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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Wendte v. State, Board of Real Estate Appraisers (5/23/2003) sp-5694

Wendte v. State, Board of Real Estate Appraisers (5/23/2003) sp-5694

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
                                

RONALD W. WENDTE,             )
                              )    Supreme Court No. S-10558
             Appellant,            )
                              )    Superior Court No. 1JU-01-1359
CI
     v.                       )
                              )    O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, BOARD OF     )
REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS,       )    [No. 5694 - May 23, 2003]
                              )
             Appellee.             )
________________________________)


          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of  Alaska, First Judicial District,  Juneau,
          Patricia A. Collins, Judge.

          Appearances:  Robert S. Spitzfaden,  Gruening
          &  Spitzfaden,  APC, Juneau,  for  Appellant.
          Gayle   A.   Horetski,   Assistant   Attorney
          General,   and  Bruce  M.  Botelho,  Attorney
          General, Juneau, for Appellee.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          EASTAUGH, Justice.

I.        INTRODUCTION

          After Ronald Wendte was convicted of first degree theft

for   stealing  about  $250,000  from  three  children's   sports

programs,  the  Alaska Board of Certified Real Estate  Appraisers

suspended his real estate appraiser's license for two years.   It

did  so  under authority of AS 08.87.210(2).  The superior  court

affirmed  the suspension.  We also affirm, because  there  is  no

merit  to  Wendte's appellate arguments that there was  no  nexus

between his criminal conduct and his professional licensure,  and

that   the   board  failed  to  consider  relevant   or   current

information.  We conclude that substantial evidence supports  the

decision the board adopted, that there was a reasonable basis for

the  board's  licensure  action,  and  that  the  superior  court

correctly analyzed and rejected Wendte's administrative appeal.

II.       FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

           Ronald  Wendte  has  been  a residential  real  estate

appraiser   in  Ketchikan  since  he  opened  his  own  appraisal

business, Wendte Services, in 1978.  Wendte volunteered his  time

to  handle  the finances for several nonprofit children's  sports

organizations   in  Ketchikan.   His  volunteer  responsibilities

included   preparing gaming permit applications,  collecting  and

depositing revenues, issuing checks, and planning raffles.

          Between October 1993 and January 1997 Wendte stole over

$250,000 from the Ketchikan Little League, Little League District

2,  and  the Kayhi Girls Basketball Club.  In August 1998  Wendte

pled  no  contest to one count of first degree theft, a  Class  B

felony   offense.   Superior  Court  Judge  Michael  A.  Thompson

sentenced  Wendte to five years in prison, with  four  suspended,

and  to  ten years probation.  He also ordered Wendte to complete

1,000   hours  of  community  service  and  pay  restitution   of

$257,594.80.

          While Wendte was imprisoned, the Department of Commerce

and   Economic   Development,  Alaska  Division  of  Occupational

Licensing,  notified  him of its intention to  seek  disciplinary

sanctions  under AS 08.87.210(2) because of his theft conviction.

Through  his  attorney, Wendte negotiated an agreement  with  the

Division  of  Occupational Licensing to settle  the  disciplinary

matter.   The  agreement recommended five years  of  professional

probation and a $5,000 fine, payment of which would be stayed  so

long as he complied with the terms of his criminal probation  and

parole.   By its own terms, the agreement was subject to approval

by  the Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers.  In March 2000

the  board  unanimously  rejected the  agreement  and  issued  an

accusation  seeking either revocation or suspension  of  Wendte's

license.

          At Wendte's request, an administrative hearing was held

in  Juneau  in January 2001.  Wendte was represented by  counsel,

presented witnesses, and testified on his own behalf.  The record

also  included  letters  written  by  members  of  the  Ketchikan

community to support his retention of his license.  At  the  time

of the hearing, Wendte had repaid $2,602.12 of the $257,594.80 he

owed in restitution.

