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City of Kodiak v. Samaniego (01/23/2004) sp-5772
City of Kodiak v. Samaniego (01/23/2004) sp-5772
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKACITY OF KODIAK,
KODIAK )POLICE DEPARTMENT, and )
Supreme Court No. S-10365WILLIAM D. MARSH,
) ) Superior Court No.
Appellants, ) 3KO-98-00134 CI
) v. ) O P I N I O N
)MARTHA SAMANIEGO, ) [No. 5772 - January 23,
2004] )
Appellee.
)________________________________)Appeal from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial
District, Kodiak, Sharon L. Gleason, Judge.Appearances:
Frank S. Koziol, Law Office of Frank S. Koziol,
Anchorage, for Appellants. Jeffrey A. Friedman and
Kenneth R. Friedman, Friedman, Rubin & White,
Anchorage, for Appellee.Before: Bryner, Chief Justice,
Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
FABE, Justice.I. INTRODUCTION
Martha Samaniego sued the City of Kodiak for
false confinement and battery when Sergeant Marsh of
the Kodiak Police Department grabbed her and prevented
her from leaving the scene of an Immigration and
Naturalization investigation. At trial, the jury found
that Sergeant Marsh had falsely confined and battered
Martha Samaniego. The City of Kodiak appeals (1) the
superior court's denial of its summary judgment motion
on the question whether exigent circumstances
justifying Marsh's detention of Martha existed as a
matter of law; (2) the court's refusal to give a jury
instruction proposed by Kodiak; (3) the court's
evidentiary rulings concerning expert testimony and a
knife at the scene; and (4) the court's award of
attorney's fees to Martha Samaniego. Because the
superior court's legal decisions were correct and its
evidentiary determinations fell well within its
discretion, we affirm the superior court's rulings.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Factual History
In April 1994 Kodiak Police Sergeant William D. Marsh
responded as back-up to a traffic stop conducted by Kodiak Police
Officer Bohac and two Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) agents. Bohac and the INS agents were investigating
whether the people in the stopped car had documentation proving
that they were in the United States legally. While the INS
agents and Bohac questioned the individuals, Julia Samaniego
drove up and stopped at the scene because she knew the people
under investigation. She was driving with four of her children,
including her daughter Martha, and a friend.
One of the INS officers approached Julia Samaniego's
car and asked her where she was from. According to the INS
officer, Julia Samaniego replied "Mexico." The INS officer asked
Julia Samaniego for her immigration documents, and Samaniego
replied that the documents were at her house. The INS officer
then asked whether Julia Samaniego had any identification with
her, to which Samaniego replied "no." At that point, Sergeant
Marsh approached Julia Samaniego's car.
At this point, Sergeant Marsh and Julia Samaniego's
accounts of what happened diverge. According to Julia Samaniego,
Sergeant Marsh told her "get out of the car or I [will] do it for
you" and proceeded to pull her by the arm out of the car.
According to Sergeant Marsh, he asked Julia Samaniego to step out
of her car and offered his arm to help her. Julia Samaniego left
the car and had a conversation with Marsh. While they were
talking, the INS agent spoke to Samaniego's children, who were
still in the car. According to Martha Samaniego, who was fifteen
years old at the time, the agent asked the children individually
where they were from and whether they had identification. Martha
testified that when the agent asked her where she was from, she
first replied "Mexico," but she then told the agent that she was
just kidding and that she was born in the United States. Martha
then decided to go home to get her mother's immigration and
identification papers. She left the car and started to walk
away. Martha explained that when her mother saw her walking
away, her mother told her to wait and asked her where she was
going.
It is uncontested that after Martha explained where she
was going, Marsh grabbed her. Julia Samaniego pulled Martha
behind her and stood between Martha and Sergeant Marsh. Martha
testified that Julia told Marsh not to touch Martha. According
to Martha, Marsh then attempted to arrest Julia and started to
walk her to the back of the Samaniegos' car. Martha watched this
as she was being held with her hand behind her back by an INS
agent. Martha testified that during this confrontation, her
mother's shirt had lifted up, and Martha wanted to reach out and
pull it back down. Martha explained that she slipped out of the
jacket she was wearing, left the INS officer holding the jacket,
and took a step forward toward her mom to pull the shirt down.
