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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Anderson v. PPCT Management Systems, Inc. (10/06/2006) sp-6058
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| DEBORAH J. ANDERSON, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S-11766 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. | |
| v. | ) 3AN-02-14199 CI |
| ) | |
| PPCT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC., | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 6058 - October 6, 2006 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Mark Rindner, Judge.
Appearances: Thomas S. Gingras, Jonathan E.
Iversen, Eide, Miller & Pate, P.C.,
Anchorage, for Appellant. Joanne Thomas
Blackburn, David S. Cottnair, Forsberg &
Umlauf, P.S., Seattle, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A state employee sued Pressure Point Control Tactics
Management Systems, Inc., (PPCT) under theories of vicarious
liability, retained control, and negligence for injuries incurred
during a training program designed by PPCT and taught by PPCT-
certified state employees. We affirm the superior courts award
of summary judgment to PPCT on the retained control and vicarious
liability claims because we conclude that PPCT did not retain
control over the instructors and the instructors were neither
servants nor agents of PPCT. We reverse the superior courts
award of summary judgment to PPCT on the negligence claim because
we conclude that PPCT had a duty of care in developing and
implementing its training program.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Deborah Anderson attended the State of Alaska
Department of Corrections (DOC) training academy from November 5
to December 14, 2001. One week of this six-week program, officer
safety week, students were trained in use-of-force techniques
through a program developed by PPCT. PPCT designs use-of-force
programs that provide criminal justice agencies with (1) a system
for training employees, (2) a model use-of-force policy and
report forms, and (3) litigation assistance.
The first thirty-two hours of officer safety week teach
PPCT techniques and the last eight hours provide simulation
training. Anderson alleges that she was injured as a result of
the use of excessive force during a simulation training exercise
with PPCT-certified instructor Regina McLain. We assume for
purposes of review that Anderson was injured during PPCT
training.1 Both PPCT and non-PPCT techniques are used during
simulation training.
PPCT does not conduct PPCT training programs. Instead,
agencies send employees to a five-day program where PPCT
instructor trainers train employees to be PPCT instructors. Once
an agency employee is certified as an instructor, she may conduct
training to certify other agency employees in PPCT methods.
Agencies may also have employees certified as instructor
trainers, enabling them to certify other employees as
instructors. Michael Addington was the officer in charge of
training on the day Anderson was injured. Addington was
certified as both a PPCT instructor and a PPCT instructor
trainer.
PPCT uses three sequences of practice: static, fluid,
and dynamic. Static training moves in slow motion and breaks
down the components of a technique. Fluid training occurs at
fifty percent or less of full speed and is the level at which
students perform the most repetitions of a technique. Dynamic
training is full-speed role playing. PPCT does not require
dynamic training for certification.
Instructor trainers must sign an agreement with PPCT.
The agreement requires instructor trainers to teach PPCT tactics
in an unmodified form and to follow all PPCT procedures for the
certification of instructors. The agreement also states that
[t]he INSTRUCTOR TRAINER is a representative of [PPCT] and will
act professionally and ethically with all matters relating to Use
of Force training. . . . The INSTRUCTOR TRAINER agrees to wear
PPCT Instructor jerseys, or the logo of the INSTRUCTOR TRAINERS
agency or academy. But [t]he INSTRUCTOR TRAINER shall not
represent himself as an agent or employee of PPCT nor enter into
any agreement or contract [o]n behalf of said corporation.
Breach of the agreement can result in termination of the
instructor trainers certification. Instructor trainers may
conduct courses at the request of an agency or on their own
initiative. However, PPCT must approve the instructor trainers
training request. Instructor trainers may delete techniques from
the PPCT instruction manual, but all PPCT techniques must be
taught according to the manual. Instructor trainers may not
teach non-PPCT techniques.
Unlike instructor trainers, instructors do not sign an
agreement with PPCT. However, instructors must follow certain
procedures for class certification. Instructors must submit a
training certification request, provide students with instruction
manuals, and submit student evaluations, a training injury
report, a class roster, and copies of the students exams to PPCT.
