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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Casciola v. F.S. Air Service, Inc. (09/23/2005) sp-5943

Casciola v. F.S. Air Service, Inc. (09/23/2005) sp-5943

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

PHILLIP D. CASCIOLA, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 11023
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-02-6489 CI
)
F. S. AIR SERVICE, INC., ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5943 - September 23, 2005]
)
          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Third   Judicial    District,
          Anchorage, Phillip Volland, Judge.
          
          Appearances:  Phillip D.  Casciola,  pro  se,
          Bradenton,  Florida.  Gregory A.  Miller  and
          Daniel  C.  Kent,  Birch Horton  Bittner  and
          Cherot, Anchorage, for Appellee.
          
          Before:   Bryner,  Chief  Justice,  Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
          
          CARPENETI, Justice.
I.   INTRODUCTION
          Phillip  Casciola  and  his  wholly-owned  corporation,
Jetbroker.com, Inc. (Jetbroker), obtained $25,000 from  F.S.  Air
Service, Inc. (F.S. Air) by misrepresenting Jetbrokers ability to
procure two Learjet engines for F.S. Air.  F.S. Air sued Casciola
and  Jetbroker for misrepresentation and breach of contract after
Jetbroker   failed to deliver the engines or return the  deposit.
Following  summary  judgment and a damages  trial,  Casciola  and
Jetbroker were held jointly and severally liable for compensatory
and  punitive damages.  Casciola now appeals the partial  summary
judgment  order  finding  him personally  liable  for  Jetbrokers
actions,  as  well  as  the awards of compensatory  and  punitive
damages.  We affirm the superior court in all respects.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
     A.   Factual Background
          F.S.   Air  is  a  charter  flight  service  based   in
Anchorage.   F.S.  Air  has  a long-term  medevac  and  personnel
transport contract with a hospital in Bethel which requires  F.S.
Air to be ready to fly on forty-five minutes notice at all times.
Two F.S. Air Learjets are dedicated to medevac duty.
          Phillip  Casciola  is a resident  of  Florida  and  the
founder, sole shareholder, and president of Jetbroker.  Jetbroker
is  ostensibly in the business of buying, selling, and appraising
engines and parts for jet aircraft.
          In  March 2002 the engines of one of F.S. Airs Learjets
needed  replacement.  F.S. Air responded to an advertisement  for
freshly   overhauled  Learjet  engines  from  Jetbroker.    After
inspecting  detailed  descriptions of  the  engines  provided  by
Jetbroker, F.S. Air signed a letter drafted by Casciola on  March
13,  2002  that  listed  the  terms  of  the  parties  agreement.
Jetbroker  agreed to broker two engines to F.S. Air  in  exchange
for  $100,000  and  the  cores  of  F.S.  Airs  current  engines.
Jetbroker  required  an immediate deposit  of  $25,000  with  the
remaining  $75,000  due  upon delivery  of  the  engines.   After
agreeing  to  Casciolas terms and signing the letter,  F.S.  Airs
president, Sandra Butler, immediately wired $25,000 to Jetbrokers
Florida bank account.
          Jetbroker did not deliver the engines.  Casciola  wrote
to  F.S.  Air on March 26, 2002 that there seems to be a  logbook
problem  with  the engines that we had anticipated  securing  and
outsourcing for you, and asked for a few more days to settle  the
logbook  problem.   Casciola  also  asked  if  F.S.  Air   wanted
Jetbroker to attempt to secure two other engines.
          On April 3, 2002 Sandra Butler asked Casciola to return
the  $25,000  deposit because the two engines that Jetbroker  had
agreed to broker were unavailable.  Casciola agreed to refund the
deposit but asked F.S. Air to release Jetbroker from the March 13
agreement.   F.S.  Air  agreed  to  release  Jetbroker  from  the
agreement  as  long as Jetbroker returned the $25,000.   Casciola
responded  by asking for a mutual release and offering to  secure
other  suitable engines for F.S. Air.  On April 15,  2002  Sandra
Butler  signed and delivered a mutual release to Jetbroker   once
again  asking Jetbroker to refund the deposit.  Casciola  replied
that  the  mutual release would be acceptable with  a  few  minor
changes  but  expressed  his  hope  that  the  release  would  be
unnecessary  and  that F.S. Air would allow Jetbroker  to  locate
alternative  engines.  F.S. Air accepted Jetbrokers  changes  and
informed Jetbroker that F.S. Air had secured engines from another
source and desired nothing further to do with [Jetbroker], except
to  get  its  money back.  F.S. Air also promised  to  file  suit
against Jetbroker if the deposit was not promptly refunded.
          On  April  19, 2002 Jetbroker replied that the contract
provided  more than twenty business days to perform and expressed
dissatisfaction  that  F.S.  Air had  purchased  engines  through
another  vendor.   Because  F.S. Air no  longer  needed  engines,
Jetbroker offered to provide some other type of aviation  related
service  or  product to earn our fees.  Jetbroker also  requested
that  the parties submit their dispute to mediation, but approved
of  the  mutual  release.   F.S. Air replied  by  demanding  that
