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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Sengupta v. Wickwire (12/09/2005) sp-5963

Sengupta v. Wickwire (12/09/2005) sp-5963

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


MRITUNJOY SENGUPTA, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 11232
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-02-00713 CI
)
THOMAS R. WICKWIRE, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5963 - December 9, 2005]
)



          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Fourth   Judicial   District,
          Fairbanks, Richard D. Savell, Judge.

          Appearances:   Mritunjoy  Sengupta,  pro  se,
          Mill Creek, Washington, Appellant.  Thomas R.
          Wickwire,  pro  se,  Law  Office  of   Thomas
          Wickwire, Fairbanks, Appellee.

          Before:   Bryner,  Chief  Justice,  Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          FABE, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          Mritunjoy  Sengupta  was  a tenured  professor  at  the
University  of  Alaska  Fairbanks.  He was terminated  for  cause
after  a  hearing  officer  found that  he  had  presented  false
evidence   during  a  university  grievance  hearing.    Sengupta
appealed  his  termination to the superior court.   The  superior
court affirmed, and Sengupta informed his attorney that he wished
to  appeal  that  decision  to the  Alaska  Supreme  Court.   His
attorney  filed  the appeal late and it was dismissed.   Sengupta
then  brought  a lawsuit against the university alleging  various
violations  of his constitutional rights.  On appeal, this  court
held that Senguptas claims were barred by res judicata because he
did  not  timely  appeal  the superior  courts  decision  in  his
termination  proceedings.  Sengupta then brought this malpractice
action against his attorney, alleging that the attorney failed to
file  a  timely  appeal  and failed to raise  certain  claims  on
Senguptas  behalf.   Because Senguptas attorney  only  agreed  to
appeal  a  single issue, we affirm the superior courts  grant  of
summary judgment to the attorney.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
     A.   Senguptas  Grievances Against the University of  Alaska
          Fairbanks (Parrish Hearing)
          
