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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Greywolf v. Carroll (01/05/2007) sp-6089

Greywolf v. Carroll (01/05/2007) sp-6089, 151 P3d 1234

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

T.C. GREYWOLF, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 11830
Appellant,)
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-01-02916 CI
)
WILLIAM N. CARROLL, M.D., ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) No. 6089 - January 5, 2007
)

          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Fourth   Judicial   District,
          Fairbanks, Randy M. Olsen, Judge.

          Appearances:  James M.  Hackett,  Law  Office
          of   James   M.    Hackett,  Fairbanks,   for
          Appellant.  Donna M. Meyers, Delaney,  Wiles,
          Hayes,   Gerety,   Ellis   &   Young,   Inc.,
          Anchorage, for Appellee.

          Before:   Bryner,  Chief  Justice,  Matthews,
          Fabe,  and  Carpeneti, Justices.   [Eastaugh,
          Justice, not participating.]

          FABE, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          A  mental  health  unit  patient,  T.C.  Greywolf,  was
arrested  at  Fairbanks  Memorial  Hospital  and  discharged   to
Fairbanks  Correctional Center on a charge of felony  assault  in
the third degree because she had allegedly threatened to harm her
psychiatrist, Dr. William Carroll.  After Greywolf was  acquitted
in  her  criminal trial, she filed a lawsuit against Dr.  Carroll
for (1) malicious prosecution; (2) abuse of process; (3) invasion
of  privacy;  and  (4) medical malpractice.  The  superior  court
granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Carroll on three of  the
claims,  ruling  that  Greywolf had failed to  establish  genuine
issues  of  material  facts  on each element  of  the  respective
claims.   The  superior court dismissed the fourth claim  on  the
ground that Dr. Carroll was protected by the doctrine of absolute
quasi-judicial  immunity. We affirm the superior  courts  summary
judgment rulings.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          At  the  time of the events leading to this case,  T.C.
Greywolf  was  thirty-nine years old, had a ten-year  history  of
multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, and had been confirmed  as
suffering  from  Post  Traumatic Stress  Disorder.   Dr.  William
Carroll  is  a  psychiatrist who usually lives and  practices  in
Anchorage   but  temporarily  practiced  at  Fairbanks   Memorial
Hospital whenever the hospital did not have a local psychiatrist.
          Dr.  Carrolls first contact with Greywolf  was  in  May
2000,  when she was admitted to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital twice
within  a  three-week period because she had  attempted  suicide.
Greywolfs  medical records indicated that she had a long  history
of  self-abuse previous to May 2000, including acts  of  cutting,
poisoning, and attempting to hang herself.  Greywolf was  treated
again by Dr. Carroll in August 2000.
          On September 18, 2000, Greywolf stood outside Fairbanks
Memorial Hospital and held a gun to her chest with a single round
in  the  chamber.  After approximately thirty minutes,  she  shot
herself  in  the  chest.  She was treated  at Fairbanks  Memorial
Hospital  and then transported to Anchorage, first to  Providence
Hospital  for  treatment  of the wound and  then  to  the  Alaska
Psychiatric  Institute (API).  Dr. Carroll treated  her  both  at
Fairbanks  Memorial Hospital before the shooting and  at  API  in
September.   Greywolf  was also seen by Dr.  Mark  Erickson,  who
diagnosed  Greywolf  with  Post  Traumatic  Stress  Disorder  and
Depressive Disorder on Axis I and Borderline Personality on  Axis
III.
          Greywolf later told Dr. Pogos Voskanian, a psychiatrist
hired  by Greywolfs lawyer to evaluate the level of care provided
to  Greywolf  by  Dr.  Carroll, that she had  filed  a  grievance
against  Dr. Carroll one day before she was discharged  from  API
because Dr. Carroll had discussed Greywolfs case in front of  the
staff and other patients and because he was demeaning.
          Greywolf  was released from API on an unknown date  and
returned to Fairbanks.  On November 8, 2000, Dr. Carroll admitted
her to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital for an involuntary seventy-two-
hour evaluation because she was threatening suicide.  Dr. Carroll
discharged  her  two  days  later, on  November  10,  because  he
determined  that  she did not meet the standards for  involuntary
commitment under AS 47.30.700.1
          On  November 10, 2000, Greywolf filed a second  written
complaint  against  Dr. Carroll.  She claimed  that  Dr.  Carroll
should  not  have  discussed her case with the  trooper  who  had
brought  her to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital on November 8 because
there  was not a need to know.  She also complained that she  was
denied Paxil, the medicine she usually takes, and that the denial
of  medication  was detrimental to her.  Greywolfs complaint  was
          filed with the manager, presumably of Fairbanks Memorial
Hospitals  mental  health unit, and is  stamped  as  having  been
witnessed by Dr. Carroll.
          Four days later, on November 14, 2000, after discussing
her  options  with  a  case manager at a community  psychiatrists
office, Greywolf drove herself to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital and
was  admitted on an involuntary basis to the locked mental health
unit.    She   was  again  threatening  suicide.   Dr.   Carrolls
handwritten  notes state that Greywolf  does appear  to  be  more
withdrawn.  Greywolf reported at that time that she had not  used
illegal drugs and was compliant with her medications.
          Because  he  had  admitted Greywolf on  an  involuntary
basis, Dr. Carroll applied for an ex parte order for seventy-two-
hour  detention for evaluation from the court under AS 47.30.700.
Dr. Carroll wrote in the application that Greywolf was likely  to
cause  serious  harm  to self or others and listed  as  facts  to
support  the  belief: [patient] complaining of  feeling  suicidal
with  intent  to harm herself.  Superior Court Judge  Charles  R.
Pengilly  issued an ex parte order for seventy-two-hour detention
for  evaluation  and appointment of attorney  and  mental  health
professionals.2 That order included the direction  that  Greywolf
shall  be examined at the evaluation facility by the locum tenens
doctor   at   Fairbanks  Memorial  Hospital,  a   mental   health
professional  and  physician, and by Dr. Jane  Krauss,  a  mental
health professional within 24 hours of arrival at the facility.
          Dr.  Carrolls  handwritten notes on November  15,  2000
state  that Greywolf was angry that morning because she  did  not
want  to be in the closed unit and wanted more medication  and  a
medical  evaluation of problems she can handle as an out-patient.
Dr.  Carroll wrote at this point that [Greywolf] does not  appear
sad  or  depress[ed]  today.   She is  more  aptly  described  as
simmering looking for a target for her rage.  The nurses  patient
care  notes also state that Greywolf was angry on the morning  of
November 15 but that she had calmed down by the end of the day.
          On  November  16,  2000, Dr. Carroll changed  Greywolfs
admission status to voluntary.3  The court then issued  an  order
for  dismissal of the petition for commitment.  Greywolf does not
contend that the statutory requirements were not followed at that
time.
          At  about  2:45  p.m. on November 16,  after  Greywolfs
change  to voluntary status, the nurses notes state that Greywolf
became increasingly agitated and went into her room and curled up
in  the  corner  in  a  fetal  position.   She  began  to  scream
obscenities directed at the nurse and Dr. Carroll.  Security  was
called.  One of the nurses overheard Greywolf say that when I  go
out   again   Im   taking  someone  with  me.   Greywolf   became
increasingly  irate,  threw her bedding and mattress  around  her
room,  and  smashed  a  plastic cup against the  nursing  station
window.
          Although  Dr. Carroll was not present in the  unit,  he
was notified about Greywolfs increasing agitation.  He arrived in
the  unit  later in the day and spoke to Greywolf.   Dr.  Carroll
testified  that  when  he spoke to her, Greywolf  said  something
like,  you know, Im going to kill you  and began making  shooting
          sounds and tracking him with her finger as if aiming a gun.
After Dr. Carroll left the unit, one of the nurses heard over the
two-way intercom what sounded like the patient imitating shooting
a gun.
          When  Dr. Carroll returned to talk to Greywolf a second
time  at about 3:20 p.m. on November 16, she screamed profanities
at  him.   Dr. Carrolls handwritten notes indicate that  Greywolf
was [m]aking gestures that she wants to shoot me and saying shell
get  me.  Nothing specific enough to press assault charges.   The
nurses   notes  stated  that  Greywolfs  anger  was  particularly
directed at Dr. Carroll because she felt she was not getting  the
medication she wanted.  After Dr. Carroll left the unit to attend
to another matter, a nurse succeeded in calming Greywolf down and
she  ate  her evening meal at 6:00 p.m.  But at around 7:00  p.m.
Greywolf  began banging her head against the wall and refused  to
agree  not to harm herself.  The nurses notes state that Greywolf
curled up in a fetal position and began to wail.  Dr. Carroll was
telephoned and he ordered over the phone that Greywolf  be  given
medication and be placed in four-point restraints to prevent self-
harm.
          Greywolfs  status was then changed back to  involuntary
and  the  requisite  paperwork completed.  This  time  the  order
issued by the court ordered that respondent be examined by  locum
tenens   at   Fairbanks  Memorial  Hospital,  a   mental   health
professional  and physician, and by Dr. Steven Parker,  a  mental
health professional, within 24 hours of arrival at the facility.
          Dr.  Carroll observed Greywolf in four-point restraints
and  wrote  in his handwritten notes [w]hen I went  to  check  on
[Greywolf] in four points, she appeared comfortable although  she
refused to talk to me.  At the same time the night shift reported
that she told the day staff that she was going to use her gun  to
kill  herself  and  take someone with her.   At  8:00  p.m.,  Dr.
Carroll  wrote  an  order to [n]otify the supervisor  immediately
about  this  threat.  At 8:00 p.m. one restraint was removed  but
Greywolf  remained in three-point restraints.   Those  restraints
were removed fully by 11:00 p.m.
          On  the morning of November 17, 2000, the nurses report
that  Greywolf was calm and that she said I have nothing  against
the  staff, it is the MD Im angry at.  Before Dr. Carroll arrived
at  the  hospital  that morning, he had already decided  that  he
could  no  longer be Greywolfs psychiatrist and that  the  police
should  be called because of her threats.  He spoke to a hospital
administrator  and stated that he could not continue  working  at
Fairbanks Memorial Hospital if Greywolf remained a patient there.
Dr.  Carroll suggested that the police should be called, and told
the  administrator that Greywolf should have a physician assigned
to  her.  Dr. Carroll stated that he probably also discussed with
the administrator transferring Greywolf to another facility.
          Although  Dr.  Carroll  did not speak  to  Greywolf  on
November 17, he noted on the chart:
          After yesterdays threat [and] todays lack  of
          remorse,  I  can  no longer function  as  her
          physician  in  any  capacity.   I  hope  that
          pressing charges against [her] will have some
          positive effect for her and end this  endless
          violence and senseless rage.
          