Jetbroker  refund the deposit and reiterating that  there  is  no
possibility   of  F.S.  Air  doing  any  further  business   with
[Jetbroker].  On April 22, 2002 F.S. Air filed this suit.
     B.   Proceedings
          F.S.  Airs  complaint  advanced claims  for  breach  of
contract   against  Jetbroker  and  intentional   and   negligent
misrepresentation against Jetbroker and Casciola.  F.S. Air asked
for compensatory and punitive damages.
          Casciola  did  not  obtain  counsel  for  Jetbroker  or
himself.  He has attempted to represent Jetbroker and himself pro
se throughout the proceedings below and this appeal.  He filed an
answer and counterclaim on behalf of himself and Jetbroker in May
2002.   In July 2002 the superior court granted F.S. Airs  Motion
to  Strike  Jetbrokers Answer and Counterclaim because  Jetbroker
had  not  obtained corporate counsel as required by AS 22.20.040.
Superior  Court  Judge Eric Sanders ordered Jetbroker  to  obtain
corporate  counsel by August 7, 2002.  Jetbroker did  not  obtain
corporate  counsel, and Judge Sanders entered a default  judgment
against  Jetbroker on August 21, 2002 for failure to  appear  and
answer or otherwise defend this action.
          In  October  2002  F.S. Air moved for  partial  summary
judgment  against  Casciola  for misrepresentation  both  in  his
personal capacity and in his role as an officer/shareholder for a
sham  corporation.   Casciola did not oppose  F.S.  Airs  motion.
Judge  Sanders granted the motion without an opinion on  November
7, 2002.
          Casciola  also failed to respond to F.S. Airs discovery
requests.   F.S.  Air  moved to compel  discovery  and  deem  its
Requests  for Admission to be admitted.  Casciola did not  oppose
the  motion  or respond to F.S. Airs earlier discovery  requests.
Judge  Sanders  granted F.S. Airs motion on  November  28,  2002.
Among  other  facts,  Casciola was deemed to have  admitted  that
neither he nor Jetbroker possessed the advertised engines between
March  2002 and September 2002 and that neither he nor  Jetbroker
possessed  the  authority to broker or sell the two  jet  engines
involved in this case.
          The   case  proceeded  to  trial  on  compensatory  and
punitive  damages.   Casciola submitted an Answer  to  Plaintiffs
Trial  Brief  but  did not otherwise participate  in  the  trial.
Superior  Court Judge Phillip R. Volland conducted a bench  trial
on  February  27, 2002.  Judge Volland found that  F.S.  Air  had
proven  by  a  preponderance of the evidence  that  it  had  been
injured  in the amount of $30,000 and held Jetbroker and Casciola
jointly and severally liable for the damages.
          Judge  Volland also determined that F.S. Air had  shown
by  clear  and convincing evidence that [d]efendants conduct  was
outrageous, malicious, and done with bad motives and/or  reckless
indifference to F.S. Airs interests, to deliberately pocket  F.S.
Airs $25,000 for Defendants own financial profit and to F.S. Airs
detriment.  . . . Defendants actions also appear . .  .  to  have
been . . . part of a series of deliberate actions.  Judge Volland
held  Jetbroker  and  Casciola jointly and severally  liable  for
$300,000 in punitive damages.
          Casciola appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We  review  a grant of summary judgment de  novo.1   We
will  affirm if there are no genuine issues of material fact  and
if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2  Since
Cooper  Industries,  Inc. v. Leatherman  Tool  Group,  Inc.,3  we
review  de  novo  whether  a punitive damages  award  is  grossly
excessive   under  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.4
IV.  DISCUSSION
     A.   Casciolas  Briefing Is Adequate Only in Regard  to  His
          Arguments Concerning Punitive Damages and Piercing  the
          Corporate Veil.
          
          We  do  not  consider arguments that  are  inadequately
briefed.5  We have held that where a point is specified as  error
in  a  brief  on  appeal, but the point is not  given  more  than
cursory statement in the argument portion of the brief, [it] will
not be considered by the court but will be treated as abandoned.6
We  apply a more lenient standard to pro se litigants.7  To avoid
waiver,  a  pro  se  litigants briefing must  allow  his  or  her
opponent  and this court to discern the pro ses legal  argument.8
Even  a pro se litigant, however, must cite authority and provide
a legal theory.9
          Casciolas  briefing  on appeal is  for  the  most  part
insufficient  and  difficult to follow.  Because  his  argument10
regarding  the compensatory award does not allege any  errors  by
the  superior  court or articulate a legal theory,  we  will  not
consider  it.  But his argument that the superior court erred  by
piercing the corporate veil and holding him personally liable for
Jetbrokers  misdeeds and his argument that the  punitive  damages
award  was inappropriate outline recognizable legal theories  and
cite  identifiable authorities.  Given our lenient stance towards
pro se litigants, we will address these two arguments.
     B.   Casciola  Is  Liable for the Compensatory and  Punitive
          Damages Award Regardless of his Personal Liability  for
          Jetbroker.
          
