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Ford v. Ford (4/25/2003) sp-5683
Ford v. Ford (4/25/2003) sp-5683
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
email corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
HENRY H. FORD, )
) Supreme Court No. S-10188
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 1KE-99-382 CI
)
DARLENE D. FORD, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5683 - April
25, 2003]
_______________________________ )
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District,
Ketchikan, Michael A. Thompson, Judge.
Appearances: Karla F. Huntington, Anchorage,
for Appellant. Chrystal Sommers Brand,
Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Henry H. Ford appeals from the superior courts decision
upholding the settlement agreement reached between him and
Darlene D. Ford, its order enforcing the agreement, and its
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the superior
courts finding that the parties intended to enter into a
settlement was not clearly erroneous, and its enforcement order
was well within its discretion, we affirm its decision.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Darlene D. Ford and Henry H. Ford were married in Sitka
in 1978. In October 1999 Darlene sued for divorce, alleging that
Henry desired a divorce and that she would not contest a divorce.
Although Henry and Darlene had no children, they did have marital
property to divide.
Prior to his marriage to Darlene, Henry owned property
in Craig. During their marriage, Darlene and Henry developed the
property into the Ford Marina, although it is disputed as to how
much each party contributed. The marina is the parties primary
asset.
Darlene and Henry hired Vance Sanders to conduct a
mediation on August 31, 2000. Both parties were represented by
counsel during the mediation process. The mediation produced a
settlement, and the parties went into an empty courtroom to place
their agreement on the record. Because the mediation did not end
until approximately 6:30 p.m., no court personnel were present
when the parties recorded the settlement. Sanders recited the
settlement and, as he had invited counsel to do, was interrupted
numerous times by both parties counsel for clarification
purposes. At no time during the recital did Sanders ask Darlene
or Henry whether they understood the contents of the agreement,
whether the agreement was voluntarily entered into, or whether
they were willing to abide by its contents. Chrystal Sommers
Brand, counsel for Darlene, was responsible for preparing the
settlement documents.
On October 5 counsel for Henry, H. Clay Keene, informed
the Ketchikan court that the mediation had settled the case in
its entirety. That same day, Brand filed a notice of settlement
with the court. In it, Brand notified the court that the parties
had settled and that she was in the process of preparing the
settlement papers.
The parties scheduled a hearing to put the settlement
on the record on December 13. On November 28 Keene requested a
continuance of the hearing because Brand had failed to provide
him with a copy of the agreement. Brand filed a non-objection to
Keenes request. In it she stated that the hearing would only
entail entry of the final decree and findings, as the parties had
settled the case. The continuance was granted and the hearing
rescheduled for February 5, 2001. Prior to the February 5
hearing, Keene asked for another continuance because he had not
yet had the chance to review the settlement documents with Henry.
On February 14 Darlene moved to enforce the settlement
agreement. In the motion, Darlene argued, among other things,
that Henry had failed to vacate the marina by December 31, 2000
as the parties had agreed he would. Darlene further argued that
Henry had failed to remove his personal property from the marina,
failed to clean up the property, and failed to ensure that any
other persons residing there also vacated the property, as they
agreed he would. All of these actions, Darlene argued, had been
agreed upon so that the marina could be sold under the best
possible conditions as quickly as possible. Darlene and Henry
were then to divide the profits from the sale according to their
agreement.
Henry opposed Darlenes motion to enforce the settlement
agreement. He asked the court to allow the case to proceed to
trial with his new counsel, Michael P. Heiser. The basis of
Henrys objection and motion was that, at the time of the
mediation, he was in poor health. Henry claimed that because of
his health he could not concentrate during the mediation and did
not understand the true nature and consequences of his actions
and did not know how to express settlement intentions to his
attorney present at the conference. Henry claimed, All I [knew]
is [that] I needed to have the hearing end so I could get rest
and get away from the intolerable stress of the mediation.
