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DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage (01/14/2005) sp-5859
DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage (01/14/2005) sp-5859
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
DANIEL DeNARDO and )
DEBORAH LUPER, ) Supreme Court No. S-11128
)
Appellants, ) Superior Court No.
) 3AN-03-06518 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE )
and NEIGHBORS FOR MARK ) [No. 5859 - January 14, 2005]
BEGICH, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, John Suddock, Judge.
Appearances: Daniel DeNardo, pro se,
Appellant, Anchorage. Kenneth P. Jacobus,
Kenneth P. Jacobus, P.C., Anchorage, for
Appellant Luper. Frederick H. Boness,
Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellee
Municipality of Anchorage. Jeffrey M.
Feldman, Susan Orlansky, and Julie Rikelman,
Feldman & Orlansky, Anchorage, for Appellee
Neighbors for Mark Begich.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The appellants in this case challenge the order in
which the candidates names were placed on the ballot in the 2003
Anchorage mayoral election. They also seek to undo the passage
of an amendment to the Anchorage Municipal Charter due to alleged
procedural defects. We affirm the superior courts grant of
summary judgment to the appellees on all grounds.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
On April 1, 2003, the Municipality of Anchorage held a
general election. The election included races for mayor and three
school board seats. The ballot listed Mark Begich first among
the mayoral candidates. The election also submitted four
propositions to the voters for approval, including the one at
issue in this case, Proposition 2. Proposition 2 was a charter
amendment limiting run-off elections to mayoral elections where
no mayoral candidate receives more than 45% of the vote. Before
Proposition 2 was adopted, run-off elections in mayoral, school
board, and assembly races were required when no candidate
received more than 50% of the vote.
1. Random selection of candidate placement on ballots
Before 1996 the Municipality used a rotational system
for placement of candidate names on ballots. In 1996 the
Municipality changed to a system where a random process
determines a fixed order for placement of candidate names. In
the April 2003 Anchorage mayoral election, candidate Mark Begich
occupied the first position. Begich won the election, receiving
45.03% of the vote.
2. Proposition 2
The initial version of Proposition 2, an ordinance
referred to as AO 2002-79, provided that run-off elections would
take place only in mayoral elections where no candidate received
more than 50% of the vote. The Anchorage Assembly held a meeting
on June 25, 2002, where many members of the public spoke about AO
2002-79. The assembly then submitted a revised version of AO
2002-79 providing for run-off elections where no mayoral
candidate received more than 45% of the vote. Like the initial
version, the revised version repealed the requirement of run-off
elections for other positions. On July 7 and July 14, 2002, the
assembly published two notices in the Alaska Journal of Commerce
regarding the revised version, AO 2002-79(S). The notices
informed the public that a public hearing would take place on
July 16. The notices described the proposition as permitting a
mayoral candidate to be elected with 45% of the vote without a
run-off election. At the July 16 public hearing, many
individuals testified for and against the ordinance; the chairman
limited testimony to those who had not testified on the issue at
the June 25 hearing.
After the assembly passed the ordinance, the
Municipality placed Proposition 2 on the ballot. A notice
appeared in the Anchorage Daily News on February 15, 2003. The
notice ran again on March 31, 2003, the day before the election.
After the first notice, there was significant public discussion
regarding Proposition 2s effective date and the 45% requirement.
Some citizen groups urged voters to reject the measure and the
Anchorage Daily News featured articles and op-ed pieces
discussing the impact of Proposition 2.
3. Election results
Proposition 2 passed with 54.99% of voters approving
it. Mark Begich was elected mayor, receiving 45.03% of the vote.
Begichs closest competitor, George Wuerch, received 37.18% of the
vote. Begich was sworn in as mayor on July 1, 2003.
B. Proceedings
Daniel DeNardo filed a pro se complaint against the
Municipality of Anchorage in superior court on April 15, 2003
challenging the passage of Proposition 2. Approximately two
weeks later, Deborah Luper and Rinna Merculieff (Luper)
intervened as plaintiffs, alleging that Proposition 2 was invalid
and that fixing the order of the candidates names on the ballot
was improper. Neighbors for Mark Begich (Neighbors) intervened
as a defendant. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.
