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Ruckle v. Anchorage School District (02/27/2004) sp-5784
Ruckle v. Anchorage School District (02/27/2004) sp-5784
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
KELLY RUCKLE, )
) Supreme Court No. S-10422
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-01-9106 CI
)
ANCHORAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT ) O P I N I O N
and STATE OF ALASKA, )
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ) [No. 5784 - February 27,
2004]
AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT, )
)
Appellees. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Mark Rindner, Judge.
Appearances: Robert K. Stewart, Jr., Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Howard S. Trickey and Matthew
Singer, Jermain Dunnagan & Owens, P.C.,
Anchorage, for Appellee Anchorage School
District. G. Ken Truitt, Assistant Attorney
General, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee State of
Alaska, Department of Education and Early
Development.
Before: Matthews, Eastaugh, Bryner, and
Carpeneti, Justices. [Fabe, Chief Justice,
not participating.]
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
I. Kelly Ruckle challenged the decision of the Anchorage
School District to grant its school transportation contract to
First Student, Inc. and sought a declaration voiding the states
regulation governing pupil transportation contracts. The
superior court dismissed with prejudice Ruckles claims against
both the school district and the state for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and denied her request to file an amended complaint.
We agree with the superior court that Ruckle does not have
citizen-taxpayer standing with respect to her claims against the
district. However, we conclude that the superior court erred in
refusing to grant Ruckle leave to file an amended complaint.
Because we remand on these grounds, we find it unnecessary to
determine whether the superior courts dismissal with prejudice
was appropriate.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
I. On October 4, 2000 the Anchorage School District (ASD),
seeking a school bus company to transport its students, issued a
Request for Transportation Proposals (RFP). It received five
bids for the five-year contract. According to Ruckle, the lowest
and only responsive bid was submitted by Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,
ASDs incumbent provider of school bus service. The second lowest
bidder was First Student, Inc. Despite the alleged deficiencies
in its bid,1 ASD certified First Students bid as responsive. ASD
permitted First Student to match Laidlaws bid price and decided
that an award to First Student would be in the districts best
interest. A notice of intent to award the school bus contract to
First Student was issued on January 19, 2001.
Laidlaw then instituted an action against ASD and First
Student, asking the court, among other things, to invalidate
First Students proposal and enjoin ASD from contracting with
them.2 Laidlaw requested declaratory and injunctive relief, and
money damages. On May 18, 2001 Superior Court Judge Peter A.
Michalski issued an order converting Laidlaws action to an
administrative appeal, since many of the claims in Laidlaws
complaint were based on the administrative decisions of ASD.
Judge Michalski bifurcated and stayed any claims which could not
be reached as part of the administrative appeal and halted all
discovery until the appeal could be resolved.
Laidlaw then approached Kelly Ruckle to determine if
she would be interested in commencing litigation in this matter.
Kelly Ruckle was at that time employed as a secretary by Laidlaws
law firm, Hartig Rhodes Hoge & Lekisch and was also a taxpayer in
the Municipality of Anchorage and the mother of two children who
attended ASD schools and who rode school buses operated by First
Student. She was referred to Davis Wright Tremaine LLP for
representation. On July 23, 2001 Ruckle filed a complaint
against ASD and the State of Alaska, Department of Education and
Early Development (state), alleging nearly all of the same claims
against ASD as Laidlaw had. However, whereas Laidlaw did not
challenge any of the states conduct, Ruckle argued that one of
its regulations, 4 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 27.085,3
violates the State Procurement Code, AS 36.30, that it was
adopted without proper statutory authority, and that it
constitutes a standardless delegation of authority. In addition,
while Laidlaw sought money damages, Ruckle requested only
declaratory and injunctive relief. Ruckles complaint was
assigned to Superior Court Judge Mark Rindner.
Instead of filing an answer, ASD filed a motion to
dismiss, which was later joined by the state, which argued that
Ruckle did not have citizen-taxpayer standing and that the
complaint should therefore be dismissed under Alaska Civil Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4 Ruckle
opposed, arguing that she had standing as a citizen and taxpayer
and as a member of the class of persons the procurement statute
was designed to protect.