According to Martha, another officer stopped her and then the INS
agent regained control over her, holding her until the incident
was over.
Also relevant to this appeal are facts concerning a
knife at the scene of the incident. On April 9, 1994, before the
confrontation with the police occurred, the Samaniego family went
to a rodeo. At the rodeo, Martha Samaniego found a knife, which
she gave to her mother who put it into her pocket. Besides
keeping the knife away from her kids, Julia Samaniego testified
at her deposition that she did not know what she planned to do
with the knife. The knife was never used during the
confrontation nor was it discovered by the police until after
Julia was arrested.
B. Procedural History
Martha Samaniego sued the City of Kodiak, the Kodiak
Police Department, and Kodiak Police Sergeant William D. Marsh
for assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment.
The parties stipulated that Martha Samaniego's case against the
City of Kodiak be consolidated with her mother Julia Samaniego's
case as both cases involved common issues of law and fact.1
Martha and Julia Samaniego filed a pre-trial motion in
limine to exclude any evidence "concerning or referring to the
pocketknife possessed by Julia Samaniego at the time of her
arrest." Kodiak opposed the motion, arguing that introduction of
evidence of the knife was integral to its case. Over Kodiak's
objection, Superior Court Judge Sharon L. Gleason granted the
motion to bar any reference to Julia Samaniego's possession of
the knife. The superior court also noted that if Kodiak believed
that the evidence became admissible during trial, it could raise
the issue with the court outside of the jury's presence.
Kodiak moved for summary judgment against Martha
Samaniego arguing that it was entitled to prevail on the question
whether exigent circumstances existed as a matter of law. The
superior court denied this motion.
The Samaniegos moved to exclude the testimony of
Michael A. Brave, one of Kodiak's expert witnesses. Brave is an
expert on the use of force. The court granted the motion to
exclude Brave's testimony, finding that his expert opinion
contained credibility determinations regarding the witnesses in
the case and would usurp the court's role in instructing the jury
on the applicable law of "reasonable force." For these reasons,
the superior court concluded that Brave's opinion would not
assist the jury as required by Alaska Rule of Evidence 702.
Martha Samaniego presented four issues to the jury: (1)
whether Marsh, without legal justification, falsely confined
Martha Samaniego at the scene; (2) whether Marsh, without legal
justification, falsely confined Martha Samaniego when he brought
her to the police station and kept her there; (3) whether Marsh,
without legal justification, committed a battery on Martha
Samaniego when he kept her from leaving the scene; and (4)
whether Marsh, without legal justification, committed a battery
on Martha Samaniego when he handcuffed her.
The jury found for Martha Samaniego on two of her
claims. The jury determined that Marsh falsely confined Martha
at the scene, but not when he brought her to the police station
and kept her there. The jury found that the confinement at the
scene was not a legal cause of injury to Martha and thus awarded
her $1 in nominal damages. Finding that Marsh committed a
battery on Martha when he kept her from leaving the scene, but
not when he handcuffed her, the jury awarded Martha $35,000 for
pain, suffering, and emotional distress resulting from the
battery. The jury rejected Martha's claim for punitive damages
against Marsh. The superior court entered final judgment for
Martha for $35,001 in damages, plus $12,887.67 prejudgment
interest, $7,288.87 attorney's fees, and $1,725.80 costs, for a
total judgment of $56,903.34.
Kodiak appeals the superior court's denial of its
summary judgment motion, the court's refusal to give the jury a
certain proposed instruction, its exclusion of evidence regarding
the knife and Brave's expert testimony, and its award of Alaska
Civil Rule 82 attorney's fees to Martha Samaniego.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a superior court's denial of a motion for
summary judgment under the independent judgment standard.2 Under
that standard, we determine whether any genuine issue of material
fact exists and whether the movant is entitled to judgment on the
law.3 We view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.4
In reviewing the superior court's rulings on jury
instructions, we apply our independent judgment to determine
whether the challenged or refused instruction states the law
correctly.5 We then evaluate whether any error was prejudicial
by putting ourselves " `in the position of the jurors and
determining whether the error probably affected their judgment.'