Henry contended that had he not been in poor health, he
would have vigorously opposed the sale and distribution of the
marina, as he believed it to be his separate property, improved
and developed with his separate funds. Henry also claimed that
Darlene devoted very little, if any, effort to the management,
maintenance or improvement of the property and that [t]he title
to this property was put in both our names on advice of counsel
for estate planning purposes only. Henry also argued that
Sanderss failure to inquire as to whether Henry understood the
nature of the settlement and if he entered into the agreement
freely and voluntarily was grounds for finding no agreement had
occurred.
Darlene responded to Henrys objection to her motion to
enforce and she opposed Henrys cross-motion to set for trial.
Darlene contended that the transcript of the settlement recital
showed that Henry was an active participant in the proceeding.
Darlene also noted that Henry made no specific objections that
the settlement documents submitted by Brand did not conform with
the settlement agreed to at mediation. Thus, assuming the court
found the agreement was enforceable, Darlene argued that the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law should be
entered. Darlene attached an affidavit from Vance Sanders
stating that Darlene and Henry did reach a final settlement and
that the settlement was placed on the record.
In his reply, Henry requested an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the case should be set for trial. Henry filed
an additional affidavit on March 27. In it, he states:
I also want to point out that I was confused
about the purpose of mediation. I believed
that the mediation involved hashing out
various points of view before a referee. I
thought anything at the mediation was not
final until I had an opportunity to look over
a document and decide whether or not to sign
it. I thought a contract had to be signed.
I thought if I did not like what a document
said we could go to trial.
Superior Court Judge Michael A. Thompson held a hearing
on all pending motions in April 2001. At the hearing, Henry and
Darlene testified. Henry testified that the marina was his
separate property and that he had no recollection of the
placement of the settlement on the record, claiming that his
memory was very vague and that he did not understand the proposed
division of the marina. Henry testified that Darlenes only
participation with the marina was as its bookkeeper.
Darlene testified that she believed the marina was
marital property. After the parties were married, Darlene
claimed to have helped develop the marina, helping Henry to build
the dock as well as other tasks. Darlene also testified that she
understood the agreement at the time of the recital to be final
and binding.
The court found that the mediation had produced a
binding settlement agreement between the parties. Judge Thompson
then issued an order to enforce the settlement and signed the
decree of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law
submitted by Darlene.
Henry appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. We analyze a settlement agreement under traditional contract
principles.1 [C]ourts need not accept property settlements as
controlling when the facts indicate that an agreement was not
made with full understanding.2 Whether the parties to an
informal agreement become bound prior to the drafting and
execution of contemplated formal writings is a question of
intent.3 We determine the parties intent under the clearly
erroneous standard by looking to the surrounding facts and
circumstances in each case.4 A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when [we are] left with a definite and firm conviction
that the trial court has made a mistake.5
We review questions regarding a trial courts response
to a motion to enforce a settlement under the abuse of discretion
standard.6 We will find an abuse of discretion has occurred
when, after a review of the entire record, we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that the trial court has erred in
its ruling.7
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Courts Finding that Darlene and Henry Intended
To Enter into a Final Agreement when They Placed Their Property
Settlement on the Record Directly After Mediation Was Not Clearly
Erroneous.
Henry contends that the trial court erred in
determining that the recital of the agreement reached on August
31 was a final and binding settlement. We disagree.
1. Expressed intentions
1. Henry claims he did not think recitation of the agreement
after mediation constituted a final agreement. In determining
the parties intent, [we] look first to the parties expressed
intentions.8
a. The transcript
Preliminarily, Henry notes that the transcript
available to the superior court is incomplete as it ends before
the termination of the proceeding.9 Henry argues that Judge
Thompson could not have properly assessed whether the recital led
to a binding settlement because he did not rely on a complete
transcript of the proceeding. From his comments at the hearing,
it appears that Judge Thompson relied on the incomplete
transcript. Judge Thompson made reference to page numbers from
the incomplete transcript at the hearing.
Henrys argument was not raised below and is therefore
waived. Moreover, the superior courts failure to use a complete
transcript in rendering its decision was not clearly erroneous.