The superior court issued an order granting summary
judgment to the Municipality and Neighbors on the basis that no
significant deviation from the law occurred that could have
affected the elections results. The court entered its final
order on July 3, 2003. This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.1 We uphold a grant of summary judgment if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.2 We apply our independent
judgment to legal and statutory interpretation issues.3
B. Random Selection of Candidate Order on the Ballot Is
Constitutional Under Sonneman.
DeNardo and Luper argue that the mayoral election was
biased and unfair due to positional bias created by the fixed
position of the candidates names on the ballot. They also argue
that this courts holding in Sonneman v. State,4 that positional
bias does not impermissibly burden the right to vote, does not
control this case. We disagree. This case is controlled by
Sonneman, and we therefore hold that the placement of the
candidates names on the ballot was constitutional.
In Sonneman, we considered whether ending the practice
of rotating the order of candidates names on state election
ballots and replacing it with a random determination of the fixed
order of candidates names was constitutional.5 We examined
whether the legislature is required to use the fairest method, or
whether a reasonable, nondiscriminatory method is sufficient.6
We emphasized the important regulatory interests of reducing
costs and preventing voter confusion and then concluded that
those interests justify the minimal burden on the right to vote
imposed by the random selection of the first candidate.7
Although we recognized the possibility that fixed placement of
candidates names could result in a positional bias of 5-7%, we
held that random selection of fixed ballot positions was
nonetheless constitutional.8
While DeNardo and Luper acknowledge that Sonneman
permits random selection of ballot positions in state primary
elections, they argue that the factors for the April 2003 mayoral
election were so different that Sonneman should not control.
They first emphasize that the 5% positional bias did not actually
affect the Sonneman election because the difference in votes
received between the first and second place finishers in that
case was substantially more than 5%. Next, DeNardo and Luper
focus on the fact that Begich achieved a 45% plurality by only
seventeen votes, alleging that Begichs position on the ballot
resulted in his victory.
We do not find this argument persuasive. In Sonneman,
we explicitly considered the possibility that positional bias
could determine the outcome of Alaska elections. We noted that
even if we accepted as true that positional bias affects 5-7% of
the votes cast and that Alaska elections are often decided by
margins of less than 5%, the burden placed by random selection on
the right to vote is reasonable.9
DeNardo and Luper also focus on our statement in
Sonneman that we would not address whether the effects of
positional bias could necessitate a stricter review if it
affected a greater percentage of the votes.10 They argue that a
greater percentage of the votes was affected in the Anchorage
election than in the state election, and that the entire election
was determined by positional bias. This interpretation is
mistaken. In Sonneman, we assumed a 5-7% bias,11 while DeNardo
and Luper claim only a 4-5% bias in elections generally. Thus,
DeNardo and Luper allege that a smaller percentage of the vote is
affected by positional bias than the percentage we deemed
permissible in Sonneman.
DeNardo and Luper also argue that Sonneman is
distinguishable because it resulted in a majority winner and
dealt with a primary election. However, we never suggested that
our holding in Sonneman would be limited to primary elections or
to elections where the winner receives a majority of the votes.12
Because Sonneman governs this case, we hold that the random
selection of fixed positions for the candidates names did not
impermissibly burden the right to vote in the 2003 mayoral
election.
C. There Was No Significant Deviation from the Law
Associated with Proposition 2.
DeNardo and Luper contend that Proposition 2 was
presented to the voters in a biased and confusing manner. We
address this claim in three parts. First, we conclude that this
is an election contest. Next, we explain that it is subject to a
higher standard of review because it is an election contest.
Finally, we apply the higher standard of review and conclude that
there was no significant deviation from the law sufficient to
warrant upsetting the election results.
1. This is an election contest.
In the past we have drawn a distinction between pre-
election challenges to ballot initiative language and post-
election challenges seeking to overturn election results.13 The
standard for post-election contests is higher than that for pre-
election challenges.14 The different standards serve the
important purpose of discouraging parties from mounting post-
election challenges just because they are displeased with the
results of a given election.