           Administrative Hearing Officer David G. Stebing issued

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed decision  in

July  2001; he concluded that Wendte's theft conviction qualified

as  a crime of moral turpitude under AS 08.87.210(2) and that the

board  had  discretion  to  reject Wendte's  agreement  with  the

division.   The  hearing  officer concluded  that  revocation  of

Wendte's  license was too harsh because Wendte's crime  was  "not

directly  related to his appraisal activities."   He  recommended

that  the board suspend Wendte's license for two years and  place

him on professional probation for five years after he returned to

active status.

           In September 2001 the board met to consider whether to

adopt  the hearing officer's proposed decision.  After conferring

in  executive  session, the board declined to permit  counsel  to

argue,  but  gave  Wendte  three minutes  to  address  the  board

members.   Immediately after Wendte completed his  comments,  the

board  unanimously voted to adopt the hearing officer's sanctions

recommendation.  Wendte's license was consequently suspended  for

two  years, effective December 2001, to be followed by five years

of probation.

            Wendte  appealed the board's decision to the superior

court.   He also petitioned the board to reconsider its decision.

He also asked the board and the superior court to stay suspension

of  his  license  pending the resolution of  his  superior  court

appeal.  The superior court ultimately denied Wendte's request to

stay his suspension.1

           In  February  2002  Superior Court Judge  Patricia  A.

Collins affirmed the board's decision.  The court held that there

was  substantial evidence to support disciplining  Wendte  for  a

crime  involving moral turpitude under AS 08.87.210(2)  and  that

the  board  properly acted within its discretion  in  sanctioning

Wendte.   The  court  held that "there is a  direct  relationship

between  a  conviction for theft and a professional's ability  to

reflect high ethical standards for the profession."

          Wendte appeals this order.

III. DISCUSSION

     A.   Standard of Review

          Because the superior court sat as an intermediate court

of appeal, we will independently review the merits of the board's

administrative determination.2

          We review findings of fact in appeals of administrative

decisions  under  the "substantial evidence" test.3   Substantial

evidence  is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable  mind  might

accept  as adequate to support a conclusion."4  In this case,  we

will review the administrative hearing officer's findings of fact

which were later adopted by the board and served as the basis for

suspension  of  Wendte's  license.  The superior  court  did  not

conduct a de novo review of the board's decision.

           When  an  appeal  of  an agency  decision  involves  a

question  of  statutory  interpretation,  we  apply  one  of  two

standards.5  The "reasonable basis" test applies when an issue of

law  requires agency expertise.6  When an issue of law  does  not

involve  agency  expertise, the "substitution of  judgment"  test

applies.7   Because  this appeal concerns a disciplinary  statute

authorizing  the  Board of Certified Real  Estate  Appraisers  to

exercise  its own discretion in sanctioning license  holders,  we

will apply the "reasonable basis" test.

     B.   The  Board  Had Authority To Sanction Wendte  Under  AS

          08.87.210(2).

