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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (05/21/2004) sp-5809

Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (05/21/2004) sp-5809

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,


                              )    Supreme Court No. S-10198
             Appellant,            )
                              )    Superior Court No.
     v.                       )    1JU-99-00928 CI
ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,        )    O P I N I O N
             Appellee.             )    [No. 5809 - May 21, 2004]

          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of  Alaska, First Judicial District,  Juneau,
          Patricia A. Collins, Judge.

          Appearances:   Stuart Aaron Hallam,  pro  se,
          Juneau, Appellant.  James N. Leik and  Helena
          L.  Hall,  Perkins Coie LLP,  Anchorage,  and
          Douglas  S.  Parker, Preston Gates  &  Ellis,
          Anchorage, for Appellee.

          Before:  Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, and
          Fabe,  Justices.   [Eastaugh  and  Carpeneti,
          Justices, not participating.]

          FABE, Justice.


          This  appeal is the culmination of a series of customer

service  disputes  between  Stuart Hallam  and  Alaska  Airlines.

Hallam  sued  the  airline, alleging that  by  failing  to  honor

various  terms  of  his plane tickets, it breached  a  series  of

contracts.   He also alleged, on behalf of a class of passengers,

that  the  airlines  standard ticket terms and  policies  violate

Alaskas  Unfair  Trade  Practices Act and  state  antitrust  law.

After  a bench trial, the superior court ruled in favor of Alaska

Airlines  on  all  counts,  and  Hallam  appeals.   Most  of  his

arguments  on  appeal  challenge  the  superior  courts   factual

findings,  which  we  conclude were not  clearly  erroneous.   We

therefore affirm the superior court.


     A.   Factual History

          Hallams claims are based on several transactions he had

with  Alaska  Airlines.  The bulk of his  appeal  is  devoted  to

challenging  the factual findings supporting the superior  courts

judgment  on  these  claims.  We outline the incidents  here  and

describe them in greater detail as we examine each in Parts III.B-

F below.

          First,  Hallam  claims  that he purchased  from  Alaska

Airliness  website a ticket labeled unrestricted that turned  out

to  be  restricted.   Believing that he could change  the  ticket

without incurring a fee, he attempted to change his travel dates,

but was told that he would be charged.  The fee was later waived,

but  Hallam chose not to use the ticket.  In the second incident,

Hallam  bought a ticket to fly to Puerto Vallarta.  Two  charges,

for  differing amounts, appeared on his credit card  bills.   The

greater  of  the  two charges was credited back to  him.   Later,

Hallam  was  informed that the charge was being  reinstated,  but

that  he  could  continue to contest it.  In the third  incident,

Hallam  attempted to use a Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD)  voucher

to  purchase  a  ticket to fly from Seattle to  Juneau.   At  the

Seattle airport, Hallam was informed that his voucher had expired

and  that  he would have to purchase his ticket some  other  way.

Fourth,  Hallam claimed below that he was denied  a  first  class

seat for which he had a reserved ticket.  He therefore chose  not

to take the flight; he claimed that the denial of the first class

seat  was a breach.  Finally, Hallam purchased a pair of  tickets

from  the  airlines website.  He claims that he  was  charged  an

amount  much greater than what appeared on the screen, and called

the  airline  to  complain.  The airline refunded  all  but  nine

dollars of the alleged overcharge.

     B.   Procedural History

          Hallams Second Amended Complaint was filed January  18,

2000.   He  brought  a series of contract and  conversion  claims

based  on  the  incidents described above and  defamation  claims

arising  from  one of his more energetic encounters  with  Alaska

Airlines  personnel, along with both class and individual  claims

under  the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices Act1 and state antitrust

law.2   On March 7, 2000, the superior court dismissed the unfair

trade  practices and antitrust claims on the ground that  Hallam,

as a pro se litigant, could not represent the class.  The complex

procedural history of these claims is laid out in Part  F  below.

In  short,  Hallam moved for reconsideration of the dismissal  of

his individual claims.  When reconsideration was denied, he moved

to  amend his complaint to reinstate his individual unfair  trade

practices  and  antitrust claims.  The superior court  eventually

denied  this  motion in November 2000, citing federal  preemption

under the Airline Deregulation Act3 as grounds for rejecting  the


          Meanwhile, discovery closed on May 1, 2000 and in  June

and  July  the parties filed cross-motions for summary  judgment.