In Walleri v. City of Fairbanks, we explained that
[w]hether a cause of action should be deemed an election contest
. . . turns on the remedy sought. If granting the remedy would
defeat the public interest in the stability and finality of
election results, it is appropriate to deem the cause of action
an election contest and to require compliance with the procedures
for such contests.15 DeNardo and Luper seek to void Proposition
2, a remedy that would both overturn the proposition and mandate
a runoff in the mayoral election. Because their proposed remedy
implicates the public interest in the stability and finality of
election results, we conclude that this is an election contest.
DeNardo and Luper claim that it is not an election
contest, citing the superior courts conclusion that they did not
need to exhaust their administrative remedies. But they are
mistaken. The superior court, in deciding that judicial review
was not precluded for failure to comply with election contest
procedures, emphasized that the challenge was justiciable wholly
apart from the election itself and that the Municipality asserted
at oral argument that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not a condition precedent to judicial review.16 The superior
courts relaxation of the exhaustion requirement does not answer
the question whether a claim is an election contest subject to
the stricter standard of review.
DeNardo and Luper also urge us to apply the standard
set forth in Alaskans for Efficient Government, a case in which
we struck down the states proposed summary for a ballot
initiative because it was inaccurate and potentially misleading.17
But Alaskans for Efficient Government involved a pre-election
challenge to the ballot language. This case resembles Boucher,
where we reviewed the prefatory language of a referendum post-
election and applied the higher post-election standard requiring
proof of malconduct on the part of an election official
sufficient to change the result of the election.18
Because DeNardo and Luper seek to overturn the results
of the election, we conclude that their challenge is an election
contest.
2. The standard of review for election contests is
higher than that for pre-election contests.
We apply a higher standard of review for post-election
challenges to ballot language than we apply to pre-election
challenges. The standard for pre-election challenges, which we
applied in Alaskans for Efficient Government, requires that a
ballot summary be impartial and accurate.19 In contrast, the
standard for post-election contests is set forth in section
28.100.010 of the Anchorage Municipal Code:
A candidate or ten qualified voters may
contest the election of any person or the
approval or rejection of any question or
proposition upon one or more of the following
grounds:
1. Malconduct, fraud or corruption on
the part of an election official sufficient
to change the result of the election.
This standard is identical to the standard contained in
the Alaska statute governing election contests, AS 15.20.540.20
We construed AS 15.20.540 in Boucher, where we cautioned that
persons seeking to contest an election must show more than a lack
of total and exact compliance with the constitutionally and
statutorily prescribed form of ballot.21 In Boucher, we defined
malconduct as behavior resulting in a significant deviation from
the prescribed form . . . of a magnitude sufficient to change the
result of the . . . election.22 Therefore, DeNardo and Luper must
satisfy the dual burden of showing that there was both a
significant deviation from statutory direction, and that the
deviation was of a magnitude sufficient to change the result of
the election.23
3. DeNardo and Luper have not demonstrated a
significant deviation from the statutory directive
sufficient to change the result of the election.
DeNardo and Luper assert that the title of Proposition
2 as it appeared on the ballot contained four specific defects
that changed the outcome of the election. They argue that (1)
the title failed to provide notice of its effective date; (2) the
titles reference to reducing costs was biased; (3) the title
failed to make clear that the proposition would eliminate the
majority vote requirement; and (4) the title failed to inform
voters that the proposition would eliminate run-off requirements
for school board and assembly members. The superior court
rejected all of these claims, concluding that DeNardo and Luper
failed to demonstrate a significant deviation or creat[e] a
factual issue regarding likely alteration of electoral outcome.
Proposition 2s title read:
CHARTER AMENDMENT REPEALING AND REENACTING
CHARTER SECTION 11.02(b) TO REQUIRE RUN OFF
ELECTIONS ONLY FOR OFFICE OF THE MAYOR,
THEREBY REDUCING THE COSTS OF RUN OFF
ELECTIONS
We now address each claim in turn.
a. Notice of effective date
DeNardo and Luper first assert that the title was
defective because it failed to notify voters that the proposition
would become effective for the election in which it appeared.