          At  this  point she appears totally committed
          to  getting redress for what she sees  as  an
          endless series of injustices.
          
          She  has  no  interest in making any  changes
          herself.  She has never followed through with
          our   aftercare  plans.   Instead   she   has
          insisted  on displacing her rage  onto  me  &
          others in mental health rather than face  her
          fear  of  making  any changes  in  her  empty
          loveless life.
          
          Fairbanks  Police  Department officers  arrived  around
noon.  Officer Korshin interviewed Dr. Carroll and described  him
as shaky and nervous.  Officer Korshin also interviewed Greywolf,
who  denied  having  any  intent to harm Dr.  Carroll.   Greywolf
explained  to the officer that she intended Ill get you  to  mean
that she would sue Dr. Carroll for malpractice.
          A  statement from Dr. Carroll was taken on November 17,
2000.  He wrote:
          Yesterday, T.C. Greywolf threatened  to  kill
          me and I [am] afraid to be around her.
          
          After  I made her a voluntary patient, I  sat
          with  her  to  discuss what else  she  needed
          before  discharge.  Instead she  insisted  on
          questioning  my  actions in past  admissions.
          Particularly  why I kept her  on  the  locked
          unit  and  why I had not ordered  medications
          when  she  demanded them.  To  be  honest,  I
          could  not  reply  to her  questions  without
          looking  at old charts.  There have  been  so
          many admits that I could not say for sure.
          
          I  also wanted to focus on the present.  That
          only  made her angry.  She became so verbally
          abusive that I became afraid she was going to
          attack me and backed out of the unit.
          
          I  later  returned to see  her  but  she  was
          pummeling  her fists and smashing  dinnerware
          against  the  nurses  [station].   Once   she
          settled down, I reentered the main room  with
          a  security guard nearby to talk with  [her].
          This  time she demanded a witness in the room
          with  us which I told her was not reasonable.
          Again  she  became enraged  that  I  was  not
          caring for her.  As I backed out of the  room
          she said [] repeatedly that she was going  to
          get  me.  She kept [pantomiming] shooting  me
          as I stood talking with the nurses.
          
