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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Hutka v. Sisters of Providence in Washington (12/10/2004) sp-5851
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ELIZABETH HUTKA, )
) Supreme Court Nos. S-
10706/10735
Appellant/ )
Cross-Appellee, ) Superior Court No.
) 3AN-95-06452 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
SISTERS OF PROVIDENCE IN )
WASHINGTON, ) [No. 5851 - December 10, 2004]
)
Appellee/ )
Cross-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, John Reese, Judge.
Appearances: Kenneth W. Legacki, Anchorage,
for Appellant and Cross-Appellee. John A.
Treptow and Jahna M. Lindemuth, Dorsey &
Whitney LLP, Anchorage, for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this appeal, we address questions arising from the
state and federal law overtime claims of a home health care
supervisor. Appellant Elizabeth Hutka is a nurse who worked as a
supervisor for Providence Hospital and was classified by
Providence as exempt from receiving overtime payments after she
received a promotion. Hutkas employment responsibilities
included supervising nurses who provided personal care to
patients in their homes, reviewing time sheets and task sheets,
reviewing payroll records, and visiting patients at home to
manage their care. The superior court granted summary judgment
to Providence on Hutkas Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) claim on
the ground that Hutka was exempt under AS 23.10.060(d)(12)
because her position included the provision of medical services.
The superior court found that Hutka could, however, recover
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
After a bench trial, the superior court found that Hutka had
worked an average of 2.71 overtime hours per week from July 1992
to May 1995.
We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial courts
decision.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In October 1990 Providence Hospital hired Elizabeth
Hutka as a staff registered nurse. From November 1991 to August
1995, Hutka worked as a supervisor for the Home Health Care unit,
headquartered on hospital grounds in Providences former convent.
In July 1992 Providence promoted Hutka from a team leader
assistant paid on an hourly basis to a home health aide
supervisor paid by salary. After giving her this promotion,
Providence classified Hutkas new position as exempt from earning
overtime wages and stopped compensating her for time worked in
excess of forty hours a week.
In March 1994 Hutka filed a complaint with the Alaska
Department of Labor to ask for an official determination as to
whether Providence could classify her as exempt from receiving
overtime. Providence initially responded to the Department of
Labor that, as a supervisor, Hutka was exempt from the Alaska
Wage and Hour Act (AWHA); it later also contested the Alaska
regulation defining nurses as nonexempt under the AWHA.
Hutka filed a complaint in superior court on July 26,
1995 to recover overtime compensation under the AWHA. The trial
court denied both Providences summary judgment motion that
alleged Hutka was exempt as a supervisor and Providences request
for a ruling that nurses should not be entitled to bring overtime
claims under the AWHA.
The trial court did, however, grant Providence partial
summary judgment on January 13, 2000, holding that Hutka could
not bring an AWHA claim because AS 23.10.060(d)(12) exempts
employees whose employment includes the provision of medical
services.1 Providence had already acknowledged that Hutka did
not provide medical care as her primary responsibility. In an
affidavit submitted on behalf of Providence by Kathy Lum, a co-
director of Home Health Care, Lum testified that
the primary function of the home health aides
that Ms. Hutka supervised was to provide
personal care, time sheet and task sheet
review and verification, as opposed to
medical care, for patients in their homes . .
. . The important thing to note is that Ms.
Hutka, and the other supervisor of home
health aides, Joan Hamilton, both were
responsible for reviewing time sheets, task
sheets, and giving their approval for payroll
purposes.
The superior court found, however, that there is no maximum or
minimum quantification in the statute. Therefore, based on Ms.
Hutkas statements [that she provided patient care], she is
exempt.
Hutka then moved on February 7, 2000 to amend her
complaint to add a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim for
overtime compensation. Providence filed a motion to dismiss the
FLSA claim, arguing that it did not relate back to the original
complaint and that it unfairly prejudiced Providence. The
superior court denied the motion to dismiss but allowed
Providence to bring a motion to sanction Hutka for her failure to
timely allege the federal law claim. The court ultimately
assessed attorneys fees in the amount of $7,134.50 against Hutka
as a sanction for the untimely amendment.
A nonjury trial commenced on June 5, 2000 to
determine the number of overtime hours worked by Hutka, and her
entitlement to overtime compensation under the FLSA. Providence
had required Hutka and other exempt staff to fill out time cards
but several witnesses testified that Providence directed that the
actual hours worked by exempt employees should not be recorded.
