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Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (05/21/2004) sp-5809
Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (05/21/2004) sp-5809
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STUART AARON HALLAM, )
) Supreme Court No. S-10198
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 1JU-99-00928 CI
)
ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5809 - May 21, 2004]
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau,
Patricia A. Collins, Judge.
Appearances: Stuart Aaron Hallam, pro se,
Juneau, Appellant. James N. Leik and Helena
L. Hall, Perkins Coie LLP, Anchorage, and
Douglas S. Parker, Preston Gates & Ellis,
Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, and
Fabe, Justices. [Eastaugh and Carpeneti,
Justices, not participating.]
FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal is the culmination of a series of customer
service disputes between Stuart Hallam and Alaska Airlines.
Hallam sued the airline, alleging that by failing to honor
various terms of his plane tickets, it breached a series of
contracts. He also alleged, on behalf of a class of passengers,
that the airlines standard ticket terms and policies violate
Alaskas Unfair Trade Practices Act and state antitrust law.
After a bench trial, the superior court ruled in favor of Alaska
Airlines on all counts, and Hallam appeals. Most of his
arguments on appeal challenge the superior courts factual
findings, which we conclude were not clearly erroneous. We
therefore affirm the superior court.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Factual History
Hallams claims are based on several transactions he had
with Alaska Airlines. The bulk of his appeal is devoted to
challenging the factual findings supporting the superior courts
judgment on these claims. We outline the incidents here and
describe them in greater detail as we examine each in Parts III.B-
F below.
First, Hallam claims that he purchased from Alaska
Airliness website a ticket labeled unrestricted that turned out
to be restricted. Believing that he could change the ticket
without incurring a fee, he attempted to change his travel dates,
but was told that he would be charged. The fee was later waived,
but Hallam chose not to use the ticket. In the second incident,
Hallam bought a ticket to fly to Puerto Vallarta. Two charges,
for differing amounts, appeared on his credit card bills. The
greater of the two charges was credited back to him. Later,
Hallam was informed that the charge was being reinstated, but
that he could continue to contest it. In the third incident,
Hallam attempted to use a Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) voucher
to purchase a ticket to fly from Seattle to Juneau. At the
Seattle airport, Hallam was informed that his voucher had expired
and that he would have to purchase his ticket some other way.
Fourth, Hallam claimed below that he was denied a first class
seat for which he had a reserved ticket. He therefore chose not
to take the flight; he claimed that the denial of the first class
seat was a breach. Finally, Hallam purchased a pair of tickets
from the airlines website. He claims that he was charged an
amount much greater than what appeared on the screen, and called
the airline to complain. The airline refunded all but nine
dollars of the alleged overcharge.
B. Procedural History
Hallams Second Amended Complaint was filed January 18,
2000. He brought a series of contract and conversion claims
based on the incidents described above and defamation claims
arising from one of his more energetic encounters with Alaska
Airlines personnel, along with both class and individual claims
under the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices Act1 and state antitrust
law.2 On March 7, 2000, the superior court dismissed the unfair
trade practices and antitrust claims on the ground that Hallam,
as a pro se litigant, could not represent the class. The complex
procedural history of these claims is laid out in Part F below.
In short, Hallam moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of
his individual claims. When reconsideration was denied, he moved
to amend his complaint to reinstate his individual unfair trade
practices and antitrust claims. The superior court eventually
denied this motion in November 2000, citing federal preemption
under the Airline Deregulation Act3 as grounds for rejecting the
amendment.
Meanwhile, discovery closed on May 1, 2000 and in June
and July the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Upon receiving Alaska Airliness summary judgment memorandum,
Hallam moved on August 22 to reopen discovery and for a
continuance under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), arguing
that the airlines motion evidenced both document tampering and
perjury. After the superior court gave Hallam a chance to
explain what he was looking for, it denied the motion. The
superior court then granted Alaska Airlines summary judgment on
some of the defamation claims, based on statute of limitations
and privilege grounds, and on Hallams failure to present evidence
that one of the allegedly defamatory statements was published.
