sp-6103, 153 P3d 296

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,

GOVERNMENT, INC., an Alaskan ) Supreme Court No. S- 11916
non-profit corporation, and KAREN )
BRETZ, ) Superior Court No. 3AN-03-10863 CI
Appellants, )
v. ) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, LOREN ) No. 6103 - February 23, 2007
Appellee. )
Appeal    from     the
          Superior Court of the State of Alaska,  Third
          Judicial   District,  Anchorage,  Sharon   L.
          Gleason, Judge.

          Appearances:   Kenneth  P.   Jacobus,   P.C.,
          Anchorage,  for Appellants. Brenda  B.  Page,
          Assistant  Attorney General,  Anchorage,  and
          David  W. M rquez, Attorney General,  Juneau,
          for Appellee.

          Before:   Bryner,  Chief  Justice,  Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
          BRYNER, Chief Justice.
          Alaskans for Efficient Government, an Alaskan nonprofit
corporation,   submitted   Initiative   Petition    03TMLT    for
certification   by  the  lieutenant  governor.   The   initiative
included  a  section  requiring  a  supermajority  vote  for  the
legislature  to pass tax-related bills.  The lieutenant  governor
declined  to  certify  the proposed initiative,  ruling  that  it
failed  to  comply with constitutional provisions  governing  the
initiative  process.  The question presented in  this  appeal  is
whether  the  initiative could properly be rejected before  being
voted  on and enacted.  Alaska law usually requires an initiative
to  be  enacted before its provisions become subject to challenge
but  allows a pre-election challenge if the initiative  conflicts
with  a  constitutional  provision  that  limits  the  initiative
process.   Here,  we conclude that the initiatives  supermajority
requirement conflicts with article II, section 14 of  the  Alaska
Constitution,  which requires bills to be enacted by  a  majority
vote.   Since  article  XI, section 1 of the Alaska  Constitution
does   not   allow   an  initiative  to  amend  a  constitutional
requirement,  we  hold that the initiative was properly  rejected
for  violating  constitutional  restrictions  on  the  initiative
          In 2003 Karen Bretz, an Alaska voter and organizer of a
non-profit  corporation called Alaskans for Efficient  Government
(AFEG),  filed  a  petition  that proposed  a  ballot  initiative
designed  to  curb  new taxes.  The initiative proposed:  (1)  to
require  a  three-fourths  (seventy-five  percent)  vote  by  the
legislature  (or a majority vote by the electorate) to  enact  or
increase  taxes;  (2) to allow municipalities to use  initiatives
for  limiting  local  taxes; and (3) to prohibit  taxes  on  real
estate  transfers.  After consulting with the Department of  Law,
the  lieutenant  governor rejected the petition, notifying  Bretz
that  the  department had determined that the proposal  does  not
comply with the constitutional and statutory provisions governing
the use of the initiative.
          Bretz   and  AFEG1  appealed  to  the  superior  court,
claiming that the proposed initiative dealt with a proper subject
and  should have been certified.  The parties filed cross-motions
for  summary judgment; their dispute centered on the validity  of
the  proposed initiatives first section  its supermajority voting
               Section   1.      Limitation  on   State
          Taxes.   No  new state taxes may be  imposed,
          nor  may existing rates on existing taxes  be
          increased, except as follows:
               (1)  Upon the affirmative vote of 75% of
          the  members  of  each house  of  the  Alaska
               (2)   Upon  the affirmative  vote  of  a
          majority  of  those voters of  the  State  of
          Alaska  voting on this question at a  regular
          or special election, or
               (3)   If  necessary to comply  with  the
          terms  of  state bonded indebtedness existing
          as of the effective date of this Act.[2]
          The state maintained that the proposed initiatives call
          for a supermajority vote would violate the Alaska Constitution,
which  authorizes the legislature to enact most laws by a  simple
majority  vote.   Contending that approval of  the  supermajority
requirement  would effectively amend the constitution   a  change
that cannot be made by the initiative process  the state reasoned
that  AFEGs  initiative  was properly  rejected.   AFEG  in  turn
defended  the  initiative, insisting that it merely  proposed  to
enact  a  law,  not  a  constitutional  amendment.   Because  the
proposed  initiative  was  not  clearly  unconstitutional,   AFEG
argued,  it  could only be challenged after being placed  on  the
ballot and approved by the voters.
          The  superior  court granted summary  judgment  to  the
state.   In the courts view, article II, section 14 of the Alaska
Constitution,  which allows the legislature  to  enact  bills  by
majority   vote,  could  only  be  changed  by  a  constitutional
