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Lawson v. Lawson (03/11/2005) sp-5876
Lawson v. Lawson (03/11/2005) sp-5876
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
LEE LAWSON, )
) Supreme Court No. S-11260
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 1SI-95-00225 CI
)
VALERIE LAWSON, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5876 - March 11,
2005]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District, Sitka,
Larry C. Zervos, Judge.
Appearances: Lee Lawson, pro se, Port
Alexander, Appellant. No appearance by
Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lee Lawson appeals a superior court order denying his
request to modify his child support obligation. Lee challenges
the constitutionality of Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 on the grounds
that: (1) this court lacks the authority to create a child
support rule; (2) Rule 90.3 is vague and overbroad; and (3) Rule
90.3s financial disclosure requirements violate his rights to due
process and privacy and his right against self-incrimination. We
affirm the decision of the superior court and hold that Rule 90.3
is constitutional.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Lee Lawson and Valerie Lawson were living together in
Sitka in February 1994 when their son, Kevin, was born. They
moved to Sacramento, California in October 1994 and continued to
live together until August 1995. Valerie then decided to return
to Sitka with Kevin. Lee came back to Alaska in the fall of 1995
and currently resides in Port Alexander.
Superior Court Judge Larry C. Zervos issued a judgment
in July 1996 determining that Lee was Kevins biological father
and that he owed Kevin a duty of support. On December 23, 1996,
Valerie was awarded legal and physical custody of Kevin; Lee
received visitation rights. On August 19, 1997, Lee was ordered
to pay $200 a month in child support, retroactive to January 1,
1997. This amount was increased to $311.01 per month on
September 15, 1998. Lee requested multiple modifications of
child support between 1999 and 2000, but he failed to produce the
requisite documentation to support modification. On October 12,
2000, the superior court again denied his request for
modification, finding that there was no evidence to support that
he was involuntarily unemployed. Child support was reduced to
$218.68 in June 2001 but was increased in October 2002 to $439.10
when Lee found employment. Support was revisited in June of
2003; the superior court reduced Lees obligation to $217.88
following notice of his voluntary unemployment status. On July
7, 2003, Lee submitted a motion requesting that he be excused
from paying child support, but he offered no evidence that his
situation had changed since the courts last action in June 2003.
The superior court denied this motion on September 18, 2003.
Lee had previously challenged the constitutionality of
Rule 90.3 in June 2002. Judge Zervos denied this challenge in a
July 2002 order, relying on our decision in Coghill v. Coghill.1
Judge Zervos reiterated this ruling in his September 2003 order.
Lee now appeals this order.2
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Constitutional questions and other questions of law are
reviewed de novo.3 Our duty is to adopt the rule of law that is
most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.4
IV. DISCUSSION
Lee raises seven issues on appeal that can be grouped
into three challenges to the constitutionality of Rule 90.3 and a
request that we overrule Coghill. He does not dispute any
specific factual findings of the superior court.
A. There Is No Valid Ground To Overturn Coghill.
In Coghill, we addressed many of the issues raised by
Lee in this appeal. There we held that promulgation of Civil
Rule 90.3 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.5 We
also concluded that Civil Rule 90.3 is not arbitrary and
capricious, and does not violate either due process or equal
protection by creating a presumption against non-custodial
parents.6 Lee now asks us to overrule our decision in Coghill.
As we explained most recently in State v. Semancik, [w]e will
only overrule a prior decision when clearly convinced that the
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result
from a departure from precedent. 7 We conclude that Lee has
failed to meet his burden of establishing either of the necessary
elements that would justify overruling Coghill.
1. Rule 90.3 is neither vague nor overbroad.
Lee argues that the best interests of the child
provisions of Rule 90.3 are unconstitutionally vague.8 He
maintains that [t]here is no statutory definition for The Best
Interest of the Child and therefore it is broad, vague, and
opinionated which makes the application of this phrase in a court
of law unconstitutional. He also argues that the term gives the
courts unrestricted power over the family unit. We considered a
similar vagueness challenge to the child support guidelines in
Coghill and held that so long as judges and hearing commissioners
continue to exercise their discretion to achieve equitable
results consistent with existing case law there should be no
vagueness concern.9 The term best interests of the child is no
more general than the terms good cause and manifest injustice
that survived a vagueness challenge in Coghill.10 Lee fails to
demonstrate how the superior courts exercise of discretion in
this case was unfair or inequitable, nor does he distinguish
Coghill. We therefore conclude that Rule 90.3 is not vague and
that our previous holding in Coghill was not clearly erroneous.