          Mritunjoy  Sengupta was a tenured professor  of  Mining
Engineering at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF).  In 1992
and  1993  Sengupta filed three grievances against UAF, asserting
that  he was not considered for promotion to acting head  of  his
department  or  director  of  the  Mining  and  Mineral  Resource
Research Institute, and that he should have received various  pay
increases.1   James  Parrish served as the  hearing  officer  for
Senguptas  grievance proceedings.2  Thomas Wickwire was Senguptas
lawyer.
          On  June  24,  1994, Parrish issued a  lengthy  written
decision  dismissing Senguptas grievances.   Parrish  found  that
Sengupta  was  not a credible witness and that he had  repeatedly
and   purposefully   been   untruthful   during   the   grievance
proceedings.   Parrish  found that during  the  hearing  Sengupta
presented  false  documents, lied about being  laid  off  from  a
previous job, and lied about unfounded public attacks he had made
against  colleagues.   Parrish  also  found  that  Sengupta   had
mischaracterized  his  degree  on  his  resume,   that   he   had
plagiarized the work of another professor, and that Sengupta  and
his  wife  had  improperly accessed the bank  account  of  a  UAF
student  in  an attempt to attack the professional reputation  of
another professor.
          After  Parrish  issued his findings, Wickwire  wrote  a
letter  to Sengupta recommending that he initiate a communication
process  with  the  university chancellor to try  to  repair  any
damage  done  during the grievance hearings.  Wickwire  cautioned
that  he  thought  it likely that the chancellor  might  initiate
disciplinary  proceedings against Sengupta based on  the  Parrish
findings.   Wickwire  informed  Sengupta  that  he  believed  Mr.
Parrish [had] done a very thorough job of evaluating the evidence
in  detail and logically reasoning through the evidence  on  each
point  to  reach his conclusions.  Based on this letter, Sengupta
decided not to appeal the Parrish decision.
     B.   UAF  Termination  Proceedings  Against  Sengupta  (Rice
          Hearing)
          On   September  1,  1994,  UAF  initiated   termination
proceedings  against  Sengupta based on the findings  of  Hearing
Officer  Parrish.3   Sengupta requested and was  granted  a  pre-
termination  hearing.  Sengupta also filed  a  grievance  against
          UAF, asserting that the termination was improper retaliation for
his   earlier  grievances  in  violation  of  a  UAF   regulation
prohibiting  retaliation.4  The university chancellor  determined
that  the retaliation claim should be decided in the pending pre-
termination   hearing,  rather  than  in  a  separate   grievance
proceeding.5   The pre-termination hearing was held  on  December
12,  1994 before Hearing Officer Julian Rice.6  Sengupta appeared
pro  se  at this hearing.  Rice issued a decision on January  17,
1995,  in  which  he recommended that Sengupta be terminated  for
cause.  Rice afforded collateral estoppel to the Parrish findings
and  concluded that the University is not obligated to relitigate
all  of  the  issues covered at length in the previous  grievance
proceeding.  Rice made a number of findings similar to those made
by Hearing Officer Parrish.
          On  January  19, 1995, the university chancellor  wrote
Sengupta   to   inform   him   that  she   had   accepted   Rices
recommendations and that Sengupta would be discharged for  cause.
The  chancellor  informed  Sengupta  that  he  could  appeal  the
decision  to  the  university president and then pursue  judicial
review   if  he  wished.  Sengupta  appealed  to  the  university
president and his appeal was rejected.7
     C.   Senguptas   Appeal  to  the  Superior   Court   (Hodges
          Decision)
          On February 23, 1995, Sengupta appealed his termination
to  the  superior court.8  Wickwire served as Senguptas  attorney
for  this appeal, along with attorney Robert Groseclose.  In  his
appeal  to  the superior court, Sengupta argued that:  (1)  under
university regulations, Senguptas termination proceedings  should
have  included a hearing before other tenured faculty members  in
his  department;  (2)  Rice should not have  afforded  collateral
estoppel   to   issues   decided   during   Senguptas   grievance
proceedings;  (3) many of Parrishs findings during the  grievance
proceedings  were not relevant to Senguptas grievances;  and  (4)
Sengupta  was  entitled  to a hearing  on  his  second  grievance
alleging retaliation.
          On  August  20, 1996, Superior Court Judge  Jay  Hodges
issued a decision affirming UAFs termination of Sengupta.   Judge
Hodges  also  affirmed UAFs decision to dismiss all of  Senguptas
grievances, including the grievance alleging retaliation.
     D.   Senguptas Attempt To Appeal Judge Hodgess Decision
          On  August 29, 1996, Groseclose wrote Sengupta a letter
informing  him  of  Judge Hodgess decision.  Groseclose  informed
Sengupta  that [a]ny appeal must be filed by September  19,  1996
and  cautioned,  I  hazard a preliminary assessment  that  it  is
unlikely the Alaska Supreme Court will conclude differently  from
the  Superior Court.  To do so, the Alaska Supreme Court, through
independent review, would have to conclude that an error  of  law
occurred.  Groseclose again informed Sengupta that his  right  of
appeal  would  expire on September 19, or thirty  days  from  the
issuance of the superior courts decision.
          On  September  2, 1996, Sengupta wrote  Groseclose  and
Wickwire and informed them that he wished to appeal Judge Hodgess
decision.   Sengupta enclosed a list of conclusions made  by  the
superior  court that he believed to be erroneous.   On  September
          12, 1996, Wickwire wrote a letter to Sengupta indicating that he
would  handle  the appeal.  In the letter, Wickwire  limited  the
scope of his representation to a single issue:
          This  confirms  our  phone  conversation   of
          September 12, 1996 regarding my agreement  to
          pursue  your appeal.  I agree to  handle  the
          appeal  and briefing of Judge Hodges decision
          for  the  purpose of raising just one  issue:
          that  Judge  Hodges erred in concluding  that
          you  had to accept the administrative hearing
          before   Julian   Rice,   instead    of    an
          administrative determination by  the  tenured
          faculty of your unit, as you had requested.
          
Wickwire filed a notice of appeal with this court on November  1,
1996, forty-three days after the deadline.  The appeal challenged
the superior courts conclusion that Sengupta did not have a right
to  a  hearing before his tenured colleagues and was required  to
accept a hearing before a hearing officer.  On November 29, 1996,
we  issued  an order dismissing Senguptas appeal because  it  was
untimely.
     E.   Senguptas  1997  Lawsuits Against UAF and  Sengupta  v.
          University of Alaska
          