Ballot requirements for municipal elections differ significantly
from ballot requirements for state elections. Unlike state law,
which requires that ballots in state elections contain only a
title and summary of the proposition,24 the Anchorage Charter
requires ballot propositions for charter amendments to include
both the current charter wording proposed to be changed and the
proposed new wording.25 The Anchorage Municipal Code does not
require a summary of the proposition, and the proposition title
need only be informative, not comprehensive.26 The Anchorage
Charter assumes that the proposition language itself will inform
the voters about its content. Here, the text of Proposition 2
stated that the proposition would be effective for the April 1,
2003 election if approved. This language was included on the
ballot, and nothing in the Anchorage Charter or the Anchorage
Municipal Code required the language to be included in the title
as well.
DeNardo and Luper also contend that the text of the
proposition regarding the effective date was confusing. The text
of the proposition read in part: If approved by the voters on
the April 1, 2003 Regular Election, this proposition will be
effective for this election. This language made clear to voters
that the proposition would be effective for the April 1 election.27
Because a title need not be comprehensive and because the text
stated the effective date, DeNardo and Luper did not meet the
high burden of demonstrating a deviation from the law that
affected the election outcome.
b. Reference to reducing costs
DeNardo and Luper next claim that the titles reference
to reducing costs is a blatant political statement which biased
the proposition in favor of an affirmative vote. They point to
our decision in Alaskans for Efficient Government, in which we
invalidated the lieutenant governors ballot summary for a
proposed initiative because it was potentially partisan and one-
sided.28 But it is not necessary to decide whether the cost-
reduction language in the title for Proposition 2 was one-sided
in violation of the standard set forth in Alaskans for Efficient
Government, for that standard does not govern this case; Alaskans
for Efficient Government dealt with a pre-election challenge.29
Because this is a post-election challenge, we analyze whether the
language rose to the level of malconduct effecting a deviation
from the law of a magnitude sufficient to change the result of
the election.
In Boucher, we invalidated election results because the
ballot language implied that voters were required by the state
constitution to pass the proposition at issue.30 But in Boucher,
we determined that the unauthorized prefatory language [on the
ballot] hindered the free expression of the will of the people in
a manner which was sufficient to change the result of the
referendum election.31 Here, we cannot say that the ballot
language hindered the free expression of the will of the people
so as to change the election results. In Burgess v. Alaska
Lieutenant Governor Terry Miller, we observed that statements
about a bills proposed effect do not introduce bias into the vote
as long as the statements are accurate.32 As the superior court
determined, it is reasonable to conclude that fewer run-off
elections will in fact save money. We find that the reference to
reducing costs did not rise to the level of malconduct affecting
the outcome of the election.
c. Majority vote requirement
DeNardo and Luper also assert that the title was
defective for failing to state that Proposition 2 would change
the charter to allow candidates to be elected by 45% of the vote,
rather than 50%. Again, municipal law requires only that
proposition titles be objectively stated and informative, not
comprehensive.33 The ballot displayed both the text of the former
statute and the text of the proposed proposition, as required by
the Anchorage Charter.34 While the title could have made the
content of the proposed charter amendment more clear, the ballot
contained everything required by the Anchorage Charter and the
Anchorage Municipal Code. We find that failure to highlight the
change in percentage did not amount to malconduct.
d. Elimination of run-off for school board and
assembly elections
Finally, DeNardo and Luper contend that the title was
defective because it failed to state that the proposition would
eliminate run-off elections for school board and assembly
elections. The title stated that it would require run off
elections only for office of the mayor. The superior court
rejected the appellants suggestion that the title should have
expressly stated that it eliminated run-off elections in school
board and assembly elections, characterizing this claim as
exceedingly weak even in a pre-election challenge.
Again, we analyze this claim under the stringent post-
election standard set forth in AMC 28.100.010 and in Boucher.35
We do not agree with the superior court that the claim would
necessarily be weak in the context of a pre-election challenge.
In order to comprehend that there would no longer be run-off
elections for school board and assembly elections, voters were
required to compare the text of Proposition 2 with the text of
the charter provision then in effect. Voters would have
benefitted from an explanation of this change in the title. But
the deficiencies in the title do not rise to the level of
malconduct. As discussed above, the Anchorage Municipal Code
does not require proposition titles to be comprehensive.36 Both
the text of Proposition 2 and the text of the charter as it then
stood were included on the ballot, and voters had the ability to
discern the full effect of the proposition by comparing the
language of the two provisions. Because this omission did not
amount to a significant deviation from statutory direction
sufficient to change the outcome of the election, we decline to
reverse the results of the election.