amendment.   Since  an initiative cannot amend the  constitution,
the  court concluded, AFEGs initiative could not properly be used
to enact a supermajority voting requirement.
          AFEG appeals.
          We  review  an  award of summary judgment independently
and  will  affirm if the evidence, when viewed in the light  most
favorable  to the non-moving party, fails to disclose  a  genuine
issue  of  material  fact and the moving  party  is  entitled  to
judgment  as a matter of law.3  We likewise review constitutional
questions  independently and will adopt the rule of law  that  is
most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.4
     A.   Pre-Election Review of Supermajority Requirement
          We  have long recognized that when initiative petitions
meet  formal  requirements for filing, the laws they  propose  to
adopt  are  ordinarily  not subject to immediate  challenge:  The
general   rule   is  that  a  court  should  not  determine   the
constitutionality  of  an  initiative  unless  and  until  it  is
enacted.5   The rule against pre-election review is a  prudential
one,  steeped  in traditional policies recognizing  the  need  to
avoid  unnecessary  litigation, to uphold the  peoples  right  to
initiate  laws  directly, and to check the  power  of  individual
officials  to keep the electorates voice from being heard.6   But
this bar against pre-election review has never been absolute:
          There  are  two  exceptions to this  [general
          rule].   First,   where  the  initiative   is
          challenged  on  the basis that  it  does  not
          comply  with  the  state  constitutional  and
          statutory  provisions regulating initiatives,
          courts  are empowered to conduct pre-election
          review. Second, courts are also empowered  to
          conduct  pre-election review  of  initiatives
          where     the    initiative    is     clearly
          unconstitutional or clearly unlawful.[7]
          AFEG  argues  that its proposed initiative should  have
avoided  review and been placed on the ballot because it  is  not
clearly unconstitutional8 as required under the second exception:
          The case at bench involves a claim that the proposed initiative
is  in conflict with the Constitution of Alaska and, accordingly,
is  an  attempt  to amend it.  Judicial review of  Constitutional
challenges,  however,  should not be conducted  until  after  the
passage of the initiative by the voters, if in fact it is passed.
          But the state responds that the initiative was properly
rejected  under  the  first exception  not because  it  might  be
unconstitutional  if  enacted  but  rather  because  enacting  an
initiative   on   a  subject  that  can  only   be   changed   by
constitutional  amendment  fails to  comply  with  constitutional
provisions regulating the initiative process.
          The  states argument starts from the premise  that  the
Alaska Constitution does not permit constitutional amendments  to
be  enacted  by initiative.  As this court recognized soon  after
statehood in Starr v. Hagglund,
          [Article  XIII  of  the Alaska  Constitution]
          provides   two   methods  of   amending   the
          constitution:   (1)   by   a   constitutional
          convention, followed by ratification  of  the
          proposed amendment by the people, and (2)  by
          a  proposal  that has obtained  a  two-thirds
          vote of each house of the legislature, and is
          adopted by the people by majority vote  at  a
          statewide election.[9]
As  we  further  recognized  in Starr, article  XIII  necessarily
limits  the scope of the initiative process:  The initiative  may
be  used  only  to  enact  laws,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of
constitutional amendment.10
          Building  on the premise that article XIII forbids  the
initiative from being used to amend the constitution, the  states
argument   turns  to  article  II,  section  14  of  the   Alaska
Constitution.   This  provision  authorizes  the  legislature  to
establish  procedures  for  enacting  laws  and  specifies   that
enacting a law generally requires a majority vote of both houses:
          The legislature shall establish the procedure
          for enactment of bills into law.  No bill may
          become   law  unless  it  has  passed   three
          readings  in  each  house on  three  separate
          days,  except that any bill may  be  advanced
          from second to third reading on the same  day
          by  concurrence of three-fourths of the house
          considering  it.  No  bill  may  become   law
          without an affirmative vote of a majority  of
          the  membership of each house. The  yeas  and
          nays on final passage shall be entered in the
          In the states view, the majority-vote clause of article
II,   section   14,  restricts  the  use  of  an  initiative   by