          As noted, F.S. Air named Casciola as a defendant in his
individual capacity based on his intentional misrepresentations.11
F.S.  Air  moved for partial summary judgment on two issues:  (1)
Casciolas  liability  for misrepresentation,  and  (2)  Casciolas
personal liability for Jetbrokers corporate wrongdoing.  Casciola
failed  to  oppose the motion, and Judge Sanders granted  partial
summary  judgment.   Following trial, Judge  Volland  entered  an
order  noting that Judge Sanders previously ruled in this  matter
that  F.S.  Air  is  entitled to judgment from  both  Defendants.
Judge Volland determined that Jetbroker and Casciola were jointly
and severally liable to F.S. Air in the amount of the $30,000 for
compensatory damages and $300,000 for punitive damages.  Casciola
has  not  challenged  on appeal either Judge Vollands  conclusion
that he is jointly liable, or Judge Sanderss finding of liability
in   his   personal   capacity  for  his   individual   acts   of
misrepresentation.
          Instead, Casciola contends that Judge Sanders erred  in
granting  summary  judgment to F.S. Air  regarding  his  personal
liability  for Jetbrokers wrongdoing.  He argues that  there  was
insufficient proof before Judge Sanders that Jetbroker functioned
as a mere instrumentality of his will.12  We need not address this
argument.  Even if F.S. Air were not entitled to summary judgment
regarding  Casciolas  personal liability for Jetbroker,  Casciola
has  not contested that he would still be jointly liable  in  his
individual  capacity  for both punitive and compensatory  damages
because  of  his  misrepresentations.  Consequently,  a  reversal
would not alter Casciolas liability, and error, if any, would  be
harmless.
     C.   The Punitive Damages Award Is Not Excessive.
          Casciola  does  not appeal Judge Vollands  ruling  that
F.S. Air has shown by clear and convincing evidence that F.S. Air
is  entitled to recover punitive damages, jointly and  severally,
from  Jetbroker  and  Casciola.  Rather,  Casciola  contests  the
amount of punitive damages awarded, arguing that a $300,000 award
is  grossly  excessive in comparison to the $30,000  compensatory
award.   Because  Casciola  engaged  in  extremely  reprehensible
conduct,  Alaska case law and statutory law gave  notice  that  a
high   ratio  between  punitive  and  compensatory  damages   was
possible, and since a large award is necessary to deter this type
of  fraud,  we  conclude that the award does not  violate  either
Alaska or federal law.
          1.   The punitive damages award does not violate Alaska
               law.
          Casciola  has  not  argued  that  the  punitive   award
violates  Alaska  law.   Consequently, we  would  not  ordinarily
address  the  application of Alaska law to  the  punitive  award.
However,  in  light  of Casciolas claim that the  punitive  award
violates  federal  due process, and the emphasis  placed  by  the
United States Supreme Court on the reprehensibility of misconduct
and  the existence of comparable civil and criminal penalties for
particular misconduct,13 we review Alaska law on punitive damages
and on civil and criminal penalties for comparable misconduct  as
a guide.
          As  a  preliminary matter, we note that Alaska law does
not prescribe a fixed ratio, or range of ratios, between punitive
and  compensatory  damages.14  Though both AS 09.17.020  and  the
United  States  Supreme Court suggest that three- or  four-to-one
ratios between punitive and compensatory damages are appropriate,15
we  have upheld punitive damages far in excess of these ratios.16
Our reluctance to adopt a fixed ratio is motivated in part by the
fact  that  punitive  damage awards must  be  tailored  to  case-
specific  facts  in  order  to  achieve  optimal  deterrence  and
punishment.17  Where compensatory damages may be small relative to
the  cost  of  litigating, or where the nature of  a  tortfeasors
scheme makes deterrence and punishment difficult, a higher  ratio
may  be necessary to create the incentives necessary to vindicate
Alaskas  legitimate interest in preventing particularly malignant
conduct.18
          Alaska  Statute 09.17.020(c) identifies  seven  factors
relevant to the determination of an appropriate punitive  damages
          award:
          (1) the likelihood at the time of the conduct
          that  serious  harm  would  arise  from   the
          defendants conduct;
          (2) the degree of the defendants awareness of
          the  likelihood  described  in  (1)  of  this
          subsection;
          (3)   the   amount  of  financial  gain   the
          defendant  gained or expected to  gain  as  a
          result of the defendants conduct;
          (4)  the  duration  of the  conduct  and  any
          intentional concealment of the conduct;
          (5) the attitude and conduct of the defendant
          upon discovery of the conduct;
          (6) the financial condition of the defendant;
          and
          (7) the total deterrence of other damages and
          punishment  imposed  on the  defendant  as  a
          result of the conduct, including compensatory
          and  punitive  damages awards to  persons  in
          situations similar to those of the  plaintiff
          and the severity of the criminal penalties to
          which  the  defendant  has  been  or  may  be
          subjected.
          