           Under  AS  08.87.210(2), the Board of  Certified  Real
Estate  Appraisers may exercise its disciplinary powers under  AS
08.01.0758  if  the  board  finds that  an  appraiser  has  "been
convicted  of  a crime that involves moral turpitude."9   On  its
face, AS 08.87.210(2) only requires the board to find that a real
estate appraiser has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude
in order to exercise its disciplinary powers.
           The  parties do not dispute that Wendte's felony theft
conviction  is  a  crime of moral turpitude.10   Instead,  Wendte
argues  that AS 08.87.210(2) requires the board to find  a  nexus
between  a crime of moral turpitude and his ability to carry  out
his professional duties before issuing sanctions.  He claims that
because  the  board found both that his theft was  "not  directly
related to his appraisal activities" and that his "crime [had] no
direct  nexus  to his professional activity," he  should  not  be
sanctioned.
           Wendte's  argument is unconvincing.   Nothing  in  the
language  of  AS  08.87.210(2) suggests that the board  may  only
sanction  licensees  who commit crimes of moral  turpitude  while
they are performing their professional duties.  Wendte's argument
fails  to  recognize that criminal violations may bear  on  one's
fitness  to  practice  a  particular  profession,  regardless  of
whether  the violations are committed while the licensee performs
professional duties.
           In  Alaska,  it  is common for professional  licensing
statutes  to  permit  a  board to impose sanctions  for  criminal
misconduct  occurring outside the scope of required  professional
duties.11  We have upheld sanctions imposed against professionals
who  committed  crimes  of moral turpitude  when  they  were  not
carrying out professional responsibilities.12  Other courts  have
similarly   interpreted   professional   disciplinary    statutes
authorizing sanctions against licensees who have committed crimes
involving  moral  turpitude to cover crimes not  committed  while
they performed professional activities.13
          Although there are no reported Alaska cases applying AS
08.87.210(2),  we  have  held  in  two  comparable   professional
licensing  cases that a licensing board need not  establish  that
there  is  a nexus between a crime involving moral turpitude  and
one's  ability  to  carry out the professional  duties  to  issue
sanctions.   In  Kenai Peninsula Borough Board  of  Education  v.
Brown,  we upheld a school board's decision to dismiss a  tenured
teacher   convicted   of   the  crime  of   willfully   diverting
electricity,  which the board held was a theft, and  therefore  a
crime  of moral turpitude.14  We did not require a showing  of  a
nexus between the teacher's criminal conduct and his capacity  to
perform his job.15  Instead, we held that a "finding that a crime
involving  moral turpitude has been committed raises at  least  a
presumption that there is a nexus between the teacher's  act  and
the  teacher's  fitness  to teach."16  We observed  that,  "[t]he
legislature,   in   enacting  certain  criminal   statutes,   has
established minimum acceptable moral standards for the state as a
whole.   If a teacher cannot abide by these standards his or  her
fitness as a teacher is necessarily called into question."17
          In a later case involving the same teacher disciplinary
statute,  we upheld the dismissal of a teacher who years  earlier
had  engaged  in  sexual misconduct with a minor.18   Relying  on
Brown, we said, "it is well established that there need not be  a
separate  showing  of a nexus between the act or  acts  of  moral
turpitude  and the teacher's fitness or capacity to  perform  his
duties."19  We observed that if the school district had sufficient
evidence that Toney had committed an act of moral turpitude,  the
dismissal was valid.20
           The reasoning of Brown and Toney is persuasive. Alaska
Statute  08.87.210(2)  contemplates  a  nexus  between  a   crime
involving  moral  turpitude  and  the  ability  to  satisfy   the
requirements  of the profession.  We hold here that  there  is  a
presumed  logical nexus between any crime of moral turpitude  and
the  ability to satisfy the ethical standards of the real  estate
appraisal  profession.  The superior court correctly  noted  that
when professionals commit crimes involving moral turpitude "their
fitness  to  hold a position of trust is necessarily called  into
question."
           Alaska Statute 08.87.210(2) contemplates that a  crime
involving  moral  turpitude necessarily bears on  a  real  estate
appraiser's  trustworthiness, regardless of  whether  a  licensee
commits  such  a  crime while acting as a real estate  appraiser.
The  real  estate  appraisal profession requires reliability  and
honesty  of  its  members.  An appraiser who had been  the  first
chairman of the Alaska Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers,
Alfred  Ferrara, testified at Wendte's January 2001 hearing.   He
testified  that  the  purchase of a house is "often  the  largest
financial transaction many individuals ever get involved in."  He
explained that the appraiser is "the only objective party,  quite
often, in that transaction."21
          Wendte argues that he has rebutted any presumption of a
nexus  between a crime of moral turpitude and fitness to  perform
duties.   He cites the Brown court's observation that during  the
disciplinary hearing provided under the statute,  "[o]f course  .
.  . the teacher may attempt to demonstrate that the board should
retain the teacher despite the finding of a crime involving moral
turpitude."22   Wendte  claims that he  has  overcome  the  Brown
presumption because the board found that his crime did not have a
direct  connection with his real estate activities.  He therefore
claims he should not be sanctioned at all.
           Wendte's  argument is without merit.  The board  found