Judge Rindner granted the motion to dismiss, which
prompted Ruckle to request reconsideration. She argued that she
should be permitted to litigate her claims against the state
because Laidlaw was not pursuing those claims, and therefore they
would likely evade review. Judge Rindner denied Ruckles motion
for reconsideration, but before receiving notice of the denial,
Ruckle filed an amended complaint in which she alleged that she
had interest-injury standing. ASD asked the court to strike
Ruckles amended complaint because it was filed without leave of
the court. ASD also argued that Ruckle should not be permitted
to re-allege citizen-taxpayer standing since her first complaint
had already been dismissed for lack of such standing. Ruckle
opposed ASDs motion, contending that she had timely filed her
amended complaint pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) and that,
in the absence of an Alaska rule barring the filing of an amended
pleading after dismissal but before entry of judgment, she should
be permitted to amend her complaint as a matter of course. In
response, ASD maintained that, even if it might be permissible
for Ruckle to amend her complaint, she should be required to
request leave of the court and such leave should be denied since
amendment would be futile and she had failed to take advantage of
earlier opportunities to do so.
Ruckle then moved for leave to supplement her
opposition to ASDs motion to strike, informing the court that her
daughter had been in an accident involving a First Student bus on
December 6, 2001, thereby clarifying her standing status and
demonstrating the legitimate concerns she has concerning the
safety of the school buses operated by First Student under the
contract awarded it by the ASD. Judge Rindner granted ASDs
motion to strike the amended complaint and advised Ruckle that,
if she still believed she had interest-injury standing, she could
file a complaint seeking relief appropriate to such a claim. On
the same day, February 4, 2002, Judge Rindner entered final
judgment in the matter, dismissing with prejudice Ruckles
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, Ruckle filed a motion seeking to amend the
judgment, arguing that the court should have dismissed her
complaint without prejudice so as to allow her to file a new
complaint without running afoul of res judicata. That motion was
also denied and Ruckle appealed.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a superior courts decision to dismiss
a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5
Whether an amended complaint may be filed after
dismissal without leave of the court is a question of law. We
scrutinize questions of law under a de novo or independent
judgment standard of review. When reviewing a question of law,
it is our duty to adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive
in light of precedent, reason and policy. 6
We review under the abuse of discretion standard a
superior courts decision to deny a plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint7 and a superior courts decision to dismiss a
complaint with prejudice.8 We will reverse a ruling for abuse
of discretion only when left with a definite and firm conviction,
after reviewing the whole record, that the trial court erred in
its ruling.9
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Dismissing Ruckles
Complaint Against ASD for Lack of Citizen-Taxpayer
Standing.
In dismissing Ruckles original complaint against ASD,
the superior court found that Ruckle could not satisfy the
requirements of citizen-taxpayer standing and, therefore, could
not pursue her claims against ASD under the theory advanced in
the original complaint. Ruckle had requested declaratory and
injunctive relief, both of which the superior court could grant
pursuant to AS 22.10.020.10 As the basis for her complaint,
Ruckle alleged that she is a resident of Anchorage, Alaska and a
taxpayer in the municipality of Anchorage. ASD immediately moved
to dismiss, arguing that Ruckle had not demonstrated sufficient
interest-injury or citizen-taxpayer standing and, therefore, that
the court should dismiss her action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
We have held that all that is required of a complaint
seeking declaratory relief is a simple statement of facts
demonstrating that the superior court has jurisdiction and that
an actual justiciable case or controversy is presented.11 Under
our case law, the actual case or controversy language encompasses
a number of more specific reasons for not deciding cases,
including lack of standing, mootness, and lack of ripeness.12 At
issue in this case is whether Ruckle has standing to pursue her
claims against ASD and the state. We have observed that
[s]tanding in our state courts is not a constitutional doctrine;
rather, it is a rule of judicial self-restraint based on the
principle that courts should not resolve abstract questions or
issue advisory opinions. The basic requirement for standing in
Alaska is adversity.13
We have recognized two forms of standing: interest-
injury and citizen-taxpayer.14 In her original complaint, Ruckle
only relied on citizen-taxpayer standing. Under Alaska law, to
establish such standing a taxpayer or citizen need only show that
the case in question is one of public significance and the
plaintiff is appropriate in several respects.15 This
[a]ppropriateness has three main facets: the plaintiff must not
be a sham plaintiff with no true adversity of interest; he or she
must be capable of competently advocating his or her position;
and he or she may still be denied standing if there is a
plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct in
question who has or is likely to bring suit. 16
The superior court focused on the third factor used to
determine Ruckles appropriateness as a plaintiff whether another
plaintiff is more directly affected by the action in question and
has brought suit or is likely to bring suit and explicitly
declined to rule on Ruckles fulfillment of the remaining two
appropriateness requirements. Because Laidlaw had already raised
nearly identical claims against ASD, the superior court
concluded:
Ruckle clearly fails the third aspect of
the appropriate plaintiff test. There is
another plaintiff more directly affected by
the challenged conduct in question who has
brought suit. This court need not
hypothetically question whether another
plaintiff exists who may bring forth suit
against ASD. Laidlaw filed a lawsuit against
ASD almost six months prior to Ruckles
lawsuit. Laidlaw was the former provider of
transportation for ASD and is more directly
affected by ASDs awarding the contract to
First Student.