          These   factors  are  well-represented  in  this  case.
Casciola  intentionally  deceived F.S. Air  in  order  to  obtain
$25,000,19  and  he continued to lie to F.S. Air to  conceal  his
fraud and to delay legal action.20  The facts admitted by Casciola
strongly resemble criminal conduct21 and could form the basis for
charges  carrying  substantial fines and jail time.22   Casciolas
conduct  also  resembles a series of unlawful business  practices
under  AS  45.50.471(b).23  Such unlawful business practices  can
result in civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation.24  Alaska
law also specifically authorizes larger punitive awards to punish
intentional torts motivated by financial gain.25
          Additionally, the record supports the conclusion that a
substantial penalty is necessary to punish Casciola and to  deter
him,  and others like him, from similar misconduct in the future.
Ample  evidence  demonstrates that Casciolas misconduct  in  this
case  was  merely  one part of an ongoing pattern  of  fraud  and
misrepresentation.   Casciola  appears  to  have  engaged  in  an
identical scheme on at least one previous occasion:  Casciola was
deemed  to have admitted that he was a defendant in a case  filed
by  Heritage Christian to recover an unreturned $200,000  deposit
made  by Heritage Christian to purchase a jet.26  As the superior
court  noted,  Casciola  is  the sole officer  of  eight  Florida
corporations engaging in jet aircraft engine and part  sales  and
appraisals.   During the course of this litigation, Casciola  has
continued  to  solicit business from F.S. Air through  his  other
corporations.
          A  large award is also necessary in order to change the
dynamic  of Casciolas fraudulent scheme.  Currently a  victim  of
Casciolas  scheme  must  choose between  accepting  a  fractional
          refund, thereby leaving Casciola with undeserved thousands, and
pursuing  an  expensive and uncertain vindication in the  courts.
F.S. Air faced this difficult choice.27  At this juncture, it  is
not  clear that F.S. Air would not have been economically  better
off  had it accepted some fractional refund in April or May 2002.
Though  the nominal values of the awards in this case  are  quite
large, F.S. Air must discount them by the strong possibility that
Casciola will never pay.  F.S. Air has also spent a great deal of
time, energy, and money in seeking its refund.  Other victims may
allow  Casciola  to  skim their deposits in  order  to  make  the
economic  best of a bad situation.  Given this dilemma,  a  large
punitive  award is necessary to provide victims with an incentive
to pursue proper legal action.
          2.   The  punitive  damages award does not  impinge  on
               Casciolas federal due process rights.
               
          Casciola  argues  that the punitive  damages  award  is
grossly  excessive  and violates the due process  clause  of  the
Fourteenth    Amendment.    We   disagree.     The    award    is
constitutionally  sound given the reprehensibility  of  Casciolas
conduct, the necessity of a large penalty to alter the incentives
of  this  type  of  fraud, and the potential penalties  available
under Alaska criminal and civil law.
          In  BMW  of  North America, Inc. v. Gore,28 the  United
States  Supreme  Court  recognized that  [p]unitive  damages  may
properly  be imposed to further a States legitimate interests  in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.29   Only
when  an award can fairly be categorized as grossly excessive  in
relation   to  these  interests  does  it  enter  the   zone   of
arbitrariness  that  violates  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the
Fourteenth  Amendment.30  In relevant  part,  Gore  held  that  a
punitive award may be grossly excessive where a tortfeasor lacked
notice  of  the  magnitude of the sanction  that  a  state  might
employ.31
          To  determine whether a tortfeasor had fair  notice  of
the  potential magnitude of a punitive damages award, the Supreme
Court has identified three guideposts:
          (1)  the  degree of reprehensibility  of  the
          defendants  misconduct;  (2)  the   disparity
          between the actual or potential harm suffered
          by  the  plaintiff  and the punitive  damages
          award;  and  (3) the difference  between  the
          punitive damages awarded by the jury and  the
          civil  penalties  authorized  or  imposed  in
          comparable cases.[32]
          
