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Fuller v. City of Homer (06/03/2005) sp-5902
Fuller v. City of Homer (06/03/2005) sp-5902
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ABIGAIL FULLER, )
) Supreme Court No. S-11105
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 3HO-02-78CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
CITY OF HOMER, )
) [No. 5902 - June 3, 2005]
Appellee. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer,
Charles K. Cranston, Judge.
Appearances: Brooks W. Chandler, Hicks,
Boyd, Chandler & Falconer, LLP, Anchorage,
for Appellant. Gordon J. Tans, Perkins Coie,
Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Abigail Fuller asked to see City of Homer
documents concerning a disputed annexation proposal, the city
required her to pay a fee for a search that included the city
managers privilege review of the documents. Fuller filed an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that she
could not be charged for the privilege review. The superior
court rejected her contention and granted summary judgment to the
city. We conclude that the statute and code provisions
authorizing assessment of a search fee did not permit the city to
charge for time spent conducting a privilege review of public
documents. We therefore reverse and remand for deduction of the
time the city manager spent reviewing documents for privileged
information.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The City of Homer attempted to annex approximately
twenty-five square miles of land adjacent to the city. Abigail
Fuller opposed annexation and occasionally requested access to
city records bearing on annexation. We discussed some of the
facts relevant here in Fullers prior appeal, Fuller v. City of
Homer.1
In 2000 Fuller wrote to Homer City Manager Ron Drathman
asking to inspect various records related to the annexation.2
Drathman made some of the requested documents available but
withheld others, invoking the deliberative process privilege.3
Fuller appealed to the city council, which upheld Drathmans claim
of privilege without reviewing the requested documents.4 Fuller
appealed to the superior court, which remanded the case to the
city council, directing it to review the documents.5 The council
conducted the review and reaffirmed its prior decision.6 The
superior court upheld the city councils decision, but in August
2003 in Fuller v. City of Homer we reversed the superior courts
decision, holding that the deliberative process privilege did not
protect the documents from disclosure.7
While Fuller was on appeal to us, Fuller, by request of
October 11, 2001, asked to see, among other records, the contents
of boxes CM01-03 and CM01-04 in inactive records storage, along
[with] any other boxes containing annexation related material
from 1998, 1999, 2000. Drathman responded that Fullers October
request does not provide a reasonable or adequate description of
the records sought. A general request to view the contents of
boxes (or file cabinets, drawers, desks, offices, or departments)
does not describe the records with sufficient detail to enable
the city to locate and identify the records sought. Drathman
also wrote that Fullers request cannot be approved or processed
until Ms. Fuller provides a more specific description . . . .
Apparently after receiving Drathmans response, Fuller, by letter
of November 6, followed up her October 11 request with a somewhat
more specific request. Drathmans letter in response stated, in
part:
[B]efore any substantive response can be
given to her request, either the City
Attorney or I, or both, will have to
personally review each document in every file
to determine whether it is privileged . . . .
This alone will take a considerable amount of
time, which I currently estimate to be not
less than 8-9 hours for review.
. . . .
If the time necessary to respond to her
request exceeds five hours, she will be
required to pay fees for producing the
records; in this case, my hourly salary plus
benefits.
Drathman then personally reviewed the two boxes, CM01-03 and CM01-
04, and removed privileged documents. His review time totaled
7.25 hours.
Fuller later wrote to Drathman and objected to paying
your salary. She stated that
its your choice to go through those files
yourself rather than have a clerk check them,
if they need checking at all. The research
fee is intended to cover time spent searching
for information, not time spent sifting
through old papers to make sure you arent
compromising national security, or whatever
it is you are worried about.
Apparently before receiving this letter from Fuller,
the city attorney wrote Fullers attorney stating that the boxes
of files were ready for Fullers review, and that before she could
review the documents she had to pay the city $354.59 for 7.25
hours of search time valued at $48.91 per hour. The city
attorneys letter also stated that [t]here will be an additional
charge for the salary and benefits of the clerks office personnel
who assist Ms. Fuller in the searching and copying tasks. It is
estimated that the time involved will be approximately seven
hours . . . . Fuller received this letter in mid-January.
Fuller refused to pay for the documents.