2. Rule 90.3 does not violate equal protection.
Lee also contends that the sole purpose of Rule 90.3 is
for the State to collect monies . . . . He further argues that
the federal child support scheme, 42 U.S.C. 658, creates an
incentive and rewards state [j]udges for taking children away
from perfectly fit parents by telling [s]tate [j]udges that the
[f]ederal government will pay the [s]tate 6% of what the [j]udge
orders the non-custodial parent to pay the custodial parent in
child support. Lee classifies these arguments as vagueness
challenges, but he does not point to language in the rule that is
unclear or overbroad. Rather, he seems to object to the
classification of custodial and non-custodial parents as a
violation of equal protection.
We have considered equal protection challenges to Rule
90.3 on previous occasions and have held each time that custodial
and non-custodial parents are not similarly situated for purposes
of child support.11 As we explained in Coghill, the commentary to
Rule 90.3 is explicit as to why non-custodial and custodial
parents must be examined differently: Applications of the rule
should result in a non-custodial parent paying approximately what
the parent would have spent on the children if the family was
intact. Integral to the rule is the expectation that the
custodial parent will contribute at least the same percentage of
income to support the children.12 We see no reason to conclude
that our previous holding that the percentage of income approach
has a fair and substantial relationship to the goals of Civil
Rule 90.313 was clearly erroneous or will cause more harm than
good.
3. Rule 90.3 does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
Fifth Amendment, or Alaskas constitutional right
to privacy.
Lees third challenge to the constitutionality of Rule
90.3 concerns the requirement that a non-custodial parent provide
financial documentation to the court. He contends that this
requirement violates his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches;14 his Fifth Amendment right to not give
testimony against himself;15 and his right to privacy as protected
by the Alaska Constitution.16 Lee fails to provide any legal
authority to support his claims.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the chief
evil the Fourth Amendment is directed at preventing is physical
entry of the home.17 The Fourth Amendment is usually applied in
cases involving police searches made either without a valid
warrant,18 without probable cause,19 or with excessive force.20 In
this instance, Lee is asked to comply with a court order, not a
police investigation or search. And the courts order requiring
financial information is designed to assist the court in
establishing a non-custodial parents adjusted income in order to
calculate the appropriate amount of child support as required by
Rule 90.3.21 We conclude this does not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The core protection afforded by the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment is a prohibition on compelling a
criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial.22 Lee
fails to raise any argument to support a claim that the Fifth
Amendment should be extended to child support financial
affidavits. We need not decide the precise boundaries of the
Fifth Amendment in this case in order to conclude that the
submission of financial documentation does not violate the Fifth
Amendment.
Lees final argument is that his right to privacy under
the Alaska Constitution is violated by Rule 90.3s requirement
that he disclose his income. We rely on a three-part test to
determine whether a persons privacy rights have been violated:
(1) whether a party seeking protection has a legitimate
expectation that materials or information will not be disclosed;
(2) whether disclosure is nonetheless required to serve a
compelling state interest; and (3) if so, whether disclosure will
occur in the least-intrusive manner with respect to the right to
privacy.23 Lee presents no evidence or arguments to indicate how
his right to privacy is violated under this test. The purpose of
Rule 90.3s guidelines is to ensure that child support orders are
adequate to meet the needs of children . . . .24 As noted in the
commentary to Rule 90.3, [t]he obligation to provide child
support is more important than the obligation to fulfill most
other obligations.25 We explained in Koller v. Reft that if a
parent who shares physical custody of a child could stop working
and claim that his or her income could not be imputed . . . then
no support would be provided for that child. This result would
be contrary to the very purpose of the Rule 90.3 guidelines.26 We
conclude that the state has a compelling interest in supporting
children. Non-custodial parents are required to supply financial
information because it is necessary for the courts to have this
information in order to calculate adequate child support.27 We
therefore conclude that the disclosure of financial information
does not violate Alaskas constitutional right to privacy.