On all other claims, the superior court declined to enter summary
judgment. The case was tried to the bench before Judge Patricia
A. Collins, who had handled the case throughout. In late
November, and in March 2001 the superior court entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law, finding for Alaska Airlines on
all claims. Hallam moved for reconsideration, and the motion was
denied. Final judgment was entered in April 2001, at which time
the superior court awarded fees and costs to Alaska Airlines.
Hallam made several further motions for reconsideration or relief
from the judgment, including one asking Judge Collins to recuse
herself if the court cannot be unbiased and impartial. All were
denied.
Hallam appeals to this court challenging: the superior
courts factual findings on claims concerning the incidents
described above; the superior courts dismissal of his individual
Unfair Trade Practices Act and antitrust claims and its denial of
his motion to amend his complaint to add those claims after they
were dismissed; the superior courts refusal to reopen discovery;
Judge Collinss failure to recuse herself; and the superior courts
award of costs and fees to Alaska Airlines.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standards of Review
This court review[s] the trial courts factual findings
. . . under a clearly erroneous standard. A finding is clearly
erroneous if it leaves this court with a definite and firm
conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made.4 A
motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo.5 The denial of a motion
for leave to amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.6 A motion to reopen discovery is also reviewed for
abuse of discretion,7 as is the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion.8
The refusal by a judge to be recused from a case is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.9 In each of these instances, the court
will find an abuse of discretion when we are left with a definite
and firm conviction after reviewing the whole record that the
trial court erred in its ruling.10 Finally, [a]n award of
attorneys fees will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of
discretion or a showing that the award is manifestly
unreasonable.11
B. The Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in Favor
of Alaska Airlines on Hallams Claim Relating to
Unrestricted Tickets.
Hallam claims that he purchased a ticket labeled
unrestricted or U, which Alaska Airlines held out as requiring no
fee to change the dates of travel. The airline, he alleges,
breached a contract with him when it refused to change the dates
without a fee.12 The superior court found for the airline because
Hallam ha[d] not been denied unrestricted travel to date and, in
fact, has changed the tickets without charge. He therefore could
not show any breach.
Alaska Airlines argues that Hallam has not shown that
the U designation actually means that the ticket may be changed
without a fee, a claim Hallam goes to great lengths to dispute.
The superior courts finding on breach, however, is dispositive
if Hallam cannot show a breach of the terms as he describes them,
his claim must fail. And the courts finding that there was no
breach of those terms is fully supported by the evidence. The
record contains a Post Departure Information report (PDI),
showing all of the activity concerning the ticket in question.
The PDI shows that the change fee to which Hallam objects was
waived at least once. Although Hallam testified at trial that
his attempts to change the ticket or get a refund were met by
demands that he pay a fee, the superior court found that his
testimony was not credible. Because it is the function of the
trial court, not of this court, to judge witnesses credibility,13
this court must give due regard14 to the superior courts
credibility judgments. Hallam offers no documentation of any
failed attempts to change the ticket without a fee, nor any other
reason to believe that any contract term was breached.15 The
superior courts finding that there was no breach of contract was
not clearly erroneous and we affirm its judgment in favor of
Alaska Airlines on this claim.
C. The Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in Favor
of Alaska Airlines on Hallams Claim Relating to His
Ticket to Puerto Vallarta.
Hallam claims that he was charged more than once for a
single ticket to Puerto Vallarta that he purchased in August
1998. The cause of the double charge remains unexplained, but
that is immaterial. The superior court found that Hallam
suffered no damages as a result of the incident. The court
therefore concluded that no award of damages for this claim is
appropriate. These findings are well supported by the evidence.
Hallams credit card was billed $160.25 for the ticket
on September 22. It was charged again, for $190.32, on February
20. The PDI for the ticket indicates that these charges are for
the same ticket, as the ticket numbers associated with the two
transactions on the credit card statements both appear on the
PDI. On October 5, 1998, Hallam wrote to the credit card company
to dispute the $190 charge. His credit card was credited for
that amount on October 20.16 An August 1999 letter from the
credit card company says that Alaska Airlines asked to reinstate
the $190 charge. The letter gives Hallam an opportunity to
continue disputing the charge, but there is no evidence of how he
responded. By Hallams own admission, there is similarly no
evidence showing that the charge ever actually reappeared on a
bill. At trial, Hallam was unable to say whether the charge ever
reappeared on his credit card bill and if so, whether he paid it
or continued to contest it. He therefore did not prove that the
contract was ever breached. We affirm the superior courts
dismissal of this claim.