When teaching a PPCT technique, instructors may not grossly
modify the technique in the printed manual. Instructors may
delete PPCT techniques or add non-PPCT techniques to the
training, but PPCT will not certify or provide litigation support
for added or deleted material. Although instructors are not
required to wear PPCT clothing, occasionally they wear PPCT gear.
B. Proceedings
Anderson sued PPCT for negligence, claiming that PPCT
owed her a duty of care to train instructors not to allow the use
of excessive force during classes. PPCT moved for summary
judgment on the basis that, because Andersons injuries did not
occur during PPCT training, PPCT could not have proximately
caused her injuries. Andersons opposition claimed that there
were disputed issues of fact and developed an additional argument
for PPCTs vicarious liability for the negligence of the
instructors.
PPCT filed a second motion for summary judgment,
arguing that (1) the instructors were not employees of PPCT, and
(2) even if the instructors were independent contractors, PPCT
was not liable for the torts of its independent contractors.
Andersons opposition again claimed disputed issues of fact and
argued that principles of vicarious liability, respondeat
superior, actual and apparent authority, and retained control
made PPCT liable for the actions of the instructors.
The superior court denied PPCTs motion for summary
judgment on the negligence claim, finding that there were
material facts in dispute as to whether plaintiff was injured
during a segment of the training academy that was a part of the
PPCT training. The court granted PPCTs second motion for summary
judgment, finding as a matter of law that the instructors were
neither employees of PPCT nor independent contractors over whom
PPCT retained control. Noting Andersons shifting theories of
liability, the court allowed PPCT to move for summary judgment on
the agency theories.
PPCT made a third motion for summary judgment that was
eventually withdrawn with permission to file a fourth motion for
summary judgment addressing any remaining issues.
In its fourth and final motion for summary judgment,
PPCT argued that (1) Anderson could not establish duty or breach
under her negligence claim, and (2) no agency relationship
existed between PPCT and the instructors. The court concluded
that, as a matter of law, the instructors were not acting as
agents of PPCT and granted PPCTs motion for summary judgment on
the issue of agency. As to the issue of negligence, the court
concluded that previously identified factual disputes about
whether dynamic training was part of PPCT training remained, and
also determined that there was a factual dispute about whether
the technique being used when [Anderson] was injured was a
technique taught by PPCT . . . . Therefore, the court denied
PPCTs motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim but
explained that at trial Anderson would have the burden of showing
(1) what maneuver was involved in her injury; (2) that the
maneuver [was] one that was being taught based on the training
that the Instructors had received from PPCT; and (3) that it was
somehow negligent or otherwise improper for PPCT to have
instructed the Instructors to teach this maneuver to others.
Anderson moved for reconsideration of the courts
characterization of the required elements of her negligence
claim. Anderson maintained that she should not be required to
show that the maneuver involved in her injury was based on PPCT
training. Anderson asserted that at trial she could make out a
negligence claim by showing that PPCT negligently trained its
instructors regarding excessive force and the use of non-PPCT
moves during PPCT training. The court denied the motion for
reconsideration and suggested that if Anderson could not meet her
evidentiary burden, she should allow judgment to be entered and
appeal. Anderson refused to voluntarily dismiss the case,
leading the court to sua sponte reconsider its earlier decision
and grant PPCT summary judgment on the negligence claim.