establishing  that,  except  when  otherwise  provided   in   the
constitution,  a  majority vote of both houses is  the  exclusive
method  for  enacting a bill. Under this view, since  a  majority
vote  is a constitutional requirement and, as such, under article
XIII, is not subject to change by initiative, a proposal to adopt
          a supermajority vote by initiative is barred because it conflicts
with constitutional provisions that place the topic off limits to
the initiative process.  As the state puts it:
          The  Alaska  Constitution  requires  only   a
          majority   vote   of  each   house   of   the
          legislature   to   enact  legislation.    The
          measure  proposed  by  the  AFEG  initiative,
          however,   would  establish  new,  additional
          requirements   for  enactment   of   taxation
          legislation.    Specifically,  the   proposed
          measure  would require a 75 percent  majority
          vote   of   both   houses   of   the   Alaska
          legislature, or approval of a majority of the
          electorate, to enact legislation  that  would
          impose  or  increase  state  taxes.   Such  a
          fundamental   change  to  the  constitutional
          requirements  for  enactment  of  legislation
          constitutes  an  amendment  to   the   Alaska
          Constitution.      Under     the      Alaskan
          constitutional  restrictions on  initiatives,
          the  initiative  process cannot  be  used  to
          amend  the  constitution.   Accordingly,  the
          lieutenant    governor    properly     denied
          certification of the application.
          Although AFEG concedes that the initiative process  may
not  be  used to amend the constitution, it disputes  the  states
reading  of  article II, section 14s majority-vote clause.   AFEG
reads  article II, section 14 as simply establishing the  minimum
baseline  for enacting a law.  In AFEGs view, this baseline  does
not preclude a more stringent law requiring a supermajority vote.
          But  AFEGs  interpretation of article II,  section  14s
majority-vote requirement is unpersuasive for several reasons.
          Initially, we note that other states that have  adopted
supermajority  or voter-approval requirements for  enacting  tax-
related  bills  have almost always treated these requirements  as
constitutional  matters.  Indeed, of the states  that  have  such
requirements,  it appears that all but one have implemented  them
as constitutional provisions.12  Moreover, the only state to adopt
a  supermajority requirement by ordinary legislation, Washington,
later  suspended  it through a bill enacted by a  majority  vote,
leaving   Washington  law  where  it  started  until   its   next
legislative  session.13  The subject has also been  viewed  as  a
constitutional one in the federal arena.  In 1995, when the House
of  Representatives  passed a rule requiring supermajority  votes
for  certain  tax-related legislation,14  members  of  the  House
immediately  filed  a constitutional challenge.15   Although  the
challenge  stalled  for lack of standing16 and ultimately  became
moot after the House determined that the rule could be waived  by
a  majority,17 Chief Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit  expressed
the  view that the supermajority rule clearly violated the United
States  Constitution by fundamentally alter[ing] the  balance  of
power established by the Framers.18
          Thus,  to  the  extent  that other  jurisdictions  have
addressed  the  issue,  the  clear  consensus  appears  to   view
          supermajority voting requirements as implicating the kind of
basic   subject   matter  usually  addressed  by   constitutional
provision rather than legislation.
          This  view coincides with the Alaska Constitutions text
and  its  traditional application by the Alaska legislature.   As
already  mentioned,  article  II,  section  14,  of  the   Alaska
Constitution  directs the legislature to establish the  procedure
for  enactment  of bills into law; section 14  then  goes  on  to
specify that [n]o bill may become law without an affirmative vote
of  a  majority of the membership of each house.  By  giving  the
legislature the duty to adopt procedural rules for enacting  law,
while  spelling out the precise vote required to enact  bills  as
law,  section 14 unmistakably signals that Alaskas constitutional
framers   intended  the  majority-voting  provision   to   be   a
substantive requirement instead of a mere procedural rule.
          AFEG insists that the negative phrasing of section  14s
majority-vote  clause   [n]o  bill  may  become  law  without  an
affirmative  vote of a majority  should be read as signaling  the
framers intent to set a floor, not a ceiling: to require at least
a   majority   vote   while  allowing  laws   imposing   stricter
requirements.   If the framers had intended to  require  no  more
than a majority vote, AFEG contends, they would have drafted  the