D. The Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in Favor
of Alaska Airlines on Hallams Claim Relating to His
Attempt To Use a PFD Ticket in Seattle.
Hallam claims that Alaska Airlines breached another
contract with him in March 1999 when it refused to honor a ticket
from Seattle to San Francisco that he purchased with a Permanent
Fund Dividend voucher. The airline acknowledges that it
prevented Hallam from boarding the flight, but defends its action
by claiming that the ticket had been purchased with a 1998
voucher and was good only for travel through December 15, 1998.
The superior court found that the ticket had expired, and that
there was therefore no breach of contract.
Hallam makes much of the fact that an Alaska Airlines
employee said in an affidavit that he attempted to board the
flight on March 9 while strong evidence argues that it happened
on March 8. The exact date of the incident is immaterial. If
the tickets expiration date was December 15, 1998, there was no
breach. The superior courts finding that the ticket had expired
is well supported by the evidence.
Hallam points to a notation on the PDI for the disputed
ticket, which states that it is good for travel through December
15, 1999. The airline explains this through the testimony of
employee Jeanne Hightower, who described how that notation would
have been generated. She explained that it was placed in the
tickets record because he made a change to the ticket in 1999,
and the res[ervation] agent has no idea what tickets he was
actually using. Once he got to the airport, the ticket agent
would have tried to confirm that it was a current ticket, and
found that it had expired.
Faced with the conflicting testimony, the trial court
disbelieved Hallams assertion that he thought the ticket was
still good in March 1999. The court held that he failed to prove
that it was more likely than not that he purchased a valid ticket
for the travel on the date in question. In a bench trial, the
judge is the trier of fact, determining the credibility of
witnesses and deciding how to weigh the evidence presented.17
Hallam gives us no reason to overturn the trial courts weighing
of the evidence. We therefore affirm the superior courts
judgment for Alaska Airlines on this claim.
E. The Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in Favor
of Alaska Airlines on the Bumping Claim.
Hallam claimed below that a contract was breached when
the airline refused on November 29, 1997 to seat him in first
class, despite his reservation. He does not challenge any of the
findings underlying the superior courts conclusion that he failed
to prove it is more likely than not he was ever promised a First
Class seat on the flight he alleges. These findings are
primarily credibility determinations the court found that he was
not credible in his claim of being denied First Class passage on
the flight of his choosing. Rather, it is more likely that
Hallam voluntarily changed his travel plans . . . . We find no
clear error in this determination and affirm the superior courts
judgment in favor of Alaska Airlines on this claim.
F. The Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in Favor
of Alaska Airlines on Hallams Claim Relating to the
Purported Overcharge for Tickets He Bought from the
Airlines Website.
Hallam claims that he was overcharged for tickets he
purchased through the Alaska Airlines website in June 1997. He
claims that the website advertised a total ticket price of $180
but his credit card was charged $697 for it. Alaska Airlines
refunded all but nine dollars of the difference. He has sued for
the nine dollars.
The superior court held that Hallam had not proved that
the charge on his credit card was a breach because he failed to
prove he was promised a fare at the [lower] rate he asserts. The
court based this conclusion on several factual findings, most of
which Hallam challenges. Most importantly, the court did not
believe Hallams testimony. Hallam, the court found, was not
particularly credible in his claim that he actually reserved or
purchased a ticket for the price he claimed. The superior court
also relied in part on the testimony of an Alaska Airlines
customer service employee who testified that her internal
investigation found no evidence confirming that . . . he reserved
at [the lower] fare or that Alaska Airlines even offered this
fare. The employee also testified that Hallams was the only
complaint of this sort that she heard. Finally, the court noted
that while federal law requires the publication of airline
prices, the official publication had no record of the price
Hallam claimed.