These  guideposts are meant to provide a flexible  guide  to  the
requirements  of  due  process.   In  practice,  the   guideposts
identify  a  range of ratios of punitive to compensatory  damages
that  are presumptively acceptable and prescribe constitutionally
permissible   reasons for deviating upwards.  Though the  Supreme
Court  is  careful to say that there is no bright-line  rule  and
that  due process cannot mandate a specific ratio, it also  notes
that  statutes  authorizing punitive damages extending  back  700
years  have  emphasized double, treble, or quadruple damages  and
that a four-to-one ratio may be close to the constitutional line.33
The  Court  noted  that  the  most  important  justification  for
departing  upward from the constitutional comfort zone of  three-
or  four-to-one is the reprehensibility of the misconduct.34   We
turn now to an application of the BMW v. Gore guideposts.
               a.   Casciolas      conduct     was      extremely
                    reprehensible.
          [T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness  of
a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendants  conduct.35  The Supreme Court has set out factors  to
consider  in  measuring  the  reprehensibility  of  the  tortious
conduct:
          We  have  instructed courts to determine  the
          reprehensibility   of    a    defendant    by
          considering  whether:  the  harm  caused  was
          physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
          conduct  evinced  an  indifference  to  or  a
          reckless disregard of the health or safety of
          others;   the  target  of  the  conduct   had
          financial vulnerability; the conduct involved
          repeated actions or was an isolated incident;
          and  the  harm was the result of  intentional
          malice,   trickery,  or   deceit,   or   mere
          accident.[36]
          
          While  only  two of these criteria apply  to  Casciolas
conduct   Casciolas  conduct  involved  intentional  deceit   and
involved a series of misrepresentations (indeed, it appears to be
part  of a larger pattern of wrongdoing)  the facts in this  case
more  than  demonstrate the egregiousness of  Casciolas  conduct.
The  analysis undertaken above pursuant to Alaska law shows  that
Alaska  considers Casciolas conduct to be extremely  blameworthy.
The  superior court found that Casciolas actions were outrageous,
malicious and with bad motives . . . to deliberately pocket  F.S.
Airs $25,000 for Defendants own financial profit and to F.S. Airs
detriment.    This  finding  was  correct  given  the  undisputed
evidence  at  trial that Casciolas actions were not  part  of  an
isolated incident but emblematic of a larger pattern of fraud and
that  the  injuries  suffered by F.S. Air flowed  from  Casciolas
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit.
               b.   The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
                    is not excessive.
                    
          Under  the  second  guidepost, which compares  punitive
damages with actual damages, the Supreme Court has not prescribed
a  bright-line  rule  for when a punitive damages  award  so  far
exceeds  actual damages that the award violates the  due  process
clause.37  The Court has noted, however, that few awards exceeding
a  single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory  damages,
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process,38 and also has
stated  that  an  award of more than four  times  the  amount  of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety.39
          This guidepost does not proscribe particular ratios  as
presumptively unconstitutional.  Rather, it is a rule of thumb  a
general  prediction  regarding  what  ratios  will  satisfy   due
process.   Whether or not a given ratio does satisfy due process,
however,  depends on other factors, including analysis under  the
other  two stated guideposts.  Due process, as noted by the lower
federal  courts,  allows  for  larger  awards  relative  to   the
compensatory damages when appropriate.40  In this case, the ratio
between punitive and actual damages awarded is ten-to-one.  While
this  ratio may exceed the Supreme Courts preference for  single-
digit  ratios, it does so only slightly, and it is  a  far  lower
ratio  than  any of those that have actually been invalidated  by
the Supreme Court.41  More importantly, we are satisfied that the
award is more than adequately justified when the other guideposts
the  reprehensibility  of  the conduct and  the  civil  penalties
imposed  in  comparable cases  are considered, as  in  the  other
sections of this Opinion.  Consequently, while the ratio  between
the  punitive  award and the compensatory award  is  sufficiently
high to draw scrutiny, the ratio passes constitutional muster.
               c.   There  is no disparity between the award  and
                    similar  punitive  damage  awards  or   civil
                    penalties in Alaska.
                    
          The  third  guidepost in Gore is the disparity  between
the punitive damages award and the civil penalties authorized  or
imposed in comparable cases. 42  The Supreme Court has also looked
to criminal penalties that could be imposed.43  As we have already
seen,  Alaska  law  authorizes  substantial  criminal  and  civil
penalties  for  the  conduct admitted by  Casciola,  as  well  as
enhanced punitive damages.44  Given these penalties, Casciola was
on notice that he could face harsh punishment for his conduct.
          This analysis of the BMW v. Gore guideposts leads us to
conclude  that the punitive damages award here does  not  violate
Casciolas  due process rights.  Casciolas acts in deceiving  F.S.
Air  in  order  to  steal  a  large  sum  of  money  were  highly
reprehensible.   Casciola was on notice that  his  conduct  could
result  in severe penalties.  A large punitive award is necessary
to  provide the incentive for victims to seek compensation and to
reduce   the   efficacy   of  Casciolas  scheme.    Given   these
considerations, we conclude that the size of the  punitive  award
does not violate federal due process.
V.   CONCLUSION
          Because  any  error  in  piercing  the  veil  would  be
harmless  and  because the punitive award does  not  violate  due
process, we AFFIRM the superior court in all respects.
_______________________________
     1     Alakayak  v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd.,  48  P.3d
432, 447 (Alaska 2002).

