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Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates (03/19/2004) sp-5789
Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates (03/19/2004) sp-5789
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
JERRY GUNTER, )
) Supreme Court No. S-10931
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-99-12483 CI
) 3AN-88-843 P/C
KATHY-O-ESTATES, et al., )
) O P I N I O N
Appellee. )
________________________________) [No. 5789 - March 19, 2004]
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Elaine M. Andrews, Judge.
Appearances: Jerry Gunter, pro se,
Anchorage. Allan E. Tesche, Russell, Tesche,
Wagg, Cooper & Gabbert, Anchorage, for
Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
I. Jerry E. Gunter was permanently and totally disabled by
a brain injury he suffered while working for Kathy-O-Estates.
Gunter and Kathy-O-Estates entered a compromise and release
agreement settling their dispute over Kathy-O-Estatess workers
compensation liability due to that injury. This case involves
Gunters attempt to overturn that agreement. The superior court
appointed the Community Advocacy Project of Alaska, Inc. as
Gunters guardian/conservator and gave it the power, which the
Community Advocacy Project then exercised, to dismiss Gunters
claims. Gunter also sought reimbursement for various costs
related to his brain injury. These claims were denied by the
Alaska Workers Compensation Board and this denial was upheld by
the superior court. We affirm the denial of Gunters
reimbursement claims because the Alaska Workers Compensation
Board correctly concluded that it lacked the authority to
reimburse Gunter for the financial consequences of his work-
related injury. We affirm the denial of Gunters attempt to
overturn the compromise and release because the superior court
properly vested Gunters guardian/conservator with the authority
to dismiss the claim on Gunters behalf.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Jerry E. Gunter suffered a severe head injury in a
traffic accident on April 4, 1988 while working for Kathy-O-
Estates, his parents business. He was permanently and totally
disabled as a result of the accident. Kathy-O-Estates and its
insurer, Firemans Fund Insurance Company, were liable for
benefits under the Alaska Workers Compensation Act. The parties1
agreed to settle the workers compensation disputes stemming from
the injury by entering into a partial Compromise and Release (C &
R). The C & R provided that Gunter would be paid $175 per week
for ten years and $200 per week after that. It was signed by
both Gunters guardian and his attorney, and was approved by the
board on November 18, 1992.
B. Proceedings
A. Gunter filed a workers compensation claim requesting that
the board overturn the C & R in July 1998. The board originally
refused to allow Gunter to proceed with his claim, ordering the
Community Advocacy Project of Alaska, Inc. (CAPA) to seek a court-
appointed guardian for Gunter. Gunter amended his complaint
attempting to overturn the C & R in 1999 and added a number of
claims against Kathy-O-Estates which have nothing to do with
medical treatment, rehabilitation, or disability benefits. These
claims included reimbursement for: a $500 fine imposed on him
for disorderly conduct; the costs of court-ordered alcohol and
drug testing and treatment; $500 in unpaid rent by one of his
roommates; $10,000 for theft by a roommate; $4,000 for a stolen
watch; and $6,000 for one-half of the value of his river boat.
The board concluded that Gunters claims were not compensable
under the Alaska Workers Compensation Act and, consequently, that
it lacked authority to impose liability for them on Kathy-O-
Estates. The board dismissed and denied all claims. Superior
Court Judge Elaine M. Andrews affirmed the boards denial of
Gunters reimbursement claims in February 2002, citing as
justification the reasons stated in [the boards] decision, and
based on the analysis contained in [Kathy-O-Estatess] brief.