"6 The appellant bears the burden of proving prejudicial error.7
We review the superior court's evidentiary decisions
under the abuse of discretion standard.8 We will find that the
superior court abused its discretion only when we are left "with
a definite and firm conviction, after reviewing the record as a
whole, that the trial court erred in its ruling."9
We will overturn a superior court's award of attorney's
fees "only upon a showing of abuse of discretion or a showing
that the award is manifestly unreasonable."10
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Applied the Exigent
Circumstances Test To Determine Whether the Detention
of a Witness Is Permissible.
The issue of what test to apply to the detention of a
witness arose in two contexts during the trial proceedings.
First, Kodiak argued in its motion for summary judgment that
exigent circumstances existed as a matter of law. Therefore,
Kodiak argued, Marsh was authorized to use reasonable force to
stop Martha Samaniego, a potential witness, from leaving the
scene. In support of its position, Kodiak argues for the first
time on appeal that no exigency should be required for a police
officer to use reasonable force to detain the driver and
passengers of a vehicle for the duration of a traffic violation
investigation or INS investigation. Second, Kodiak appeals the
superior court's refusal to give Kodiak's proposed jury
instruction, which permitted the jury to find that Marsh was
legally justified in using reasonable force to stop Martha from
leaving the scene because she was a material witness to the INS
investigation of her mother.
1. Exigent circumstances are required to
justify the stop of a witness to a crime.
The court of appeals addressed the question whether
police may detain a witness at a crime scene in Metzker v. State11
and Castle v. State.12 In Metzker, it noted that "courts
generally seem to be in agreement that the fourth amendment does
not allow the police to stop potential witnesses to the same
extent as suspects of a crime."13 The court of appeals concluded
that "police are justified in stopping witnesses only where
exigent circumstances are present, such as where a crime has
recently been reported."14
Metzker involved a possible assault victim who ran away
from the police, was intoxicated, and may have been in need of
medical attention. After fleeing the police, the victim flagged
down a passing truck and left the scene. Another officer
responded to the request to locate and stop the truck. And
shortly thereafter, the second officer spotted the truck, stopped
it, and spoke with both the victim and the driver of the truck.
The Metzker court determined that these facts - specifically the
serious nature of the crime and a potentially injured victim -
constituted exigent circumstances thereby justifying the stop of
the truck driver as a witness to the crime.
The court of appeals revisited the question of when
police may detain a witness at a crime scene in Castle v. State.
In Castle, a Fairbanks police officer stopped a vehicle because
one of its headlights was out.15 The officer discovered that the
driver's license was revoked. As the officer took the driver
into custody, Castle, who was a passenger in the car, stepped out
of the car and walked away. The officer chased and caught
Castle, and searched him for drugs, finding plastic bags
containing cocaine residue. When Castle challenged the legality
of the stop, the state asserted that the officer was authorized
to stop Castle because the officer knew that Castle was a witness
to a crime: driving with a revoked license. The court of appeals
in Castle reiterated its holding in Metzker: "the police are
justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent circumstances
are present."16 The court concluded that the officer's seizure of
Castle could not be justified under the theory that Castle was a
witness to a crime because of the lack of exigent circumstances.17
The Castle court reasoned that the crime was over, that there was
no ongoing or recently committed unsolved crime, that the officer
had already taken the driver into custody, that the officer had
no reason to believe that Castle possessed knowledge that would
materially aid the investigation, and that the officer was not
acting to ensure the health or safety of a crime victim as was
the case in Metzker.18
Kodiak argues for the first time on appeal that we
should overrule Metzker and Castle and find that no exigency is
required for a police officer to detain the driver and all
passengers in the vehicle or at the scene for the duration of a
traffic stop. If the driver or passengers fail to comply with an
order to remain, Kodiak advocates permitting an officer to use
reasonable force to detain them at the scene.