     2    Id.

     3     532  U.S. 424 (2001) (instructing appellate courts  to
review constitutionality of punitive damages awards de novo).

     4    Central Bering Sea Fishermens Assn v. Anderson, 54 P.3d
271,  277 (Alaska 2002).  Prior to Cooper Industries, we reviewed
a  lower courts decision on a motion for remittitur or new  trial
regarding punitive damages for abuse of discretion.  Id.

     5    Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 692 n.2 (Alaska 1970).

     6     Id.   See  also Great Divide Ins. Co. v. Carpenter  ex
rel.  Reed, 79 P.3d 599, 608 n.10 (Alaska 2003) (Points that  are
inadequately briefed are considered waived.).

     7     Breck  v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987) (citing
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

     8    Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458, 464 n.9 (Alaska 2004).

     9    Id.

     10     Casciolas compensatory damages argument consists only
of  a  paragraph requesting us to review a long list of cases  in
which  awards were reduced on appeal.  No citations are  provided
for these cases.  The submission is unreviewable.

     11     All  persons  may  be  found  liable  for  their  own
intentional  tortious  conduct,  including  acts  of   fraudulent
misrepresentation.  The corporate form does not shield  corporate
officers  or  employees  who commit  torts  on  behalf  of  their
employer  from personal liability.  As an Oregon appellate  court
has stated, [t]here is no reason to protect corporate officers or
employees  who  authorize,  direct and  participate  in  tortious
conduct by their corporate principal.  If the corporation commits
a  tort  as  a  result of intentional action on the part  of  its
officers or employees, these agents are also responsible.  Schram
v.  Albertsons, Inc., 934 P.2d 483, 491 (Or. App. 1997)  (quoting
Wampler  v. Palmerton, 250 OR 65, 77, 439 P.2d 601 (1968)).   See
also  Scribner  v. OBrien, Inc., 363 A.2d 160, 168  (Conn.  1975)
(when  an  agent  or  officer  commits  or  participates  in  the
commission  of  a tort, whether or not he acts on behalf  of  his
principal  or corporation, he is liable to third persons  injured
thereby.);  Robsac Indus., Inc. v. Chartpak, 497 A.2d 1267,  1271
(N.J.  App. Div. 1985) (Corporate officers are personally  liable
to  persons  injured by their own torts, even  though  they  were
acting  on  behalf  of the corporation and their  intent  was  to
benefit  the  corporation.); Oxmans Erwin Meat Co. v.  Blacketer,
273  N.W.2d  285,  289 (Wis. 1979) (An individual  is  personally
responsible  for  his own tortious conduct.   A  corporate  agent
cannot  shield  himself from personal liability  for  a  tort  he
personally  commits  or  participates in  by  hiding  behind  the
corporate  entity;  if he is shown to have been  acting  for  the
corporation,  the  corporation  also  may  be  liable,  but   the
individual  is  not thereby relieved of his own responsibility.).
We  do not address whether the corporate form shields individuals
from  liability for negligent torts committed on  behalf  of  the
corporation.

     12     In Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d 229, 234-35
(Alaska  1982),  we held that it was appropriate  to  pierce  the
corporate veil and hold a dominant shareholder personally  liable
for  a  corporations wrongdoing if the corporation functioned  as
the  mere  instrumentality  of  the  dominant  shareholder.    To
determine   when   a   corporation   functioned   as   the   mere
instrumentality of its dominant shareholder, we  adopted  a  six-
part  test adapted from the eleven-part test announced in Jackson
v.  General  Electric  Co.,  514 P.2d  1170  (Alaska  1973),  for
piercing   the  corporate  veil  in  the  context  of  a   parent
corporations liability for its subsidiary.  Uchitel, 646 P.2d  at
235.  The six-part test instructed:

          In  adapting  the quantitative approach  from
          the parent-subsidiary cases to the individual
          shareholder-corporation context the following
          factors should be considered: (a) whether the
          shareholder sought to be charged owns all  or
          most  of  the  stock of the corporation;  (b)
          whether the shareholder has subscribed to all
          of  the  capital stock of the corporation  or
          otherwise   caused  its  incorporation;   (c)
          whether   the   incorporation   has   grossly
          inadequate    capital;   (d)   whether    the
          shareholder   uses  the   property   of   the
          corporation  as  his  own;  (e)  whether  the
          directors  or  executives of the  corporation
          act  independently  in the  interest  of  the
          corporation or simply take their orders  from
          the  shareholder in the latters interest; (f)
          whether the formal legal requirements of  the
          corporation are observed.
          