          After  Senguptas appeal was dismissed, he  consulted  a
new attorney, Robert Sparks.  On January 14, 1997, Sengupta filed
a  complaint  against  UAF  in superior  court  asserting  claims
relating to his termination, denial of a request for sick  leave,
and  an alleged salary disparity.  Sengupta brought claims  under
42  U.S.C.   1983 alleging that UAF had violated his  freedom  of
speech,  right  to  due process, and equal protection;  under  42
U.S.C.   1981 alleging discrimination on the basis of  color  and
national origin; and under Title VII of the Civil Rights  Act  of
1964, 42 U.S.C.  2000(e), alleging employment discrimination.
          On  March  29, 1997, Sengupta filed a second  complaint
against  UAF  in superior court adding a cause of action  to  set
aside  prior  judgments as void because of  alleged  due  process
violations  and alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and  misconduct
on the part of UAF.9  Superior Court Judge Mary E. Greene granted
summary  judgment  to  UAF  on all of Senguptas  claims  in  both
lawsuits and awarded partial attorneys fees to UAF.10
          Sengupta  appealed  to  this  court.   In  Sengupta  v.
University of Alaska, we affirmed Judge Greenes grant of  summary
judgment  because: (1) Senguptas  1983 claims  relating  to  sick
leave  and  salary  level were barred by a  two-year  statute  of
limitations;11  (2)  Senguptas  1983 claim alleging  due  process
violations  at  the  Parrish hearing was  barred  by  a  two-year
statute  of limitations; (3) Sengupta could not object to Hearing
Officer  Rices application of collateral estoppel to the findings
in  the  Parrish  hearing  because Judge  Hodges  affirmed  Rices
application of collateral estoppel and Sengupta failed to file  a
timely appeal of Judge Hodgess decision;12 (4) collateral estoppel
precluded Senguptas  1983 claims asserting due process violations
at the Rice hearing because Judge Hodges determined that Sengupta
          had been afforded due process and Sengupta failed to file a
timely  appeal  of  Judge Hodgess decision;13  (5)  res  judicata
precluded Sengupta from asserting his First Amendment claims in a
separate   1983  action because he could have  asserted  them  at
either  the Parrish hearing or the Rice hearing but did not,  and
because  he did not appeal Judge Hodgess decision;14 (6) Sengupta
did   not  produce  any  evidence  to  support  his   1983  equal
protection claim;15 (7) Sengupta did not produce any evidence  to
support  his claim that UAF had fraudulently concealed  documents
from  him;16 (8) UAF regulations did not entitle him  to  a  pre-
termination hearing before a faculty panel;17 and (9) Sengupta did
not  meet his threshold burden to produce circumstantial evidence
supporting his mixed motive discrimination claims under Title VII
and  1981.18
     F.   Senguptas Current Malpractice Action Against Wickwire
          On  March  26, 2002, Sengupta filed a pro se  complaint
against  Thomas  Wickwire19 alleging malpractice  and  breach  of
contract.20   The  complaint asserts that  [a]t  all  periods  of
representation  . . . the defendant failed to protect  plaintiffs
record, failed to raise appropriate claims, failed to timely file
an  appeal and generally failed to properly represent and protect
the interests of the plaintiff.
          Sengupta  moved for partial summary judgment, asserting
that if Wickwire had filed the appeal from Judge Hodgess decision
on time, Sengupta would have prevailed in his claims that UAF did
not  afford  Sengupta  due  process  during  his  pre-termination
hearings and that Rice improperly applied collateral estoppel  to
the Parrish findings.  Sengupta also claimed that Wickwire should
have  raised  his First Amendment claims during one  of  his  two
administrative  hearings.   Wickwire  also  moved   for   summary
judgment, arguing that all of Senguptas claims against  him  were
time-barred.
          On  August  19, 2003, Superior Court Judge  Richard  D.
Savell granted summary judgment to Wickwire on all of the claims.
Sengupta  moved for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil  Rule
60(b) following the issuance of Judge Savells decision.  Sengupta
claimed  that  the  superior court erred by  issuing  a  judgment
without  addressing Senguptas claim that, had Wickwire filed  the
appeal on time, Sengupta would have prevailed in arguing that  he
should  have  been  afforded  a pre-termination  hearing  by  the
tenured faculty of his unit.  Judge Savell denied the motion  and
issued a final judgment dismissing all of Senguptas claims.
          Sengupta filed this appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
     A.   Standard of Review
          We  review a grant of summary judgment de novo and will
affirm  if there are no genuine issues of material fact  and  the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.21   When
reviewing  a  grant of summary judgment, we draw  all  reasonable
inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
entered.22  A trial courts determination regarding the applicable
statute  of  limitations is a question of law that we  review  de
novo.23  The determination of the date on which a cause of action
accrued is a factual finding and is reviewed for clear error.24
     B.   Senguptas Claim of Retaliation for Free Speech
           Sengupta  moved  for partial summary judgment  on  his
malpractice claim against Wickwire, asserting that he could  have
prevailed  in  his  first appeal to this court  if  Wickwire  had
argued  at  the  Parrish  hearing  that  UAF  retaliated  against
Sengupta  in  violation of his First Amendment rights.   Sengupta
also argued that Wickwire should have raised the retaliation  for
free  speech  claim  in the administrative  appeal  before  Judge