Anderson appeals the superior courts conclusions on
summary judgment that (1) the instructors were not employees of
PPCT, (2) the instructors were not independent contractors over
whom PPCT retained sufficient control to impose liability, (3)
there was no agency relationship between PPCT and the
instructors, and (4) PPCT did not owe or breach a duty of care to
Anderson.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial courts ruling on summary judgment presents
questions of law and is reviewed independently.2 This courts
review is based on the entire trial record, and in considering
these materials this court gives [t]he non-moving party . . . the
benefit of all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the
proffered evidence.3
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Master-Servant Relationship
Anderson argues that PPCT is vicariously liable for the
negligence of the instructors because the instructors are
servants of PPCT. We disagree. Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, a master is liable for the negligence of a servant that
occurs within the scope of employment.4 According to the
Restatement (Second) of Agency 220(1), [a] servant is a person
employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the others control or right to control.5
To determine whether a master-servant relationship exists, we
look to all of the characteristics listed in the Restatement.6
However, the most important factor is whether the alleged master
had the right to control the manner of performance of the work.7
Although PPCT set standards, curriculum, and course
protocol, PPCT did not possess sufficient control over the
instructors to create a master-servant relationship. PPCT did
not pay the instructors, and Anderson does not contend that PPCT
had the authority to fire them.8 While PPCT could deny
certification for the class and revoke the certification of the
instructor, the only significant effect of these actions would be
loss of litigation support. Although PPCT could prohibit
instructors from teaching certified classes, there is nothing in
the record to indicate that PPCT would try to bar instructors
from teaching PPCT methods in non-certified classes. The record
demonstrates that DOC, not PPCT, told instructors not to deviate
from the PPCT manual. The parties do not appear to have believed
that they were creating a master-servant relationship. While two
instructors referred to themselves as representatives of PPCT,
they did not refer to themselves as employees, and one stated
clearly that he did not work for PPCT. Based on all of these
factors, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the instructors
were not servants of PPCT.
B. Agency
Anderson argues that, even if the instructors were not
servants of PPCT, they were agents of PPCT and PPCT is liable for
the tortious acts of its agents. We have recognized that a
principal can be vicariously liable for the torts of its agents.9
Under the Restatement, authority to do an act can be created by
written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal which,
reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the
principal desires him so to act on the principals account.10
While PPCTs conduct could be interpreted as expressing
a desire for instructors to act on its account,11 the record is
devoid of evidence that instructors actually and reasonably
believed PPCT wanted them to act on PPCTs behalf. Deposition
statements by instructors that instructors are representative of
[PPCT], instructors represent [DOC] and PPCT, and that instructor
trainers are elite member[s] of the organization indicate that
the instructors believed that their behavior reflected upon the
reputation of PPCT. There is no indication that the instructors
believed they had the authority to act on PPCTs behalf.
Addington articulated his belief that he represent[s] the
techniques that [PPCT] teach[es] but not that he represent[s] the
organization.
Anderson argues next that the instructors had apparent
authority to act on PPCTs account. We have adopted the
Restatement general rule for creation of apparent authority:
[A]pparent authority to do an act is created
as to [a] third person[] by written or spoken
words or any other conduct of the principal
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the
third person to believe that the principal
consents to have the act done on his behalf
by the person purporting to act for him.[12]
There are three considerations in evaluating
apparent agency: (1) the manifestations of
the principal to the third party; (2)
reliance on the principals manifestations by
the third party; and (3) the reasonableness
of the third partys interpretation of the
principals manifestations and the
reasonableness of the third partys
reliance.[13]
As the Restatement indicates, the manifestation may be
in the form of written or spoken words or any other conduct
. . . .14 The manifestation may be directly communicated to the
third party or may come through, among other things, signs or
advertising.15 However, no agency relationship exists where the
principal never indicates to the third party that the supposed
agent has authority.16 Anderson argues that statements made by
instructors and references to the PPCT manual during training
were sufficient to indicate to Anderson that the instructors had
authority. But because Anderson does not identify these
statements, it would be impossible to determine whether her
belief was reasonable. Furthermore, the statements were not made
by the principal, PPCT. Although there is evidence in the record
that instructors sometimes wore PPCT gear, there is no evidence
that any of Andersons instructors wore PPCT gear during her
training. While the PPCT manuals might be analogized to signs or
advertising, PPCT never communicated directly with Anderson.
This court has found it to be clear error for a trial court to
find apparent agency when the third party never spoke with the
principal about the transaction at issue.17
Even if there had been a sufficient manifestation by
PPCT, [t]here must be such reliance upon the manifestation as
exposes the plaintiff to the negligent conduct.18 There is no
evidence in the record indicating that Andersons reliance on an
agency relationship was a factor in her participation in PPCT
training.19
C. Retained Control
Anderson argues that the instructors were independent
contractors, and because PPCT retained control over the manner in
which they conducted training, PPCT is liable for the instructors
negligence. We agree with the superior courts conclusion that
PPCT did not retain sufficient control for liability to attach.