Id.   See also Nerox Power Systems, Inc. v. M-B Contracting  Co.,
54 P.3d 791 (Alaska 2002) (articulating Uchitel quantitative test
in  slightly modified form).  Uchitel also held that  a  dominant
shareholder could be held personally liable for corporate acts if
the  corporate form is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong,  commit  fraud,  or defend crime.  Id.  at  234  (citation
omitted).  In this case, Casciola claimed that F.S. Air  had  not
presented  sufficient evidence of the elements  of  the  six-part
test for instrumentality to justify summary judgment.  We decline
to  evaluate this claim because Casciola will remain  liable  for
the entire judgment even if we were to reverse on this issue.  We
do  note,  however,  that Casciola failed to  address  F.S.  Airs
assertion  that  piercing  the  corporate  veil  was  appropriate
because Casciola used Jetbroker as a front for fraud.  Such abuse
of  the  corporate form may justify piercing the  corporate  veil
even in the absence of a showing of instrumentality.  Id.

     13     See  BMW of N. America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,  574-75
(1996).  See also infra Part IV.C.2.

     14    Fyffe v. Wright, 93 P.3d 444, 457 (Alaska 2004) (citing
Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158, 175-77 (Alaska 1999)).

     15     See  AS 09.17.020(f)(1), (g)(1)-(2); State Farm  Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (four-to-one
ratio   of   punitive  to  compensatory  damages   may   approach
constitutional  line).   Note that AS 09.17.020,  by  its  terms,
permits juries to depart from these suggested ratios, so long  as
the total punitive damages award falls within the maximum dollar-
value statutory cap.

     16     See,  e.g.,  Cent.  Bering  Sea  Fishermens  Assn  v.
Anderson,  54 P.3d 271, 274-77 (Alaska 2002) (approving  $600,000
in total punitive damages and $48,000 in compensatory damages for
constructive  termination and defamation); Laidlaw Transit,  Inc.
v.  Crouse  ex rel. Crouse, 53 P.3d 1093, 1096-97 (Alaska   2002)
(approving   $500,000  in  punitive  damages   and   $19,259   in
compensatory  damages  against school bus company  that  employed
drug-using driver); Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17  P.3d  40,
43,  49  (Alaska 2000) (ordering $725,000 punitive award remitted
to  $500,000  where  compensatory damages for emotional  distress
equaled  $50,000);  IBEW, Local 1547 v.  Alaska  Utility  Constr.
Inc.,  976  P.2d  852,  853-55 (Alaska 1999) (affirming  $212,500
punitive award against union that engaged in outrageous picketing
behavior where compensatory damages totaled $11,622.05);  Norcon,
Inc.  v.  Kotowski,  971  P.2d 158,  161,  174-77  (Alaska  1999)
(ordering  $3,000,000 punitive award remitted to  $500,000  where
compensatory damages totaled slightly more than $10,000 in sexual
harassment suit).

     17    See Norcon, 971 P.2d at 179 (Eastaugh, J., concurring)
(discussing  desirability  of punitive  damage  awards  that  are
tailored to provide optimal deterrence given litigation costs).

     18    Id.

     19     The  superior court deemed Casciola to have  admitted
that  he  knowingly entered a contract to sell to  F.S.  Air  jet
engines which he did not possess nor have authority to broker  or
sell, and that, in partial consideration for these engines,  F.S.
Air  paid  a  $25,000  deposit to Casciola  which  has  not  been
refunded.  Casciola has not attempted to dispute these  facts  on
appeal.

     20    Casciola initially told F.S. Air that the engines could
not  be delivered because of a logbook problem.  He then promised
to return the deposit if F.S. Air executed a release.  After F.S.
Air  executed  a  revised  release to  Casciolas  specifications,
Casciola explained that he had engines available for [F.S.  Airs]
inspection  and proposed continuing to do business  but  did  not
return the deposit.  Given Casciolas admissions, we are confident
that none of these statements was true.

     21     For  example, knowingly taking advantage of  anothers
false  impressions  to obtain $25,000 could constitute  theft  by
deception,  a class B felony.  See AS 11.46.100, .120,  .180;  AS
11.81.900(18).  Similarly, Casciolas acts could fit the  elements
of  a  scheme  to  defraud,  another  class  B  felony.   See  AS
11.46.600.

     22     An  offender  convicted of a class B  felony  may  be
sentenced   to   a   maximum  of  ten  years   imprisonment,   AS
12.55.125(d), and fined as much as $100,000.  AS 12.55.035(b)(3).