The dialogue missing from the transcript used by the trial court
only further supports Judge Thompsons findings that Henry
intended the settlement to be binding, as it makes clear the
parties intent that the agreement is final. There are some minor
instances where the incomplete and complete transcripts differ;
however, none of these differences provides any basis for
reversing the trial courts decision.
b. Judge Thompsons findings
a. At the April 12 hearing, Judge Thompson found that the
degree of Henrys participation indicated his intent to engage in
a final, binding process on the day of mediation. Judge Thompson
noted eleven separate instances in the recital process where
Henry made topical and relevant observations regarding settlement
of various issues:
The subjects being discussed at the time hes
making his contribution, all of which seem
sensibl[e] contributions on his part where he
points out the difficulty in disposing of a
documented vessel, where he reminds the
participants that Ms. Ford cant mail firearms
. . . . I mean these are all very sensible
observations. [These do] not appear to be
observations that would be made by a person
who is in so much pain [he] can hardly be
aware of whats going on around him. He seems
to have been a full-fledged participant
there.
There is no expression to suggest that Henry was
suffering any type of pain, that he in some way did not agree
with the final settlement, or that he did not understand what was
taking place. Henry argues that this is because he tuned out and
just wanted the mediation to be over.
We rejected a similar argument in Pavek v. Curran.10 In
Pavek, Curran was present and spoke at the hearing11 and did not
object to the terms of the agreement.12 Curran then claimed she
did not understand the significance of the agreement and alleged
that the settlement was invalid.13 We found Currans claim
groundless, finding that her presence at the hearing without
objection and her participation in it implied her understanding.14
Similarly, in light of Henrys active participation, particularly
at the end of the day when he now alleges he was exhausted and
unable to understand the process, the superior courts finding
that Henry intended to settle the case on August 31 was not
clearly erroneous.15
c. The proposed later reduction of the settlement to writing
Henry next argues that the parties stated intention to
reduce the agreement to writing shows that their oral recital was
not a binding agreement. But a brief review of all of the
participants statements shows the incorrectness of Henrys
position. Sanders began the recital process by stating that a
settlement had been reached and was going to be placed on the
record. Brand stated that it was her intent to put the agreement
in written form so that the parties could have something to
reference but that the settlement was final. Keene stated that
the agreement, as stated on the record, was binding on Henry and
Darlene. Sanders ended the proceedings by stating that Alaska
law was clear the parties would be held to the settlement as set
out at that point by the parties. Under these circumstances, the
references to a later writing do not support Henrys position that
the recital was not final and binding.
d. Henrys age and condition
a. Henry also claims that his age and condition affected his
understanding and that it was error for Judge Thompson to find
that his age could only have benefitted him throughout the
mediation process. It is true that Henry has well-documented
medical problems and that he was 73 years of age at the time of
the litigation below. There is no evidence, however, that these
conditions affected Henry at the mediation. Moreover, Henry was
represented by counsel. Neither Keene nor any doctor has
submitted an affidavit stating that Henry was incompetent at the
time, that he did not understand the proceedings, or that he had
trouble concentrating. And his active participation throughout
the recital process undercuts his present claim. Henry asserts
that he felt safe in tuning out because he did not believe the
agreement was final, but there is no contemporaneous evidence
that Henry did in fact tune out.
Rather, Henry actively participated in discussions on
how the marina would be divided: Henrys counsel asked how an
allowance granted to Darlene for her efforts in marketing the
marina would be impacted by expenditures over the alloted amount.
When Henry heard the answer, he commented, Thats fair. He
volunteered to contact the Coast Guard regarding disposal of
garbage at the marina. Henry also stated that he would work to
ensure that a vessel was removed from the marina prior to his
vacating the property. He discussed how profits from the sale of
oil containers would be shared. In all, he contributed no less
than seven comments to the discussion concerning the marinas
division.
From these statements, we conclude that Judge Thompsons
findings that Henry not only participated at the mediation, but
that it was his intent for Darlene to sell the property and that
the proceeds from that sale would be distributed to the parties,
and that Henry intended the settlement to be binding, were not
clearly erroneous.
e. Extrinsic circumstances
Henry last argues that extrinsic circumstances support
his contention that he did not intend to be bound by the
agreement. While the trial court pointed to the delay from the
August mediation to Henrys first objection to the settlements
validity in February as evidence that Henry originally intended
to be bound and was now only suffering from buyers remorse, Henry
argues that during the entire period he did not believe any
agreement had occurred; therefore he had no reason to ask his
lawyer to try and rescind the agreement. Henry claims his delay
was simply the result of Brands delay in reducing the agreement
to a written document. Henry argues that his failure to abide by
the agreement was further evidence of his not knowing that it was
binding.