The boards December 1999 opinion reaffirmed its earlier
refusal to allow Gunter to proceed with his attempt to overturn
the C & R unless he was represented by a court-appointed guardian
or other competent representative. In September 2001, after an
unsuccessful attempt to find counsel willing to represent Gunter,
the superior court appointed CAPA as Gunters
guardian/conservator. In January 2002 the superior court ordered
the board to dismiss all of Gunters pending claims, including his
challenge to the C & R, upon the filing with the board of a
stipulation by CAPA to dismiss Gunters claims. CAPA filed such a
stipulation and the board dismissed Gunters pending claims.2
Gunter, appearing pro se, appeals these decisions.3
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We independently review the merits of an administrative
boards decisions when the superior court is acting as an
intermediate court of appeal in an administrative matter.4
We have established that [i]n questions of law
involving an agencys expertise, a rational basis standard will be
applied and we will defer to the agencys jurisdiction as long as
it is reasonable.5 But we will use our independent judgment in
reviewing questions of law that do not involve an agencys
expertise.6 In applying our independent judgment we will adopt
the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent,
reason, and policy.7
We review the appointment of a limited guardian or
conservator for abuse of discretion.8 We review factual findings
involved in determining whether a guardian or conservator should
be appointed for clear error.9 We decide today that we will
review a wards challenge to the dismissal of his or her legal
claims by a guardian or conservator by determining whether the
ward presents a colorable legal claim.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Board Was Correct in Deciding that Gunters Claims
Seeking Reimbursement for a Court-Imposed Fine, Court-Ordered
Alcohol Treatment and Testing, Theft, Unpaid Rent, an Interest in
a Boat, and an Interest in Kathy-O-Estates Are Not Compensable.
A. Gunter claims that Kathy-O-Estates should reimburse him for
a court-imposed fine for disorderly conduct, related court-
ordered alcohol treatment and testing, rent that his roommates
failed to pay, money and a gold watch allegedly stolen by his
roommates, and a half-interest in a boat that he transferred to a
mechanic because he was unable to maintain the boat on his own.10
He contends that Kathy-O-Estates should be held liable for all of
these costs because none of them would have been incurred if his
brain had not been injured in his work-related accident; he
states that [m]y brain is broke in half from work. Therefore
[Kathy-O-Estates] is responsible for everything that I do or what
happen[s] to me. Specifically, he contends that he would not
have been convicted of disorderly conduct and ordered to pay the
associated fine and treatment costs if his brain had not been
injured. He also reasons that if he had not been injured, he
would not have been forced to live with roommates, and therefore
would have been spared their alleged thefts.
The board found that it had to dismiss Gunters claims
because it lacked legal authority to award the relief he
requested. It noted that it had no authority over Gunters
reimbursement claims because claims for expenses for court-
ordered alcohol abuse counseling, rent owed due from a former
roommate, thefts and damage by another roommate, alcohol and drug
testing, . . . one-half the value of a boat, and a stolen gold
watch are either criminal matters or claims for general civil
damages, not claims under specific provisions of the Alaska
Workers Compensation Act. The board was correct in concluding
that it can only adjudicate a dispute if the legislature has
granted it adjudicatory authority.11 Therefore, we determine
this issue by examining whether the board had authority over
Gunters claims. We find it unnecessary separately to address the
issue whether the board correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to interfere with criminal sanctions and penalties.
Instead, we affirm the boards dismissal of all of Gunters
reimbursement claims because those claims are not compensable
under the workers compensation act.12
The board was created by the act and its authority is
limited to the powers and duties prescribed by that act.13
Therefore, the board was empowered to grant Gunters reimbursement
claims only if his claims were compensable under the act. The
workers compensation act provides that employers are strictly
liable to their injured employees for medical treatment,
rehabilitation, and disability benefits.14 Gunters reimbursement
claims do not involve issues of medical treatment,
rehabilitation, or disability benefits.15 Because the board is
empowered to provide compensation under the act and because the
act does not provide a means of compensating employees for the
remote consequences of their injuries, such as those for which
Gunter seeks reimbursement, the board was correct in deciding
that it did not have the authority to grant Gunters requested
relief.
To the extent that Gunter was seeking reimbursement
outside of the structure provided by the workers compensation
act, the board was correct that the act immunized Kathy-O-
Estates from such civil liability. The act generally provides
the exclusive remedy for injured employees: Alaska Statute
23.30.05516 establishes that an employers workers compensation
liability, which the employer must pay irrespective of fault, is
the exclusive remedy for an employee injured during the course of
employment.17 This limited workers compensation remedy was made
exclusive for the benefit of both employers and employees:
The exclusiveness of the remedy reflects a
quid pro quo exchange of rights and
liabilities for both workers and employers.