Upon  receiving  Alaska  Airliness summary  judgment  memorandum,

Hallam  moved  on  August  22  to  reopen  discovery  and  for  a

continuance  under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f),  arguing

that  the  airlines motion evidenced both document tampering  and

perjury.   After  the  superior court gave  Hallam  a  chance  to

explain  what  he  was looking for, it denied  the  motion.   The

superior  court then granted Alaska Airlines summary judgment  on

some  of  the  defamation claims, based on statute of limitations

and privilege grounds, and on Hallams failure to present evidence

that  one  of the allegedly defamatory statements was  published.

On all other claims, the superior court declined to enter summary

judgment.  The case was tried to the bench before Judge  Patricia

A.  Collins,  who  had  handled the  case  throughout.   In  late

          November, and in March 2001 the superior court entered findings

of  fact  and conclusions of law, finding for Alaska Airlines  on

all claims.  Hallam moved for reconsideration, and the motion was

denied.  Final judgment was entered in April 2001, at which  time

the  superior  court awarded fees and costs to  Alaska  Airlines.

Hallam made several further motions for reconsideration or relief

from  the judgment,  including one asking Judge Collins to recuse

herself if the court cannot be unbiased and impartial.  All  were


          Hallam appeals to this court challenging:  the superior

courts  factual  findings  on  claims  concerning  the  incidents

described  above; the superior courts dismissal of his individual

Unfair Trade Practices Act and antitrust claims and its denial of

his  motion to amend his complaint to add those claims after they

were  dismissed; the superior courts refusal to reopen discovery;

Judge Collinss failure to recuse herself; and the superior courts

award of costs and fees to Alaska Airlines.


     A.   Standards of Review

          This  court review[s] the trial courts factual findings

.  .  . under a clearly erroneous standard.  A finding is clearly

erroneous  if  it  leaves this court with  a  definite  and  firm

conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made.4  A

motion  to dismiss is reviewed de novo.5  The denial of a  motion

for  leave  to  amend  a  complaint  is  reviewed  for  abuse  of

discretion.6   A motion to reopen discovery is also reviewed  for

abuse  of  discretion,7 as is the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion.8

The  refusal by a judge to be recused from a case is reviewed for

an  abuse of discretion.9  In each of these instances, the  court

will find an abuse of discretion when we are left with a definite

and  firm  conviction after reviewing the whole record  that  the

trial  court  erred  in  its ruling.10  Finally,  [a]n  award  of

attorneys fees will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of

discretion   or   a   showing  that  the  award   is   manifestly


     B.   The  Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in  Favor
          of   Alaska  Airlines  on  Hallams  Claim  Relating  to
          Unrestricted Tickets.
          Hallam  claims  that  he  purchased  a  ticket  labeled

unrestricted or U, which Alaska Airlines held out as requiring no

fee  to  change  the dates of travel.  The airline,  he  alleges,

breached a contract with him when it refused to change the  dates

without a fee.12  The superior court found for the airline because

Hallam ha[d] not been denied unrestricted travel to date and,  in

fact, has changed the tickets without charge.  He therefore could

not show any breach.

          Alaska  Airlines argues that Hallam has not shown  that

the  U  designation actually means that the ticket may be changed

without  a fee, a claim Hallam goes to great lengths to  dispute.

The  superior  courts finding on breach, however, is  dispositive

if Hallam cannot show a breach of the terms as he describes them,

his  claim must fail.  And the courts finding that there  was  no

breach  of  those terms is fully supported by the evidence.   The

record  contains  a  Post  Departure  Information  report  (PDI),

showing  all  of the activity concerning the ticket in  question.