According to the court, Ruckle lacks standing as a citizen-
taxpayer because another plaintiff more directly affected by the
complained of conduct, Laidlaw, has already filed a virtually
identical lawsuit concerning the subject matter of this case.
Because Ruckle lacks standing, the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and cannot address Plaintiffs claims.
Ruckle argues that the superior court erred in its
determination that she was not the most appropriate plaintiff to
bring this suit. She contends that, because citizens comprise
the class specifically protected by the public procurement
system, the most appropriate plaintiff in any challenge to the
award of a public contract should be selected from that class of
people. In support of her argument, Ruckle cites several cases
which hold that all members of the public, not the bidders, are
the intended beneficiaries of the competitive public bidding
system. In McBirney & Associates v. State,17 this court explained
that the purposes of the competitive public bidding system are:
to prevent fraud, collusion, favoritism, and
improvidence in the administration of public
business, as well as to insure that the
[state] receives the best work or supplies at
the most reasonable prices practicable.
. . . [T]he requirement of public
bidding is for the benefit of property
holders and taxpayers, and not for the
benefit of the bidders; and such requirements
should be construed with the primary purpose
of best advancing the public interest.[18]
By virtue of her position as both a citizen and a taxpayer,
Ruckle argues that she will best represent the broad set of
interests common to other citizens and taxpayers of Anchorage,
while Laidlaw will represent only its own economic interests.
Ruckle also cites a number of cases from other
jurisdictions which she argues support the proposition that
taxpayers, rather than bidders, should be granted standing to
challenge flaws in public bidding systems. These cases do
support the proposition that citizen-taxpayers have standing to
challenge the results of public bidding systems.19 However, none
of these cases involve a situation, such as the one at bar, where
both the bidder and a citizen-taxpayer have filed suit on the
same issue, and three of the cases hail from jurisdictions where
bidders are only permitted to challenge the bid procedures of
municipalities in which they are also municipal taxpayers.20 This
is not the law in Alaska. Here, unsuccessful bidders may
administratively appeal bid decisions and may pursue bid-related
claims against a state agency in court.21 Furthermore, ASD does
not argue that Ruckle could never establish standing based on her
citizen-taxpayer status, but rather it contests the idea that
both Ruckles and Laidlaws claims should be permitted to proceed
at the same time.
ASD also contends that Ruckles claim that, as a citizen
and taxpayer, she is a more appropriate plaintiff than Laidlaw
misconstrues the test for citizen-taxpayer standing, and relies
on the unsupportable presumption that an ordinary citizen is more
affected by the award of the Districts $45 million transportation
contract than is the incumbent contractor who lost the contract.
ASD compares Laidlaws request for money damages and its right to
recover money for bid preparation costs if it can show that the
government agency failed to consider its bid fairly and honestly
to Ruckles claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, and
maintains that it is untenable that Ruckle could be more directly
affected by the outcome of this litigation than Laidlaw.
Furthermore, ASD questions Ruckles claim that she represents
different and broader interests than Laidlaw, and argues that
[e]very one of Ruckles alleged defects in the procurement process
were previously alleged by Laidlaw [and] [t]he relief that Ruckle
seeks is the same relief that Laidlaw seeks.
Finally, Ruckle argues that she should be permitted to
proceed with her lawsuit despite Laidlaws pending appeal because
the issues of whether the First Student proposal was
nonresponsive and whether the ASDs best interest determination
was flawed might evade review in Laidlaws administrative appeal.