          Officer  Korshin  determined that  there  was  probable
cause to arrest Greywolf for assault based on his interviews with
Dr.   Carroll,  two  nurses,  and  Greywolf.   When  the  officer
explained  the  options of pressing charges or not,  Dr.  Carroll
indicated  that  he wanted to press charges.   Greywolf  did  not
resist  arrest and as she left the unit, she remarked to  one  of
the nurses, I guess you guys are rid of me now.
          The District Attorneys office sought to indict Greywolf
for  assault in the third degree under AS 11.41.220.   The  grand
jury  heard  from  Dr.  Carroll, the two  nurses,  and  a  police
officer,  and  it  returned an indictment for  assault  based  on
repeated  threats under AS 11.41.220(a)(2).  The  superior  court
issued  a  restraining order against Greywolf that  enjoined  her
from  coming  within 250 yards of Fairbanks Memorial Hospital  or
Dr. Carroll.
          Greywolf  was scheduled for a bail hearing  on  January
17,  2001  and  Dr. Carroll wrote a three-page  letter  to  Judge
Richard  D. Savell, the superior court judge hearing the  request
for  release.   The  letter was written in  response  to  several
issues  which  [Greywolfs] attorney glossed over  that  might  be
worthy  of your time while considering her motion to be  released
without  supervision  or  restriction.4   Dr.  Carroll  expressed
concern that Greywolf still had access to guns.  Near the end  of
the  letter,  Dr. Carroll wrote I have come to realize  that  she
does not belong in the mental health system.  No one in the state
or  V.A.  mental health system knows how to deal with someone  so
lethal.   Despite  this  letter, Greywolf appears  to  have  been
released  at  some  point  into the custody  of  a  third  party,
although the release order is not in the record.
          Greywolf  filed  motions  to  dismiss  the  indictment,
alleging  that  the  facts did not establish probable  cause  for
felony  assault in the third degree charges.  Those motions  were
denied.  Greywolfs criminal trial was then held on April 3, 2001.
After  the  state presented its case-in-chief, the defense  moved
for a judgment of acquittal.  Judge Savell granted the motion and
acquitted Greywolf.
          In   his   ruling  granting  acquittal,  Judge   Savell
identified four possible threats made by Greywolf.  The first was
the  statement overheard by the nurse that the next time Greywolf
shot  herself,  she was not going out alone.  The superior  court
ruled that this statement was not a true threat because it failed
to  meet  the  requirements of intent and imminence.   The  other
three  alleged threats were all statements or gestures made  when
Greywolf was agitated on November 16.  Judge Savell stated:
          The  court  must determine that [the  threat]
          was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate,
          and specific as to the victim as to convey  a
          gravity  of purpose and imminent prospect  of
          execution.   The  doctor  was  dealing   with
          someone  in a locked mental ward and  he  had
          the key.  He had the ability on a phone call,
          and  exercised  that  ability,  to  keep  Ms.
          Greywolf confined.  In fact, if anything, the
          ability he lacked was  and was frustrated in,
          was  the  ability to get rid of Ms.  Greywolf
          from the ward.
          
Judge Savell therefore concluded that a reasonable jury could not
find that Greywolfs statements were threats that would constitute
assault  under  the  statute.  He also noted  that  the  statutes
requirement  of repeated threats could not be met  by  statements
and gestures made almost simultaneously.
          After  her  acquittal, Greywolf sued  Dr.  Carroll  for
malicious  prosecution5 on December 31, 2001.   She  amended  her
complaint  on  October  29, 2002 to add claims  for  invasion  of
privacy  against  Dr.  Carroll and claims  against  the  City  of
Fairbanks  for deprivation of federal and civil rights  under  42
U.S.C.    1983  and  invasion  of  privacy.6   A  second  amended
complaint  added a medical malpractice claim against Dr.  Carroll
to the claims from the first amended complaint.
          Superior  Court  Judge  Randy J.  Olsen  dismissed  the
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and invasion of  privacy
claims  on summary judgment on June 29, 2004.  Greywolfs  medical
malpractice claim was allowed to proceed.  On November 22,  2004,
Judge  Olsen  dismissed  with prejudice the  medical  malpractice
claim on summary judgment based on the doctrine of absolute quasi-
judicial  immunity.  Greywolf filed a motion for  reconsideration
that was denied by the trial court.
          Greywolf  now appeals the grant of summary judgment  on
her  claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,  invasion
of privacy, and medical malpractice.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          Summary   judgment   is  granted  if   the   pleadings,
depositions,  or other admissible evidence along with  affidavits
show  that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that  a
party  is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7  We review  a
grant  of  summary  judgment de novo8 and in so  doing  draw  all
reasonable  inferences  in  favor  of  the  nonmoving  party   to
determine  whether  the  parties  genuinely  dispute  any   facts
material  to  a  viable legal theory and,  if  not,  whether  the
undisputed  facts entitle the movant to judgment as a  matter  of
law.9
          [A]  complete failure of proof concerning an  essential
element  of  the  nonmoving partys case necessarily  renders  all
other  facts immaterial.10  The movant has the burden of  showing
that there is an absence of a factual dispute on a material fact11
and that this absence of a dispute constitutes a failure of proof
on  an essential element.12  If a prima facie case is established
by  the  movant, then the nonmoving party must set forth specific
facts  showing  that admissible evidence could be  produced  that
reasonably  tends  to  dispute or contradict  the  moving  partys
evidence  in order to demonstrate the existence of a  dispute  of
material  fact  and  prevent entry of  summary  judgment.13   Any
admissible evidence in favor of the nonmoving party concerning  a
material   fact   is   sufficient  to  render  summary   judgment
inappropriate.14
          Whether  probable cause exists is a mixed  question  of
law  and  fact.15  In the absence of clear error, we  accept  the
factual findings of the trial court.16  Once the historical facts
          have been established, the existence or absence of probable cause
is a purely legal question that we review de novo.17  The question
of  whether  immunity exists as a defense to a claim  is  also  a
matter of law reviewed de novo.18
IV.  DISCUSSION
     A.   Malicious Prosecution
          At   trial,   Greywolf   claimed   that   Dr.   Carroll
maliciously,  and  without probable cause,  caused  her  wrongful
arrest  knowing that he had insufficient information  to  justify
causing  [Greywolfs] arrest.  The following elements are required
to  maintain  a  cause  of  action  for  the  tort  of  malicious
prosecution:
               (1)  a criminal proceeding instituted or
          continued   by  the  defendant  against   the
          plaintiff;
          
               (2)   termination of the  proceeding  in
          favor of the plaintiff;
          
               (3)   absence of probable cause for  the
          proceeding; and
          
               (4)   malice or a primary purpose  other
          than   that   of  bringing  an  offender   to
          justice.[19]
          