The  PDI   shows that the change fee to which Hallam objects  was

waived  at  least once.  Although Hallam testified at trial  that

his  attempts to change the ticket or get a refund  were  met  by

demands  that  he pay a fee,  the superior court found  that  his

testimony  was not credible.  Because it is the function  of  the

trial court, not of this court, to judge witnesses credibility,13

this  court  must  give  due  regard14  to  the  superior  courts

credibility  judgments.  Hallam offers no  documentation  of  any

failed attempts to change the ticket without a fee, nor any other

reason  to  believe that any contract term was  breached.15   The

superior courts finding that there was no breach of contract  was

not  clearly  erroneous and we affirm its judgment  in  favor  of

Alaska Airlines on this claim.

     C.   The  Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in  Favor
          of  Alaska  Airlines on Hallams Claim Relating  to  His
     Ticket to Puerto Vallarta.
          Hallam claims that he was charged more than once for  a

single  ticket  to  Puerto Vallarta that he purchased  in  August

1998.   The  cause of the double charge remains unexplained,  but

that  is  immaterial.   The  superior court  found  that   Hallam

suffered  no  damages  as a result of the  incident.   The  court

therefore  concluded that no award of damages for this  claim  is

appropriate.  These findings are well supported by the evidence.

          Hallams  credit card was billed $160.25 for the  ticket

on  September 22.  It was charged again, for $190.32, on February

20.   The PDI for the ticket indicates that these charges are for

the  same ticket, as the ticket numbers associated with  the  two

transactions  on the credit card statements both  appear  on  the

PDI.  On October 5, 1998, Hallam wrote to the credit card company

to  dispute  the $190 charge.  His credit card was  credited  for

that  amount  on  October 20.16  An August 1999 letter  from  the

credit  card company says that Alaska Airlines asked to reinstate

the  $190  charge.   The letter gives Hallam  an  opportunity  to

continue disputing the charge, but there is no evidence of how he

responded.   By  Hallams  own admission, there  is  similarly  no

evidence  showing that the charge ever actually reappeared  on  a

bill.  At trial, Hallam was unable to say whether the charge ever

reappeared on his credit card bill and if so, whether he paid  it

or  continued to contest it.  He therefore did not prove that the

contract  was  ever  breached.  We  affirm  the  superior  courts

dismissal of this claim.

     D.   The  Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in  Favor
          of  Alaska  Airlines on Hallams Claim Relating  to  His
          Attempt To Use a PFD Ticket in Seattle.
          Hallam  claims  that Alaska Airlines  breached  another

contract with him in March 1999 when it refused to honor a ticket

from  Seattle to San Francisco that he purchased with a Permanent

Fund   Dividend  voucher.   The  airline  acknowledges  that   it

prevented Hallam from boarding the flight, but defends its action

by  claiming  that  the  ticket had been purchased  with  a  1998

          voucher and was good only for travel through December 15, 1998.

The  superior court found that the ticket had expired,  and  that

there was therefore no breach of contract.

          Hallam  makes much of the fact that an Alaska  Airlines

employee  said  in an affidavit that he attempted  to  board  the

flight  on March 9 while strong evidence argues that it  happened

on  March  8.  The exact date of the incident is immaterial.   If

the  tickets expiration date was December 15, 1998, there was  no

breach.   The superior courts finding that the ticket had expired

is well supported by the evidence.

          Hallam points to a notation on the PDI for the disputed

ticket,  which states that it is good for travel through December

15,  1999.   The airline explains this through the  testimony  of

employee Jeanne Hightower, who described how that notation  would

have  been  generated.  She explained that it was placed  in  the

tickets  record because he made a change to the ticket  in  1999,

and  the  res[ervation] agent has no idea  what  tickets  he  was

actually  using.   Once he got to the airport, the  ticket  agent

would  have  tried to confirm that it was a current  ticket,  and

found that it had expired.

          Faced  with the conflicting testimony, the trial  court

disbelieved  Hallams  assertion that he thought  the  ticket  was

still good in March 1999.  The court held that he failed to prove

that it was more likely than not that he purchased a valid ticket

for  the  travel on the date in question.  In a bench trial,  the

judge  is  the  trier  of fact, determining  the  credibility  of

witnesses  and  deciding how to weigh the  evidence  presented.17

Hallam  gives us no reason to overturn the trial courts  weighing

of  the  evidence.   We  therefore  affirm  the  superior  courts

judgment for Alaska Airlines on this claim.