Ruckle claims that under 4 AAC 27.085(e),22 a finding that a bid
is nonresponsive can only be challenged by that bidder, not by a
competing bidder, such as Laidlaw. In addition, Ruckle argues
that 4 AAC 27.085(g)23 limits challenges by unsuccessful bidders
to fraud or mathematical errors and does not permit a bidder to
contest an award on the basis that a best interests determination
was flawed. However, while 4 AAC 27.085(e) and (g) limit the
bases upon which a bidder can move the school board for
reconsideration, a bidder can seek judicial review of the boards
decision by the superior court under Alaska Rule of Appellate
Procedure 602(a)(2).24
The analysis of ASD and the superior court is
compelling. Not only is it clear that another party has brought
suit to vindicate these interests, but under the circumstances we
agree that Laidlaw is the more appropriate plaintiff in this
case. As the superior court notes, we have encouraged trial
courts to evaluate the appropriateness of plaintiffs on a case-by-
case basis. In this situation, we agree that allowing Ruckle to
proceed with her claims against ASD would be unnecessarily
duplicative given Laidlaws enormous economic incentive and the
fact that it has already filed suit. Because Laidlaw has raised
similar, if not identical, claims against ASD in its lawsuit, and
because Ruckle has been unable to demonstrate a likelihood that
these issues will evade review during the course of the
administrative appeal, we affirm the superior courts decision to
dismiss Ruckles complaint against ASD for lack of citizen-
taxpayer standing.
B. After Dismissal Ruckle Was Not Entitled To Amend Her
Complaint Without Leave of the Court.
After entry of the courts order dismissing her claims
against ASD and the state, Ruckle filed an amended complaint.
Several times prior to filing, Ruckle informed the court that she
planned to exercise her right under Civil Rule 15(a)25 to file an
amended complaint.26 The amended complaint differed from the
original complaint only in that, for the first time, Ruckle
alleged interest-injury standing.
Judge Rindner granted ASDs motion to strike Ruckles
amended complaint. He stated that he would proceed as though
Ruckle had requested leave to file an amended complaint, but he
denied Ruckles motion because the court dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Rindner noted that
[i]f Ruckle believes she has a claim based on interest-injury
standing she may file a separate complaint seeking relief
appropriate to that claim.
Ruckle argues that the superior court erred in striking
her complaint, because she should have been permitted to amend
her complaint once as a matter of course without seeking leave of
the court since a responsive pleading had never been served as
required by Civil Rule 15(a). Whether Rule 15(a) permits
amendment without leave of the court after an order of dismissal
has been entered is a question of first impression in Alaska.
Essentially, Ruckle argues that, because a responsive
pleading was never filed, we should liberally construe Rule 15(a)
to allow her to amend her complaint without leave of the court
within a reasonable time of service of the order dismissing the
complaint. The parties agree that there is no Alaska rule
explicitly addressing this issue and that the federal courts are
divided as to whether the right to amend a pleading under Rule
15(a) without leave of the court survives a dismissal order.
Three main approaches to this question have been adopted by other
courts and were recently summarized in an Eastern District of
Pennsylvania decision, United States v. Union Corp.27
Under the first approach, which has been applied in
some Ninth Circuit cases, the right to amend once as a matter of
course never terminates, even if the original pleading is
dismissed by the district court, until a responsive pleading is
filed.28 As the Union Corp. court explained, [t]his approach is
based on a rigid, literal reading of the language of Rule 15(a)
that the right to amend continues until a responsive pleading is
filed, regardless of what might happen prior to the filing of
that responsive pleading; because the rule is silent as to the
effect of an intervening dismissal of that pleading, such action
had no effect on the right to amend.29 Neither party supports the
adoption of this approach.
The second approach, which has been followed in the
majority of circuits, is that the right to amend without leave
terminates upon the entry of an order of dismissal.30 ASD
champions this rule because it gives substantial effect to a
lower courts determination that a claim should be dismissed, it
prevents a party from repleading a claim which has already been
disposed of, and it encourages litigants not to sleep on their
rights and waste judicial resources by waiting until after
dismissal to amend their complaints.