Henrys argument does not account for what actually
occurred during the recital and is not persuasive as to what
occurred later. Henry was present after the mediation when
Sanders, Brand, and Keene (Henrys lawyer) stated that the
agreement was binding. Moreover, it is not entirely true that
Henry failed to abide by the agreement. At one point Keene
requested an extension of the date Henry was to leave the
property, which suggests that Henry did in fact know there was an
agreement. Also, at both sides request, the trial was taken off
the calendar, and no further settlement conferences or litigation
ensued. Yet Henry took no step to resolve a matter that,
according to his present position, was unresolved. Finally, we
agree with Darlenes contention that to credit Henrys argument
that his failure to abide by the agreement is evidence that he
did not believe he was bound by it opens the door for any party
to a contract to breach the contract and then use that breach as
evidence of his or her belief that no contract had been entered.
2. Enforcing an agreement where the mediator failed to ask the
parties whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily and
whether they understood the agreement does not violate public
policy.
1. Henry contends that it would violate public policy to
enforce an agreement where no one asked the parties whether they
had entered into it voluntarily, understood its contents, and
agreed to be bound. Henry argues that the presumption of
enforcing settlements should not apply in these circumstances.
Darlene responds that any such magic words requirement would
itself be against public policy. We agree with Darlene.
Henry argues that, because he was not asked whether he
entered into the agreement voluntarily, no valid settlement was
reached. He claims that the court erred in applying the
presumption in favor of settlement,16 as that presumption only
applies to those settlements that are valid. Henry misconstrues
both the law and Judge Thompsons statements. In his remarks,
Judge Thompson stated that settlements are favored and should be
enforced. But Judge Thompson was careful to note that the
presumption applied only to a valid settlement: for their own
sake we should enforce settlements when theyre reached. (Emphasis
added.) Thus, it is clear that the court carefully determined
the settlement to be valid before it applied the presumption of
enforcement.
In Crane v. Crane,17 we held that a party need not
expressly state on the record that it entered into a settlement
agreement voluntarily for the agreement to be considered valid.18
We made this finding based on the fact that Crane was represented
by counsel and by looking to the record.19 Henry distinguishes
himself from Crane by arguing that, unlike Crane, he did not have
the final settlement agreement before him, he was not present
before a superior court judge, and he was not required to read or
sign off on a written document. These distinctions do not call
for a different result. Henry did not have an agreement before
him because the parties had yet to put the oral agreement into
written form. And the presence of a superior court judge is not
required for the parties to enter into a binding agreement.
Henry argues the lack of a judge is evidence that he did not
intend the recital to be final. However, non-judicial settlement
officers, mediators, and arbitrators are frequently used and
Henrys rule would require a judges presence to complete an
agreement in any of these settings, an obviously unattractive
rule.
It is true that this case would be easier for us and
would have been easier for the superior court if the mediator
had directly addressed the parties during the recorded session
and confirmed that each understood the settlement and agreed with
it. Simple affirmations by the parties of their understanding
and intent to be bound may have obviated the need for an
extensive evidentiary hearing and for later detailed reviews of
the recitations made at the recorded session. Nonetheless, we
reject Henrys contention that, without particular questions or
recitations when a settlement is put on the record, either party
may successfully attack the settlement. We encourage judges and
mediators who conduct settlement proceedings, and who reach
settlements, to confirm on the record directly with the parties
their understanding of the settlement and their intentions to
enter into it, but we reject the proposition that the failure to
conduct such inquiries is necessarily fatal to the entry of a
settlement.
It was not clear error for Judge Thompson to find that
Henry did intend to settle. It was not an abuse of discretion
for Judge Thompson not to have required statements of
voluntariness from the parties for the agreement to be valid.