clause to read: Any bill may be enacted by an affirmative vote of
the majority of the membership of each house.
          But  as  the  state  correctly observes,  other  courts
interpreting  constitutional language have wisely refrained  from
attributing any automatic significance to the distinction between
negative  and  positive phrasing.19  Here, for example,  had  the
framers said any bill rather than no bill, AFEGs logic would just
as  readily compel the anomalous conclusion that section  14  was
meant  to  set  a ceiling but not a floor  that a  majority  vote
would  be  the  maximum  needed  to  enact  any  bill,  but   the
legislature would remain free to specify a sub-majority  vote  as
sufficient to enact laws dealing with specified subjects,  as  it
saw fit.20
          More  important, the Alaska Constitution includes other
provisions  that  undercut  AFEGs  contention  that  the  framers
intended  section 14s majority-vote clause as a minimal standard.
Alaskas  constitutional framers, well aware of their  ability  to
require   more  stringent  voting  requirements,  included   such
requirements  in  the Alaska Constitution for laws  dealing  with
various  subjects.   Examples can be found in the  three-readings
clause  of article II, section 14;21 the veto-override clause  of
article  II,  section  16;22  the  effective-date  provisions  of
article  II, section 18;23 the impeachment standard  set  out  in
article  II,  section 20;24 and the provisions  governing  budget
reserve fund appropriations set out in article IX, section 17(c).25
In  our  view,  the  superior  court correctly  recognized  these
examples as convincing evidence of the framers intent to  include
provisions in the Alaska Constitution describing all instances in
which supermajority votes could be required to enact a bill.
          To  support its position that section 14s majority-vote
clause  just  sets a minimal level for enacting bills  into  law,
AFEG  further  cites numerous instances in which the  legislature
          has adopted rules establishing voting requirements, including
some  rules requiring supermajority votes.  Yet all of the  cited
rules  either  deal  with  non-substantive  matters  relating  to
internal  legislative  procedures or  simply  mirror  substantive
voting    requirements   expressly   included   in   the   Alaska
Constitution.26  AFEG identifies no rule that alters any provision
of the constitution specifying the votes for enacting a bill; nor
does  AFEG cite any rule establishing a supermajority requirement
for  enacting  any  bill  not already  covered  by  supermajority
requirements set out in the constitutions text.  And AFEG  points
to  no  authority suggesting that the legislature, the Department
of  Law,  or this court has ever interpreted the constitution  to
allow a rule of this sort.
          Apparently, then, during the half-century since  Alaska
voters  ratified  our constitution, the majority-vote  clause  of
article  II, section 14 has uniformly been understood and applied
as  a substantive provision that sets both a floor and a ceiling:
a  requirement  that  bills be enacted by majority  vote  in  all
situations  not  covered by other requirements  set  out  in  the
          So construed, the majority-vote requirement operates as
a  constitutionally based subject-matter restriction, prohibiting
the  enactment  of any law that proposes to modify the  majority-
vote standard.  Because the legislature itself cannot change this
constitutional  standard by enacting a  law,  and  an  initiative
cannot enact laws that the legislature has no authority to enact,27
it  follows  that article II, section 14 prevents  an  initiative
from  addressing  the subject of the number of  votes  needed  to
enact  a  bill  into  law.  Accordingly,  we  conclude  that  the
lieutenant  governor  correctly reviewed the proposed  initiative
before it appeared on the ballot and properly rejected it at that
stage  for  failing  to  comply  with  constitutional  provisions
regulating initiatives.28
     B.   Severance
          AFEG  separately  argues that the proposed  initiatives
severance clause authorizes us to remove the offending provisions
from  the  measure  and allow the rest to go  forward.   But  the
lieutenant governor rejected the entire initiative, not just  its
supermajority  vote provision.  In appealing this ruling  to  the
superior  court, AFEG failed to argue the severance  issue.   And
its  cursory briefing of the point on appeal to this court  fails
to  provide  a  meaningful basis for appellate review.   We  have
often  emphasized that [w]e will not ordinarily  consider  issues
unless  they  were  raised  in the trial  court.29   Given  AFEGs
untimely and conclusory argument on the severance issue, we  hold
that AFEG has failed to preserve the point.
          For  these  reasons,  we  AFFIRM  the  superior  courts
judgment   upholding  the  lieutenant  governors   rejection   of
Initiative Petition 03TMLT.