In evaluating Hallams testimony, the court relied on
his failure to present documentation of any ticket(s) or ticket
confirmation of any travel reserved or purchased at the alleged
fare. The court found that the documentation Hallam did produce
was a letter that he drafted that purported to duplicate a web
fare advertisement for travel at the lower rate. Hallam asserts
that the document in the record is in fact a printout of the web
page itself; Alaska Airlines makes no claim as to whether the
document is authentic or not. The authenticity of the document,
however, is immaterial. Even if it is authentic, it does not
establish Hallams claim. The document states: To proceed in
holding a reservation or purchasing Instant Travel, click
Continue. This shows only that Hallam saw the lower price. It
does not establish decisively that he purchased a ticket at the
lower price.
Hallam points out that the customer service employee
was at the top of a long chain and that all complaints would not
necessarily be communicated to her. The employee did, however,
testify that she would be surprised if [she] didnt hear about a
problem like his. The superior court was entitled to credit the
witness.18
Hallam attacks the superior courts reliance on the fact
that the official publication for airline fares had no record of
the fare Hallam claimed to have purchased. He compares the
prices offered on the website on a given day with those published
in the official publication for airline fares on the same day and
shows that the official publication does not always match the
website fares. This casts some doubt on the weight the superior
court should have given this evidence, but is insufficient to
undermine the superior courts conclusion that Hallam did not
purchase this fare.
Finally, Hallam points to the PDI for this ticket,
which appears to say that he received a refund due to an
incorrect Internet fare. This may suggest that someone at the
airline at one time thought that Hallam had been overcharged.
The superior court apparently found that other evidence
outweighed it, and decided that Hallam had not shown that he
bought the ticket at the lower fare. We ordinarily will not
disturb findings of fact made upon conflicting evidence.19 In
view of all the evidence and the superior courts findings, we are
not left with a definite and firm conviction on the entire record
that a mistake has been made.20 The superior courts findings are
not clearly erroneous and we therefore affirm its judgment in
favor of Alaska Airlines on this claim.
G. The Superior Court Properly Denied Hallams Motion for
Further Time Under Rule 56(f).
After Alaska Airlines filed its motion for summary
judgment, Hallam moved to reopen discovery. The court denied his
motion. Hallam now appeals that denial. He treats the superior
courts action as the denial of a motion under Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(f), claiming that he had the right to conduct
discovery to oppose summary judgment. The rule allows a party
opposing summary judgment to seek additional time to gather and
submit evidence to justify the partys opposition.21 Specifically,
when the party opposing summary judgment demonstrates to the
courts satisfaction that the party cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the partys
opposition, the court may choose one of two remedies it may
decline to grant summary judgment or it may grant a continuance.
Although the superior court denied Hallams Rule 56(f) motion, it
did not enter summary judgment against him on any of the
ticketing claims for which he claims he needed further discovery.
He therefore was not harmed by the denial of his Rule 56(f)
motion.
Hallam further claims that discovery should have been
reopened because Alaska Airlines failed to produce documents that
they were required to produce in the initial discovery period.22
Deciding whether or not to reopen discovery is within the trial
courts discretion, and is subject to harmless error review.23
Hallam only identifies two of the missing documents, neither of
which makes a case for reopening discovery.
The first concerns the Puerto Vallarta ticket. In its
summary judgment motion, the airline suggested that one of the
charges was for a ticket issued to Hallam himself; at a
deposition, an Alaska Airlines attorney suggested the extra
charge was for a ticket issued to one Anna Salyer. Hallam wants
the airline to produce documentation for these theories. As
described above, however, the question of how the extra charges
came to be on Hallams credit card is immaterial because Hallam
never proved he paid them. Any error associated with this
failure is harmless.24
The other example of missing documents Hallam provides
is the documentation surrounding the expired PFD ticket: if the
airline claims he exchanged a 1998 voucher for the original
ticket, he argues, it should have produced the voucher. Hallam
knew that the voucher would be subject to proof long before
Alaska Airlines filed its summary judgment motion. The voucher
was, in fact, part of his theory of the case. He could have
specifically requested the documentation or made a motion to
compel during discovery. The superior court was entirely
justified in determining that Hallams requests following the
summary judgment motion involve[d] discovery that could have (and
should have) been made long ago. The courts refusal to reopen
discovery at that time was not an abuse of discretion.