D. The Municipality Provided Adequate Notice and
Opportunity for Hearing Regarding Proposition 2.
DeNardo and Luper contend that the Municipality did not
follow public notice and hearing requirements for the adoption of
Proposition 2. The Anchorage Charter requires public notice and
a hearing for the introduction and enactment of ordinances.37
The initial version of Proposition 2, then listed as
Anchorage Ordinance 2002-79, provided that run-off elections
would take place only in mayoral elections where no candidate
received more than 50% of the vote. The assembly held a meeting
on AO 2002-79 on June 25, 2002, with many members of the public
speaking on the issue. The Municipality issued a revised version
of AO 2002-79, called AO 2002-79(S), and ran notices in the
Alaska Journal of Commerce on July 7 and 14, 2002. The notices
informed the public that a hearing would be held on July 16. The
notices described the proposition as permitting a mayoral
candidate to be elected with 45% of the vote without a run-off
election. At the July 16 public hearing, the chairman limited
testimony to those who had not testified on the issue at the June
25 hearing.
Luper and DeNardo argue that limiting testimony at the
second hearing to persons who did not testify at the first
hearing violated the notice and hearing requirements contained in
the Anchorage Charter. The superior court rejected this
argument, concluding that the limitation on testimony at the
second hearing was a de minimis imposition on the public hearing
process, and was not a significant enough deviation from proper
practice, standing alone, to vitiate the election. We agree.
While the preferred practice may have been to allow limited
testimony on the proposed change to the ordinance at the second
hearing, the record demonstrates that Lupers attorney did in fact
testify at both hearings.38 Therefore, it does not appear that
the policy was strictly enforced, and in any event it did not
amount to malconduct on the part of municipal officials. We
conclude that the Municipality provided adequate public notice
and that the assemblys decision to limit testimony at the second
public hearing was not a significant deviation from the law.39
E. The Anchorage Charter Did Not Require a Three-Fifths
Majority Vote To Pass Proposition 2.
DeNardo and Luper claim that Proposition 2 diminishes
civil rights, voting rights, and rights of political association
such that a 60% majority is required to pass under Anchorage
Charter section 18.01. Section 18.01 of the Anchorage Charter
provides:
Vote Required.
This Charter may be amended only upon the
concurrence of a majority of the qualified
voters of Anchorage voting on a proposed
amendment, except that a proposed amendment
which would diminish any right referred to in
article II or any provision of Section 16.02
requires approval by three-fifths of the
qualified voters voting on the amendment.
The superior court concluded that the 60% supermajority
requirement did not apply to this election because the
requirement only applies to the diminishment of one of the
thirteen enumerated rights in article II.40 We agree. Article II
of the Anchorage Charter guarantees rights to the people of
Anchorage in addition to the rights guaranteed under the United
States and Alaska Constitutions.41 None of the thirteen
enumerated rights relates to the voting rights at issue in this
case.42 Moreover, as the superior court concluded, if Proposition
2 truly diminished rights protected by the federal and state
constitutions, as DeNardo and Luper claim, the Municipality could
not enact the proposition by any percentage of the vote. Because
the supermajority requirement delineated in section 18.01 of the
Anchorage Charter refers to the thirteen rights enumerated in
article II of the Anchorage Charter, we find that a majority vote
was appropriate.43
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that random selection of a fixed candidate
order on the ballot did not impermissibly burden the right to
vote in the 2003 mayoral election. We also conclude that there
was no significant deviation from the law that affected the
election outcome. We therefore AFFIRM the superior courts grant
of summary judgment to the Municipality and Neighbors.
_______________________________
1 Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300, 303
(Alaska 2000); Moore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 231, 233
(Alaska 2000).
2 K&K Recycling, Inc. v. Alaska Gold, Co., 80 P.3d 702,
711 (Alaska 2003).
3 Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, 46 P.3d 957, 961 (Alaska
2002).
4 969 P.2d 632, 641 (Alaska 1998).