The  superior court found sufficient participation by Dr. Carroll
in  the  initiation of the criminal proceedings to  preserve  the
cause  of  action on the first element.  That the  criminal  case
terminated  in  favor of Greywolf is uncontested.   The  superior
court also found that there were questions of fact that prevented
summary  judgment for Dr. Carroll on the fourth element requiring
malice.   But  because the trial court concluded that  there  was
probable cause to believe a crime had been committed and that Dr.
Carroll was justified in calling the police to make a report  and
ask  for  an  investigation, it granted summary judgment  to  Dr.
Carroll on the malicious prosecution claim.
          The  superior  court found the following  facts  to  be
undisputed: (1) that Greywolf had recently demonstrated both  the
means  and  capacity  to use a gun on herself  in  her  attempted
suicide  in September; (2) that she had declared an intention  to
take  someone  with her the next time she attempted suicide;  (3)
that she had told Dr. Carroll that she was going to get him;  and
(4)  that she had mimicked shooting him.  Although she emphasizes
other facts in her argument, Greywolf does not offer any evidence
to establish a genuine dispute as to these underlying facts.  But
Greywolf  does  argue that probable cause did not exist  for  her
arrest  because Dr. Carroll knowingly supplied false  information
to the arresting officer.
          It  is  a  settled  rule  that  an  arresting  officers
exercise  of his or her independent discretion in initiating  and
maintaining  the prosecution is a complete defense to  an  action
for  malicious prosecution.20  But if a private person  makes  an
accusation  of criminal misconduct about another to an  official,
the  person  must believe that the accusation or  information  is
          true.21  If the person knows the information to be false, an
intelligent   exercise   of  the  officers   discretion   becomes
impossible,  and a prosecution based upon it is procured  by  the
person  giving  the  false  information.22   To  survive  summary
judgment, then, Greywolf must show that there is a genuine  issue
of  material fact whether Dr. Carroll in good faith believed  his
own  statements  to the police or whether he deliberately  misled
the police by suggesting that the situation was more serious than
it was.
          Greywolf first claims that Dr. Carroll himself believed
that  there was no probable cause for arrest.  Greywolfs argument
is  based  on the fact that after she threatened Dr.  Carroll  on
November  16, 2000, Dr. Carroll wrote in his notes that  Greywolf
had  done  [n]othing  specific enough to press  assault  charges.
Greywolf  claims that this note is [Dr.] Carrolls admission  that
he  lacked  probable  cause to accuse or  press  assault  charges
against  Greywolf.  But Dr. Carroll testified that he  made  this
note  prior  to  hearing from the staff of the night  shift  that
Greywolf told the day staff that she was going to use her gun  to
kill  herself and take someone with her.  Upon hearing about this
threat from the night shift, Dr. Carroll made an additional  note
to  [n]otify the administration supervisor immediately about this
threat.  Dr. Carroll also explained before the grand jury that it
was  this  additional information that caused him  to  decide  to
consult the police.  But Dr. Carrolls testimony on this point was
disputed.  One of the day nurses testified to the grand jury that
she  told  Dr.  Carroll about Greywolfs threat  during  the  day,
before the note was written.  Because we are reviewing a grant of
summary  judgment to Dr. Carroll, all factual inferences must  be
made  in  favor of the nonmoving party, Greywolf.   However,  Dr.
Carroll is not a law enforcement official, and at most, his  note
represents his lay opinion regarding whether assault charges were
appropriate.  As the trial court noted: [Dr.] Carroll  cannot  be
charged  with  knowing the law, nor deciding  on  the  degree  of
assault  to  be  charged and the elements  of  each.   Thus,  Dr.
Carrolls  lay assessment of whether the facts known to  him  were
sufficient to support an assault charge does not create a genuine
issue  of  material fact.  And as there is no  genuine  issue  of
material  fact  regarding whether Dr. Carroll believed  that  the
facts  he provided to the police were true, the grant of  summary
judgment was appropriate.
          Greywolf  then  relies on statements  made  by  Officer
Korshin  at deposition  to argue that Officer Korshin  would  not
have  made  the arrest on November 17 had he known that Greywolfs
threats had been made the previous day.  But Officer Korshin also
testified  that  no  one  told him that the  events  occurred  on
November  17, as opposed to November 16, and that he  had  merely
assumed  it.  And the written statement Dr. Carroll gave  Officer
Korshin  on  November  17  clearly  indicated  that  the   events
described  had  occurred on November 16.   Officer  Korshin  also
testified  that  Dr.  Carroll  did not  appear  anxious  to  have
Greywolf  arrested and that Dr. Carroll appeared to be  genuinely
scared.   Finally,  Officer Korshin made his decision  to  arrest
after  talking  to  Dr.  Carroll, two  nurses,  and  to  Greywolf
          herself, and did not simply rely on Dr. Carrolls information.
Therefore,  the  record  supports  the  conclusion  that  Officer
Korshin independently determined that there was probable cause to
arrest.
          Probable  cause  to arrest does not require  an  actual
showing  that  [criminal] activity occurred but requires  only  a
fair  probability  or substantial chance of criminal  activity.23
Probable  cause  to arrest exists if the facts and  circumstances
known  to the officer would support a reasonable belief  that  an
offense has been or is being committed by the suspect.24  Although
Greywolfs  actions on November 16 were eventually determined  not
to  constitute assault in the third degree, we conclude that  the
facts as Officer Korshin knew them on November 17 were sufficient
to  establish probable cause to arrest.  Therefore, the  superior
court  correctly granted summary judgment to Dr. Carroll  on  the
claim of malicious prosecution.
     B.   Abuse of Process
          Even  if  a  malicious  prosecution  claim  cannot   be
sustained because there was probable cause to arrest, a claim for
abuse  of  process may still remain.  In her complaint,  Greywolf
alleged  that Dr. Carroll pursued the assault charge for  reasons
other  than  to  bring  [Greywolf] to justice.   The  Restatement
(Second)  of  Torts defines abuse of process as the misuse  of  a
legal  process against another primarily to accomplish a  purpose
for which it was not designed.25  Alaska law requires two elements
for the claim:
               (1)   ulterior purpose independent  from
          the process, and
          
               (2)   a  willful act in the use  of  the
          process  that  is not proper in  the  regular
          conduct of the proceeding.[26]
          