Workers gain an assured remedy without the
burden of proving fault, but lose the right
to sue their employers in tort. Employers
gain relief from large tort damage awards and
enjoy an absolute limit on liability under
the Act, but are liable without fault for
injuries covered under the Act.[18]
The remedy provided by the act is exclusive, and employees
generally cannot obtain compensation outside of the system
provided by the act. Because Kathy-O-Estates provided workers
compensation benefits, the board was correct that Kathy-O-Estates
is immune from Gunters claims seeking to impose general civil
liability on it. Kathy-O-Estates is only liable for the benefits
provided by the act because Kathy-O-Estates is paying
compensation pursuant to AS 23.30.055 under the C & R. Gunters
claims are not compensable because the limited and exclusive
nature of workers compensation benefits precludes Gunter from
pursuing any claims for compensation beyond the wage-based
compensation provided by the act.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Allowing CAPA To Dismiss
Gunters Attempt To Overturn the C & R that Governed Kathy-O-
Estatess Workers Compensation Obligation to Him.
A. Gunter also challenges the 1992 C & R in which the parties
agreed that Kathy-O-Estates would pay Gunter $175 per week for
ten years and $200 per week after that. Gunter filed a claim
seeking to overturn the C & R on July 8, 1998. The board
initially determined, based on the opinion of Dr. Paul L. Craig,
that Gunter was not competent to represent himself in seeking to
overturn the C & R. It postponed ruling on Gunters attempt to
overturn the C & R because CAPA was attempting, pursuant to a
superior court order, to find an attorney to represent Gunter in
the matter. CAPA was unable to find an attorney willing to take
Gunters case, and the superior court appointed CAPA as Gunters
guardian/conservator to provide legally trained staff to
informally advise and assist Gunter in [these] proceedings. The
superior court ordered the board to dismiss all pending claims,
including Gunters challenge to the C & R, if CAPA filed a
stipulation to that effect. This stipulation was filed and the
board dismissed Gunters pending claims.19 Gunter appeals the
superior courts dismissal of his challenge to the C & R, and, by
implication, the superior courts decision allowing CAPA, as
Gunters guardian/conservator, to stipulate to the dismissal of
Gunters challenge to the C & R.
We must analyze Gunters appeal in light of the superior
court order denying Gunter the power to challenge the C & R
without the assistance of counsel or his guardian/conservator.
The order would appear to prevent Gunter from pursuing this
appeal. But we recognize that a ward must have some means of
contesting legal decisions made by his or her guardian. We
conclude that we should review a wards appeal of a tribunals
dismissal of his or her case pursuant to a guardians or
conservators decision to dismiss the case by determining whether
the ward presents a colorable, or plausible, claim.20 If the ward
presents such a claim, we will appoint counsel to assist the ward
in pursuing it. In this case, we would appoint counsel to assist
Gunter in pursuing his challenge to the C & R if he presented a
colorable claim that the superior court should not have allowed
CAPA to dismiss his attempt to overturn the C & R. Upon our
review of the record, we conclude that Gunters challenge to the
dismissal of the C & R is not colorable.21
In examining Gunters appeal of the dismissal of his
challenge to the C & R, the key question is whether the superior
court erred by granting CAPA the authority to dismiss Gunters
claims. We have established that a properly appointed
conservator has the authority to settle a lawsuit under AS
13.26.280(c)(19).22 Therefore, CAPAs dismissal of Gunters
challenge to the C & R can be challenged on only two grounds on
appeal: (1) that CAPA was improperly appointed as
guardian/conservator with authority over Gunters workers
compensation claims or (2) that CAPAs actions were unreasonable.
Because CAPA was properly appointed as guardian/conservator over
Gunters claims and because CAPAs actions with respect to those
claims were reasonable, Gunter does not have a plausible
challenge to the superior courts decision granting CAPA the
authority to dismiss Gunters claims and the resulting dismissal
of those claims.
1. CAPA was properly appointed as Gunters guardian/conservator
with authority over his claims seeking to overturn the C & R.