Ruckle prefers the third approach, in which the right
to amend survives the granting of a motion to dismiss but is
extinguished by the entry of judgment.31 This approach has been
adopted in certain situations by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
and is based on principles of finality only after the entire
action has been dismissed in a final and appealable order should
the right to amend terminate, at which point the plaintiff either
may appeal or seek leave of the district court to reopen the case
so she may pursue an amended complaint.32 Ruckle argues that this
approach best comports with the plain language of Rule 15(a),
that it would be most consistent with the superior courts order
in this case recognizing Ruckles reservation of her right to file
an amended complaint, and that it is most closely aligned with
Alaskas approach to finality for purposes of appeal. Finally,
Ruckle argues that the rule which [she] advances promotes even
more consistency and certainty than [the rule] adopted by certain
of the federal circuits which rely upon the heavily criticized
test of whether a particular order is a final decision which ends
litigation on the merits.
There are strong arguments for each interpretation of
Rule 15(a). However, we believe that the majority rule the one
espoused by ASD is the one which best reflects our longstanding
concerns with consistency, fairness, and finality, and which
accords appropriate deference to the superior court. Adoption of
this rule would allow an opposing party to rely on the finality
of a dismissal, while providing an opportunity to respond to a
request to amend should the circumstances so require. It would
also facilitate an efficient use of resources, require parties to
exercise their rights sooner rather than later, and prevent the
unnecessary overextension of litigation. While this rule would
undoubtedly restrict the plaintiffs right to amend without leave,
we have long held that leave to amend should not usually be
difficult to obtain.33 Thus, where plaintiffs have demonstrated
valid reasons for amending a pleading, they will be permitted to
do so. We believe that adoption of this rule strikes the
appropriate balance among these competing concerns, and we
therefore adopt it. We must accordingly reject Ruckles argument
that she was entitled to file her amended complaint without
seeking leave of the court.
C. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Ruckle Leave To File an
Amended Complaint.
Ruckle sought to file an amended complaint in order to
demonstrate an alternate basis for asserting standing. In her
amended complaint, she alleged:
Ruckle has standing to bring this action
because she is the mother of two children who
attend schools operated by the ASD. Her
oldest child currently rides school buses
contracted for by the ASD, the younger child
will do so next year. She has suffered
injury to cognizable interests by the acts
and omissions of the ASD and Department as
alleged herein, including, but not limited
to, the facts that the ASD awarded the school
bus contract to a proposer which failed to
comply with the requirements of RFP2000-605
Request for Pupil Transportation Proposals,
especially those relating to safety, and
because that award was not in the best
interests of the user population.
The superior court did not explain why it denied Ruckle leave to
amend her complaint. Ruckle argues that this denial without
explanation constitutes an abuse of discretion. Absent a
determination that amendment would be futile, Ruckle maintains,
the superior court should have granted her the leave it assumed
she had requested.34
We have long held that leave to amend a pleading should
be freely given and that, absent a showing that the amendment
would have resulted in injustice, a trial court will be found to
have abused its discretion in denying a motion to amend.35 In
Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group,36 we endorsed the reasons set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis37 for
denying the amendment of a complaint. Specifically, the Foman
Court instructed that:
If the underlying facts or circumstances
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an
opportunity to test his claim on the merits.
In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc. the leave sought should, as
the rules require, be freely given.[38]
ASD focuses its argument on the alleged futility of
amendment, maintaining that Ruckle should not be permitted to
amend her complaint because her allegations of interest-injury
standing are too generalized to survive a motion to dismiss. In
response, Ruckle maintains that she has set forth sufficient
facts to survive a motion to dismiss. As Ruckle explains:
Ruckles cognizable interest is that of
assuring the safety of her children as they
ride transportation provided by the ASD to
and from school each day. The injury she
suffered was the reasonable apprehension that
her daughter was being placed at risk because
the ASD awarded the school bus contract to a
proposer, First Student, which failed to
comply with numerous requirements of the RFP,
most particularly those relating to safety.
The fact that her daughter was subsequently
involved in two separate school bus
accidents, sustaining injuries in the second,
only reinforced the reasonableness of Ruckles
apprehensions. The relief Ruckle sought, a
declaration voiding the contract awarded by
the ASD to First Student, would fully
remediate the injury she suffered by
eliminating the risk that her children will
continue to be transported to and from school
by a contractor which failed to meet the
minimum safety and other operator
requirements set forth in the RFP.
(Emphasis in original, footnote and citations omitted.)