In his treatise, Search and Seizure, LaFave endorses
the limits that the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
places on the detention of witnesses. He contends that the
Fourth Amendment does not allow potential witnesses to be stopped
to the same extent as those suspected of crimes.19 The Model Code
also supports requiring exigent circumstances for the stop of a
witness. It takes the position that an officer may detain a
witness only when: a serious crime occurred recently; the officer
reasonably believes that the witness's information will
materially assist in the investigation; and the detention is
necessary. The Code requires that
(i) [t]he officer [have] reasonable
cause to believe that a misdemeanor or
felony, involving danger or forcible
injury to persons or of appropriation of
or danger to property, has just been
committed near the place where he finds
such person, and (ii) the officer [have]
reasonable cause to believe that such
person has knowledge of material aid in
the investigation of such crime, and
(iii) such action is reasonably
necessary to obtain or verify the
identification of such person, or to
obtain an account of such crime.[20]
Many courts have adopted the exigent circumstances
requirement.21 The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ward
reasoned that no exigent circumstances existed to justify pulling
a driver over for questioning as a witness when there was no
crime "afoot" and no emergency situation nor any need for
immediate action - such as a fear that the driver would leave
town.22 And in Hawkins v. United States, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals found the stop of a crime victim unreasonable
when "there was no fast-moving scenario, no just-completed crime,
and no flight."23
While the brief detention of a potential witness may be
necessary under certain circumstances, we conclude, as did the
court in Metzker v. State24 and Castle v. State,25 that exigent
circumstances are required to justify the stop of a witness to a
crime. Accordingly, the superior court did not err in applying
the exigent circumstances standard to Kodiak's request for
summary judgment.
2. The superior court did not err in denying Kodiak's
motion for summary judgment.
Kodiak argues that the trial court erred in denying its
motion for summary judgment against Martha. In its motion for
summary judgment, Kodiak argued that Marsh was authorized to use
reasonable force to stop Martha, a potential witness, from
leaving the scene of an ongoing INS investigation of Julia
Samaniego. Kodiak cited the court of appeals's decision in
Metzker v. State26 for the proposition that a police officer may
use reasonable force to prevent a witness from leaving the scene
of a crime, where exigent circumstances exist. According to
Kodiak, because Marsh "reasonably believed the INS investigation
was continuing when Martha tried to leave the scene . . . [a]n
exigent circumstance" existed.
The superior court denied Kodiak's motion for summary
judgment, reasoning: "Based on sworn testimony presented by
[Martha Samaniego] with her opposition to the motion, a jury
could conclude that a reasonable officer would not have felt it
necessary or appropriate to use the force alleged to prevent
Martha from leaving the scene." The superior court determined
that Kodiak had not demonstrated, as a matter of law, that
exigent circumstances existed to excuse Marsh's detention of
Martha. We review the superior court's denial of a summary
judgment motion de novo.27
In order to determine that the superior court erred in
denying Kodiak's motion for summary judgment, we would need to
conclude that there is no factual dispute and that exigent
circumstances existed as a matter of law.28 As both Metzker and
Castle illustrate, the determination of whether exigent
circumstances exist is fact specific. The Metzker and Castle
courts each considered whether the crime involved was serious;
whether it was reasonable to believe that questioning the witness
would materially aid the investigation; and whether the health or
safety of a crime victim was at risk.29 The superior court was
correct in concluding that there were factual disputes as to the
reasonableness of Marsh's belief that Martha had information
regarding Julia's immigration status and that preventing Martha
from leaving would aid the INS investigation. Thus, summary
judgment was inappropriate because a factual dispute existed.
Additionally, the trial court was correct in its
conclusion that Kodiak had not demonstrated, as a matter of law,
that exigent circumstances existed to justify Martha's detention
as a witness. Kodiak argues that this case is analogous to
Metzker. According to Kodiak, Marsh was entitled to stop Martha
Samaniego as a witness to a crime because a federal misdemeanor
immigration offense had been admitted by Julia and was still
being investigated; Martha was a material witness to such an
offense; and questioning Martha could reveal useful information
about the crime such as whether or not a green card existed and,
if so, whether it was still valid.