The  ulterior  purpose  must  be  the  primary  purpose  for  the
defendants  use of the process.27  Unlike malicious  prosecution,
abuse of process does not require that probable cause be lacking28
and also does not require termination in favor of the accused.29
          On the first element, the superior court found there to
be  a  genuine issue of material fact as to whether [Dr.] Carroll
had  an  ulterior  purpose of having Greywolf  removed  from  the
mental  health  unit  and discouraged from  using  mental  health
services  at  [Fairbanks Memorial Hospital].  The superior  court
pointed  out  that Greywolf had a well-established  diagnosis  of
Post  Traumatic  Stress  Disorder and that,  in  the  opinion  of
Greywolfs expert, her behavior on November 16 was consistent with
that diagnosis.  The superior court also took note of the opinion
of  Greywolfs expert that characterized Dr. Carrolls behavior  as
an  attempt to criminalize Greywolfs mental illness as the result
of  a  personal conflict with her.  The superior court found that
portions of Dr. Carrolls testimony before the grand jury  and  at
trial reflected strong antipathy toward Greywolf and that it  was
arguable whether Dr. Carroll viewed arrest and jail as some  form
of  punitive treatment for [Greywolfs] violent outbursts  on  the
mental  health unit.  The superior court also took  note  of  the
          fact that Dr. Carroll stated in his deposition that it was time
to  try  a  different  system, the criminal  justice  system,  in
Greywolfs  case.  Given these facts, the superior court concluded
that  reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether Dr.  Carroll
used criminal proceedings to get rid of Greywolf from his unit at
Fairbanks Memorial Hospital.
          But the superior court found that there was no issue of
material fact on the second element, requiring a willful  act  in
the  use of the process that is not proper in the regular conduct
of the proceeding.30  As we explained in Hayes v. A.J. Associates,
Inc.,  even if a lawsuit were filed for an improper purpose,  the
mere act of filing suit is not sufficient for an abuse of process
action.31  Furthermore, we have recognized that actions taken  in
the  regular course of litigation such as testifying  before  the
grand  jury  or at trial also cannot form a proper basis  for  an
abuse of process claim.32
          In  order to prevail, then, Greywolf must show that Dr.
Carroll undertook a separate act in addition to the initiation of
the proceedings, which amounted to a misuse of those proceedings.33
The  usual  case  of  abuse of process is one  of  some  form  of
extortion,  using the process to put pressure upon the  other  to
compel  him to pay a different debt or to take some other  action
or  refrain  from it.34  In Sands v. Living Word  Fellowship,  we
provided  three  examples  of  a willful  act:  (1)  offering  to
discontinue  a proceeding in return for a payment of  money;  (2)
filing  a  lien  to force the plaintiff to pay off  an  unrelated
debt;  or  (3)  causing  an arrest and confinement  in  order  to
intimidate the plaintiff.35
          Greywolf argues that the letter written by Dr.  Carroll
addressed  to  Judge  Savell  and  filed  on  January  25,   2001
constituted a willful act because it evidenced an attempt by  Dr.
Carroll to cause, improperly, the arrest and confinement [of  the
plaintiff] to intimidate the plaintiff.36  But AS 12.61.010(a)(2),
as  part  of  Alaskas  Crime Victims Rights Act,37  entitled  Dr.
Carroll  to be notified of bail hearings38 and article 1, section
24  of  the  Alaska Constitution provides that a victim  has  the
right  to  be heard at any proceeding where the accuseds  release
from custody is considered.39  Dr. Carrolls letter is thus within
the  limits  anticipated for his participation in the proceedings
as  a victim.  Greywolf therefore failed to raise a genuine issue
of  material  fact  on this element and we affirm  the  grant  of
summary judgment to Dr. Carroll on the abuse of process claim.
     C.   Invasion of Privacy
          Greywolfs   complaint   claimed   that   Dr.    Carroll
intentionally invaded Greywolfs solitude, seclusion . . . private
affairs  or  concerns by contacting and summoning  third  persons
into [] Greywolfs private and secluded area while she was in  the
Fairbanks  Memorial Hospital locked mental health  unit.   Alaska
law  recognizes the claim for invasion of privacy  based  on  the
Restatement (Second) of Torts  652B.40  Section 652B reads:
          One who intentionally intrudes, physically or
          otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion  of
          another  or his private affairs or  concerns,
          is  subject  to  liability to the  other  for
          invasion  of  his privacy, if  the  intrusion
          would  be  highly offensive to  a  reasonable
          person.[41]
          
Two elements are required:
               (1)   that  plaintiff had  a  reasonable
          expectation of privacy, and
          
               (2)  that defendant intruded in a manner
          highly offensive to a reasonable person.[42]
          