that  "Wendte's theft conviction is not directly related  to  his

appraisal  activities."   But  that  is  not  evidence  that   he

sufficiently rebutted the presumption that he was unfit to  be  a

real  estate  appraiser.  As discussed above, Brown held  that  a

finding that a crime of moral turpitude has been committed raises

at  least  a  presumption  that  there  is  a  nexus  between   a

professional's  act and his fitness to practice  his  profession.

Fitness to practice a regulated profession demands more than  the

professional's   capacity  to  perfunctorily  complete   required

activities.   The  board's finding that Wendte's  crime  was  not

directly  related to his  professional activities does not  rebut

Brown's  presumption that there is a nexus  between  a  crime  of

moral turpitude and one's fitness to hold a professional license.23

           The  plain  language of AS 08.87.210(2) suggests  that

there  is  a  connection between a crime of moral  turpitude  and

general  fitness  to  be  a real estate appraiser  regardless  of

whether  the  crime was committed in the course of  carrying  out

real  estate  appraising activities.  Because the board  properly

found  that  Wendte's theft was a crime of moral  turpitude,  the

board  had discretion to impose sanctions.24  We therefore affirm

the superior court's decision affirming the board's sanctions.

     C.   Double Jeopardy

          Wendte also argues that he cannot be sanctioned because

the  suspension of his professional license is a punishment  that

violates the prohibition on double jeopardy.

           In  Alaska,  revoking  or  suspending  a  professional

license is not "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes when  it

furthers a regulatory goal.  In State v. Zerkel, the Alaska Court

of Appeals held that administratively revoking a driver's license

for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test did not constitute

punishment  for  double  jeopardy purposes.25   The  court  there

observed that "[a] person who loses a professional license in  an

administrative  proceeding is not subjected to  `punishment'  for

double   jeopardy  purposes,  even  though  the   revocation   or

suspension  is  based on misconduct that could  be  or  has  been

prosecuted  as a criminal offense."26  The court recognized  that

professional license revocation does not punish the licensee, but

rather  serves the regulatory goal of protecting the public  from

unfit practitioners.27

            We  later  observed  in  State  v.  Niedermeyer  that

administrative revocation or suspension of a professional license

"can  legitimately  serve  to  deter  conduct  and  still  remain

`remedial' for double jeopardy purposes so long as the revocation

or suspension is based on conduct that bears a direct relation to

the government's regulatory goals or to the proper administration

and enforcement of the regulatory scheme."28

           Wendte  argues  that "the prohibition  against  double

jeopardy  prevents  sanctioning a licensee,  unless  there  is  a

direct nexus between the criminal conviction for a crime of moral

turpitude and the professional activity of the licensee."   Thus,

he  argues  that because the board found that his theft  was  not

connected  to  his  appraisal activities, the suspension  of  his

license does not bear a direct relation to the state's regulatory

goals.    Here  again,  Wendte  asserts  that  only  professional

activities should bear on his fitness as a real estate appraiser.

But  as  discussed above, there is a nexus between  committing  a

crime  of  moral turpitude and one's fitness to be a real  estate

appraiser.   Alaska  Statute 08.87.210(2)  reflects  the  board's

regulatory  goal  of maintaining high ethical standards  for  the

profession.