     E.   The  Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in  Favor
          of Alaska Airlines on the Bumping Claim.
          Hallam claimed below that a contract was breached  when

the  airline  refused on November 29, 1997 to seat him  in  first

class, despite his reservation.  He does not challenge any of the

          findings underlying the superior courts conclusion that he failed

to  prove it is more likely than not he was ever promised a First

Class  seat  on  the  flight  he  alleges.   These  findings  are

primarily credibility determinations  the court found that he was

not credible in his claim of being denied First Class passage  on

the  flight  of  his choosing.  Rather, it is  more  likely  that

Hallam  voluntarily changed his travel plans . . . .  We find  no

clear  error in this determination and affirm the superior courts

judgment in favor of Alaska Airlines on this claim.

     F.   The  Superior Court Properly Entered Judgment in  Favor
          of  Alaska  Airlines on Hallams Claim Relating  to  the
          Purported  Overcharge for Tickets He  Bought  from  the
          Airlines Website.
          Hallam  claims that he was overcharged for  tickets  he

purchased through the Alaska Airlines website in June  1997.   He

claims  that the website advertised a total ticket price of  $180

but  his  credit  card was charged $697 for it.  Alaska  Airlines

refunded all but nine dollars of the difference.  He has sued for

the nine dollars.

          The superior court held that Hallam had not proved that

the  charge on his credit card was a breach because he failed  to

prove he was promised a fare at the [lower] rate he asserts.  The

court based this conclusion on several factual findings, most  of

which  Hallam  challenges.  Most importantly, the court  did  not

believe  Hallams  testimony.  Hallam, the court  found,  was  not

particularly credible in his claim that he actually  reserved  or

purchased a ticket for the price he claimed.  The superior  court

also  relied  in  part  on the testimony of  an  Alaska  Airlines

customer   service  employee  who  testified  that  her  internal

investigation found no evidence confirming that . . . he reserved

at  [the  lower] fare or that Alaska Airlines even  offered  this

fare.   The  employee also testified that Hallams  was  the  only

complaint of this sort that she heard.  Finally, the court  noted

that  while  federal  law  requires the  publication  of  airline

prices,  the  official publication had no  record  of  the  price

Hallam claimed.

          In  evaluating Hallams testimony, the court  relied  on

his  failure to present documentation of any ticket(s) or  ticket

confirmation of any travel reserved or purchased at  the  alleged

fare.   The court found that the documentation Hallam did produce

was  a  letter that he drafted that purported to duplicate a  web

fare  advertisement for travel at the lower rate.  Hallam asserts

that the document in the record is in fact a printout of the  web

page  itself;  Alaska Airlines makes no claim as to  whether  the

document  is authentic or not.  The authenticity of the document,

however,  is  immaterial.  Even if it is authentic, it  does  not

establish  Hallams claim.  The document states:   To  proceed  in

holding  a  reservation  or  purchasing  Instant  Travel,   click

Continue.   This shows only that Hallam saw the lower price.   It

does  not establish decisively that he purchased a ticket at  the

lower price.

          Hallam  points  out that the customer service  employee

was  at the top of a long chain and that all complaints would not

necessarily  be communicated to her.  The employee did,  however,

testify  that she would be surprised if [she] didnt hear about  a

problem like his.  The superior court was entitled to credit  the


          Hallam attacks the superior courts reliance on the fact

that the official publication for airline fares had no record  of

the  fare  Hallam  claimed to have purchased.   He  compares  the

prices offered on the website on a given day with those published

in the official publication for airline fares on the same day and

shows  that  the official publication does not always  match  the

website  fares.  This casts some doubt on the weight the superior

court  should  have given this evidence, but is  insufficient  to

undermine  the  superior courts conclusion that  Hallam  did  not

purchase this fare.

           Finally,  Hallam  points to the PDI for  this  ticket,

which  appears  to  say  that he received  a  refund  due  to  an

     incorrect Internet fare.  This may suggest that someone at the

airline  at  one  time thought that Hallam had been  overcharged.