Fuller then filed a superior court complaint seeking an
order declaring her rights to inspect the documents to which
access has been denied by the city and an injunction requiring
that Homer comply with applicable state and local law and make
the Records available for review . . . . During the ensuing
proceedings Fuller served discovery requests seeking production
of the documents listed in her October 11 request, as amended by
her November 6 request, but the city objected and produced no
documents in addition to those it had previously produced.
Fuller moved to compel production.
The superior court granted summary judgment to the city
and dismissed Fullers complaint. The city contends in its brief
that after judgment was entered, Fuller paid the $354.59 and was
granted access to the documents. Fuller does not dispute this
contention.
Fuller appeals. She contends that the superior court
erred in (1) determining that as a matter of law, the City of
Homer was entitled to charge a privilege review fee; (2)
determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact
relating to the time spent and the amount charged for the City of
Homers privilege review; and (3) denying [her] motion to compel
production.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We independently review the grant or denial of a motion
for summary judgment.8 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party and may [uphold] summary judgment only if no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 9
Courts typically review discovery orders under the
abuse of discretion standard.10 We review an interpretation of
the Civil Rules under the independent judgment standard.11
We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous
standard.12 A finding is clearly erroneous if a review of the
entire record leaves the court with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.13 In reviewing factual
findings, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below.14
B. The City Was Not Authorized To Charge Fuller for Its
Privilege Review of City Records.
The superior court required Fuller to pay for the time
Drathman spent reviewing the files she requested, including the
time he spent reviewing the records for privileged documents.
Although she implies that public records should generally be
available without charge, Fullers main contention is that the
city may not charge for a privilege review of public documents.
We hold that Homer could appropriately charge for the ministerial
aspects of record production but that the city was not entitled
to charge for the time Drathman spent conducting the privilege
review. We turn first to the relevant state statute and city
code provisions and regulations.
1. The state statute, city code provisions, and city
regulations
We must first consider what provisions of law control.
Fuller seems to contend that the Homer City Code (HCC) sections
dealing with access to city documents, particularly HCC 01.80.010
and HCC 01.80.050(a), are inconsistent with the city regulations,
Homer Regulation (HR) 01.03 and HR 01.05, that actually impose
the fees. The city responds that the fee requirements in its
regulations are consistent with its code and the relevant state
statute, AS 40.25.110.
Alaska Statute 40.25.110 governs access to public
records and provides for payment of fees for searching for and
copying public records in response to a request.15 We have held
that it applies to municipalities.16 This statute does not
expressly or impliedly prevent the city from charging a fee for
searching for and copying public documents in response to a
document request.
Homer City Code 01.80.010 (1995) describes the citys
general approach to requests for public records:
It is the intention of the City to provide
full and free access of the public to
municipal records and information so that the
people of the City may be well informed at
all times as to municipal business. With the
exception of the specific exemptions set
forth under Section 1.80.040, all information
and records in the control of the
municipality shall be made available to the
public upon request.
Homer City Code 01.80.050 (1995) authorizes the city
manager to adopt regulations that impose a fee for inspecting
public records:
The City Manager shall adopt regulations as
to the time, place, and manner of inspection
of public records held by the municipality.
Such regulations may also provide:a. That a
fee may be required. The fee shall not
exceed the actual cost to the agency. No fee
shall be charged when a person simply
requests access to the information. In the
event the person is unable to pay any
requested fee, and signs an affidavit to the
effect that he or she is indigent, there will
be no cost to the above described person.
In a seeming exercise of that authorization, the city
promulgated regulations requiring a requester to pay a search
fee. Homer Regulation 01.03 (2003) discusses payment of search
fees for time spent searching for and copying records:
If the production of records for one
requestor in a calendar month exceeds five-
person hours [sic], the requestor must pay a
search fee. The fee for city staff to search
the citys records will be the employees
actual salary plus benefit costs for the time
to search and copy the records. The search
fee will be in addition to the standard
copying fee.
Homer Regulation 01.05 (2003) also discusses imposition of search
fees for production of records for inspection:
There will be no copying fee for simple
inspection of records, except when the
production of the records for inspection by
one requestor in a calendar month exceeds
five person-hours. In that case the
requestor will be required to pay the search
fee as described in the preceding paragraphs.
Alaska Statute 40.25.110 and HR 01.03 and 01.05 thus
allow the city to require a records requester to pay fees when
the production time for a response exceeds five hours a month.