     D.   The Board's Decision Was Reasonably Based on Relevant and
          Current Information.
          
           Wendte argues that the board did not base its decision

on  relevant or current information.  He first contends that  the

board did not consider his post-conviction conduct, the effect of

the  hearing officer's proposed sanctions on his ability to  make

restitution  payments,  and  alternative  lesser  sanctions.   In

support,   he cites only State, Division of Insurance v. Schnell,

in  which  we  held  that an insurance agent  whose  license  was

suspended was entitled to present updated evidence regarding  his

professional conduct during the period of time after disciplinary

proceedings  had  been instituted.29  Without  conducting  a  new

hearing,  the  Alaska  Division of Insurance  took  almost  three

years, l992-95, to issue a decision disciplining Schnell, due  in

part to personnel changes at the division.30  We held that Schnell

was entitled to present updated evidence describing (1) his post-

1992  conduct, (2) the current effect that the hearing  officer's

proposed  sanctions  would have, and (3) alternative  supervisory

controls available through his employer.31  We concluded that this

evidence was highly relevant to the issue of sanctions.32

           Schnell  is  inapposite.  We directed the division  on

remand  to consider updated evidence because there was  a  three-

year  delay  between the hearing and the issuance of  a  decision

disciplining Schnell.  Schnell does not require licensing  boards

to  apply particular criteria when imposing sanctions.  Nor  does

Schnell  require boards to give any particular factors a  certain

weight.    Likewise,  AS  08.87.210(2)  here  grants  the   board

discretion   to  impose  sanctions  on  real  estate  appraisers.

Although  the board must exercise its discretion reasonably,  the

statute  does  not require the board to consider  any  particular

criteria when imposing sanctions.

           Nonetheless, the record establishes that  the  hearing

officer  did  consider Wendte's post-conviction conduct  and  the

effect  of  proposed  sanctions on Wendte's  life.   The  hearing

officer acknowledged that Wendte's real estate appraisal business

"was  rebounding  after his incarceration."  The hearing  officer

acknowledged  that  Wendte  was  not  able  to  work  during  his

incarceration,  but found it significant that he  had  paid  only

$2,602.12 of the $257,594.80 in restitution he owed at  the  time

of the January 2001 hearing.  The hearing officer also considered

alternative  sanctions  for Wendte.   Taking  into  account  that

Wendte's  crime was not perpetrated while conducting professional

activity, the hearing officer recommended that the board  suspend

rather  than completely revoke Wendte's license, even though  the

division had requested revocation.

           The  board  therefore considered the  "criteria"  that

Wendte  requested,  but drew a different conclusion  than  Wendte

would  have liked.  As Judge Collins concluded, "[i]t  is  fairly

clear  that the [b]oard simply assigned different weight  to  the

evidence than that suggested by Mr. Wendte."

           Wendte  next  argues that the board's  September  2001

decision  to  suspend  his  license  did  not  reflect  any   new

information about his conduct since the last hearing  in  January

2001.  He contends that because the board voted immediately after

Wendte  finished  speaking,  it  did  not  consider  the  updated

evidence  he offered.  Wendte argues that Schnell "mandates  that

the  [b]oard  hear updated information relevant to the  issue  of

sanctions before imposing sanctions."

           Wendte's  reliance  on  Schnell  is  again  misplaced.

Wendte  did  not experience a three-year delay between  his  last

opportunity  to  offer evidence and the issuance of  a  decision.

Wendte's administrative hearing took place in January 2001.   The

board  issued  its final decision in September 2001.   Less  than

eight  months  elapsed before the board imposed sanctions.   This

period  was too short to imply the likelihood of material changes

in Wendte's conduct.

           Although Wendte had only three minutes to address  the

board  at  the  September 2001 hearing, the board  was  under  no

obligation to allow either side to make any presentation.  As the

superior  court noted, the only updated evidence Wendte presented

at   the   September  2001  hearing  concerned  his  most  recent

restitution  payment  of $4,450, bringing his  total  payment  to

$7,000.   At  the  January hearing, Wendte had already  presented

evidence  that his business rebounded after he was released  from

prison,  submitted letters supporting him, and offered  testimony

of  witnesses  recommending  him as  an  honest  appraiser.   The

additional  restitution  is not legally significant,  given  both

that  a  large  amount  remained  unpaid,  and  that  restitution

payments  were  not  the  only factor  the  board  considered  in

sanctioning Wendte.33

            Wendte  also  argues  that  the  district  attorney's

sentencing  memorandum in the criminal case was insufficient  "to

set  forth the factual basis for Wendte's conviction."  He argues

that  he  is  not attacking the validity of his no-contest  plea.