The   superior   court  apparently  found  that  other   evidence

outweighed  it,  and decided that Hallam had not  shown  that  he

bought  the  ticket  at the lower fare.  We ordinarily  will  not

disturb  findings of fact made upon conflicting  evidence.19   In

view of all the evidence and the superior courts findings, we are

not left with a definite and firm conviction on the entire record

that a mistake has been made.20  The superior courts findings are

not  clearly  erroneous and we therefore affirm its  judgment  in

favor of Alaska Airlines on this claim.

     G.   The  Superior Court Properly Denied Hallams Motion  for
          Further Time Under Rule 56(f).
          After  Alaska  Airlines filed its  motion  for  summary

judgment, Hallam moved to reopen discovery.  The court denied his

motion.   Hallam now appeals that denial.  He treats the superior

courts  action  as the denial of a motion under  Alaska  Rule  of

Civil  Procedure 56(f), claiming that he had the right to conduct

discovery  to oppose summary judgment.  The rule allows  a  party

opposing  summary judgment to seek additional time to gather  and

submit evidence to justify the partys opposition.21  Specifically,

when  the  party  opposing summary judgment demonstrates  to  the

courts  satisfaction  that the party cannot  for  reasons  stated

present  by  affidavit  facts essential  to  justify  the  partys

opposition,  the  court may choose one of two  remedies   it  may

decline  to grant summary judgment or it may grant a continuance.

Although the superior court denied Hallams Rule 56(f) motion,  it

did  not  enter  summary  judgment against  him  on  any  of  the

ticketing claims for which he claims he needed further discovery.

He  therefore  was  not harmed by the denial of  his  Rule  56(f)


          Hallam  further claims that discovery should have  been

reopened because Alaska Airlines failed to produce documents that

they  were required to produce in the initial discovery period.22

Deciding  whether or not to reopen discovery is within the  trial

          courts discretion, and is subject to harmless error review.23

Hallam  only identifies two of the missing documents, neither  of

which makes a case for reopening discovery.

          The  first concerns the Puerto Vallarta ticket.  In its

summary  judgment motion, the airline suggested that one  of  the

charges  was  for  a  ticket  issued  to  Hallam  himself;  at  a

deposition,  an  Alaska  Airlines attorney  suggested  the  extra

charge was for a ticket issued to one Anna Salyer.  Hallam  wants

the  airline  to  produce documentation for these  theories.   As

described  above, however, the question of how the extra  charges

came  to  be on Hallams credit card is immaterial because  Hallam

never  proved  he  paid  them.  Any error  associated  with  this

failure is harmless.24

          The  other example of missing documents Hallam provides

is  the documentation surrounding the expired PFD ticket:  if the

airline  claims  he  exchanged a 1998 voucher  for  the  original

ticket,  he argues, it should have produced the voucher.   Hallam

knew  that  the  voucher would be subject to  proof  long  before

Alaska  Airlines filed its summary judgment motion.  The  voucher

was,  in  fact,  part of his theory of the case.  He  could  have

specifically  requested the documentation or  made  a  motion  to

compel   during  discovery.   The  superior  court  was  entirely

justified  in  determining that Hallams  requests  following  the

summary judgment motion involve[d] discovery that could have (and

should  have) been made long ago.  The courts refusal  to  reopen

discovery at that time was not an abuse of discretion.

     H.   The   Superior   Court   Properly   Dismissed   Hallams
          Individual Claims Brought Under the Alaska Unfair Trade
          Practices  Act  and Alaska Antitrust Law  and  Properly
          Denied  Hallam Leave To Amend His Complaint To  Include
          Hallams  complaint includes both individual  and  class

claims  based on alleged violations of state antitrust  law   and

the  Unfair  Trade Practices Act.  The superior  court  dismissed

these  claims  on the ground that Hallam, as a pro  se  litigant,

could  not represent the class; it held that the question whether

the  unfair  trade practices claims are preempted by federal  law

was  mooted  by its class-representation decision.  Hallam  moved

for  reconsideration in order to reinstate the individual  aspect

of   these   claims.   The  court  denied  his   motion   without

explanation.   The  court then noted that [n]either  Mr.  Hallams

motion to amend nor the proposed amended complaint make clear how

the  actions  [Hallam  alleged]  violate  the  cited  [statutory]