As a general rule, an employer is not responsible for
the negligence of an independent contractor.20 However, if an
employer has retained an element of control over the work, he
should be responsible for the harmful consequences of its
performance as a concomitant of the control retained.21 This is
not an exception to the independent contractor rule, but rather a
form of direct liability of the employer for his own negligence
in exercising retained control.22 The Restatement clarifies that
the rule applies only where the employer has retained some degree
of control over the manner in which the work is done.23 The
employer has not retained sufficient control where he has only a
general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect
its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or
recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to
prescribe alterations and deviations.24 Instead, the employer
must retain such control that the contractor is not entirely free
to do the work in his own way.25 Because retained control
subjects an employer to direct liability, the control retained
must be related to the cause of the injury.
We consider a number of factors when deciding whether
retained control applies, none of which is individually
determinative of the outcome. The right to conduct safety
inspections and the authority to direct that dangerous equipment
not be used or operations cease because of safety concerns
indicated retained control in Hammond v. Bechtel Inc.26 and Moloso
v. State.27 Obligating the independent contractor to follow
specific procedures in accomplishing the work and retaining
responsibility to revise job specifications to ensure worker
safety were strong evidence of retained control in Everette v.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.28 But in Petranovich v. Matanuska
Electric Assn,29 the right to conduct inspections and stop work
were not sufficient to attribute liability where the contract
indicated that the independent contractor was responsible for
safety compliance. Inspections and stop-work provisions do not
necessarily establish retained control if the employer does not
assume any affirmative safety duties. In Moloso the court also
noted that [i]f the employer reserves and exercises only the
right to inspect the construction work to see that the contract
specifications are met while the independent contractor controls
how and when the work is to be done, there is probably not
sufficient retained control to subject [the employer] to
liability.30 Merely retaining the power to forbid work from being
done in a dangerous manner is not in itself a sufficient degree
of retained control to result in liability.31
In this case, PPCT did not reserve the right to conduct
safety inspections though it did advance some safety
requirements. However, as in Petranovich, any safety
requirements were the responsibility of the instructor, not PPCT.
While PPCT told instructors to follow specific speed and
repetition guidelines during training, these procedures were
designed to help students retain information. The record does
not indicate that PPCT has the right to order a training stopped
or resumed. PPCT may have the right to review an instructor
trainers techniques or to receive course evaluations, but this is
insufficient to indicate retained control under both the
Restatement guidelines32 and Moloso.33 PPCT can make suggestions
or recommendations, but DOC is not required to follow them. PPCT
cannot force DOC to employ particular techniques or training
methods, or even prescribe alterations and deviations in DOCs
training methods. If PPCT disagreed with a training method
employed by instructors at DOC, the most PPCT could do is refuse
litigation support.
D. Negligent Training
Andersons final argument is that PPCT negligently
trained instructor trainers and instructors regarding safety and
the use of non-PPCT moves during PPCT training. In its sua
sponte order denying PPCTs motion for summary judgment the
superior court explained that, in order to prevail on her
negligence claim, Anderson must show at trial (1) what maneuver
was involved in [her] injury; (2) that the maneuver is one that
is being taught based on the training that the Instructors had
received from PPCT; and (3) that it was somehow negligent or
otherwise improper for PPCT to have instructed the Instructors to
teach this maneuver to others. Because Anderson could not
produce evidence that she was injured by a PPCT maneuver, the
court granted PPCTs motion for summary judgment.