Instead,  he  argues  that the board should  not  have  used  the

district  attorney's sentencing memorandum as a factual basis  on

which  to sanction him administratively because "[w]hether Wendte

did  what  the district attorney's sentencing memorandum  alleges

was never resolved in the criminal proceedings. . . . "

           The hearing officer's proposed decision relied on more

than  the  district  attorney's  sentencing  memorandum  for  its

account  of  the details of Wendte's theft.  To substantiate  his

findings  of fact regarding the circumstances of Wendte's  crime,

the  hearing officer cited Wendte's licensing file, the  judgment

and  order of commitment and probation in State v. Wendte,34  the

state's  sentencing memorandum and exhibits in State  v.  Wendte,

the  Division of Occupational Licensing's investigative  file  on

Wendte,   sentencing  letters,  and  the  transcript   of   Judge

Thompson's remarks at sentencing.

          Moreover, Wendte did not ask the hearing officer not to

consider the district attorney's sentencing memorandum.  He  only

objected  to the hearing officer using the sentencing  memorandum

to  establish any instances of theft other than those  the  state

advanced  at  Wendte's  no  contest  hearing.   Wendte  did  not,

however,  identify  any  particular passages  in  the  sentencing

memorandum which were unsubstantiated, nor does he do so now.  He

also has not demonstrated how the hearing officer's consideration

of  the  sentencing memorandum harmed him.   Wendte has therefore

waived  his  argument that the hearing officer  should  not  have

considered the sentencing memorandum.35

IV.  CONCLUSION

           We  AFFIRM  the superior court decision affirming  the

sanctions imposed by the board.

_______________________________
1     It  is not clear from the record whether the board formally
denied  Wendte's  request for a stay of his suspension.   In  its
brief,  the  state asserts that the board took no action  on  his
motion  and  that  it  was  therefore  deemed  denied  under   AS
44.62.540, which provides in part that "[i]f no action  is  taken
on   a   petition   within   the  time   allowed   for   ordering
reconsideration, the petition is considered denied."
2     Handley  v.  State, Dep't of Revenue, 838 P.2d  1231,  1233
(Alaska 1992).
3    Id.
4    Id.
5     Newmont  Alaska Ltd. v. McDowell, 22 P.3d 881, 883  (Alaska
2001).
6    Id.
7    Id.
8    AS 08.01.075 provides in part:

          (a)  A   board   may   take   the   following
               disciplinary actions,
          singly or in combination:
                    (1)  permanently revoke a license;
                    (2)  suspend a license for a specified period
               . . . .
9    AS 08.87.210 provides:

          The   board  may  exercise  its  disciplinary
          powers  under AS 08.01.075 if, after hearing,
          the  board  finds  a  certified  real  estate
          appraiser has
          (1)  violated a provision of this chapter  or
          a  regulation adopted by the board under this
          chapter;
          (2)   been convicted of a crime that involves
          moral turpitude; or
          (3)  committed, while acting as a real estate
          appraiser,  an  act  or  omission   involving
          dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation  with
          the  intent  to  benefit  the  appraiser   or
          another person or to injure another person.
10    Under Alaska law, an act of theft is commonly held to be an
act involving moral turpitude.  See Disciplinary Matter Involving
Schuler,  818  P.2d  138, 140 & n.1 (Alaska 1991)  (holding  that
attorney's  concealment  of  merchandise  was  crime   of   moral
turpitude);  Kenai Peninsula Borough Bd. of Educ. v.  Brown,  691
P.2d 1034, 1039 (Alaska 1984) (holding that teacher convicted  of
willfully  diverting  electricity had committed  crime  of  moral
turpitude); see also 52A C.J.S., Larceny  60(1)(b) (1968).
11    See, e.g., AS 08.88.071(a)(10) (authorizing board to revoke
or  suspend  license  if  real estate  broker  is  "convicted  of
forgery, theft, extortion, conspiracy to defraud creditors, or  a
felony  involving moral turpitude committed while licensed  under
this  chapter");  AS 08.04.450 (providing that board  may  revoke
license  of accountant for "conviction of any crime, an essential
element  of which is dishonesty or fraud, under the laws  of  any
state or the United States").
12     See, e.g., Disciplinary Matter Involving Schuler, 818 P.2d
138 (Alaska 1991) (upholding two-year suspension from practice of
law   for   district   attorney  convicted  of   concealment   of
merchandise); Kenai Peninsula Borough Bd. of Educ. v. Brown,  691
P.2d  1034 (Alaska 1984) (upholding dismissal of tenured  teacher
convicted of diverting electricity, a theft crime involving moral
turpitude).
13     See,  e.g., Jennings v. Karpe, 111 Cal. Rptr. 776,  777-78
(Cal.  App.  1974)  (holding that licensed real  estate  broker's
conviction for engaging in oral sex with minor was crime of moral
turpitude  and grounds for revocation of license even though  not
connected with licensee's activities as real estate broker); Carp
v.  Florida  Real Estate Comm'n, 211 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla.  Dist.
App.   1968)  (holding  that  registered  real  estate   broker's
bookmaking  conviction was crime of moral turpitude  and  grounds
for  suspension  or  revocation of registration);  Missouri  Real
Estate  Comm'n v. McCormick, 778 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. App.  1989)
(upholding  suspension  of  real estate  broker's  license  where
broker plead guilty to theft related to insurance business).
14    691 P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1984).
15     The  statute at issue in Brown, AS 14.20.170, provided  in
part that "[a] teacher . . . may be dismissed at any time for . .
. immorality, which is defined as the commission of an act which,
under  the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude . . . ."  See Brown, 691 P.2d at 1036 n.1.
16    Brown, 691 P.2d at 1041.
17    Id.
18     Toney v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist.,  Bd.  of
Educ.,  881 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1994).
19    Id. at 1114.
20    Id.
21    Ferrara initially testified at the January 2001 hearing that
he  "usually  [  ] would not refer someone . . . who  has  had  a
criminal  conviction of that type . . . ."   He  later  testified
that he would look at the appraiser's post-conviction conduct  to
see if he was doing good work.
22    Brown, 691 P.2d at 1041.
23     Cf.  Alaska R. Evid. 609 (allowing impeachment of  witness
based  on  conviction  of  crime involving  dishonesty  or  false
statement).
24     See  Toney,  881 P.2d at 1114 (holding that  dismissal  of
teacher  was  valid  as  long as school district  had  sufficient
evidence that Toney had committed act of moral turpitude); Brown,
691 P.2d at 1041 (holding that school board had met its burden of
going forward by finding that Brown had committed theft).
25    900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App. 1995).
26    Id. at 753.
27    Id. at 754.
28    14 P.3d 264, 269 (Alaska 2000) (quoting Zerkel, 900 P.2d at
757).
29    8 P.3d 351, 360-61 (Alaska 2000).
30    Id. at 354-55.
31    Id. at 360.
32    Id.
33    The board adopted the hearing officer's decision and did not
consider  evidence  beyond  the record  created  at  the  January
hearing.   In  addition  to payment of restitution,  the  hearing
officer considered Wendte's post-incarceration conduct, community
reaction to the crime, and the nature of Wendte's crime.
34    State v. Wendte, No. 1KE-97-99 Cr. (Alaska Super., March 22,
1999).
35     Walden v. Dep't of Transp., 27 P.3d 297, 304 (Alaska 2001)
("It is well-settled that a party must object to evidence at  the
time it is offered in order to preserve the issue on appeal.").