Lee has not demonstrated that Coghill was clearly
erroneous when it was decided or that more good than harm would
result from a departure from established precedent. Lee has also
not advanced a single argument to demonstrate that changed
conditions exist since Coghill that would justify overturning
established precedent. We therefore are not persuaded to depart
from principles of stare decisis and abandon our prior holding in
Coghill.
B. Rule 90.3 Does Not Violate Separation of Powers.
Lee also argues that this court lacks the authority to
promulgate Rule 90.3 or require non-custodial parents to pay
child support. He questions whether we have the authority to
write a rule, apply it as law, and decide its constitutionality.
We answered this contention in Coghill. We held that Civil Rule
90.3 was an interpretative rule promulgated under article IV,
section 1 of the Alaska Constitution, vesting the judicial power
of the state in this court.28 Inherent in the judicial power is
the authority to make rules of interpretation that govern how
courts interpret constitutional, statutory, or common law
requirements.29 We explained in Coghill that
Alaska Statute 25.24.160 allows courts to set
child support awards as may be just and
proper for the parties to contribute toward
the nurture and education of their children.
Civil Rule 90.3 interprets this statute and
establishes guidelines to enable courts to
determine what is a just and proper
contribution. Establishing such guidelines
recognizes the need for uniformity across
income levels; however, the guidelines also
recognize that unique circumstances might
require variance from the guidelines.[30]
Similarly, in Koss v. Koss, we cited language from the 1977
session laws that enacted the Child Support Enforcement Act31 as
additional evidence that the legislature authorized the
enforcement of child support obligations by the courts.32 The
legislature stated that the common law and Alaska statutes
pertaining to the establishment and enforcement of the child
support obligations shall be augmented by additional remedies in
order to meet the needs of minor children.33
Lee relies on Justice Burkes dissent in Coghill as
support for his argument that the creation of Rule 90.3 was an
exercise of legislative power by the courts.34 But the rationale
of the dissent in Coghill was fully addressed and rejected by the
majority opinion in that case. Further, the Alaska Legislature
has on multiple occasions since our 1992 holding in Coghill
ratified the courts child support enforcement powers. For
example, the legislature has amended Rule 90.3 a number of times
since 1995, including most recently in 2004.35 Each time, the
legislature had the ability to alter or supersede provisions of
Rule 90.3 via legislation, but at no point did the legislature
question this courts ability to order child support. Additional
statutory authority for court-ordered child support is evidenced
in AS 25.27.060,36 AS 25.27.070,37 and AS 25.27.080.38 Lee presents
no basis for us to overrule our previous holding in Coghill that
Rule 90.3 does not violate separation of powers.
V. CONCLUSION
Because Rule 90.3 is constitutional and Lee has failed
to provide any evidence or arguments that warrant reconsideration
of our established precedent, we AFFIRM the superior courts order
in its entirety.
_______________________________
1 836 P.2d 921, 927-30 (Alaska 1992).
2 Valerie filed a notice of non-participation under
Alaska Appellate Rule 204.
3 See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1372 n.2
(Alaska 1987).
4 Id.
5 836 P.2d at 928.
6 Id. at 928-30.
7 99 P.3d 538, 540 (Alaska 2004) (quoting State v.
Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996)).
8 The two provisions of Civil Rule 90.3 that mention best
interests of the child are:
(c)(3) In addition to ordering a parent
to pay child support as calculated under this
rule, the court may, in appropriate
circumstances, order one or more grandparents
of a child to pay child support to an
appropriate person in an amount determined by
the court to serve the best interests of the
child.
. . . .
(k) . . . The court may allocate the
dependent tax deduction for each child
between the parties as is just and proper and
in the childs best interests.
9 Coghill, 836 P.2d at 929 (quoting Fitzgerald v.
Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d 719, 732 (D.C. App. 1989)).