Gunter has a long history of guardianship and
conservatorship proceedings, and the superior courts order
appointing a guardian/conservator in September 2001 relies on
that history. Though guardianship and conservatorship
proceedings are quite similar, there are separate statutes
governing each appointment. Alaska Statute 13.26.165, which
governs the appointment of conservators, provides that:
[u]pon petition and after notice and hearing
in accordance with the provisions of AS
13.26.165-13.26.315, the court may appoint a
conservator or make other protective order
for cause as follows:
. . . .
(2) appointment of a conservator or other
protective order may be made in relation to
the estate and affairs of a person if the
court determines that
(A) the person is unable to manage the
persons property and affairs effectively for
reasons such as mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability .
. . and
(B) the person has property which will
be wasted or dissipated unless proper
management is provided . . .
Likewise, AS 13.26.113(e), which governs the appointment of
guardians, provides that after a hearing,
[i]f it is found that the respondent is able
to perform some, but not all functions
necessary to care for the respondent, and
alternatives to guardianship are not feasible
or adequate to provide for the needs of the
respondent, the court may appoint a partial
guardian, but may not appoint a full
guardian.
The partial guardians authority is limited to the powers and
duties respecting the ward enumerated in the court order.23
It is apparent from the record that CAPAs authority to
dismiss Gunters claims for him was properly established in a
manner that protected Gunters rights under either the
guardianship or conservatorship statutes. In its September 2001
order, the superior court modified Gunters existing guardianship
order to make CAPA Gunters temporary, partial
guardian/conservator [f]or the purposes of advising and assisting
Mr. Gunter in all administrative proceedings before the [board].
The superior court order specifically granted CAPA the authority
to allow those proceedings to continue, engage in settlement
negotiations and enter into binding settlement agreements on Mr.
Gunters behalf, or dismiss those actions on behalf of Mr. Gunter
where CAPA determines that such action is in his best interests.
The superior court held a hearing, at which Gunter was
represented by an attorney and had the benefit of a court-
appointed visitor.24 The superior court based its appointment of
CAPA, for the limited purpose of protecting Gunters workers
compensation benefits, on the complexity of these proceedings and
the severity of Mr. Gunters injury. The determination that these
proceedings were too complex for Gunter to manage on account of
his brain injury is supported by a significant amount of evidence
establishing the severity of Gunters injury. Gunter himself
establishes that his injury has left him unable to understand the
C & R, stating that [a]ll I understand about [the] compensation
rate is work me for life. I have not understood at all
compensation rate. The superior court cannot be said to have
committ[ed] clear error in accepting the evidence as clear and
convincing proof of [Gunters] inability to manage his property
and affairs effectively.25 Accordingly, the superior court did
not abuse its discretion in appointing CAPA to protect Gunters
workers compensation benefits.26 Therefore, Gunter does not
present a colorable claim that the superior court erred by
granting CAPA the authority to dismiss Gunters challenge to the C
& R.
2. CAPA acted reasonably by dismissing Gunters claims
attempting to overturn the C & R.
The superior courts approval of CAPAs decision to
dismiss Gunters claims also does not present a colorable claim of
error because CAPAs decision was reasonable. After
unsuccessfully attempting to secure representation for Gunter,
CAPA stated in a report to the superior court that
[t]he fact that no attorney seems interested
in representing Mr. Gunter in this matter is
evidence that this appeal may be unlikely to
bring sufficient financial benefit to Mr.
Gunter to justify the expense of pursuing it.
If Mr. Gunter is successful in setting
aside the compromise[] and release, he runs
the risk that the ultimate decision could be
the same or even less than he has been
receiving under the settlement. For this
appeal to benefit him, he must prevail in
setting aside the agreement and then win
substantially more. This result appears
unlikely.