provisions.   This  order  gave Hallam  five  days  to  submit  a

statement explaining how the conduct alleged in his contract  and

conversion  claims  violated the cited statutes.   His  response,

although  it  contains  some  language  suggesting  he  may  have

abandoned  his motion to amend, detailed the actions  he  alleged

violated the statutes.  The superior court denied the motion  for

leave to amend for the reasons set forth in [its initial ruling],

the  opposition  memorandum by Alaska Airlines  and  the  summary

judgment  order entered on this date as it relates to  preemption

of  state statutory consumer protection claims related to airline

services.   Hallam appeals both the dismissal of  the  individual

claims  and  the  superior courts denial of leave  to  amend  the

complaint to add them.

          Even  when the court concludes that no portion  of  the

action   is  maintainable  as  a  class  action,  the  individual

plaintiff[]  may continue it on an individual basis  .  .  .  .25

Hallam  claims  that  he should have been allowed  to  amend  his

complaint  to  reinstate the individual claims  after  they  were

dismissed  along  with  the  class claims.   The  superior  court

correctly  denied his motion for leave to amend because amendment

would  be  futile  as the claims were clearly  preempted  by  the

federal  Airline  Deregulation Act.26  [I]f the  proposed  change

          clearly is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is

legally  insufficient on its face, the court may  deny  leave  to


          The federal statutes preemption provision provides that

a  State  .  .  . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,  or

other provision having the force and effect of law related  to  a

price,  route, or service of an air carrier.28  The provision  is

broadly  preemptive,29  reaching any state  laws  or  enforcement

actions  having a connection with or reference to airline  rates,

routes, or services.30  In American Airlines v. Wolens, the United

States  Supreme  Court  held that the  Airline  Deregulation  Act

preempted  a claim under the Illinois analog to the Unfair  Trade

Practices  Act  challenging an airlines changes to its  frequent-

flier  program.31  Wolens requires an analysis of the  particular

claims  in  question.  Here, Hallams claims plainly relate  to  a

price,  route,  or service of an air carrier.  He challenges  the

airlines  policy  of  classifying tickets as refundable  or  non-

refundable;  he  challenges the airlines  policy  of  overbooking

flights;  and  he challenges the terms included in  all  tickets,

relating to timetables, routes, departure and arrival times,  and

fares.   His Unfair Trade Practices Act claims are preempted  and

the superior court properly denied him leave to add them.

          Hallams  antitrust claims are similarly preempted.   He

argues  under AS 45.50.562 and AS 45.50.564 that Alaska  Airlines

has  attempted  to  contract, conspire, and  combine  with  other

airlines  to monopolize air travel in this region and  restrain[]

free trade.  He does not describe how this restraint of trade and

monopoly  manifest themselves, despite the superior courts  order

requiring him to state the facts underlaying the claims.   It  is

hard to imagine that they do not relate to airline rates, routes,

or  services.  We assume that these claims resemble those in  the

rest  of  his  complaint,  all  of  which  involve  the  airlines

ticketing,  ticket pricing, or boarding procedures and  would  be

preempted  if  made the subject of an antitrust  charge.   Hallam

          waived his opportunity to convince the superior court otherwise

when  he failed to take the opportunity for clarification offered

to  him  by  the  court.  The superior court  properly  held  his

antitrust claims were preempted and refused to grant him leave to

amend his complaint.

     I.   The Superior Court Properly Refused Recusal.

          Hallam  asserts that Judge Collins should have  recused

herself  because  [t]he  evidence on record  is  overwhelming  in

showing   a   bias   on  her  part.   He  also  refers,   without

documentation, to statements Judge Collins made at  the  pretrial

conference  regarding  her  failure to administratively  transfer

this case when she dismissed the class claims, as a result of the

dollar   value  involved.   He  finally  refers  to  an  incident

involving another, unrelated case before Judge Collins, Hallam v.

Alaska  Travel  Adventures, in which, he alleges,  Judge  Collins

went  out  of  her  way  to  interfere  with  production  of  the

electronic record in th[at] case.