10 Id.; see also Williams v. State, Dept of Revenue, 895
P.2d 99, 105-06 (Alaska 1995) (extraordinary and unusual not
vague); R.C. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., 760 P.2d
501, 506 (Alaska 1988) (citing other cases finding unfit,
improper, neglected, basic, essential and necessary needs, and
reasonable parental care not vague); Storrs v. State Medical Bd.,
664 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Alaska 1983) (professional incompetence not
vague).
11 Arnesen v. Anchorage Refuse, Inc., 925 P.2d 661, 668
(Alaska 1996) (holding [c]ustodial parents qualify for the
personal exemption because they care for the children for the
better part of the year) (citing Coghill, 836 P.2d at 929
(finding child support only implicates an economic interest and
the rule satisfies rational basis review)). Cf. State, Dept of
Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725,
729 (Alaska 1998) (holding child support obligors equal
protection rights were not violated by statute allowing
suspension of license for failure to pay child support).
12 Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, Commentary II; see also
Coghill, 836 P.2d at 930 (quoting Commentary to Rule 90.3).
13 Coghill, 836 P.2d at 930.
14 The Fourth Amendment states: The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
15 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . . U.S. Const. amend. V.
16 The Alaska Constitution was amended in 1972 to read:
Right of Privacy. The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed. Alaska Const. art. I,
22.
17 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
18 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2004)
(explaining that Fourth Amendment requires particularity in a
warrant for it to be facially valid).
19 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
354 (2001) (If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,
arrest the offender.).
20 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989)
(holding that excessive force claim properly analyzed under
Fourth Amendment).
21 Civil Rule 90.3(a) states: A child support award in a
case in which one parent is awarded primary physical custody . .
. will be calculated as an amount equal to the adjusted annual
income of the non-custodial parent multiplied by a percentage
specified in subparagraph (a)(2).
22 United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004).
23 Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Rue, 948 P.2d 976, 980
(Alaska 1997) (citing Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738
(Alaska 1990)).
24 Koller v. Reft, 71 P.3d 800, 806 (Alaska 2003) (quoting
Alaska Rule 90.3 Commentary II.B)).
25 Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 Commentary VI.B(4).
26 71 P.3d at 806.
27 Moreover, a non-custodial parent is always free to
request that confidential financial records such as tax returns
be placed in a confidential envelope in the court file and
withheld from the public record.
28 Coghill, 836 P.2d at 927.
29 Id.
30 Id. (citations omitted); AS 25.24.160(a)(1).
31 Ch. 126, 1, SLA 1997.
32 Koss v. Koss, 981 P.2d 106, 108 & n.13 (Alaska 1999)
(discussing how the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED)
supplements judicial powers of enforcement); see also Anderson v.
Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 323 n.2 (Alaska 1987).
33 See Anderson, 736 P.2d at 323 n.2 (quoting language
from ch. 126, 1, SLA 1977).
34 See Coghill, 836 P.2d at 930 (Burke, J., dissenting).
35 The 1995 amendment to AS 25.27.166(d) amends Rule 90.3
by allowing retroactive modification of child support arrearage
under certain circumstances. See Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 note.
The 1996 amendment to AS 25.27.195 amends the rule by allowing
CSED to retroactively modify an obligors arrearages when an order
is vacated because it was not based on an obligors ability to
pay. See id. The 1997 amendment to AS 25.24.170(b) amended
Civil Rule 90.3 by altering the standard for certain
modifications of a support order. See id. Support may be
modified without a showing of a material change in circumstances
as necessary to comply with federal law. The 2000 amendment to
AS 25.20.050 amends the rule by requiring the court to issue a
temporary child support order in a paternity action where there
is a showing of paternity by clear and convincing evidence. See
id. In 2004 several amendments were made to the child support
statutes, including a provision altering the grounds for
modifying a support order. See id.
36 AS 25.27.060, entitled Order of support, details when
an order for child support may be issued by a court and what a
court should consider when issuing such an order.
37 AS 25.27.070, entitled Order to assign wages for
support, authorizes a court on its own motion or the motion of
either party to assign a portion of the salary of either parent
in order to pay the amount ordered by the court for support.
38 AS 25.27.080, entitled Enforcement of support
orders,authorizes the child support enforcement agency to take
all necessary action permitted by law to enforce the child
support orders so entered, including petitioning the court for
orders to aid in the enforcement of child support.