But Kodiak's argument fails, as the facts of Metzker
are distinguishable from those in the case before us. In
Metzker, the court of appeals found the police officer's stop was
justified by exigent circumstances. Specifically, "the police
were justified in stopping [the vehicle] because a passenger in
that vehicle was thought to be an assault victim who had just
fled the police, who was intoxicated, and who was possibly in
need of medical treatment."30 Here, no such exigent circumstances
were present.
Indeed, this case is more analogous to Castle v. State,
where the court recognized that the officer "was not
investigating an ongoing or recently committed unsolved crime."31
Similarly, Julia Samaniego's crime was over - as soon as the INS
agent approached her and asked whether she had her immigration
documents or any form of identification, Samaniego admitted that
she did not. As in Castle, Officer Marsh "had no reason to
believe that [Martha Samaniego] possessed knowledge that would
materially aid" his investigation of Julia Samaniego's alleged
offense.32 Additionally, as in Castle, Officer Marsh was not
acting to "ensure the health or safety of a crime victim, as was
[the case] in Metzker."33 Thus, Kodiak failed to demonstrate, as
a matter of law, that exigent circumstances existed to justify
Marsh's stop of Martha Samaniego. We conclude that the superior
court did not err by denying Kodiak's motion for summary
judgment.
3. The superior court did not err in
refusing to give Kodiak's proposed jury
instruction because the superior court correctly
concluded that no exigency existed that would
justify detaining Martha as a witness .
Kodiak challenges the court's refusal to instruct the
jury "that Marsh was entitled to use reasonable force to stop a
material witness from leaving the scene of a criminal
investigation by the INS agents."
The proposed instruction provided:
William Marsh was legally justified to
use reasonable force to stop Martha Samaniego
from leaving the scene as a witness to the
INS investigation into Julia Samaniego's
immigration status if, based upon the
preponderance of the evidence, William Marsh:
1. Reasonably believed the INS
investigation into Julia Samaniego's
immigration status was ongoing at the time he
stopped Martha.
2. Exigent circumstances existed
at the time William Marsh stopped Martha
Samaniego.
First we must address whether Kodiak properly preserved
the right to appeal the superior court's refusal to give the
requested instruction. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 51
provides that a party may not assign as error the failure to give
a particular instruction "unless the party objects thereto before
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the
objection."34
Before closing arguments, jury instructions were
discussed. When Judge Gleason told the parties that it was
"time . . . for objections to instructions," Kodiak's attorney
raised the issue of its proposed instruction on reasonable force
to stop a material witness, stating:
And then you have given us legal
justification on the stopping of Martha at
the scene, those are 15 and 16, and we had
requested an instruction based on the theory
of Martha being a material witness, leaving
the scene, material witness to the
immigration investigation, potential criminal
investigation of Julia Samaniego, and I think
the court decided not to give us that?
Judge Gleason responded: "Right. My reading of the Metzker and
Castle cases would make that my view that that instruction is
inappropriate." To that, Kodiak's attorney replied: "Right."
Then the proceedings moved on without further discussion of the
court's refusal to give Kodiak's proposed instruction.
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides that a party
must object to the failure to give an instruction.35 Where an
attorney wishes to note an objection to the court's failure to
give an instruction, he or she must state "distinctly the matter
to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."36
Here, Kodiak's counsel's remark did not clearly lodge an
objection. On the other hand, Kodiak did broach the issue of the
trial court's failure to give its proposed instruction. While
Kodiak may have intended to raise the issue to challenge the
court's refusal to give the instruction, its response of "Right"
to the trial court's denial of the proposed instruction did not
distinctly state an objection or the grounds as required by Rule
51. However, even if the objection was preserved, Kodiak's claim
fails on the merits.