Drathmans total time exceeded five hours; therefore, per AS
40.25.110 and HR 01.03 and 01.05, the city was potentially
entitled to charge Fuller a search fee.17
Fuller does not seriously contend here that the city
had no authority to assess some fee for producing the documents
she requested. But she points to HCC 01.80.010, which states
that [i]t is the intention of the City to provide full and free
access of the public to municipal records and information . . . .
Fuller also cites HCC 01.80.050(a)s statement that [n]o fee shall
be charged when a person simply requests access to the
information. She therefore cursorily implies that these
provisions required the city to make the documents available
without charge.
Fuller argues that HR 01.05 is inconsistent with HCC
01.80.050(a) and that HR 01.05 renders superfluous HCC
01.80.050(a)s phrase [n]o fee shall be charged when a person
simply requests access to the information. She argues that to
give meaning to each sentence, the [n]o fee shall be charged
language in HCC 01.80.050(a) should be applied to situations in
which a fee otherwise would have been charged, i.e., instances in
which more than five hours were spent searching for requested
records.
The city contends that its regulations are a reasonable
result of reconciling the city code with mandatory state law.
The city argues that reading HCC 01.80.050(a) to require free
production of documents requiring more than five hours to produce
would conflict with, and be preempted by, AS 40.25.110(c). It
contends that just as the full access discussed in HCC 01.80.050
is subject to the numerous exceptions listed in HCC 01.80.040 and
01.80.060(a), both of which discuss documents that need not be
disclosed, free access is subject to a reasonable fee not to
exceed the citys cost.
As the issues are presented to us here, there is no
conflict between the statute, the city code, and the citys
regulations. The statute authorizes imposition of a fee for
searching for and copying records, the code authorizes adoption
of regulations charging a fee, and the regulations impose a
search fee. The tasks for which the regulation imposes a fee
searching for and copying requested records are the same tasks
the statute describes.18 The regulations five person-hour
threshold is consistent with the statutes threshold.19
We therefore reject any contention that HCC 01.80.010
and HCC 01.80.050(a) altogether precluded the city from assessing
any fee here. HCC 01.80.050(a) deals with access to . . .
information, while HR 01.03 and 01.05 deal with producing
records. Fuller did not simply seek access to records in city
files readily available for inspection at city offices. Her
request included specified records that she recognized were at a
storage facility. Therefore HCC 01.80.010 and 01.80.050(a)
cannot reasonably be read to foreclose a fee for time spent
producing records in response to Fullers request.
There is a practical difference between accessing
information and asking a public employee to find and gather
records for inspection; the former might mean viewing on ones own
time documents readily retrievable at city hall, and the latter
might entail requiring city employees to search for and gather
particular documents. The first task potentially costs the city
much less than the second because less staff time is needed for
the former. This differentiates between the activities addressed
by HCC 01.80.050(a) and the activities addressed by HR 01.03 and
01.05.
Finally, it could heavily burden a political
subdivision to be required to comply with every search request,
no matter how onerous, without charging some fee. We therefore
conclude that HR 01.03 and 01.05 permissibly interpret HCC
01.80.050(a) and that HCC 01.80.050(a) does not conflict with AS
40.25.110.
Fuller also observes that we have held that there is a
presumption in favor of public access to records and that
exceptions should be narrowly construed.20 She contends that it
therefore follows that provisions of law allowing access to
public documents without payment of fees should be broadly
construed in favor of free or inexpensive access to public
records.
The city argues that per AS 40.25.110(c), it correctly
charged Fuller for the time Drathman spent reviewing the
documents; state policy did not require the city to provide
unlimited documents free of charge. It asserts that by
promulgating HR 01.03 and 01.05, the city has interpreted HCC
01.80.050(a) to waive a fee only when the request is to look at
documents that are readily available to public access, and which
require neither a time-consuming effort to produce nor copying.
Therefore, the city argues that its regulations are a reasonable
interpretation of HCC 01.80.050(a) and conform with the
requirements of AS 40.25.110(c).
We agree with Fuller that there is a strong commitment
in Alaska to ensuring broad public access to government records.21
There is a presumption in favor of disclosure of public
documents.22 But this presumption does not resolve the questions
before us here. By statute, reasonable fees are appropriate when
the search and copying time in one month exceeds five hours per
requester.23 Fuller does not claim that the statute is invalid.