Hodges.   The superior court denied Senguptas motion for  partial
summary  judgment  and granted summary judgment  to  Wickwire  on
Senguptas  retaliation for free speech malpractice claim  on  the
ground that Senguptas claim was time-barred.
          As  the  superior  court correctly  noted,  a  six-year
statute   of  limitations  applies  to  professional  malpractice
actions  accruing before August 7, 1997, as long  as  the  action
claims economic loss.25  For actions accruing after August 7, 1997
and  claiming economic loss, a three-year statute of  limitations
applies.26  Malpractice actions claiming personal or reputational
injury are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.27   The
superior  court  determined  that Senguptas  complaint  primarily
alleged   economic   harm,  applied  the  six-year   statute   of
limitations  to Senguptas retaliation for free speech malpractice
claim, and concluded that it was time-barred.  We agree that  the
six-year  statute  of limitations applies, but we  conclude  that
even   if   Senguptas  claim  is  not  time-barred  because   the
limitations period did not accrue until Sengupta learned from his
new attorney that he had a potential malpractice claim, any error
was harmless.
          The statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run  on
the  date  the  plaintiff  is injured.   However,  we  apply  the
discovery rule to professional malpractice actions.28  Under  the
discovery  rule, the cause of action accrues when  the  plaintiff
has  information sufficient to alert a reasonable person  to  the
fact that he has a potential cause of action.  At that point,  he
should  begin an inquiry to protect his . . . rights  and  he  is
deemed to have notice of all facts which reasonable inquiry would
disclose.29  The limitations period begins to run when  a  client
discovers  or reasonably should have discovered all the  elements
of the cause of action, and suffers actual damages.30
          This  standard  raises  the question  whether  Sengupta
should  have  begun  to  inquire  about  Wickwires  conduct  when
Sengupta  was  terminated, or whether the statute of  limitations
was  tolled  until  Sengupta learned from another  attorney  that
Wickwire  might  have  neglected to pursue certain  claims.   The
superior  court determined that Sengupta knew of the  facts  upon
which  he bases his free speech malpractice claim prior to  March
26,  1996, six years before Sengupta filed his complaint.31   The
superior court therefore concluded that Senguptas claim was time-
barred by the six-year statute of limitations.
          Sengupta  argues that he did not discover that Wickwire
had  failed to raise his retaliation for free speech claim  until
his  new  attorney, Robert Sparks, advised him of  the  potential
claim  in January 1997.  He relies on Preblich v. Zorea, in which
we  observed  that  the date on which a client should  reasonably
          discover the existence of a cause of action depends upon all of
the   surrounding   circumstances.32   We   reasoned   that   the
circumstances    include   consideration   of    [the    clients]
sophistication in the particular area of knowledge and noted that
Preblich  [was]  not  an attorney and could not  be  expected  to
immediately  recognize  the inadequacy or  consequences  of  [her
lawyers]  poor  representation or lack  of  action.33   Senguptas
argument is that because as a layman he could not reasonably have
been  expected  to know that he had a potential  retaliation  for
free  speech  claim prior to learning about it  from  Sparks,  it
follows  that he could not have known until then that  he  had  a
potential  malpractice  action against Wickwire  for  failing  to
raise the claim.  But we need not decide this question.  Even  if
the  superior court erred when it determined that Senguptas claim
was   time-barred,  the  error  was  harmless  because  the  only
retaliation  claim  Wickwire could have  raised  at  the  Parrish
hearing related to UAFs denial of Senguptas request for a  raise,
which is not an issue in this appeal.
          At  Senguptas initial grievance hearing, Parrish  found
that  Sengupta had made false allegations about colleagues  in  a
letter  he sent to a state representative, the Governor, and  the
state board of engineering.  Sengupta claims that Wickwire should
have  argued  that Senguptas letter was protected  by  the  First
Amendment.  But Sengupta argues only that UAF retaliated  against
him when it terminated him following the Parrish hearing.  As the
superior  court  notes,  UAF did not  take  action  to  terminate
Sengupta  until  after the Parrish hearing.   Thus,  the  logical
forum  for  raising the retaliation for free speech  claim  would
have  been  at  the Rice pre-termination hearing, where  Sengupta
appeared  pro  se.   Although  Wickwire  could  have  raised  the
retaliation  claim in connection with Parrishs decision  to  deny
Senguptas   grievances  regarding  pay  and   promotions,   these
grievances are not issues in this appeal.34
          Senguptas argument that Wickwire should have raised the
retaliation  issue during the administrative appeal before  Judge
Hodges  is  similarly without merit.  This issue would have  been
considered  waived  in  the appeal before  Judge  Hodges  because
Sengupta did not raise it when he appeared pro se during the Rice
hearing.35   Because  Wickwire could not  have  raised  Senguptas
retaliation  for  free  speech  claim  in  connection  with   his
termination  at either the Parrish hearing or during  the  Hodges
appeal,  we affirm the superior courts grant of summary  judgment
to Wickwire on this issue.36
     C.   Wickwires Failure To Appeal Judge Hodgess Decision in a
          Timely Manner
          