Our jurisprudence has recognized interest-injury
standing in a variety of contexts. In Moore v. State,39 we set
out our expansive interpretation of standing:
Whether a party has standing to obtain
judicial resolution of a controversy depends
on whether the party has a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. In our recent decision of
Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Division,
535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975), we
described this requirement in terms of injury-
in-fact, and explained that its purpose is to
assure the adversity which is fundamental to
judicial proceedings.[40]
At issue in Moore was whether a group of commercial fisherman and
the owner of a lodge could bring a challenge against the State of
Alaska and the lessees of tracts in or near Kachemak Bay
regarding the legality of the sale of certain offshore oil and
gas leases in the bay.41 While defendants maintained that the
plaintiffs interest in the transaction in question was merely
incidental or indirect, the plaintiffs argued that they would be
adversely affected by oil exploration in the bay.42 Agreeing with
the plaintiffs, we determined that, because the plaintiffs
livelihoods depended on the biological productivity of the bay,
they did in fact have a sufficient interest in the sale of the
leases to establish standing.43
In Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,44 we
considered whether a group of fisherman who made their living
seining for bait and roe herring in Southeast Alaska could
challenge a regulation limiting the maximum number of limited
entry permits the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC)
would issue.45 The CFEC claimed that the plaintiffs had not
established standing to bring such a challenge since they could
not point to any actual or inevitable injury suffered as a result
of the maximum number regulation.46 Because the question whether
each plaintiff would receive a permit was unresolved, and each
plaintiff retained an interim use permit at the time the suit was
filed, the CFEC argued that the plaintiffs might never suffer any
injury because of the regulation.47 Plaintiffs countered that the
threatened loss of their right to enter the fishery constituted a
sufficient injury to justify standing.48 Explaining that [a]
party need not wait for anticipated harm to materialize before
bringing an action to protect his rights, we endorsed the finding
of standing based on anticipated future harm.49 To instead adopt
a rule of inevitability, as urged by the CFEC,
would establish an unwarranted distinction
between possible and certain harm for
purposes of determining standing; such a rule
would deny standing to parties who could
demonstrate at the filing only the
possibility of harm. That approach is not
consonant with the thrust of Alaska law. We
think it bad law and bad policy to approve a
rule which shuts the courthouse doors until,
in certain situations, it may be too late to
obtain meaningful judicial relief.[50]
We echoed these sentiments in Trustees for Alaska v.
State,51 in which we observed that the adverse interest required
to establish interest-injury standing
may be economic, or it may be intangible,
such as an aesthetic or environmental
interest. The degree of injury to the
interest need not be great; [t]he basic idea
. . . is that an identifiable trifle is
enough for standing to fight out a question
of principle; the trifle is the basis for
standing and the principle supplies the
motivation. [52]
Based on the expansive definition of adversity set out
in earlier cases, we agree with Ruckle that amendment of her
complaint in this case would not be futile. Ruckle alleged that
she has two children who are or will be attending Anchorage
schools and riding the buses of the transportation provider
selected by ASD. Ruckle therefore has an interest in who that
provider is. She also alleged that the selected school
transportation provider, First Student, failed to provide an
outline of its accident prevention program, as required by the
RFP. While Ruckle may never suffer injury as the result of ASDs
selection, the possibility that she might, in the form of harm to
her children, and the possibility that ASDs selection process may
have eliminated a safer transportation option, are of interest to
Ruckle. Because her allegations do not on their face appear
futile, we believe the superior court abused its discretion in
denying Ruckle leave to amend her complaint. We therefore
reverse the courts decision and remand for Ruckles amended
complaint to be reinstated.53
D. Remaining Issues
A. Ruckle also maintains that the superior court erred in
dismissing her complaint with prejudice, since a dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a dismissal on the
merits and therefore does not act as a bar to a subsequent action
on the same issue. Because we remand for the court to grant
Ruckle leave to file an amended complaint, we find it unnecessary
to resolve this question.
Finally, in response to concerns raised by ASD and the
state during the course of this case, we note that the superior
court may consider other means of approaching this litigation.
For example, the court might choose to authorize discovery on
ASDs stalking horse theory, consolidate Ruckles claims with the
Laidlaw litigation, or stay the present case until Laidlaws
claims have been resolved. We recognize that such decisions lie
within the discretion of the superior court and, therefore,
express no opinion as to which alternative approach the court
ought to follow, if any.