In reviewing a proposed instruction, we must consider
whether the proposed instruction correctly stated the law.37 The
proposed jury instruction asserted that if exigent circumstances
existed, Marsh was legally justified in using reasonable force to
stop Martha Samaniego from leaving the scene of the INS
investigation. The instruction states the holding of Metzker
correctly and in that sense correctly states the law. However,
Judge Gleason concluded that the exigent circumstances
requirement of Metzker and Castle was not satisfied, rendering
the proposed instruction inappropriate. A review of the record
supports her view because the key facts about the event at the
scene of the INS investigation are not disputed. It is
uncontested, for example, that Marsh grabbed Martha Samaniego.
The question then is whether Marsh's act of restraining Martha
was justified.
The trial court was correct in its determination that
no facts in the record suggested that "exigent circumstances"
existed at the scene. Marsh was not privileged to detain Martha
for Julia's investigation. As in Castle, Marsh "was not
investigating an ongoing or recently committed unsolved crime."38
Additionally, Marsh "had no reason to believe that [Martha
Samaniego] possessed knowledge that would materially aid" his
investigation of Julia's alleged offense.39 Finally, Marsh was
not acting to "ensure the health or safety of a crime victim, as
was true in Metzker."40 Thus, the superior court was correct in
rejecting the instruction because as a matter of law no exigent
circumstances existed.
B. The Superior Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Precluding Evidence of the Knife .
On April 9, 1994, before the confrontation with the
police, the Samaniego family went to a rodeo. At the rodeo,
Martha Samaniego found a knife, which she gave to her mother who
put it into her pocket. Besides keeping the knife away from her
kids, Julia Samaniego testified at her deposition that she did
not know what she planned to do with the knife.
Before trial, Julia and Martha Samaniego moved to
preclude at trial the presentation of evidence concerning the
knife that Julia possessed at the time of her arrest. Kodiak
opposed the Samaniegos' motion in limine, arguing generally that
evidence of the knife was relevant to its case and specifically,
with regard to Martha, that "Martha's attempted intervention into
the fray can [] be explained as an attempt to interfere with the
arrest and prevent the police from discovering the butterfly
knife."
The superior court ordered Kodiak not to introduce
evidence referring to or concerning Julia Samaniego's possession
of a knife, but noted that if Kodiak believed during trial that
the evidence had become admissible, it should raise the issue
with the court outside the presence of the jury. The superior
court found that while Julia Samaniego's possession of the knife
might have some relevance, the prejudicial impact of the evidence
outweighed its probative value.41
At trial, the subject of the admissibility of evidence
regarding the knife resurfaced. After Julia Samaniego's direct
testimony, the court discussed the issue of the knife with
counsel. The court engaged in a Rule 403 balancing and
reiterated its pretrial ruling that there would be no mention of
the knife at trial. The court concluded that evidence of the
knife might confuse the jury because the legality of the
possession was uncertain. The court reasoned that the issue of
the knife was "unnecessary or outside the central focus of the
issues in this case," and recognized that evidence of the knife
could result in unfair prejudice: "[A] jury is more likely to
make its decision on an emotional basis when a knife is flipped
out in front of them and they're advised that Mrs. Samaniego had
this knife on her [person] when, in point of fact, it was
irrelevant in stage one [Marsh's detention of Martha at the
car]."
On appeal, Kodiak argues that the superior court abused
its discretion in barring evidence of the knife from trial
because the evidence was relevant and important to its case. But
the superior court acknowledged that evidence of the knife was
relevant both in its pre-trial order and in its discussions of
the knife during trial. As this court has recognized,
"[r]elevant evidence is always subject to exclusion if, in the
discretion of the trial court, its probative value is outweighed
by the danger of prejudice or confusion, or by considerations of
undue delay."42 Our case law "recognizes that certain
circumstances call for the exclusion of evidence which is of
unquestioned relevance."43 Thus, while the evidence of the knife
may have been relevant to Kodiak's case, the superior court still
had considerable latitude to exclude that relevant evidence under
Alaska Rule of Evidence 403.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 provides that the superior
court may exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of
that evidence "is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."44 Consequently, we will
only overturn a superior court's Rule 403 balancing determination
if there has been an abuse of discretion.45
The superior court did not err in precluding evidence
regarding the knife. The court acted within its discretion in
finding that evidence of the knife could lead the jury to make
its decision on an emotional basis or could confuse the jury
because of uncertainty as to whether possessing the knife was
legal. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding evidence of the knife, we affirm the superior
court's decision.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Precluding Kodiak's "Use
of Force" Expert Witness.