          Senguptas remaining claims involve Wickwires failure to
appeal  Judge  Hodgess  decision in a  timely  manner.   Sengupta
argues  that  if Wickwire had filed the appeal on time,  Sengupta
could  have won his appeal to this court on the questions whether
his  due process was violated at the pre-termination hearing  and
whether  Rice  improperly  afforded collateral  estoppel  to  the
Parrish findings.37  Sengupta argues that the superior court erred
in  granting  summary judgment to Wickwire  on  the  ground  that
          Wickwire limited the scope of his representation to a single
issue for the appeal of Judge Hodgess decision.38
          Sengupta  argues that he wished to appeal the  entirety
of  Judge Hodgess decision and that he understood that his appeal
would include all of the points stated in Senguptas September  2,
1996 letter to Wickwire.  Sengupta also argues that he could have
amended  or  supplemented his appeal to include more  issues  and
that  this  court could have reviewed all issues of law presented
to  Judge  Hodges,  regardless of which issues Sengupta  actually
appealed.
          Sengupta  did not present any evidence to the  superior
court indicating that he did not receive Wickwires letter or that
he  did not agree to the terms of the representation at the  time
Wickwire  sent  the  letter.   In fact,  Sengupta  states  in  an
affidavit  that  Wickwire signed an agreement  with  Sengupta  on
September   12,  1996.   This  acknowledgment  of  an   agreement
apparently refers to Wickwires letter limiting the scope  of  his
representation  in  the  appeal to a single  issue:   that  Judge
Hodges  erred  in concluding that [Sengupta] had  to  accept  the
administrative  hearing  before  Julian  Rice,  instead   of   an
administrative   determination  by   the   tenured   faculty   of
[Senguptas] unit. Sengupta paid Wickwire $10,000, as  the  letter
requested,  and when Wickwire did file the late appeal,  he  only
included  the  single issue identified in the  letter.   Sengupta
failed to provide any evidence to the trial court to support  his
argument  that  he  understood that all of the  issues  would  be
appealed,  or  that he would have personally appealed  additional
issues.   All  of  the  evidence points  to  the  agreement  that
Wickwire would only appeal a single issue.
          The superior court did not address whether Sengupta was
harmed by Wickwires failure to file a timely appeal on the single
issue that he did agree to appeal:  whether Sengupta was entitled
to  a  pre-termination  hearing before a faculty  panel.39   This
omission  is harmless because Sengupta cannot establish  that  he
was injured by Wickwires failure to appeal this issue in a timely
manner.   In Sengupta v. University of Alaska, we concluded  that
Sengupta  was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing before  a
faculty panel under the UAF regulations in effect at the time  of
his termination proceedings.40  Sengupta therefore could not have
prevailed on this claim even if Wickwire had filed his appeal  on
time.  Because Wickwire and Sengupta agreed to limit the scope of
Wickwires  representation to a single point on appeal, we  affirm
the superior courts grant of summary judgment to Wickwire.41
 IV. CONCLUSION
          For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the superior
courts order granting summary judgment to Wickwire on all issues.
_______________________________
     1     Sengupta  v.  Univ. of Alaska, 21 P.3d  1240,  1245-46
(Alaska 2001).