The superior court framed Andersons negligence claim
too narrowly. Anderson argues that a reasonable training program
should include safety precautions that were not included in the
PPCT course. While the general rule is that a person is not
required to act to protect another, we have concluded that, when
an actor undertakes to render services to another, section 323 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts sometimes establishes a duty of
care.34 In Bryson v. Banner Health System we recognized that
multiple provisions of the Restatement reflect the overarching
view that undertakings can create a duty of care and that one who
voluntarily assumes a duty must then perform that duty with
reasonable care. 35 We concluded that where a treatment center
undertook to provide Bryson with substance abuse treatment, it
assumed a duty to treat her with reasonable care.36
Having undertaken to train instructor trainers and
instructors, PPCT had a duty of care in developing and
implementing its training program to avoid exposing the eventual
students of those instructors to an unreasonable risk of danger.
This duty is not, as the superior court suggested, limited to
danger from PPCT techniques and does not, as PPCT claims, require
PPCT to control the DOCs conduct or warn DOC trainees. Nor does
the claim require a showing that PPCT had control over the DOC
academy or had an agency, independent contractor, or master-
servant relationship with the instructors.37 Rather the duty
extends to all the techniques and procedures that are part of the
training program. Anderson alleges that PPCT developed a program
that, as a whole, produced instructor trainers and instructors
who lacked the training they reasonably needed to protect their
future students from harm.
PPCT identified dynamic training as the third sequence
of practice. PPCT does not provide any formal safety training
for instructors or monitor PPCT training. PPCT provides some
general admonitions to instructors on safety in simulation
training: Simulation or dynamic training should only be conducted
utilizing the proper safety equipment by instructors who have
been trained in the use of the protective equipment and the
proper design and implementation of this type of training. After
describing the dynamic method of learning, the student manual
parenthetically states, [s]afety considerations should be
utilized. PPCT does not offer instruction in dynamic training.
PPCT tells instructors that dynamic training should only be
practiced when proper safety equipment and supervision are
present. PPCT also suggests outside reading material about the
safe and proper method of conducting dynamic training exercises.
Danger to students may arise from both PPCT and non-
PPCT moves during dynamic training.38 Assuming that Anderson was
injured during PPCT training, the question for the jury is
whether PPCTs training program failed to take reasonable steps,
such as providing sufficient warnings and safety precautions for
instructor trainers and instructors, that would have prevented
Andersons injury.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM summary judgment on the vicarious liability
and retained control claims. We REVERSE the grant of summary
judgment on the negligence claim.
_______________________________
1 The superior court found a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether simulation training was part of the PPCT
program. For purposes of review, we resolve the dispute in
Andersons favor.
2 Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 776 (Alaska 2000).
3 Shade v. Co & Anglo Alaska Serv. Corp., 901 P.2d 434,
437 (Alaska 1995) (citing Deal v. Kearney, 851 P.2d 1353, 1361
(Alaska 1993)).
4 Powell v. Tanner, 59 P.3d 246, 248 (Alaska 2002).
5 Restatement (Second) of Agency 220(1) (1958).
6 See Nicholas v. Moore, 570 P.2d 174, 177 (Alaska 1977).
Restatement (Second) of Agency 220(2) (1958) states:
(2) In determining whether one acting
for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact,
among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the
agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business
(c) the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of
the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular
occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the
person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by
the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of
the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe
they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not
in business.
7 See Nicholas, 570 P.2d at 177.
8 We recognize that gratuitous acts may sometimes create
a master-servant relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency
225 (1958). However, comment b to 225 states that [i]n
determining whether or not one rendering gratuitous assistance to
another is a servant, the purpose for which the former acts may
be important. The example given is that if a car is stalled in
traffic and another driver gets out of his own car to assist in
pushing the car to the curb, such driver is presumably not a
servant of the owner of the first car if his purpose is to remove
an obstruction to his own progress down the street. In this case
the purpose of the service was to benefit DOC, not PPCT.
9 Cummins, Inc. v. Nelson, 115 P.3d 536, 544 (Alaska
2005) (holding that because agent had apparent authority to act
for principal, both agent and principal were liable for the
negligence of the agent as if they were personally negligent);
see also Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 498 P.2d 702, 705 (Alaska
1972) (noting that principal is liable for tort committed by
agent within scope of apparent authority).
10 Restatement (Second) of Agency 26 (1958).
11 The training manual states that if an instructors
certification is not kept current, the instructor is prohibited
from performing instructor duties as a representative of PPCT.