The  superior court found that Greywolf had failed to make out  a
genuine issue of material fact on either element.
          Greywolf  concentrates  her  argument  on  the   second
element, maintaining that the police intruded in a manner  highly
offensive  to  a  reasonable person.  Greywolf  argues  that  the
superior court erred when it found that [a] reasonable person who
was  a patient in a locked mental health unit would not be highly
offended  by  the  actions of the police under the  circumstances
because whether she was highly offended is a factual question for
the jury.  But the reasonable person standard has both subjective
and  objective elements.  While the question whether Greywolf was
highly offended is a factual question for the jury, whether it is
reasonable  for her to have been highly offended is  a  different
matter.43
          First,  we  note that the invasion of privacy principle
cannot  shield a person from investigations by the police  unless
the  investigation  is  carried out in an offensive  manner.   In
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., we explained that courts
have   construed  offensive  intrusion  to  require   either   an
unreasonable manner of intrusion, or intrusion for an unwarranted
purpose.44   The illustrations in the comments to the Restatement
(Second)  of  Torts  652B indicate that it must be an exceptional
kind  of  prying into another's private affairs to  constitute  a
highly offensive intrusion.45  Here, Greywolf merely argues  that
because  the  Patients  Bill  of  Rights  of  Fairbanks  Memorial
Hospital  provides that [t]hose not directly involved in  .  .  .
care  must  have the permission of the patient to be present  and
because  she did not give permission to the police to be present,
a  genuine  issue  of  material fact exists  as  to  whether  the
intrusion was highly offensive.  But Greywolf impliedly consented
to  the  interview  with Officer Korshin when  she  answered  his
questions  without objection.46  Furthermore, the police  entered
the  mental health unit for the purpose of fulfilling their  duty
to  respond and investigate when summoned.47  The record does not
indicate   anything   unreasonable  in   the   conduct   of   the
investigators  and  Greywolf  does  not  claim   that   she   was
intimidated  by  the  police.  As a matter of  law,  the  orderly
performance of the police officers duties in this case  does  not
constitute  an unreasonable manner of intrusion nor an  intrusion
for an unwarranted purpose.
          Greywolf  also  fails  to  establish  that  she  had  a
reasonable  expectation of privacy.  Again, she argues  that  the
question  is  a  factual one for the jury.  While the  subjective
element   whether Greywolf herself had an expectation of  privacy
          may present a question of fact for the jury, the objective
element   whether  it  was  reasonable  for  her  to  have   that
expectation   presents a question of law.48   Greywolfs  argument
relies  solely  on  the  Patients Bill  of  Rights  at  Fairbanks
Memorial  Hospital that states [t]he patient  has  the  right  to
every  consideration of his privacy concerning  his  own  medical
care program.  But the plain language of this provision does  not
state  that  this expectation of privacy is absolute or  that  it
excludes  law  enforcement or security from entering  the  locked
unit   for   the  purposes  of  investigating  possible  criminal
misconduct.   The  police were privileged  to  enter  the  mental
health  unit  because they had a duty to respond and  investigate
when  summoned.49  And Greywolf does not provide evidence to show
that  she had the right to exclude others from her room, a factor
commonly  considered in determining whether a persons expectation
of  privacy was reasonable.50  Because Greywolf cannot  establish
that  she  had a reasonable expectation of privacy  or  that  the
intrusion  was unreasonable in manner or purpose, we  affirm  the
grant  of  summary  judgment to Dr. Carroll on  the  invasion  of
privacy claim.
     D.   Medical Malpractice
          In her medical malpractice claim, Greywolf complains of
several  acts or omissions.  Greywolf argues that [Dr.]  Carrolls
change  of Greywolfs admission status to involuntary [on November
16]  was  done  in  bad  faith.  She also faults  [Dr.]  Carrolls
refusal to provide medical care to Greywolf on November 17, 2000;
[Dr.]  Carrolls corresponding decision to press criminal  charges
against  Greywolf, a mental health patient under  his  care;  and
[Dr.]  Carrolls corresponding discharge of his patient to a  jail
in  violation of AS 47.30.705(a).  Greywolf further complains  of
Dr.  Carrolls failure to provide her a discharge plan  specifying
the  kinds and amount of care and treatment Greywolf should  have
after  discharge, and such other steps as Greywolf might take  to
benefit  her mental health after leaving the facility as required
under  AS  47.30.825(I).  The superior court granted Dr.  Carroll
summary  judgment on the medical malpractice claim based  on  the
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.  We affirm.
          We  recognized  the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial
immunity in Lythgoe v. Quinn.51  In Lythgoe, immunity was granted
to   a   court-appointed  psychologist  who  was  acting  as   an
independent custody investigator in a divorce proceeding.52  As we
explained  in  Lythgoe,  the doctrine of absolute  quasi-judicial
immunity  is  derived  from that of absolute  judicial  immunity.
Thus,  persons, other than judges, who perform judicial functions
are  granted  immunity coextensive with that  accorded  judges.53
This  form  of immunity is absolute and it applies no matter  how
erroneous  the act may have been, how injurious its consequences,
how  informal the proceeding, or how malicious the motive.   Only
judicial  actions taken in the clear absence of all  jurisdiction
will  deprive a judge of absolute immunity.54  In a case granting
court-appointed  psychiatrists  absolute  immunity,  the   Hawaii
Supreme Court noted that [i]n adopting this position, we  do  not
condone negligence by persons in the performance of their  duties
or  their  failure  to  abide by a court  order.   The  grant  of
          absolute immunity is not intended to permit the doctors to hide
behind the judicial shield.  Rather, our position is necessary to
maintain the orderly administration of the judicial process.55
          In  Lythgoe, we pointed to several policy grounds  used
by  other  courts  in  adopting the  doctrine  of  quasi-judicial
immunity, including
          (1)  the  need  to  save  judicial  time   in
          defending suits; (2) the need for finality in
          the  resolution of disputes; (3)  to  prevent
          deterring   competent  persons  from   taking
          office;  (4) to prevent the threat of lawsuit
          from discouraging independent action; and (5)
          the    existence   of   adequate   procedural
          safeguards  such  as  change  of  venue   and
          appellate review.[56]
          
          Greywolf  first  argues that Dr. Carroll  cannot  enjoy
immunity  under the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial  immunity
because  he  was not  performing a function pursuant to  a  court
directive related to the judicial process57 on November 17.   She
argues that [t]he happenstance of the existence of a court  order
on  November 17, 2000, caused by [Dr.] Carrolls medical decisions
toward  Greywolf  on  November  16,  2000,  cannot  shield  [Dr.]
Carrolls medical malpractice on November 17, 2000.  But in  Karen
L.  v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Division of
Family  &  Youth Services, we noted that it is irrelevant  how  a
doctor  came  to  be  appointed by the court  because  [w]e  have
recognized  that it is not how the psychologist was first  chosen
but  whether  his  activity is an integral part of  the  judicial
process  so  that  to  deny immunity would disserve  the  broader
public  interest that non-judicial officers act without  fear  of
liability. 58  Thus, the question in this case does not  turn  on
whether  Dr.  Carrolls  own actions caused his  appointment,  but
whether,  once  appointed, the actions he took were  an  integral
part of the judicial process.
          Greywolfs alternative argument claims that Dr. Carrolls
actions  on  November  17  are  not  entitled  to  quasi-judicial
immunity  because they were not an integral part of the  judicial
process.  Greywolf argues that Dr. Carrolls acts were ministerial
and  that they fell outside or were contrary to the court  order.
But  the superior court order provided that the respondent  shall
be  examined  at  the  evaluation facility  by  locum  tenens  at
Fairbanks Memorial Hospital.  And Greywolf does not challenge Dr.
Carrolls  status as the locum tenens when the ex parte orders  of
November  16  and 17 were issued.  Nor does she allege  that  the
court  lacked  jurisdiction  to  appoint  the  locum  tenens   at
Fairbanks  Memorial  Hospital  to  her  case.   Greywolf  instead
complains  that  her  status  on  November  16  was  changed  for
malicious  reasons  and  that she was  wrongfully  discharged  on
November  17  without a treatment plan.  But her complaint  about
her  discharge  to  jail  relies on her  unsuccessful  claim  for
malicious prosecution.  And Dr. Carroll was appointed by  the  ex
parte  order  orally issued on November 16 to evaluate  Greywolfs
mental  health and to make recommendations regarding whether  she
          should be released or committed involuntarily pursuant to
AS 47.30.700,59 AS 47.30.705,60 AS 47.30.710,61 and AS 47.30.720.62
The  evaluation  of   Greywolf required  Dr.  Carroll  to  decide
whether  to  change  Greywolfs status and whether  she  could  be
discharged.    Thus,  Greywolfs  allegations  that  Dr.   Carroll
improperly  discharged her on November 17 without  providing  her
with  an  aftercare plan, as required under AS 47.30.825(I),  are
complaints about acts that are integrally linked to Dr.  Carrolls
judicially appointed function to evaluate Greywolfs mental health
and  to  decide  whether  she should be  committed  or  released.
Absolute  quasi-judicial immunity applies no matter how erroneous
the  act  may  have  been, how injurious  its  consequences,  how
informal the proceeding, or how malicious the motive.63  In  this
case, although Dr. Carroll may not have followed proper procedure
when  evaluating  Greywolf and making the decision  to  discharge
her,   his   acts   remain  squarely  within  his   discretionary
jurisdiction as a court-appointed psychiatrist.
V.   CONCLUSION
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the superior
court is AFFIRMED in all respects.
_______________________________
     1    AS 47.30.700(b) provides:

               The  petition required in  (a)  of  this
          section  must  allege that the respondent  is
          reasonably  believed to present a  likelihood
          of  serious  harm  to self or  others  or  is
          gravely  disabled  as  a  result  of   mental
          illness   and   must  specify   the   factual
          information  on  which that belief  is  based
          including  the  names and  addresses  of  all
          persons  known  to  the petitioner  who  have
          knowledge  of  those facts  through  personal
          observation.
          