                    FOR CERTAIN LOCAL OPTIONS
     Section  1.      Limitation on State Taxes.   No  new  state
taxes may be imposed, nor may existing rates on existing taxes be
increased, except as follows:

     (1)  Upon the affirmative vote of 75% of the members of each
house of the Alaska Legislature,

     (2)  Upon the affirmative vote of a majority of those voters
of  the  State of Alaska voting on this question at a regular  or
special election, or

     (3)   If  necessary to comply with the terms of state bonded
indebtedness existing as of the effective date of this Act.

     Section 2.     Local Option.   Any home rule or general  law
municipality,    including   cities,   boroughs    and    unified
municipalities, may enact or repeal ordinances through action  by
the governing body or through the initiative or referendum, which
limit  the  imposition of new taxes or the increase of  rates  on
existing  taxes,  repeal or reduce existing taxes,  or  determine
maximum rates or amounts of any local tax.

     Section   3.      Real  Estate  Transfer  Taxes  Prohibited.
Neither  the  State nor any municipality may impose any  transfer
taxes  or  tax  rates on transfers of real property  by  sale  or
lease.  This section does not affect the right of the State or  a
municipality  to  impose taxes or royalties  on  the  harvesting,
extraction,  or  use of oil or gas, minerals, timber,  and  other
natural resources which may be deemed to be part of the land.

     Section   4.       Interpretation.   This   Act   shall   be
interpreted  in  the manner which reasonably restricts  most  the
growth  of government.  The term taxes, for the purposes of  this
act,  shall include all taxes, permit fees, license fees and user

     Section  5.     Supersedes Conflicting Statutes, Ordinances,
and  Regulations.   This  initiative supersedes  all  conflicting
provisions  of  State statutes, local ordinances  and  State  and
local regulations and procedure, which provisions shall be of  no
further force or effect.

     Section  6.     Applicability.  The provisions of  this  Act
apply  to all new taxes and all rate increases on existing  taxes
which are levied or imposed on or after January 1, 2004.  If this
date  may not be used for legal reasons as determined by a  court
of  competent jurisdiction, then the provisions of this Act apply
to  all new taxes and all rate increases on existing taxes  which
are levied or imposed on or after the effective date of this Act.

     Section 7.     Severability.  The provisions of this Act are
independent and severable, and if any provision of this  Act,  or
the applicability of any provision to any person or circumstance,
shall be held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction,
the  remainder  of this Act shall not be affected  and  shall  be
given effect to the fullest extent practicable.
     1     For  convenience  we  will refer  to  Bretz  and  AFEG
collectively as AFEG.

     2     Since  the  issues  on appeal do  not  require  us  to
consider the initiative petitions remaining sections, we  do  not
set  them  out  as part of this opinion.  For ease of  reference,
however, the initiatives full text is included as an appendix  to
the opinion.

     3     Sonneman  v.  State, 969 P.2d 632, 635  (Alaska  1998)
(quoting Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 772 P.2d 1085, 1086
(Alaska 1989)).

     4     Sonneman, 969 P.2d at 636 (citing Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d
1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)).

     5     State  v.  Trust  the People, 113 P.3d  613,  614  n.1
(Alaska 2005).

     6    Id. at 628-29.

     7    Id. at 614 n.1.

     8     Kodiak  Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71  P.3d  896,  900
(Alaska 2003).

     9    Starr v. Hagglund, 374 P.2d 316, 317 n.2 (Alaska 1962).

     10    Id.; see also State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 639 (Alaska
1977) (The Alaska Constitution may not be amended by popular vote
alone,  without  prior  action by either  the  legislature  or  a
constitutional  convention.).  Notably,  article  XI,  section  1
empowers voters to enact laws by the initiative (emphasis added);
no  similar  provision extends the initiative  power  to  include
constitutional amendments.

     11    Alaska Const. art. II,  14 (emphasis added).

     12    See Ariz. Const. art. IX,  22; Ark. Const. art. V,  38;
Cal.  Const.  art. XIIIA; Colo. Const. art. X,  20;  Del.  Const.
art.  VIII,   11; Fla. Const. art. VII,  5; Ky. Const.   36;  La.
Const. art. VII,  2; Mich. Const. art. IX,  25; Miss. Const. art.
IV,   70; Okla. Const. art. V,  33; Or. Const. art. IV,  25; S.D.
Const.  art.  XI,   13;  see  also  Nev.  Const.  art.   4,    18
(subsequently  ruled  invalid  in part  on  state  constitutional
grounds  not relevant here, see Guinn v. Legislature of State  of
Nevada, 71 P.3d 1269, 1274-76 (Nev. 2003), decision clarified  on
denial of rehg by 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied sub  nom.,
Angle v. Guinn, 541 U.S. 957 (2004)).