The fact that PPCTs certification decision was based largely on
information provided by the instructors might show that the
instructors were authorized by PPCT to make decisions on PPCTs
behalf.
12 City of Delta Junction v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 670 P.2d
1128, 1130 (Alaska 1983) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency
27 (1958)).
13 Cummins, 115 P.3d at 542.
14 Restatement (Second) of Agency 27 (1958).
15 Id. at 8 cmt. b (1958).
16 Bruton v. Automatic Welding & Supply Corp., 513 P.2d
1122, 1126 (Alaska 1973) (holding that mere loan of a vehicle not
manifestation that borrower may act on loaners account).
17 Perkins v. Willacy, 431 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1967).
18 Cummins, 115 P.3d at 543 (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Agency 267 cmt. a (1958)).
19 But cf. Mack Trucks, 670 P.2d at 1131 (holding it was
jury question whether Mack Trucks acquiescence to Alaska Macks
use of its name and reputation was sufficient for agency by
apparent authority); Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 735 A.2d 576,
594 (N.J. Super. 1999) (holding plaintiffs assertions that
principals reputation influenced their decision created issue of
fact for jury).
20 Morris v. City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 474, 478 (Alaska
1976).
21 Id.
22 Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 211 n.5 (Alaska 1982).
23 Restatement (second) of Torts 414 cmt. c (1965).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 606 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Alaska 1980) (finding issues of
material fact where employer had an extensive safety inspection
process, and had the authority to direct that defective equipment
not be used by the independent contractor).
27 644 P.2d at 212-14 (holding that reasonable minds could
differ on whether state retained control where state had
authority, which it in fact used, to suspend work due to unsafe
conditions, to evaluate and change plans as construction
progressed, and arguably to control the safety procedures on the
job).
28 614 P.2d 1341, 1348 (Alaska 1980) (holding genuine
issue of fact found where independent contractor obligated to
adhere to certain job specifications, including specific
procedures for handling and stringing the pipe on the pipeline,
where one incident indicated that Alyeska retained responsibility
to revise job specifications to ensure worker safety, and where
project safety control manual was published in part by Alyeska).
29 22 P.3d 451, 452, 455 (Alaska 2001) (adopting the
superior courts finding that right to conduct inspections of the
project and to stop work were not sufficient to attribute
liability where safety requirements made it clear that the
independent contractor was responsible for compliance and
contract did not suggest any affirmative safety duties).
30 Moloso, 644 P.2d at 211.
31 See State v. Morris, 555 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Alaska 1976)
(quoting Orr v. United States, 486 F.2d 270, 275 (5th Cir.
1973)).
32 Restatement (second) of Torts 414 cmt. c (1965).
33 644 P.2d at 211.
34 See City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1312-13
(Alaska 1985) (holding a city which undertakes to provide police
protection to its residents has a duty to exercise reasonable
care in providing those services); Williams v. Mun. of Anchorage,
633 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1981) (holding municipality that
voluntarily supplies a ladder for access between a tugboat and a
dock is under a duty to exercise some degree of care toward those
using the ladder); Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240-41 (Alaska
1976) (if the state voluntarily conducts building fire safety
inspections, it must exercise reasonable care in conducting the
inspection and abating known fire hazards). Section 324A of the
Restatement, a parallel provision, applies this liability to
harms to a third party.
35 89 P.3d 800, 805 (Alaska 2004) (quoting 2 Dan B. Dobbs,
The Law of Torts 319, at 860-61 (2001)).
36 Id. at 805.
37 The case PPCT cites is not to the contrary. In Gus &
Jacks Tire Shop v. Reznor, 8 Fed. Appx. 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2001),
the court dismissed a negligent training claim because the record
did not suggest that the training program was inadequate. Only
the negligent supervision claim was dismissed based on a lack of
an agency relationship.
38 PPCT argues that, because Anderson admits she was not
injured by a PPCT maneuver, she has failed to show breach.
Because we reject the superior courts characterization of PPCTs
duty, PPCTs argument is moot.
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