     2    Id. at 1246.

     3    Id.

     4    Id. at 1247.  At this time, Sengupta did not argue that
his  discharge was retaliatory in violation of his constitutional
right to free speech.

     5    Id.

     6    Id. at 1246.

     7    Id.

     8    Id. at 1247.

     9    Sengupta, 21 P.3d at 1247.

     10    Id. at 1247-48.

     11    Id. at 1249-50.

     12    Id. at 1250.

     13    Id. at 1250, 1255 n.61.

     14    Id. at 1254, 1255.

     15    Id. at 1254-55.

     16    Id. at 1256-57.

     17    Id.

     18     Id. at 1259.  Our decision also affirmed the superior
courts  denial of Senguptas request for a continuance, denial  of
his  motion  to  amend the judgment of dismissal,  and  award  of
attorneys fees to UAF.  Id. at 1259-62.

     19    The complaint also names Wickwires wife as a defendant.

     20     A plaintiff must prove four elements to prevail in  a
legal malpractice claim:

          (1)  the duty of the professional to use such
          skill,  prudence,  and  diligence  as   other
          members  of  the profession commonly  possess
          and  exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3)
          a  proximate  causal connection  between  the
          negligent  conduct and the resulting  injury;
          and  (4) actual loss or damage resulting from
          the professionals negligence.
          
Tush  v.  Pharr,  68  P.3d  1239, 1244  (Alaska  2003)  (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

     21     Morgan v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 107 P.3d 267, 269
(Alaska 2005).

     22    Id.

     23     Alderman v. Iditarod Prop., Inc., 104 P.3d  136,  140
(Alaska 2004).

     24    Id.

     25    Preblich v. Zorea, 996 P.2d 730, 734 n.11 (Alaska 2000)
(citing  Breck  v. Moore, 910 P.2d 599, 603 (Alaska  1996));  see
also former AS 09.10.050 (ch. 26  3-4, SLA 1997).

     26    Preblich, 996 P.2d at 734 n.11; AS 09.10.053.

     27     Breck v. Moore, 910 P.2d 559, 603 (Alaska 1996);  Lee
Houston  &  Assocs., Ltd. v. Racine, 806 P.2d  848,  855  (Alaska
1991); AS 09.10.070.

     28    Preblich, 996 P.2d at 734.

     29    Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

     30     Beesley  v.  Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280,  1283  (Alaska
1994).

     31    Sengupta filed his complaint on March 26, 2002.

     32    Id. at 736 (citing Breck, 910 P.2d at 604).

     33     Id.; see also Greater Area Inc. v. Bookman, 657  P.2d
828,  829  (Alaska 1982) (adopting discovery rule for malpractice
actions  because  clients  are  often  not  equipped  to   detect
malpractice when it occurs).
     34    Sengupta states in his reply to Wickwires opposition to
his partial summary judgment motion that Sengupta is not claiming
any  salary  raise  loss  as  damage  against  Wickwire  in  this
complaint.

     35     See Brandon v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269,
280  (Alaska 2001) (concluding that argument not raised below was
waived).

     36      Sengupta   also   argues  that  Wickwire   committed
malpractice  by  failing to argue that Parrish  was  not  validly
appointed  as  a hearing officer.  This argument was  not  raised
below and is therefore waived.  Id.

     37    Sengupta also argues that he could have proved that UAF
did  not  meet its burden of proof at the pre-termination hearing
because it adopted the findings from the grievance hearing, where
Sengupta had the burden of proof.  This argument is an element of
his collateral estoppel argument.

     38     Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c) permits  a
lawyer to limit the scope of the representation if the limitation
is  reasonable  under the circumstances and the  client  consents
after  consultation.   The comment to this  rule  states  that  a
lawyer  is  not  required to pursue objectives  or  employ  means
simply  because a client may wish that the lawyer do so.   Alaska
R. Prof. Conduct 1.2(c) & comment.

     39     Following Judge Savells decision, Sengupta moved  for
relief from judgment, arguing that his case should go to trial on
the question whether Wickwire committed malpractice by failing to
appeal Judge Hodgess decision that Sengupta was not entitled to a
pre-termination  hearing before a faculty  panel.   Judge  Savell
denied the motion and entered a final judgment.

     40    21 P.3d at 1256-57.

     41    Sengupta stated at oral argument that Wickwire owes him
money  relating to Wickwires representation.  The record reflects
that  the  parties  had a hearing regarding  fees  before  a  fee
arbitration  panel.  If Wickwire has not complied  with  the  fee
arbitration  panels decision, Senguptas remedy is to contact  the
Alaska  Bar  Association.   See Alaska  Bar  Rule  34  (outlining
general principles of fee dispute resolution).