The city is not attempting here to withhold documents from
Fuller; it seeks to have Fuller pay the costs it incurred in
carrying out the search she requested.
In short, any contention that the city could not charge
any fee for producing the records Fuller requested is
inconsistent with AS 40.25.110, HR 01.03, and HR 01.05, all of
which allow the city to assess fees. We therefore conclude that
the city was not obliged to produce these records for free.
2. Privilege review
Fuller argues that a search fee imposable for access to
information should be for time spent searching for records, not
reviewing retrieved records for privilege. She argues that there
is no indication the State of Alaska interprets 6 Alaska
Administrative Code (AAC) 96.360(b) (2003) or AS 40.25.110 to
allow fees for time spent reviewing documents for privilege.
The city responds that reviewing records for
disclosability is part of a search. It reasons that the
terminology of AS 40.25.110(c) which speaks of production rather
than copying or duplication and refers to search and copying
tasks implies that searching is broader than copying. The city
argues that an agency is required by law to remove privileged
materials before production,24 and that the removal of
confidential information should not be treated as an activity
separate from the search. The city contends that cases elsewhere
are not helpful because their outcome depends on the underlying
statute, and each states statutes differ.
We agree with the city that case law from other
jurisdictions is not particularly helpful. Determining whether
the holder of information may charge for a privilege review
depends largely on the applicable statute or regulation.25 We
therefore rely on our interpretation of the pertinent statute and
city regulations.
Production is defined as the act or process of
producing, bringing forth, or making[,] . . . the act of
exhibiting.26 As used in AS 40.25.110 and HR 01.03 and 01.05,
production does not seem to include anything other than routine
ministerial efforts in looking for and making available the
requested documents. The statute repeatedly uses the phrase
search and copying tasks. Read literally, these words refer to
the processes of looking for27 and duplicating28 requested
documents. A task is a specific piece or amount of work
usu[ally] assigned by another and often required or expected to
be finished within a certain time.29 In the statute and
regulations, tasks is plural. This suggests that searching and
copying are distinct and different processes, and that the entire
phrase is not meant to broadly encompass other processes. It
also implies a clerical, ministerial function rather than an
executive function implicating professional expertise and
judgment. This suggests that production is essentially
administrative and clerical. It also suggests that a privilege
review is not production because it is not part of the search
task or the copying task. A privilege review is not an inherent
or necessary part of a document search. Indeed, a privilege
review would seem conceptually to require that the search already
have been conducted and the requested documents identified.30
Likewise, because it seems likely only unprivileged documents
would be copied and produced, a privilege review is not
inherently part of the copying task.
Homer Regulation 01.03 similarly discusses search[ing]
and copy[ing] the records. The references to copying fee for
simple inspection of records and production of the records in HR
01.05 imply that this regulation covers copying, and does not
cover deciding whether documents are privileged.
We therefore conclude that production in AS 40.25.110
and HR 01.03 and 01.05 does not include a privilege review,
contrary to the ruling of the superior court. Privilege review
time consequently cannot be charged to Fuller.
The effect of this error is not clear. The city did
not reveal exactly how much time Drathman spent conducting his
privilege review, although it claimed that he spent 7.25 hours
responding to Fullers request. If there were some reason to
think the privilege review took very little time, perhaps it
could be said that the prejudice was de minimis. But the city
raises no such contention. Moreover, the five-hour thresholds in
the applicable statute and regulations make the time spent on the
privilege review particularly relevant. If Drathman spent at
least 2.25 hours conducting the privilege review, the actual
production time must not have exceeded five hours. If the
production time did not exceed five hours in one month, no fees
could have been imposed on Fuller. We therefore remand to the
superior court the issue of how much time Drathman spent on the
privilege review.
The city also argues that it is relevant that Drathman
conducted his review before we issued our decision in Fuller.
But because the regulation did not authorize the city to charge
Fuller for the privilege review, it is not relevant when he
conducted that review.
C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Failing To Grant Fullers Motion To Compel Discovery.