B. The Trial Court Properly Entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Minor Factual Errors in the Findings and
Conclusions Do Not Require Reversal.
Henry claims the trial court committed legal error by
not reading the findings of fact and conclusions of law before
signing them. He points to two mistaken dates20 and a
misstatement that Henry appeared personally rather than
telephonically at the hearing. Henry also notes a substantive
error in the divorce decree: The property table states that the
Ford Marina is valued at $1,400,000 and apportions $700,000 to
both Darlene and Henry, whereas paragraph 2 of the decree states
that fifty-five percent of the value of the marina should be
distributed to Darlene and forty-five percent to Henry.
Darlene argues in response that Henry never properly
objected to these factual errors at the trial court level to
allow for their correction. She further contends that the errors
are merely clerical and do not affect the substance of the
divorce decree or findings of fact and conclusions of law. We
agree with Darlene.
Henry failed to bring these errors to the superior
courts attention after initially requesting additional time to
bring objections under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b),
raising the possibility that he waived the alleged errors. But
we need not decide whether Henrys failure to file objections
under Rule 78(b) constituted a waiver of these arguments, because
Henrys arguments for reversal lack merit.
Although Henry is correct that the decree of divorce
and findings of fact and conclusions of law do contain factual
errors, the errors are not substantial.21 They hardly constitute
evidence that Judge Thompson did not read the documents.
Further, the one substantive error does not warrant undoing the
settlement. This is because the mistake in the distribution in
the property table is evident from the text of that table. The
property table states entire property (upper and lower) to be
sold and proceeds distributed as set forth in Paragraph 2 below.
Paragraph 2 thus controls and the division should be governed by
the fifty-five percent/forty-five percent division in Darlenes
favor found in that paragraph. Moreover, even if the document
were ambiguous, the transcript of the recital of the agreement
makes clear that the parties intended a fifty-five percent/forty-
five percent split. There is, therefore, no basis to reverse the
superior courts findings and conclusions. It is sufficient that
the superior court correct the clerical errors concerning dates,
note that Henry participated telephonically rather than in person
at the hearing, and insert the correct distributional figures
(fifty-five and forty-five percent of $1,400,000 for Darlenes and
Henrys shares, respectively, of the marina).
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Issuing the
Order To Enforce the Settlement Agreement.
A. Henry argues that the order to enforce the settlement
agreement grossly exceeded the terms of the actual agreement, a
modification the court did not have the power to enforce. We
disagree.
Under the decree Darlene was charged with marketing the
marina, and Henry agreed to undertake certain tasks to aid in
that endeavor. The decree provided Darlene with payment for her
services and advanced her the sum of $3,500. Darlene was to
notify Henry of proposed expenditures in excess of this amount
and obtain his consent. Darlene and Henry would then split these
costs. When Henry failed to meet his obligations, Judge Thompson
ordered Henry to pay Darlene $10,000 as an advance for her
expenses in hiring people to help her clean up the Ford Marina.
Henry claims this was a unilateral modification of the property
settlement and thus impermissible.
Henry relies on Davis v. Dykman,22 where we found a
settlement agreement invalid because it was uncertain.23 The
agreement failed to state a dollar amount of the settlement or
any method for calculating the dollar amount.24 Although the
parties asked the superior court to fill in this gap for them, we
held that [t]he courts should not impose on a party any
performance to which he [or she] did not and probably would not
have agreed. 25 Henry argues that the trial court should not have
been allowed under Davis to order the additional payment. But
Davis is inapposite. Here the trial court was faced with
remedying a breach, not filling in the gaps of an agreement.
Henry did not fulfill any of his responsibilities under the
agreement with regard to the Ford Marina. He did not clean the
property, sell the equipment on the property, or ensure the
property was vacated by its tenants. Indeed, the condition of
the property allegedly worsened after the August 31 mediation.
In order to remedy the situation, Darlene requested in
her motion to enforce that she be entitled to take all necessary
actions and be compensated for her actions to ready the marina
for sale. She also requested that she be advanced $10,000 for
this purpose. Judge Thompson thus ordered Henry to pay Darlene
an advance of $10,000 to accomplish this. Henry did not object
to this request at the superior court level and only now voices
his opposition. The order falls within the superior courts
powers to enforce its own orders26 and was not an abuse of the
courts discretion.