     2    The order was issued orally on November 14 and the date
of the written order was November 15.

     3     This  change appears to have been initiated  at  10:30
a.m.  as  noted  in  the nurses patient care notes.   The  record
contains  an  Application for Voluntary Admission dated  November
16,  2000  signed by Greywolf and a Notice of Voluntary Admission
signed by the hospital staff.

     4     It  appears that this motion for release was heard  in
the court on the morning of January 17, 2001 and that Dr. Carroll
was  present,  but  had  been unable to speak  before  the  court
because  he  had failed to inform the district attorney  that  he
would appear.

     5     This  claim  was eventually treated as  one  for  both
malicious prosecution and abuse of process.

     6    The claims against the City of Fairbanks were dismissed
on  summary  judgment  on  July 29, 2004  and  Greywolf  has  not
appealed that judgment.

     7    Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c).

     8    Snyder v. Am. Legion Spenard Post No. 28, 119 P.3d 996,
1001 (Alaska 2005).

     9     Preblich  v.  Zorea, 996 P.2d 730, 733  (Alaska  2000)
(quoting Arctic Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Raleigh, Schwartz &  Powell,
956 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Alaska 1998)).

     10    Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1996); see
also  Hinsberger  v.  State, 53 P.3d 568,  571-73  (Alaska  2002)
(affirming  summary  judgment against plaintiff  where  plaintiff
failed to show he could prove one element of the claim).

     11     Shade v. Co & Anglo Alaska Serv. Corp., 901 P.2d 434,
437 (Alaska 1995).

     12     See,  e.g., Dansereau v. Ulmer, 903 P.2d 555,  570-71
(Alaska 1995).

     13    Preblich, 996 P.2d at 733.

     14     Meyer  v.  State,  Dept  of  Revenue,  Child  Support
Enforcement  Div.  ex  rel. N.G.T. , 994 P.2d  365,  367  (Alaska
1999).

     15    Matter of J.A., 962 P.2d 173, 175 (Alaska 1998).

     16    Id.

     17    Id.

     18     State, Dept of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v.  Sanders,
944 P.2d 453, 456 (Alaska 1997).

     19     Stephens v. State, Dept of Revenue, 746 P.2d 908, 911
(Alaska  1987); see also Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257,  262-63  n.37
(Alaska 2000); Restatement (Second) of Torts  653 (1977).

     20    Restatement (Second) of Torts  653 cmt. g (1977).

     21    Id.

     22    Id.

     23     Van  Sandt v. Brown, 944 P.2d 449, 452 (Alaska  1997)
(citations omitted).

     24    State v. Joubert, 20 P.3d 1115, 1118-19 (Alaska 2001).

     25    Restatement (Second) of Torts  682 (1977).

     26     Sands  v.  Living Word Fellowship, 34 P.3d  955,  961
(Alaska  2001);  see also Jenkins v. Daniels,  751  P.2d  19,  22
(Alaska 1988).

     27    Restatement (Second) Torts  682, cmt. b (1977).

     28    Restatement (Second) Torts  682, cmt. a (1977).

     29    Jenkins, 751 P.2d at 20, 22.

     30    Sands, 34 P.3d at 961.

     31    960 P.2d 556, 571 (Alaska 1998).

     32     Meidinger  v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d  77,  86  (Alaska
2001).

     33    Sands, 34 P.3d at 961.

     34    Restatement (Second) of Torts  682, cmt. b (1977).

     35    34 P.3d at 961.

     36    Id.

     37    Ch. 59, SLA 1989.

     38    AS 12.61.010 provides:

               (a)  Victims   of   crimes   have    the
                    following rights:
                    
               . . . .

               (2)   the  right to be notified  by  the
          appropriate  law enforcement  agency  or  the
          prosecuting  attorney of the date  of  trial,
          sentencing, including a proceeding  before  a
          three-judge  panel  under  AS  12.55.175,  an
          appeal,   and  any  hearing  in   which   the
          defendants    release   from    custody    is
          considered[.]
          
     39    Article 1, section 24 states in pertinent part:

          Crime victims, as defined by law, shall  have
          the following rights as provided by law:  . .
          .  the right to obtain information about  and
          be  allowed to be present at all criminal  or
          juvenile  proceedings where the  accused  has
          the  right to be present; [and] the right  to
          be  allowed  to  be heard, upon  request,  at
          sentencing,  before  or after  conviction  or
          juvenile  adjudication, and at any proceeding
          where  the accused's release from custody  is
          considered.
          
     40    Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123,
1133 (Alaska 1989).

     41    Restatement (Second) of Torts  652B (1977).

     42     See, e.g., Med. Lab. Consultants v. Amer. Broad. Co.,
306 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002).

     43    See, e.g., State v. Page, 911 P.2d 513, 515-16 (Alaska
App. 1996).

     44     768 P.2d at 1137; see also Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Stewart,
990 P.2d 626, 632 (Alaska 1999).

     45    See Restatement (Second) of Torts  652B, cmt. b (1977)
(The  intrusion may be a physical intrusion into a place in which
the  plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces
his  way into the plaintiff's room in a hotel or insists over the
plaintiff's  objection in entering his home.   The  illustrations
offer, among other things, the following examples: (1) taking the
photograph  of a woman in the hospital with a rare  disease  that
arouses  public  curiosity over her objection, and  (2)  using  a
telescope to look into someones upstairs bedroom window  for  two
weeks and taking intimate pictures with a telescopic lens.).

     46    Hill v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
834,  849 (Cal. 1994) ([T]he plaintiff in an invasion of  privacy
case   must  have  conducted  himself  or  herself  in  a  manner
consistent with an actual expectation of privacy, i.e., he or she
must  not  have  manifested by his or  her  conduct  a  voluntary
consent  to  the  invasive  actions of defendant.   If  voluntary
consent  is present, a defendant's conduct will rarely be  deemed
highly  offensive to a reasonable person so as  to  justify  tort
liability.) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts  652B, cmt. c).