5 Id. at 634.
6 Id. at 639.
7 Id. at 640.
8 Id. at 639 n.7.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See id. at 636-40.
13 Compare Alaskans for Efficient Govt, Inc. v. State, 52
P.3d 732, 735 (Alaska 2002) (holding that petition summary
language must be impartial in a pre-election challenge) with
Boucher v. Bomhoff, 495 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1972) (requiring post-
election challengers to demonstrate malconduct on the part of
election officials sufficient to change election results).
14 See Alaskans for Efficient Govt, 52 P.3d at 735;
Boucher, 495 P.2d at 80.
15 964 P.2d 463, 466 (Alaska 1998).
16 We need not address the correctness of the superior
courts resolution of the exhaustion issue because neither party
has raised it on appeal.
17 52 P.3d at 737.
18 495 P.2d at 80.
19 52 P.3d at 735 (applying the standard to a ballot
summary submitted by the lieutenant governor).
20 AS 15.20.540 states: A defeated candidate or 10
qualified voters may contest the nomination or election of any
person or the approval or rejection of any question or
proposition upon . . . malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the
part of an election official sufficient to change the result of
the election.
21 495 P.2d at 80.
22 Id.
23 Dansereau v. Ulmer, 903 P.2d 555, 559 (Alaska 1995).
24 AS 15.45.180.
25 Anchorage Charter 18.03.
26 AMC 28.40.010(D) states: [b]allots for propositions to
be voted on shall contain only the question posed by the
proposition without explanation preceded by an objectively
stated, informative caption or title for the proposition. This
provision was amended effective June 1, 2003, to require a
summary description of propositions when the election is
conducted using optical scanning equipment. The full text of the
proposition must then be included on a separate explanatory
ballot. AMC 28.40.010(G).
27 Voters also benefitted from pre-election publicity
about the election, including articles in the Anchorage Daily
News, League of Women Voters pamphlets, and a mailing from
Alaskans for Responsible Government, all of which pointed out
that the proposition would take effect immediately.
28 52 P.3d at 736-37.
29 Id. at 732-33.
30 495 P.2d at 81.
31 Id. at 82 n.12.
32 654 P.2d 273, 276 (Alaska 1982).
33 AMC 28.40.010(D).
34 Anchorage Charter 18.03.
35 495 P.2d at 80.
36 AMC 28.40.010(D).
37 Section 10.01 of the Anchorage Charter provides in
relevant part:
(b) . . . Following introduction and
upon approval of three assemblymen, the clerk
shall publish a notice containing the text of
the ordinance or an informative summary of
its contents, the time and place for a public
hearing on the ordinance, and the time and
place where copies of the ordinance are
available. The public hearing shall be held
at least seven days after publication of the
notice.
38 Kenneth Jacobus, an attorney for Luper, spoke at the
June 25, 2002 assembly meeting and again at the July 16, 2002
hearing. At the July 16 hearing, Jacobus said, I think you know
my position in favor of instant run off voting as being the best
solution for Anchorage. But I am just going to address this
plurality thing, should it be forty percent? Forty-five percent?
Or twenty-five? . . . Jacobus went on to state his belief that
without a majority requirement, one voter could decide the entire
election.
39 DeNardo and Luper also contend that public notice was
inadequate because the title of the adopted ordinance conflicted
with the text of the adopted ordinance. The title of the
ordinance stated that 50% of the vote would be required to avoid
a run-off election, while the amended text only required 45%.
DeNardo and Luper argue that AO 2002-79 was not validly adopted
and Proposition 2 was not validly placed on the ballot,
preventing Proposition 2 from being validly enacted. Again, this
oversight did not amount to a significant deviation from the law.
40 Anchorage Charter article II.
41 Id.
42 Section 16.02 of the Anchorage Charter, which deals
with utilities, is also not at issue in this case.
43 The Municipality and Neighbors argue that section 18.01
of the Anchorage Charter violates article X, section 9 of the
Alaska State Constitution to the extent that it requires a
supermajority to amend any part of the charter. Because the
supermajority requirement in section 18.01 only applies to the
thirteen enumerated rights in Anchorage Charter article II, we do
not reach this question.