          Recusal  was  never intended to enable  a  discontented

litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings made.32  Judge

Collins gave Hallam many chances to clarify motions and prove his

case. The fact that he did not prove it does not show bias on her

part.   His  claim  is  little more than an expression  of  [his]

dissatisfaction with the superior courts ruling[s].33  There  was

no  abuse  of discretion in Judge Collinss decision to remain  on

the case.

     J.   The  Superior  Court Did Not Abuse  Its  Discretion  in
          Awarding Fees and Costs to Alaska Airlines.
          Hallam  makes  a cursory argument that Alaska  Airlines

should  not have been awarded fees and costs because they  failed

to respond honestly to requests for admissions.  He identifies no

specific  failures or dishonesty.  Even giving this argument  the

liberal  reading  due  pro se plaintiffs, we  find  no  abuse  of



          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the superior

          court is AFFIRMED in its entirety.

     1    AS 45.50.471.

     2    AS 45.50.562, 564.

     3    49 U.S.C.  41713.

     4     City  of  Hydaburg v. Hydaburg Co-op. Assn,  858  P.2d
1131, 1135 (Alaska 1993) (quotation marks omitted).

     5    McElroy v. Kennedy, 74 P.3d 903, 906 (Alaska 2003).

     6    Taylor v. Johnston, 985 P.2d 460, 463 (Alaska 1999).

     7    Id.

     8     Gamble  v. Northstore Partnership, 907 P.2d  477,  485
(Alaska 1995).

     9     Jourdan  v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., 42 P.3d  1072,
1082 (Alaska 2002); see also AS 22.20.020.

     10    Taylor, 985 P.2d at 463 (quotation marks omitted).

     11     Feichtinger  v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266,  1268  (Alaska

     12    Hallam pled several of his claims as both contract and
conversion claims, but only discusses them before this  court  in
contract terms.

     13     Parker  v.  Northern Mixing Co., 756  P.2d  881,  892
(Alaska 1988).

     14    Barios v. Brooks Range Supply, Inc., 26 P.3d 1082, 1085
(Alaska 2001).

     15     Nor  is  there  any indication  that  any  breach  is

     16     The evidence of this credit is what appears to  be  a
letter  from the credit card company or an intermediary to Alaska
Airlines.   There is no credit card bill showing the credit,  but
Hallam does not on appeal dispute that the amount was credited.

     17    Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1166-67 (Alaska

     18    See id.

     19    In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 625 (Alaska 2001).

     20     City  of Hydaburg, 858 P.2d at 1135 (quotation  marks

     21    Gamble v. Northstore Partnership, 907 P.2d 477, 484-85
(Alaska 1995).

     22      Hallam  also raises the airlines failure to  produce
certain  documents as a distinct point on appeal.   He  did  not,
however,  make  any motion before the superior  court  to  compel
production  of   these missing documents.  Without  a  motion  to
compel,  there  is  no  decision for this court  to  review.   We
therefore  consider  this argument only in  the  context  of  his
motion to reopen discovery.

     23    Taylor v. Johnston, 985 P.2d 460, 466 (Alaska 1999).

     24    See Walden v. Dept of Transp., State, 27 P.3d 297, 307-
08 (Alaska 2001).

     25    7B Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure
  1785, at 117; see also Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112 (9th
Cir.  1972) (Nothing in Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P. contemplates that  an
action  shall be dismissed if the court determines that it cannot
be  maintained  as  a  class action.   In  all  actions,  whether
determined to be class actions or not, there are individuals  who
bring  the  action  asserting claims  for  relief  in  their  own

     26    49 U.S.C.  41713.

     27     Taylor, 985 P.2d at 464 (quoting 6 Wright,  Miller  &
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure  1487 (2d ed.1990)).

     28    49 U.S.C.  41713(b)(1).

     29     American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,  225
(1995); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504  U.S.
374,   383-84   (1992)  (analogizing  Airline  Deregulation   Act
preemption to broad scope and expansive sweep of preemption under
ERISA, 29 U.S.C.  1144(a)).

     30    Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (citation omitted).

     31    513 U.S. at 226-28.

     32     Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1171  (Alaska
2002) (citation omitted).

     33    Lacher v. Lacher, 993 P.2d 413, 421 (Alaska 1999).