CAPA appears to be correct that Gunter faced a very real threat
that he would receive a lesser award if the C & R was overturned,
as Kathy-O-Estates originally claimed that Gunter was entitled to
compensation of only $74.99 per week, a claim that was probably
correct. Kathy-O-Estates eventually agreed to the weekly
compensation rate of $175 to $200 per week specified in the C &
R. The reasonableness of CAPAs decision is supported by CAPAs
inability to find a lawyer to represent Gunter on a contingency
basis. CAPA was also correct in noting, as discussed above, that
it was highly unlikely that Gunter would succeed in his novel
attempt to gain compensation for the inheritance he believes he
would have received but for his injury. We hold that CAPA acted
reasonably in exercising its authority to dismiss Gunters
challenge to the C & R. Therefore, we hold that Gunter does not
have a colorable claim that the superior court erred by allowing
the dismissal of his challenge to the C & R.
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that the board did not err in dismissing
Gunters claims seeking reimbursement for the alleged financial
consequences of his brain injury and that the superior court did
not err by allowing CAPA to dismiss Gunters attempt to overturn
the C & R. The decisions of the board and the superior court are
accordingly AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 The Alaska Workers Compensation Board was added as a
party, but declined to participate because it has no independent
interest in this case.
2 Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, AWCB Decision No. 02-0054
(March 27, 2002).
3 The superior court also ordered the board not to accept
any future claims, applications, or petitions by Gunter unless
they were filed through Gunters counsel or guardian/conservator.
Gunter has not challenged this ruling.
4 Dougan v. Aurora Elec. Inc., 50 P.3d 789, 793 (Alaska
2002).
5 Id.
6 Id. But cf. Palmer v. Municipality of Anchorage,
Police & Fire Ret. Bd., 65 P.3d 832, 837 n.7 (Alaska 2003)
(noting that [e]ven under the independent judgment standard we
[g]ive some weight to what the agency has done, especially where
the agency interpretation is longstanding. (quoting Usibelli
Coal Mine, Inc. v. State, Dept of Natural Res., 921 P2d 1134,
1142-43 (Alaska 1996))).
7 Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979).
8 See H.C.S. v. Cmty. Advocacy Project of Alaska, Inc.,
42 P.3d 1093, 1096 (Alaska 2002). But see In re S.H., 987 P.2d
735, 738-41 (Alaska 1999) (applying clearly erroneous standard to
determine whether it was appropriate to appoint conservator).
9 See In re S.H., 987 P.2d at 738-41.
10 Gunter also appears to seek reimbursement for the
entire value of Kathy-O-Estates, which he contends he would have
inherited but for his brain injury, stating that [b]ecause of
this work accident I lost Kathy-O-Estates Inc. 4 million
[dollars] & happy life. We decline to address this argument
because the claim was not raised before the board or the superior
court. See Reid v. Williams, 964 P.2d 453, 456 (Alaska 1998)
(noting that we will not ordinarily consider issues unless they
were raised in the trial court).
11 See Far N. Sanitation, Inc. v. Alaska Pub. Util. Commn,
825 P.2d 867, 871 n.5 & 873 (Alaska 1992) (holding that agency
does not have powers beyond those which are authorized by
legislative grant, express or implied). See also Blanas v.
Brower Co., 938 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Alaska 1997) (quoting with
approval idea that a public service commission is an
administrative agency created by statute and as such has no
inherent powers, but only such as have been expressly granted to
it by the legislature or have, by implication, been conferred
upon it as necessarily incident to the exercise of those powers
expressly granted) (quoting Greater Anchorage Area Borough v.
City of Anchorage, 504 P.2d 1027, 1033 n.19 (Alaska 1972)).
12 AS 23.30.
13 See AS 23.30.005.
14 AS 23.30.045(a)-(b) (citing AS 23.30.041, which governs
liability for rehabilitation, AS 23.30.050 and AS 23.30.095,
which govern liability for medical costs, AS 23.30.145, which
governs liability for legal costs, and AS 23.30.180-23.30.215,
which govern liability for death and disability benefits).