     23      AS   45.50.471(b)(12)  defines  using  or  employing
deception,     fraud,    false    pretense,    false     promise,
misrepresentation,  or  knowingly  concealing,  suppressing,   or
omitting  a material fact with intent that others rely  upon  the
concealment, suppression or omission in connection with the  sale
or advertisement of goods or services whether or not a person has
in  fact  been  misled, deceived or damaged as unlawful  business
practices.

     24     AS  45.50.501(a) authorizes the attorney  general  to
bring an action in the name of the state against parties engaging
in  practices  that violate AS 45.50.471.  Pursuant  to  such  an
action, a penalty of $5,000 per violation may be assessed against
a  party  who  violates AS 45.50.471.  See AS  45.50.551(b).   In
addition, injured private parties in this chapter are statutorily
authorized to seek treble damages, AS 45.50.531(a), and costs and
full reasonable attorneys fees.  AS 45.50.537.

     25    Compare AS 09.17.020(f) with AS 09.17.020(g).

     26     Heritage  Christian Center paid Casciola  a  $200,000
deposit  for the jet but never received the airplane or a  refund
of its deposit.

     27     During April and May 2002 Casciola attempted to delay
F.S.  Air  by  requesting a letter releasing  Casciola  from  the
contract, then a mutual release between the parties, then changes
to  the mutual release, and followed by a claim that the contract
allowed  Casciola  more  than twenty business  days  to  perform.
These  letters  contained several requests for  settlement,  even
though  Casciola had earlier admitted that F.S. Air was  entitled
to  a full refund of the deposit.  This behavior culminated in  a
May  7,  2002  letter in which Casciola expressed his  desire  to
settle and implicitly warned F.S. Air that legal action would  be
futile  because  of  a  variety of legal and  accounting  issues.
Combined  with  Casciolas demonstrated bad faith,  this  line  of
correspondence  communicates a simple message:  F.S.  Air  should
compromise or get nothing.

     28     517 U.S. 559 (1996).  The plaintiff in Gore sued  BMW
for fraud in Alabama court after discovering that his new car had
been  damaged and the car repainted before delivery.  Id. at 563.
A  jury  awarded Gore $4,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000  in
punitive  damages.   Id.  at 565.  The  punitive  damages  figure
reflected the estimated actual damages suffered by all BMW owners
in  Gores position nationwide.  Id. at 564-65.  After the Alabama
Supreme  Court reduced the award to $2,000,000, BMW  appealed  to
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Id. at 567.

     29    Id. at 568.

     30    Id.

     31    Id. at 574-75.

     32     State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538  U.S.
408, 418 (2003) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).

     33    Id. at 424-25.

     34    Id. at 419; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.

     35     Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517  U.S.  at
575).

     36    Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77).

     37    Id. at 425.

     38    Id.

     39    Id.

     40    See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
285  F.3d  1146,  1151-52 (9th Cir. 2002) (ten-to-one  ratio  was
justified  in  stolen trade secrets case by need to  deter  large
corporation  from  such conduct); Johansen  v.  Combustion  Engg,
Inc.,  170 F.3d 1320, 1336-39 (11th Cir. 1999) (approving ninety-
three-to-one ratio in water pollution case because (1) large fine
was  necessary to deter large corporate defendant, (2) misconduct
caused  small  injury  and  was  difficult  to  detect,  and  (3)
defendant   was  on  notice  that  similar  conduct  might   earn
substantial  civil penalties); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart  Stores,  Inc.,
107  F.3d 568, 577-78 (8th Cir. 1997) (imposing ten-to-one  ratio
in  egregious sexual harassment case).  Federal appellate  courts
have  also upheld punitive damage awards that far exceed the ten-
to-one  ratio in actions under 42 U.S.C.  1983  where  plaintiffs
suffered only nominal injuries.  See Williams v. Kaufman  County,
352  F.3d  994,  1016 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding punitive  damage
award  of $15,000 per plaintiff for Fourth Amendment violations);
Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
Gore  ratio guidepost does not apply to  1983 claims where actual
damages  are nominal).  In the context of an action for  punitive
damages under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.  3601-3631,
the  Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that a punitive  damages
ratio exceeding ten-to-one required remittitur.  Lincoln v. Case,
340 F.3d 283, 293 (5th Cir. 2003).

     41     The  Supreme Court has never struck down  a  punitive
award   that   was  only  ten  times  greater  than  accompanying
compensatory  award.  In Gore, the punitive damages equalled  500
times   the   compensatory  damages,  which  the   Court   called
breathtaking.   517 U.S. at 582-83.  In Cooper  Indus.,  Inc.  v.
Leatherman  Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), the  ratio  of
punitive to compensatory damages was ninety-to-one.  Id. at  426.
And in Campbell, the ratio was 145-to-one.  538 U.S. at 412.

     42     Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S.  at
575).

     43    Id.

     44    See supra Part IV.C.1.