After Fuller commenced the present litigation by asking
the superior court for declaratory and injunctive relief, Fuller
served the city with a request for production for discovery of
the documents she had sought in her request of October 11, as
amended by her November 6 letter. The city objected to the
request for production. Fuller moved to compel production, but
the superior court did not grant her motion.
Fuller argues that her request for production sought
documents that were at the heart of the dispute over the
privilege review fee. She asserts that her request was
calculated to lead to admissible evidence regarding whether the
privilege review . . . could have been completed in five hours or
less.31 She contends that reviewing the records to determine
whether Drathman had spent too much time reviewing the documents
would have been a relevant exercise. She contends that obtaining
the records was necessary for this determination.
Alaska Civil Rule 26(b)(1) permits parties to
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter. The
information sought need not be admissible at
the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
But here the object of discovery and the goal of Fullers lawsuit
were the same. Two federal cases have dealt directly with this
issue.32 In Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. National Labor Relations Board, the plaintiff brought
suit to compel disclosure of intra-agency memoranda and a list of
employees names and addresses.33 During discovery the plaintiff
requested various documents, but the trial court denied this
motion to compel.34 The Second Circuit upheld this ruling,
stating that [d]iscovery here would essentially grant Local 3 the
substantive relief it requests: disclosure of documents that the
NLRB claims are exempt. Thus, Local 3 is not entitled to
discovery of documents claimed to be exempt.35 The plaintiff in
Giza v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare brought an
action to compel the appearance of an expert, Dr. Finkel, to give
deposition testimony for use in a state lawsuit.36 On appeal the
First Circuit stated that [w]e also agree with the district court
that the attempt to depose Dr. Finkel was improper discovery
because securing her testimony was an object of the Gizas suit.37
We similarly conclude that the superior court did not
err in denying Fullers motion to compel discovery.
D. Fullers Other Arguments
Fuller advances various arguments challenging the
amount of time Drathman spent conducting his review. She
contends that it is undisputed that in mid-November Drathman
reviewed all of the file boxes responsive to her October 11
request even though she had narrowed her request on November 6.
She contends that the facts permit an inference that if Drathman
had limited his review to the files specified in her November 6
request, it is quite likely the five hour free search time would
not have been exceeded. Relatedly, she argues that after the
city denied her October request as too broad, Drathman reviewed
the documents she requested in October despite her more specific
November request, creat[ing] an inference that the review was not
undertaken as efficiently as possible in good faith. She also
asserts that the citys past poor treatment of her permits an
inference that Drathman did not act with reasonable efficiency.
Finally, she argues that Drathman failed to follow the city
regulation that requires payment of estimated charges before the
search is undertaken. Had he done so, she contends, she might
have discovered that he intended to review the boxes she
originally requested, even though she later narrowed her request.
However, only if there were good reason to think that
the city was intentionally inefficient in retaining or producing
the disputed documents would the superior court have been
compelled to reduce the time spent in production. For the same
reason, we need not discuss Fullers argument that the city did
not comply with HCC 02.08.010(f), which states that whenever
possible only one copy of documents shall be retained, and with
HCC 02.08.010(j), which, she argues, anticipates that restricted
or confidential documents will be segregated from other stored
documents. And of course Fuller is not responsible for the
privilege review time, whether it was spent efficiently or not.
Fuller also contends that no records of Drathmans time
were preserved and that no witness could verify his review
because it occurred on a weekend. Lack of independent
verification does not mean that appropriate production costs
should not be recovered. It is for a fact finder to decide
whether the amount charged was incurred appropriately. The lack
of independent corroboration does not justify reversal here.
Having concluded above that the city could not recover
privilege review costs from Fuller, it is unnecessary for us to
consider Fullers arguments challenging the time or cost of the
privilege review. We therefore also do not need to consider
whether Drathman had expertise in reviewing documents for
privilege. We likewise need not consider Fullers argument that
the citys actions
indicate a pattern of behavior that easily
allows an inference to be drawn that the city
manager would do whatever he could to hinder
access to public records by annexation
opponents including making sure a privilege
review was conducted at a leisurely pace so
as to exceed the five free hours standard.[38]
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the grant of summary
judgment and REMAND for a determination of how much time Drathman
spent conducting the privilege review. If he spent any part of
the 7.25 hours on a privilege review, the city must repay some or
all of the fees it charged and collected from Fuller.