V. CONCLUSION
Because we agree that a more appropriate plaintiff has
already challenged ASDs actions, we AFFIRM the decision of the
superior court to dismiss Ruckles complaint against ASD inasmuch
as it was based on citizen-taxpayer standing. We AFFIRM the
superior courts determination that Ruckle was not entitled to
amend her complaint without leave of the court after the
complaint had been dismissed, but we REVERSE the courts denial of
leave to amend a complaint alleging interest-injury standing. We
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
_______________________________
1 Ruckle claims that First Students bid was missing the
following items:
1. Acknowledgments of Addenda 1-5.
2. A signed Non-Collusion Affidavit and nondiscrimination
statement.
3. The names and resumes of persons who would be primarily
responsible for managing the pupil transportation services.
4. Certifications that arrangements had been made for the
purchase, lease, or rent of facilities necessary to provide pupil
transportation services, that necessary financing was available
and that necessary facilities would be available in time to
perform the contract.
5. Samples of the driver route notebook for regular and Special
Education routes, the driver and attendant policy manual, and the
dispatch procedure manual.
6. Job descriptions for all positions required under the
contract and estimated amounts of time operations personnel would
spend on each job function, including any responsibilities not
directly related to providing service under the contract.
7. An outline of the First Students accident prevention program
tailored to driving conditions encountered in Anchorage, Alaska.
8. The wage and benefit scale to be applied to drivers and
attendants.
2 See Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., Case
No. 3AN-01-04545 CI.
3 4 AAC 27.085 provides the requirements for competitive
pupil transportation proposals and, among other things, lists the
criteria that must be contained in requests for proposals, the
procedures districts shall use in the certification process and
selection of a proposer, and the circumstances under which a
proposer may move for reconsideration of the boards
determination.
4 Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(1) sets out the procedure by
which a party may request dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
5 Andrews v. Alaska Operating Engineers - Employers
Training Trust Fund, 871 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Alaska 1994).
6 Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1379, n.5 (Alaska
1987) (citation omitted) (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284
n.6 (Alaska 1979)).
7 Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348
(Alaska 1987).
8 DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 525, 527 (Alaska 2002).
9 Id. at 527-28 (quoting Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v.
Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375, 378-79 (Alaska 1982)).
10 Under AS 22.10.020(c), superior courts may issue
injunctions and all other writs necessary or proper to the
complete exercise of its jurisdiction. Alaska Statute
22.10.020(g) provides:
In case of an actual controversy in the
state, the superior court, upon the filing of
an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and legal relations of an interested
party seeking the declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. The
declaration has the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and is reviewable as
such. Further necessary or proper relief
based on a declaratory judgment or decree may
be granted, after reasonable notice and
hearing, against an adverse party whose
rights have been determined by the judgment.
11 Jefferson v. Asplund, 458 P.2d 995, 999 (Alaska 1969).
12 Bowers Office Prods., Inc. v. Univ. of Alaska, 755 P.2d
1095, 1096 (Alaska 1988).
13 Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska
1987) (citation omitted).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 329.
16 Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998)
(citing Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d at 329-30).
17 753 P.2d 1132 (Alaska 1988).
18 Id. at 1135-36 (quoting Gostovich v. City of West
Richland, 452 P.2d 737, 740 (Wash. 1969)) (alterations in
original). See also Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 994
P.2d 991, 998 (Alaska 1999).
19 See, e.g., Ewy v. Sturtevant, 962 P.2d 991, 995 (Colo.
App. 1998) (stating that [t]he public bidding process, however,
is for the protection of the public, not the bidders and as such
bidders[] have no standing to challenge the propriety of an award
of a public contract to another bidder); Black Ash Servs., Inc.
v. DuBois Area Sch. Dist., 764 A.2d 672, 674 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (holding that mere disappointed bidder to a public contract
does not have standing to challenge its award and requiring that
[t]o have standing, the bidder must be an aggrieved taxpayer of
the municipality awarding the contract); On-Point Tech. Sys.,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 753 A.2d 911, 914 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(distinguishing between action brought by disappointed bidder
against state under Procurement Code and one filed by taxpayer in
equity); Sloan v. Sch. Dist., 537 S.E.2d 299, 303 (S.C. App.
2000) (stating that [t]he taxpayers of Greenville County have a
direct interest in the proper use and allocation of tax receipts
by the District and therefore may challenge the Districts failure
to abide by the competitive sealed bidding requirements in its
procurement code).