Henry also asks that the award of attorneys fees be
vacated as an improper exercise of the courts authority. We
decline to consider the argument because it is inadequately
briefed.27
V. CONCLUSION
The superior courts finding that Henry intended to be
bound by the recorded recital of the parties settlement agreement
after mediation on August 31 was not clearly erroneous. The
superior court properly issued findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and factual errors in the findings should be corrected
upon remand. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in
issuing the order to enforce the property settlement. We
therefore direct that the clerical and computational errors in
the decree be corrected upon remand and we AFFIRM the decision of
the superior court.
_______________________________
1 Courts will treat settlement agreements as contracts
provided they meet minimal contractual requirements. Crane v.
Crane, 986 P.2d 881, 885 (Alaska 1999) (citing Gaston v. Gaston,
954 P.2d 572, 574 (Alaska 1998); Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002,
1006 (Alaska 1997)). To form a contract, an offer including all
essential terms, an unequivocal acceptance of those terms by the
offeree, consideration, and an intent to be bound by the contract
are required. Young v. Hobbs, 916 P.2d 485, 488 (Alaska 1996).
2 Notkin v. Notkin, 921 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Alaska 1996).
3 Juliano v. Angelini, 708 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Alaska 1985).
4 Id.
5 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002).
6 Dickerson v. Williams, 956 P.2d 458, 462 (Alaska 1998).
7 Liimatta v. Vest, 45 P.3d 310, 313 (citing Peter Pan
Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375, 378-79 (Alaska 1982)).
8 Juliano, 708 P.2d at 1291.
9 A transcript prepared by another transcriber was lodged
with this court and contains a complete record of the proceeding.
10 754 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1988).
11 Id. at 1126-27.
12 Id. at 1127.
13 Id. (alleging agreement did not provide enough security
in the event Pavek defaulted on payments).
14 Id.
15 It is true that we qualified our holding in Pavek by
noting that Curran made no claim that she was defrauded or under
duress. Id. Although Henry does allege duress here, Judge
Thompson found Henry was not a credible witness on this point
when he testified at the April 12 hearing, a finding within the
ambit of the superior court, not the appellate. Barios v. Brooks
Range Supply, Inc., 26 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Alaska 2001) (Witness
credibility determinations are left to the trial court.).
16 [S]tipulations and settlements are favored in law
because they simplify, shorten and settle litigation without
taking up valuable court resources. Murphy v. Murphy, 812 P.2d
960, 965 (Alaska 1991) (internal quotations omitted). This
principle applies in the context of divorce property settlements.
Notkin v. Notkin, 921 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Alaska 1996).
17 986 P.2d 881 (Alaska 1999).
18 Id. at 886.
19 Id.
20 Henry argues that [b]oth the decree and findings
erroneously state that the Divorce hearing was on February 5, not
April 13. (The hearing was actually on April 12.) And he notes
that the Decree of Divorce misstates the date of the initial
recitation as August 2001, not August 2000.
21 The decree as well as the findings both state the
hearing took place on February 5, whereas it actually occurred on
April 12. That is most likely because the hearing was at one
point scheduled for February 5. These pleadings were lodged
January 30, 2001 to allow Henry five days to make objections to
them under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) in order that
they could be signed at the February 5 hearing.
The statement that Henry appeared personally rather
than telephonically is factually incorrect, although it may
merely reflect incorrect usage. The decree does contain a
typographical error concerning the year of mediation.
22 938 P.2d 1002 (Alaska 1997).
23 Id. at 1006.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1007 (Alaska 1997) (quoting Rego v. Decker, 482
P.2d 834, 837 (Alaska 1971)).
26 Johnson v. Johnson, 544 P.2d 65, 72 (Alaska 1975)
(noting that the courts inherent power to enforce its decrees may
justify a court in going even beyond the parties requests).
27 Stoshs I/M v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 12 P.3d 1180,
1183 & n.12 (Alaska 2000).