H. The Superior Court Properly Dismissed Hallams
Individual Claims Brought Under the Alaska Unfair Trade
Practices Act and Alaska Antitrust Law and Properly
Denied Hallam Leave To Amend His Complaint To Include
Them.
Hallams complaint includes both individual and class
claims based on alleged violations of state antitrust law and
the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The superior court dismissed
these claims on the ground that Hallam, as a pro se litigant,
could not represent the class; it held that the question whether
the unfair trade practices claims are preempted by federal law
was mooted by its class-representation decision. Hallam moved
for reconsideration in order to reinstate the individual aspect
of these claims. The court denied his motion without
explanation. The court then noted that [n]either Mr. Hallams
motion to amend nor the proposed amended complaint make clear how
the actions [Hallam alleged] violate the cited [statutory]
provisions. This order gave Hallam five days to submit a
statement explaining how the conduct alleged in his contract and
conversion claims violated the cited statutes. His response,
although it contains some language suggesting he may have
abandoned his motion to amend, detailed the actions he alleged
violated the statutes. The superior court denied the motion for
leave to amend for the reasons set forth in [its initial ruling],
the opposition memorandum by Alaska Airlines and the summary
judgment order entered on this date as it relates to preemption
of state statutory consumer protection claims related to airline
services. Hallam appeals both the dismissal of the individual
claims and the superior courts denial of leave to amend the
complaint to add them.
Even when the court concludes that no portion of the
action is maintainable as a class action, the individual
plaintiff[] may continue it on an individual basis . . . .25
Hallam claims that he should have been allowed to amend his
complaint to reinstate the individual claims after they were
dismissed along with the class claims. The superior court
correctly denied his motion for leave to amend because amendment
would be futile as the claims were clearly preempted by the
federal Airline Deregulation Act.26 [I]f the proposed change
clearly is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is
legally insufficient on its face, the court may deny leave to
amend.27
The federal statutes preemption provision provides that
a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier.28 The provision is
broadly preemptive,29 reaching any state laws or enforcement
actions having a connection with or reference to airline rates,
routes, or services.30 In American Airlines v. Wolens, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act
preempted a claim under the Illinois analog to the Unfair Trade
Practices Act challenging an airlines changes to its frequent-
flier program.31 Wolens requires an analysis of the particular
claims in question. Here, Hallams claims plainly relate to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier. He challenges the
airlines policy of classifying tickets as refundable or non-
refundable; he challenges the airlines policy of overbooking
flights; and he challenges the terms included in all tickets,
relating to timetables, routes, departure and arrival times, and
fares. His Unfair Trade Practices Act claims are preempted and
the superior court properly denied him leave to add them.
Hallams antitrust claims are similarly preempted. He
argues under AS 45.50.562 and AS 45.50.564 that Alaska Airlines
has attempted to contract, conspire, and combine with other
airlines to monopolize air travel in this region and restrain[]
free trade. He does not describe how this restraint of trade and
monopoly manifest themselves, despite the superior courts order
requiring him to state the facts underlaying the claims. It is
hard to imagine that they do not relate to airline rates, routes,
or services. We assume that these claims resemble those in the
rest of his complaint, all of which involve the airlines
ticketing, ticket pricing, or boarding procedures and would be
preempted if made the subject of an antitrust charge. Hallam
waived his opportunity to convince the superior court otherwise
when he failed to take the opportunity for clarification offered
to him by the court. The superior court properly held his
antitrust claims were preempted and refused to grant him leave to
amend his complaint.
I. The Superior Court Properly Refused Recusal.
Hallam asserts that Judge Collins should have recused
herself because [t]he evidence on record is overwhelming in
showing a bias on her part. He also refers, without
documentation, to statements Judge Collins made at the pretrial
conference regarding her failure to administratively transfer
this case when she dismissed the class claims, as a result of the
dollar value involved. He finally refers to an incident
involving another, unrelated case before Judge Collins, Hallam v.