20 See Ewy, 962 P.2d at 995 (noting that Colorado law does
not provide bidders, as bidders, with standing to challenge award
of public contract to another bidder); Black Ash Servs., Inc.,
764 A.2d at 674 (observing that to have standing in Pennsylvania,
bidder must be municipal taxpayer).
21 See Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist. v. Found. Servs., Inc.,
909 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Alaska 1996) (considering challenge by
unsuccessful bidder for school transportation contract); King v.
Alaska State Hous. Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 263 (Alaska 1981)
(holding that government agency enters implied contract with
bidder to consider bids honestly and fairly and that bidder may
sue to enforce this contract).
22 4 AAC 27.085(e) outlines the procedures to be used by a
school district in certifying bids for competitive pupil
transportation proposals as responsive or nonresponsive to the
request for proposals. Under subsection (5), a proposer whose
proposal was certified as nonresponsive may petition the board in
writing for reconsideration.
23 4 AAC 27.085(g) provides:
Within five working days following the
district school boards offering a contract, a
proposer whose proposal was not accepted may
petition the board, in writing, for
reconsideration of its action. Petitions for
reconsideration are limited to the following
grounds, which must be specified: (1) fraud
or duress by the district school board or a
proposer; or (2) error of the district school
board in calculating dollar amounts. The
aggrieved proposer shall deliver the petition
to all other proposers. The district school
board shall decide the scope and form the
reconsideration will take, except that all
responsive proposers must be given the
opportunity to be heard on the petition.
24 See also Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist., 909 P.2d 1383
(Alaska 1996) (concerning appeal of school boards transportation
contract).
25 Civil Rule 15(a) provides in relevant part:
A party may amend the partys pleading once as
a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar, the
party may so amend it at any time within 20
days after it is served. Otherwise a party
may amend the partys pleading only by leave
of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.
26 In her opposition to ASDs motion to dismiss, Ruckle
stated in a footnote that, should the court fail to find that she
had established citizen-taxpayer standing, she was reserving her
right to amend her complaint to allege facts showing the
necessary foundation for interest-injury standing. Ruckle again
noted her intention to file an amended complaint during the
hearing on the motion to dismiss. In the superior courts order
dismissing Ruckles complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court noted that Ruckle had reserved her right
to amend her complaint at a later point in time.
27 194 F.R.D. 223, 229-31 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
28 Id. at 229 (citing Mayes v. Leipzinger, 729 F.2d 605,
607 (9th Cir. 1984); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce,
Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1520 (9th Cir. 1983)).
29 Id. at 229.
30 Id. at 229-30 (citing Brever v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 40
F.3d 1119, 1131 (10th Cir. 1994); Acevedo-Villalobos v.
Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384 (1st Cir. 1994); Whitaker v. City of
Houston, Tex., 963 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1992); Dorn v. State
Bank of Stella, 767 F.2d 442, 443 (8th Cir. 1985); Czeremcha v.
Intl Assn of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 724 F.2d 1552,
1556 (11th Cir. 1984); Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc.,
590 F.2d 445, 448 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978)).
31 Id. at 230-31.
32 Id. at 231 (citing Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1289
(7th Cir. 1995); Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. State of Cal.,
623 F.2d 613, 616 (9th Cir. 1980)).
33 See, e.g., Estate of Thompson v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc.,
514 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Alaska 1973).
34 Judge Rindner stated in his order that he would proceed
as though Ruckle had requested leave to file an amended
complaint.
35 Estate of Thompson, 514 P.2d at 1271 (determining that
trial court erred in denying leave to amend where there had been
no showing of injustice by opposing party).
36 742 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1987).
37 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
38 Id. at 182.
39 553 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1976).
40 Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 14.
42 Id. at 23-24.
43 Id. at 24-25.
44 699 P.2d 334 (Alaska 1985).
45 Id. at 335-36.
46 Id. at 336-38.
47 Id. at 337.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 338.
50 Id.
51 736 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1987).
52 Id. at 327 (citations omitted) (alterations in
original).
53 This conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach Ruckles
contention that the superior court erred in dismissing for lack
of citizen-taxpayer standing her original claim against the
state. The amended complaint alleges interest-injury standing as
to both the school district and the state. Because Ruckles
allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to
demonstrate her standing as to the state, it is unnecessary for
us to consider whether the first complaint was sufficient in that
regard.