Michelle Lorenzen Iverslie, who hired Hutka in July 1992 and
supervised her until August 1994, testified that there were times
when [Hutka] put down more than 80 [hours] and I would scratch it
out and write exempt employee and write 80. Iverslie also stated
that there were times that [Hutka] wrote down actual hours but
ultimately . . . it had to be 80 hours every two weeks . . . that
was the bottom line. Iverslie further testified that while she
may not have crossed out the daily number of hours when Hutka
put more than eight, she would tell Hutka dont do this again,
youre an exempt employee.
Joan Hamilton, who held the same position as Hutka and
shared responsibilities with her from January 1993 to August
1994, testified that the time cards that were submitted to
Providence did not reflect the number of hours she and Hutka
worked. Hamilton also testified regarding the number of hours
worked by Hutka. [Hutka and I] worked . . . pretty consistently
10 hours a day but more heavily on the payroll weeks. According
to Hamilton, payroll was done every two weeks, and she and Hutka
were responsible for collecting . . . forms
on Fridays before payroll and also going . .
. to Providence on the weekends to collect
[forms] . . . then [they] would come home . .
. [each] with a stack of forms that [they]
had to go through minutely detailed exercises
tallying up . . . many . . . hours were spent
. . . to get those papers submitted to
payroll by their deadline Monday morning . .
. life on payroll weekends was pretty much
work.
Hutka herself testified with regard to the time cards
that she had made an effort to keep track of extra hours worked
but was reprimanded by [her] supervisors that [she] was messing
up the whole payroll system by doing that. Hutka also testified
that [the time card] had to say eight on Monday through Friday
whether [she] came to work or not or whether [she] was there 10
hours. Hutka alleged that she worked an average of 11.16 hours
of overtime a week for the period from July 1992 to May 1995.
The superior court found that there were
inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence presented:
Ms. Hutka told the Department of Labor that time cards were
accurately kept, at least after a certain point and then
testified differently at trial. Ms. Hutka put time on the time
cards when she was taking annual leave and also when she was on
sick leave. After considering this conflicting evidence, the
court found that it was more likely than not that Hutka worked an
average of 2.71 hours of overtime per week, the estimate given by
Providence. The court granted a directed verdict to Providence
as to Hutkas claims that shift differential and on-call pay rates
should be included in the computation of overtime rates, finding
that
the shift differential part of the salary . .
. is a contract provision and its not a
contract to which Ms. Hutka was a party . . .
. Her contract with Providence was as a
supervisory employee that didnt include that
and what she has available to her are the
FLSA remedies. She has no contract remedies
in that sense so shift differential is not
applicable . . . .
As to the on-call pay, the standard
there is the extent to which it burdens her
life and the testimony from Ms. Hutka as well
as . . . Ms. Hamilton, was that it seemed to
be an insignificant burden on her life . . .
.
The superior court ultimately awarded Hutka $14,574.18
in unpaid wages, $10,584.96 in prejudgment interest (10.5% per
annum), $14,574.18 in liquidated damages, and $5,678.63 in
attorneys fees. On the issue of liquidated damages, the court
found that [a]lthough this is a close question, it does appear
more likely than not that the employer was testing the line and
had reason to believe that there was no exemption applicable to
Ms. Hutka . . . . Certainly there was not clear and convincing
evidence of good faith.
Hutka appeals the following trial court decisions: (1)
the determination that she is exempt under AWHA as a provider of
medical services; (2) the finding in favor of Providences
estimate that Hutka worked an average of 2.71 hours of overtime a
week; (3) the decision not to include shift differential and on-
call rates in the computation of overtime; and (4) the assessment
of attorneys fees against her for the untimely amendment of her
complaint. Providence cross-appeals on two points, arguing that
the superior court erred in its decision to award both
prejudgment interest and liquidated damages under an FLSA claim
for overtime and that the court erred in allowing Hutka to claim
and receive damages for three years of overtime under the two-
year statute of limitations.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review grants of summary judgment de novo.2 We must
determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment on the law
applicable to the established facts.3 We view the facts
presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
when reviewing a grant of summary judgment.4 A finding of fact,
however, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.5 A
clearly erroneous finding of fact is one that leaves this court
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.6
On questions of law, we will adopt the rule of law that is most
persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.7 A trial
courts decisions on admissibility of evidence will not be set
aside unless there is an abuse of discretion.8 The award of
attorneys fees is also committed to the discretion of the trial
court.9 We will interfere with the exercise of that discretion
only where it has been abused.10 An abuse of discretion is