Before trial, Julia and Martha Samaniego moved to
exclude at trial the testimony of Michael A. Brave, Kodiak's "use
of force" expert witness. Brave prepared an eight-page
preliminary expert witness report for Kodiak in 1996 in which he
addressed the use of a stun gun on Julia. He included two short
paragraphs that described Marsh's seizures of Martha as
"objectively reasonable." Brave based this assertion on his
belief that because Marsh and the INS agent had probable cause to
believe that Julia Samaniego had violated the law, Marsh had
reasonable suspicion to grab Martha as a witness to prevent her
from leaving the scene.
The superior court granted the motion to exclude
Brave's expert testimony, determining that Brave's opinion as to
the reasonableness of force standard would not assist the jury
and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of Alaska Rule of
Evidence 702. The court reasoned that this testimony would not
help the jury because it would "usurp[] the court's role of
instructing the jury on the applicable law." The superior court
also noted that Kodiak sought to have Brave apply the standard of
reasonable force to the facts of the case. The court found this
problematic because "[i]n so testifying, Mr. Brave may be making
his own credibility determinations regarding the witnesses in the
case."
On appeal, Kodiak argues that the superior court erred
in excluding Brave's testimony because the testimony would have
been helpful to the jury. Kodiak asserts that Brave would have
testified to the verbal and physical "options available to Marsh
as he confronted the situation of Martha walking away from a
criminal investigation scene." Kodiak maintains that Brave would
have explained to the jury "why, through the use of force," it
was important for Marsh to keep Martha Samaniego, a witness, at
the investigation scene. Brave did not make these points in his
report or in any subsequent offer of proof. Indeed the vast
majority of Brave's testimony went to the appropriate use of a
stun gun. Although Marsh used a stun gun on Julia Samaniego,
there was no stun gun involved in the incident between Marsh and
Martha.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility
of expert testimony at trial. The rule provides:
If scientific, technical, or otherwise
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.[46]
In Spenard Action Committee v. Lot 3, we explained that
Rule 702's helpfulness standard "requires that experts `stop
short of stating their own conclusions on [points that] the jury
is at least equally capable of [determining].' "47 Specifically,
in Spenard, we held that the superior court abused its discretion
in admitting police expert testimony that an establishment was
operating as a house of prostitution.48 We noted that courts
generally "prefer to let a jury apply general standards supplied
by experts to the specific facts of a case in order to reach its
own conclusion," rather than have the expert testify to her own
conclusion.49
The superior court acted within its discretion in
determining that Brave's testimony would not assist the trier of
fact. Brave's report contained solely conclusory opinions that
Marsh's actions toward Martha "were at all time[s] objectively
reasonable," and that Marsh's seizure of Martha was objectively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. But Brave's
legal conclusion that Marsh properly seized Martha as a material
witness conflicts with the trial court's correct conclusion that
exigent circumstances did not exist. The superior court did give
an instruction providing legal justification for Marsh's action
if the jury determined that Marsh reasonably believed that Martha
was subject to an INS investigation. Brave's expert testimony
would not have been helpful to the jury on this point because his
opinion was based on Martha's status as a witness, not as a
subject of investigation. Because the superior court did not
abuse its discretion, we affirm its decision on this issue.
D. The Superior Court Err Did Not Err in Declining To
Adjust Martha Samaniego's Attorney's Fees Award.
After trial, Martha moved for prejudgment interest and
attorney's fees. In response, Kodiak argued that Martha
Samaniego was not the prevailing party and thus not entitled to
attorney's fees. The superior court rejected Kodiak's argument
and awarded Martha Samaniego $12,887.67 in prejudgment interest
and $7,288.87 in attorney's fees.
On appeal, Kodiak argues that Martha Samaniego's
attorney's fees award should be adjusted downward because
Kodiak's award against Julia Samaniego was adjusted downward by
ten percent.