     13    See Wash. Rev. Code  43.135.035.

     14     See  H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. (1995), 141 Cong.  Rec.
462,  463  (1995) (adding subsections (c) and (d) to  House  Rule

     15    Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

     16    Id. at 837.

     17     141  Cong.  Rec. 29463, 29476-77 (1995) (Speaker  Pro
Tempore  rules  that waiving supermajority rule only  requires  a

     18     Skaggs,  110 F.3d at 847 (Edwards, C.J.,  dissenting)
(expressing   view  that  House  Rule  XXXI(5)(c)  violated   the
presentment clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art.  I,   7,
cl. 2).

     19     See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,  538-39
(1969)  (recognizing  that the U.S. Constitutions  qualifications
clause   provides   an  exclusive  list  of  qualifications   for
legislators,  notwithstanding its negative phrasing);  Gerberding
v. Munro, 949 P.2d 1366, 1372-73 (Wash. 1998) (Washington Supreme
Court  found  that negative phrasing could still mean exclusivity
of  a  provision  and did not just mean a minimum);  Cathcart  v.
Meyer,  88  P.3d  1050, 1070-71 (Wyo. 2004)  (not  distinguishing
between  positive  and negative phrasing, but  noting  that  some
other  jurisdictions maintained the distinction); cf. Mississippi
County  v.  Green,  138  S.W.2d 377, 379  (Ark.  1940)  (Why  fix
[legislative  qualifications, even in negative phrasing]  in  the
first  place if the makers of the constitution did not intend  to
fix  all the qualifications required, and why fix only a part  of
them   and   leave  it  up  to  the  legislators  to  fix   other

     20    Moreover, as demonstrated by article II, section 12, it
would  be problematic to categorically reject this interpretation
on  the  assumption that the framers would never have  authorized
any  form  of  sub-majority voting requirement.  In  establishing
various legislative procedures, section 12 provides, [a] majority
of  the  membership  of each house constitutes  a  quorum  to  do
business,  but a smaller number may adjourn from day to  day  and
may compel attendance of absent members.  (Emphasis added.)

     21     Alaska Const. art. II,  14 states, in part, [n]o bill
may  become law unless it has passed three readings in each house
on three separate days, except that any bill may be advanced from
second  to  third  reading  on the same  day  by  concurrence  of
three-fourths of the house considering it.

     22     Alaska  Const. art. II,  16 states [b]ills  to  raise
revenue and appropriation bills or items, although vetoed, become
law by affirmative vote of three-fourths of the membership of the

     23    Alaska Const. art. II,  18 states [l]aws passed by the
legislature  become effective ninety days  after  enactment.  The
legislature  may, by concurrence of two-thirds of the  membership
of each house, provide for another effective date.

     24    Alaska Const. art. II,  20 states [a]ll civil officers
of  the  State  are  subject to impeachment by  the  legislature.
Impeachment shall originate in the senate and must be approved by
a two-thirds vote of its members.

     25    Alaska Const. art. IX,  17(c) states [a]n appropriation
from  the budget reserve fund may be made for any public  purpose
upon  affirmative vote of three-fourths of the  members  of  each
house of the legislature.  We note additionally that article  II,
section 19 provides an example of a voter-approval requirement:

          The  legislature  shall  pass  no  local   or
          special  act  if a general act  can  be  made
          applicable. Whether a general act can be made
          applicable  shall  be  subject  to   judicial
          determination.   Local   acts   necessitating
          appropriations by a political subdivision may
          not  become  effective unless approved  by  a
          majority  of  the  qualified  voters   voting
          thereon in the subdivision affected.
     26     For instance, Legislative Rule 14 incorporates voting
requirements of article II, sections 14, 16, and 18;  Legislative
Rule 39 relies on article II, section 14; and Legislative Rule 45
relies on article II, sections 15 and 16.

     27    See Starr, 374 P.2d at 317 n.2; Lewis, 559 P.2d at 639;
Alaska Const. art. XI,  1 (empowering voters to enact laws by the

     28     Kodiak Island Borough, 71 P.3d at 898; see also Trust
the  People, 113 P.3d at 628-29; Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025,
1027 (Alaska 1999).

     29     Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Alaska  1987);
see  also Moore v. State, Dept of Natural Res., 992 P.2d 576, 577
n.5  (Alaska  1999); Jackson v. Nangle, 677 P.2d  242,  251  n.10
(Alaska 1984).

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