15 The board has jurisdiction to grant permanent total
disability benefits under AS 23.30.180, which provides that
employees can only be compensated for their permanent total
disabilities with a percentage of their weekly wages: [i]n case
of total disability adjudged to be permanent 80 percent of the
injured employees spendable weekly wages shall be paid to the
employee during the continuance of the total disability. The
method for calculating the employees spendable weekly wage is set
out in AS 23.30.220(a), which provides in relevant part that
[c]omputation of compensation under this chapter shall be on the
basis of an employees spendable weekly wage at the time of
injury. An employees spendable weekly wage is the employees
gross weekly earnings minus payroll tax deductions. As these
statutes make clear, the Alaska Workers Compensation Act attempts
to replace an employees lost wage-based income. It does not
provide an employee with benefits covering any future expenses
that might conceivably have some relation to his or her injuries,
such as those for which Gunter now seeks compensation.
16 Alaska Statute 23.30.055 provides in relevant part that
[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in
AS 23.30.055 is exclusive and in place of all
other liability of the employer and any
fellow employee to the employee. . . .
However, if an employer fails to secure
payment of compensation as required by this
chapter, an injured employee or the employees
legal representative in case death results
from the injury may elect to claim
compensation under this chapter, or to
maintain an action against the employer in
law or admiralty for damages on account of
the injury or death.
17 Fenner v. Municipality of Anchorage, 53 P.3d 573, 575
(Alaska 2002).
18 Suh v. Pingo Corp., 736 P.2d 342, 344 (Alaska 1987).
19 Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, AWCB Decision No. 02-0054
(March 27, 2002).
20 A wards challenge to a guardians decision is analogous
to an indigent defendants challenge to appointed counsels
determination that the defendant does not have a colorable claim
for post-conviction relief. See Alaska Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35.1. In the event that an appointed attorney believes
that his or her clients application for post-conviction relief is
completely without merit, Rule 35.1(e)(2) provides that the
attorney may:
file with the court and serve on the
prosecuting attorney
. . . .
(B) a certificate that counsel
(i) does not have a conflict of
interest;
(ii) has completed a review of the facts
and law in the underlying proceeding or
action challenged in the application;
(iii) has consulted with the applicant
and, if appropriate, with trial counsel; and
(iv) has determined that the application
does not allege a colorable claim for relief.
Rule 35.1(f)(2) provides that the appellate court must review a
certificate filed under Rule 35.1(e)(2)(B) and permit counsel to
withdraw and order the application dismissed if the applicant has
no colorable claim for post-conviction relief or fails to respond
to the certificate.
21 The procedural posture of this case is somewhat
unusual. Only final judgments may be appealed. Here, the
superior court remanded an administrative appeal to an agency for
further proceedings. A remand order is not a final judgment.
City and Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska
1979). (Moreover, Gunter, who is pro se, did not appeal the
boards dismissal of Gunters claims to the superior court.) But
rather than dismiss Gunters appeal on the ground that the
superior court remanded the case to the administrative agency, we
treat it as a petition for review because Gunters injury poses a
severe hardship in his efforts to navigate the court system. See
Muncipality of Anchorage v. Anderson, 37 P.3d 420, 421 (Alaska
2001) (stating that we will treat an appeal improperly brought
from a non-final order as a petition for review in order to
prevent hardship and injustice (quoting Thibodeau, 595 P.2d at
631)).
22 In re S.H., 987 P.2d 735, 739 (Alaska 1999). Alaska
Statute 13.26.280(c) requires that a conservator must be properly
appointed and that the conservators actions must be reasonable in
order to settle a lawsuit for his or her ward:
[a] conservator, acting reasonably in efforts
to accomplish the purpose for which the
conservator was appointed, may act, without
court authorization or confirmation, to
. . . .
(19) pay or contest any claim; to settle a
claim by or against the estate or the
protected person by compromise, arbitration,
or otherwise; and to release, in whole or in
part, any claim belonging to the estate to
the extent that the claim is uncollectible.
23 AS 13.26.150(b).
24 The court must appoint a visitor to investigate the
prospective wards incapacity and evaluate whether the prospective
ward needs a guardian. AS 13.26.106(c); AS 13.26.108.
25 In re S.H., 987 P.2d at 741.
26 See H.C.S. v. Cmty. Advocacy Project of Alaska, Inc.,
42 P.3d 1093, 1096 (Alaska 2002).