As a threshold matter, Kodiak argues this for the first
time on appeal. There is no evidence that Kodiak raised this
argument below and Kodiak has thus waived the argument.50
Moreover, we will overturn a superior court's award of attorney's
fees "only upon a showing of abuse of discretion or a showing
that the award is manifestly unreasonable."51 Kodiak has not made
such a showing. Martha Samaniego was the prevailing party in
this case and there is no basis for adjusting Martha's award
downward solely because the superior court saw fit to do so in
Julia's case. We affirm the superior court's award of attorney's
fees to Martha Samaniego.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the trial court did not err in denying Kodiak's
summary judgment motion, refusing to give a jury instruction
proposed by Kodiak, excluding Brave's expert testimony and the
evidence about the knife, and awarding attorney's fees to Martha
Samaniego, we AFFIRM the superior court's determinations.
_______________________________
1The appeals in Martha and Julia's cases were brought separately
and Julia Samaniego's appeal was decided in Samaniego v. City of
Kodiak, 80 P.3d 216 (Alaska 2003).
2Christensen v. NCH Corp., 956 P.2d 468, 474 (Alaska 1998).
3Id.; Geolar, Inc. v. Gilbert/Commonwealth Inc. of Michigan, 874
P.2d 937, 941 n.8 (Alaska 1994).
4956 P.2d at 474.
5General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Alaska
1998).
6Id. (quoting Vincent by Staton v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862
P.2d 847, 851 (Alaska 1993)).
7Id.
8Buster v. Gale, 866 P.2d 837, 841 n.9 (Alaska 1994) (citation
omitted).
9Id. (citation omitted).
10Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Alaska 1995).
11797 P.2d 1219 (Alaska App. 1990).
12999 P.2d 169 (Alaska App. 2000).
13797 P.2d at 1221.
14Id.
15999 P.2d at 170.
16Id. at 173 (quotations and citation omitted).
17Id. at 173-74.
18Id.
194 Wayne LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment 9.2(b) (3d ed. 1996).
20ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 110.0(1)(b)
(1975).
21United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973); Hawkins v.
U.S., 663 A.2d 1221 (D.C. 1995); State v. Ryland, 486 N.W.2d 210
(Neb. 1992) (concluding that stop violated the Fourth Amendment
when it was for sole purpose of obtaining witness statement about
previous accident because it was "not an emergency matter").
22488 F.2d at 162.
23663 A.2d at 1226-27.
24797 P. 2d 1219 (Alaska App. 1990).
25999 P.2d 169 (Alaska App. 2000).
26797 P.2d at 1221.
27Christensen v. NCH Corp., 956 P.2d 468, 474 (Alaska 1998).
28Id. at 474.
29Castle, 999 P.2d at 173-74; Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1222.
30Castle, 999 P.2d at 173 (citing Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1221).
31Id.
32Id. at 173-74.
33Id. at 174.
34Alaska R. Civ. P. 51(a).
35Id.
36Id.; see also Jaso v. McCarthy, 923 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Alaska
1996); Brown v. Estate of Jonz, 591 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1979);
Mitchell v. Knight, 394 P.2d 892, 897 (Alaska 1964).
37General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Alaska
1998).
38999 P.2d at 173.
39Id. at 173-74.
40 Id. at 174.
41See Alaska R. Evid. 403.
42Shane v. Rhines, 672 P.2d 895, 898 (Alaska 1983).
43Alaska R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note; see also Yukon
Equip. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 436 (Alaska 1983); Lerchenstein
v. State, 697 P.2d 312 (Alaska App. 1985).
44Alaska R. Evid. 403.
45Alaska Northern Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666
P.2d 33, 42 (Alaska 1983).
46Alaska R. Evid. 702(a).
47902 P.2d 766, 780-81 (Alaska 1995) (quoting 3 Christopher B.
Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 350, at 628
(1994)).
48Id. at 781.
49Id. at 781.
50See Willoya v. State, 53 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Alaska 2002).
51Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Alaska 1995).