     47     See,  e.g., Bauman v. State, Div.  of Family &  Youth
Servs.,  768  P.2d  1097, 1100 (Alaska 1989) (Actions  of  police
officer  in response to what was eventually determined  to  be  a
false  and  maliciously  slanderous report  of  child  abuse  not
actionable because police officer acted in good faith and  in  an
orderly manner, within the scope of his duty to investigate.).

     48    Page, 911 P.2d at 515-16.

     49    See, e.g., Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1100.

     50     See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 585 N.W.2d 905,  908-10
(Wis. App. 1998).

     51    884 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1994).

     52    Id. at 1086.

     53    Id. at 1087.

     54     Trapp  v.  State,  53 P.3d 1128, 1130  (Alaska  2002)
(quoting  Cok  v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989)).   The
Supreme  Court  of the United States has noted: [t]he  procedural
difference  between the absolute and the qualified immunities  is
important.  An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so
long  as  the  officials actions were within  the  scope  of  the
immunity.   The  fate  of  an official  with  qualified  immunity
depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as
established  by the evidence at trial.  Imbler v.  Pachtman,  424
U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).

     55     Seibel  v.  Kemble, 631 P.2d 173,  177  (Haw.  1978).
Essential  to the courts reasoning was the fact that  there  were
other ways to hold a courts agents accountable for their actions,
including  the  imposition of sanctions, such  as  reporting  the
doctor  to  the  medical boards or prohibiting  the  doctor  from
further service to the court.  Id. at 177 n.8.

     56    884 P.2d at 1089 (quoting Lavit v. Superior Court, 839
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. App. 1992)).

     57    Id. at 1088 (quoting Lavit, 839 P.2d at 1144).

     58    953 P.2d 871, 878 (quoting Lythgoe, 884 P.2d at 1088).

     59     AS  47.30.700,  Initiation of involuntary  commitment
procedures, provides:

               (a)  Upon petition of any adult, a judge
          shall   immediately   conduct   a   screening
          investigation or direct a local mental health
          professional employed by the department or by
          a  local  mental health program that receives
          money  from the department under AS 47.30.520
          47.30.620    or    another   mental    health
          professional  designated  by  the  judge,  to
          conduct  a  screening  investigation  of  the
          person alleged to be mentally ill and,  as  a
          result  of  that  condition,  alleged  to  be
          gravely  disabled or to present a  likelihood
          of serious harm to self or others.  Within 48
          hours  after the completion of the  screening
          investigation, a judge may issue an ex  parte
          order  orally  or  in writing,  stating  that
          there  is  probable  cause  to  believe   the
          respondent is mentally ill and that condition
          causes  the respondent to be gravely disabled
          or to present a likelihood of serious harm to
          self  or  others.   The court  shall  provide
          findings  on which the conclusion  is  based,
          appoint   an   attorney  to   represent   the
          respondent,  and  may  direct  that  a  peace
          officer take the respondent into custody  and
          deliver   the   respondent  to  the   nearest
          appropriate     facility    for     emergency
          examination or treatment.  The ex parte order
          shall be provided to the respondent and  made
          a  part  of the respondents clinical  record.
          The  court  shall confirm an  oral  order  in
          writing within 24 hours after it is issued.
          
               (b)   The  petition required in  (a)  of
          this  section must allege that the respondent
          is   reasonably   believed   to   present   a
          likelihood of serious harm to self or  others
          or  is gravely disabled as a result of mental
          illness   and   must  specify   the   factual
          information  on  which that belief  is  based
          including  the  names and  addresses  of  all
          persons  known  to  the petitioner  who  have
          knowledge  of  those facts  through  personal
          observation.
          
     60     AS  47.30.705,  Emergency detention  for  evaluation,
provides:

               (a)  A peace officer, a psychiatrist  or
          physician who is licensed to practice in this
          state  or employed by the federal government,
          or  a  clinical psychologist licensed by  the
          state Board of Psychologist and Psychological
          Associate Examiners who has probable cause to
          believe that a person is gravely disabled  or
          is  suffering  from  mental  illness  and  is
          likely  to  cause  serious harm  to  self  or
          others   of   such  immediate   nature   that
          considerations  of  safety   do   not   allow
          initiation    of    involuntary    commitment
          procedures set out in AS 47.30.700, may cause
          the  person  to  be  taken into  custody  and
          delivered to the nearest evaluation facility.
          A  person  taken into custody  for  emergency
          evaluation  may not be placed in  a  jail  or
          other   correctional  facility   except   for
          protective  custody purposes and  only  while
          awaiting   transportation  to   a   treatment
          facility.    However,  emergency   protective
          custody  under this section may  not  include
          placement  of  a  minor in a jail  or  secure
          facility.  The peace officer or mental health
          professional  shall complete  an  application
          for  examination of the person in custody and
          be    interviewed   by   a   mental    health
          professional at the facility.
          
               (b)   In  this section, minor  means  an
          individual who is under 18 years of age.
          
     61    AS 47.30.710, Examination, provides:

               (a)  A respondent who is delivered under
          AS  47.30.700   47.30.705  to  an  evaluation
          facility   for   emergency  examination   and
          treatment shall be examined and evaluated  as
          to  mental and physical condition by a mental
          health professional and by a physician within
          24 hours after arrival at the facility.
          
               (b)   If  the mental health professional
          who  performs  the emergency examination  has
          reason to believe that the respondent is  (1)
          mentally  ill and that condition  causes  the
          respondent  to  be  gravely  disabled  or  to
          present a likelihood of serious harm to  self
          or  others,  and (2) is in need  of  care  or
          treatment, the mental health professional may
          hospitalize  the respondent, or  arrange  for
          hospitalization, on an emergency basis.  If a
          judicial order has not been obtained under AS
          47.30.700,  the  mental  health  professional
          shall apply for an ex parte order authorizing
          hospitalization for evaluation.
          
     62     AS  47.30.720, Release before expiration  of  72-hour
period, provides:

          If  at  any time in the course of the 72-hour
          period   the   mental  health   professionals
          conducting the evaluation determine that  the
          respondent  does not meet the  standards  for
          commitment  specified in  AS  47.30.700,  the
          respondent  shall  be  discharged  from   the
          facility  or  the  place  of  evaluation   by
          evaluation  personnel and the petitioner  and
          the court so notified.
          
     63    Trapp, 53 P.3d at 1130 (quoting Cok, 876 F.2d at 2).

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