_______________________________
1 Fuller v. City of Homer, 75 P.3d 1059 (Alaska 2003).
2 Id. at 1061.
3 Id. The deliberative process privilege is an exception
to the public records act intended to protect [] the mental
processes of governmental decision-makers from interference.
Gwichin Steering Comm. v. State, Office of the Governor, 10 P.3d
572, 578 (Alaska 2000). Officials may invoke this privilege when
public disclosure would deter the open exchange of opinions and
recommendations between governmental officials. Id.
4 Fuller, 75 P.3d at 1061.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1065.
8 Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Dev. Assn, Inc., 75 P.3d
83, 86 (Alaska 2003).
9 Waage v. Cutter Biological Div. of Miles Labs., Inc.,
926 P.2d 1145, 1148 n.4 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Russell v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 375-76 n.11 (Alaska
1987)).
10 Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Daily News, 794
P.2d 584, 594 n.19 (Alaska 1990).
11 Brandon v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 273 (Alaska
2001).
12 Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458, 463 (Alaska 2004).
13 Id. (quoting Demoski v. New, 737 P.2d 780, 784 (Alaska
1987)).
14 Voss v. Brooks, 907 P.2d 465, 467 (Alaska 1995) (citing
Klosterman v. Hickel Inv. Co., 821 P.2d 118, 122 (Alaska 1991)).
15 AS 40.25.110 provides in part:
(a) Unless specifically provided otherwise,
the public records of all public agencies are
open to inspection by the public under
reasonable rules during regular office hours.
The public officer having the custody of
public records shall give on request and
payment of the fee established under this
section or AS 40.25.115 a certified copy of
the public record.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this
section, the fee for copying public records
may not exceed the standard unit cost of
duplication established by the public agency.
(c) If the production of records for one
requester in a calendar month exceeds five
person-hours, the public agency shall require
the requester to pay the personnel costs
required during the month to complete the
search and copying tasks. The personnel
costs may not exceed the actual salary and
benefit costs for the personnel time required
to perform the search and copying tasks. The
requester shall pay the fee before the
records are disclosed, and the public agency
may require payment in advance of the search.
(d) A public agency may reduce or waive a
fee when the public agency determines that
the reduction or waiver is in the public
interest. Fee reductions and waivers shall
be uniformly applied among persons who are
similarly situated. A public agency may
waive a fee of $5 or less if the fee is less
than the cost to the public agency to arrange
for payment. . . .
16 Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d at 589.
17 No party asserts that the regulations promulgated in
2003 do not apply to the dispute now on appeal.
18 Compare HR 01.03 with AS 40.25.110(c).
19 Compare HR 01.03 and 01.05 with AS 40.25.110(c).
20 See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Homer, 75 P.3d 1059, 1061-
62 (Alaska 2003).
21 Id. at 1061; Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 735
(Alaska 1990).
22 Fuller, 75 P.3d at 1061-62; Municipality of Anchorage
v. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d 584, 589 (Alaska 1990).
23 AS 40.25.110(c).
24 See, e.g., 6 AAC 96.330(a).
25 See, e.g., Demers v. City of Minneapolis, 468 N.W.2d
71, 75 (Minn. 1991) (stating holder of information may not charge
for photocopies made simply to separate public from not public
data, because statute stated that responsible authority may not
charge for separating public from not public data).
26 Websters Third New International Dictionary 1810
(1961).
27 To search is to look into or over carefully or
thoroughly in an effort to find or discover[,] . . . to peruse
thoroughly and usu[ally] with a particular objective. Id. at
2048.
28 To copy is to duplicate, reproduce, transcribe. Id. at
501.
29 Id. at 2342.
30 Cf. AS 40.25.110.
31 See, e.g., Carstens v. Carstens, 867 P.2d 805, 809
(Alaska 1994).
32 Local 3, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 845 F.2d
1177 (2d Cir. 1988); Giza v. Secy of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 628
F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1980).
33 Local 3, 845 F.2d at 1178.
34 Id. at 1179.
35 Id.
36 Giza, 628 F.2d at 749.
37 Id. at 751 n.6.
38 Fuller does not contend on appeal that the hourly rate
for Drathmans time was excessive or that search and copying tasks
should have been billed at rates more likely to approach the cost
of clerical employees.