Alaska Travel Adventures, in which, he alleges, Judge Collins
went out of her way to interfere with production of the
electronic record in th[at] case.
Recusal was never intended to enable a discontented
litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings made.32 Judge
Collins gave Hallam many chances to clarify motions and prove his
case. The fact that he did not prove it does not show bias on her
part. His claim is little more than an expression of [his]
dissatisfaction with the superior courts ruling[s].33 There was
no abuse of discretion in Judge Collinss decision to remain on
the case.
J. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Awarding Fees and Costs to Alaska Airlines.
Hallam makes a cursory argument that Alaska Airlines
should not have been awarded fees and costs because they failed
to respond honestly to requests for admissions. He identifies no
specific failures or dishonesty. Even giving this argument the
liberal reading due pro se plaintiffs, we find no abuse of
discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the superior
court is AFFIRMED in its entirety.
_______________________________
1 AS 45.50.471.
2 AS 45.50.562, 564.
3 49 U.S.C. 41713.
4 City of Hydaburg v. Hydaburg Co-op. Assn, 858 P.2d
1131, 1135 (Alaska 1993) (quotation marks omitted).
5 McElroy v. Kennedy, 74 P.3d 903, 906 (Alaska 2003).
6 Taylor v. Johnston, 985 P.2d 460, 463 (Alaska 1999).
7 Id.
8 Gamble v. Northstore Partnership, 907 P.2d 477, 485
(Alaska 1995).
9 Jourdan v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., 42 P.3d 1072,
1082 (Alaska 2002); see also AS 22.20.020.
10 Taylor, 985 P.2d at 463 (quotation marks omitted).
11 Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Alaska
1995).
12 Hallam pled several of his claims as both contract and
conversion claims, but only discusses them before this court in
contract terms.
13 Parker v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, 892
(Alaska 1988).
14 Barios v. Brooks Range Supply, Inc., 26 P.3d 1082, 1085
(Alaska 2001).
15 Nor is there any indication that any breach is
forthcoming.
16 The evidence of this credit is what appears to be a
letter from the credit card company or an intermediary to Alaska
Airlines. There is no credit card bill showing the credit, but
Hallam does not on appeal dispute that the amount was credited.
17 Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1166-67 (Alaska
2002).
18 See id.
19 In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 625 (Alaska 2001).
20 City of Hydaburg, 858 P.2d at 1135 (quotation marks
omitted).
21 Gamble v. Northstore Partnership, 907 P.2d 477, 484-85
(Alaska 1995).
22 Hallam also raises the airlines failure to produce
certain documents as a distinct point on appeal. He did not,
however, make any motion before the superior court to compel
production of these missing documents. Without a motion to
compel, there is no decision for this court to review. We
therefore consider this argument only in the context of his
motion to reopen discovery.
23 Taylor v. Johnston, 985 P.2d 460, 466 (Alaska 1999).
24 See Walden v. Dept of Transp., State, 27 P.3d 297, 307-
08 (Alaska 2001).
25 7B Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure
1785, at 117; see also Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112 (9th
Cir. 1972) (Nothing in Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P. contemplates that an
action shall be dismissed if the court determines that it cannot
be maintained as a class action. In all actions, whether
determined to be class actions or not, there are individuals who
bring the action asserting claims for relief in their own
behalf.).
26 49 U.S.C. 41713.
27 Taylor, 985 P.2d at 464 (quoting 6 Wright, Miller &
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 1487 (2d ed.1990)).
28 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1).
29 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 225
(1995); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
374, 383-84 (1992) (analogizing Airline Deregulation Act
preemption to broad scope and expansive sweep of preemption under
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1144(a)).
30 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (citation omitted).
31 513 U.S. at 226-28.
32 Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1171 (Alaska
2002) (citation omitted).
33 Lacher v. Lacher, 993 P.2d 413, 421 (Alaska 1999).
