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Hixson v. Sarkesian (3/28/2003) sp-5677
Hixson v. Sarkesian (3/28/2003) sp-5677
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ELIZABETH M. S. HIXSON, )
) Supreme Court Nos. S-
10316/10335
Appellant/ )
Cross-Appellee, ) Superior Court No.
) 1JU-90-00514 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
MICHAEL S. SARKESIAN, )
) [No. 5677 - March 28, 2003]
Appellee/ )
Cross-Appellant. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau,
Larry C. Zervos, Judge.
Appearances: Elizabeth M. S. Hixson, pro se,
Juneau, Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Keith B.
Levy, Law Office of Keith B. Levy, Juneau,
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, and Bryner, Justices. [Carpeneti,
Justice, not participating.]
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The superior court granted Michael S. Sarkesians motion
to modify child support. Elizabeth M. S. Hixson argues that the
superior court erred in calculating Michaels income and that the
superior court should have enforced an earlier settlement
agreement for child support above that required by Alaska Civil
Rule 90.3. Michael S. Sarkesian filed a cross-appeal claiming
that his alimony obligations to his former wife terminated when
she remarried, that he was not obligated to pay certain of the
childrens unreimbursed medical expenses, and that he should have
been awarded attorneys fees by the superior court. Although we
affirm the superior courts decision to modify the child support
award, we reverse the superior courts imposition of Rule 90.3s
income cap and remand to the superior court to award child
support based on Sarkesians actual reduced income. We affirm the
superior courts decision in all other respects.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Elizabeth M. S. Hixson and Michael S. Sarkesian
divorced on May 23, 1991; they had two children during their
marriage.1 Sarkesian lived in Switzerland at the time of the
divorce and continues to live there. In June 1992 Superior Court
Judge Larry C. Zervos, who presided over the divorce trial,
ordered Sarkesian to pay $2,550.80 per month in child support.
The superior court also ordered Sarkesian to purchase health
insurance for the children, to pay their unreimbursed medical
expenses, and to pay for their transportation costs associated
with visitations. Deducting these expenses from Sarkesians
ordered child support reduced his monthly child support payment
to $2,138.80. Sarkesian was allowed to claim the children on his
future tax returns. Sarkesian was also ordered to pay
rehabilitative alimony of $1,000 per month for thirty months to
allow [Hixson] the time and opportunity to finish her degree and
prepare to start work.
Both sides appealed the child support, spousal support,
and property distribution awards. In a memorandum opinion and
judgment, we remanded for an adjustment of Sarkesians income, a
reduction in the property distribution to Sarkesian, and
justification of the imposition of the income cap and the amount
of the alimony award.2 Other minor matters not relevant to the
present appeal were also addressed.
Upon remand, the parties reached a settlement agreement
rather than pursue another trial. The agreement incorporated
most aspects of the prior superior court decision and calculated
the existing balances that Sarkesian owed to Hixson. The
settlement document stated that it was [t]he expressed intent of
both parties . . . to end this litigation, to stop the
possibility of further appeals and to prevent the expenditure of
additional attorneys fees.
On August 3, 2000, Sarkesian filed a motion to modify
child support based upon a decline in his income. The principal
ground claimed for the decline in income was the assertion that
he had changed employers and no longer received bonuses.
Sarkesian contended that his income had declined by more than the
fifteen percent threshold listed in Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1).3
Sarkesian further claimed that the law had been amended to allow
for a seventy-five percent reduction in child support, as opposed
to the fifty percent allowable reduction at the time of the
initial divorce settlement, for visitation longer than twenty-
seven consecutive days4 and that the childrens travel expenses
should be modified because of the reduction in his income.5
The superior court, Judge Zervos again presiding,
entered judgment on June 18, 2001. Judge Zervos found there to
be a material change in circumstances for Sarkesian because the
substantial decline in the value of the Swiss franc as compared
to the American dollar is sufficient to make a prima facie case
of a 15 percent decline in income. Judge Zervos consequently
adjusted the exchange rate by averaging the rate in use on the
date of the trial and the rate Sarkesian used in his 2000 tax
return. This resulted in a decrease of more than fifteen percent
in Sarkesians income. Because this decrease exceeded the
requirements of Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1), Judge Zervos concluded
that Sarkesian had established the material change in
circumstances necessary for an adjustment in child support
payments. Judge Zervos subsequently imposed the $84,000 income
cap contained in Civil Rule 90.3(c)(2) to the calculation of
Sarkesians child support obligations.
Judge Zervos also addressed a variety of other issues.
Judge Zervos allowed Sarkesian to deduct 1,500 Swiss francs (CHF)
of a 2,000 CHF housing allowance from income because Sarkesian
used one-third of the house, which had a monthly rent of 4,500
CHF, as office space. Judge Zervos found that a disputed car
lease was no longer relevant to calculating Sarkesians income.
Judge Zervos further ordered that Hixson list her children under
her employers health insurance, though Sarkesian was to pay one-
half of the cost of covering the children if this would result in
additional costs to Hixson. Sarkesian was ordered to pay four-
fifths of the unreimbursed medical expenses of the children.
Transportation costs were adjusted due to the children now being
able to travel alone. Judge Zervos also ordered that Sarkesians
child support obligations be reduced by seventy-five percent
during periods of extended visitation.
On appeal, Hixson challenges the calculation of
Sarkesians income, the constitutionality of the income cap, the
re-litigation of child support following a settlement agreement
designed to end litigation regarding the divorce, and the alleged
requirement that she bear the burden of proving the children had
special needs necessitating the waiver of the income cap. On
cross-appeal, Sarkesian argues that his alimony obligation to
Hixson ceased upon her remarriage, that he should not be required
to pay for the childrens orthodontia and contact lenses, that he
should not have been required to pay four-fifths of the childrens
unreimbursed medical expenses, and that the trial court should
have awarded him attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing
party.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Modifications of child support are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.6 An abuse of discretion exists
where based on the record as a whole this court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 7
Questions of law are reviewed de novo.8 Questions of
constitutional law are also reviewed de novo.9 The
interpretation of an agreement between two parties is a question
of law to which we apply our independent judgment.10 Awards of
attorneys fees in modification of child support cases are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.11 Attorneys fees awarded
pursuant to Civil Rule 82(b)(1) are presumptively correct.12
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Calculating
Sarkesians Income.
Hixson alleges that the superior court erred in
calculating Sarkesians income because it improperly accounted for
the housing and auto allowances provided by his employer. Hixson
contends that only one room of the house was used for office
space and that even then it was only used for ten days a month.
Hixson argues that Sarkesians employer could have rented an
office elsewhere and that thus Sarkesian was receiving a benefit
that was not a business expense. Hixson further claims that
Sarkesian received his excessive allowances because he is the
only board member with sole signatory powers and can therefore
manipulate the business affairs of the company to his benefit.
Hixson also contends that Sarkesian manipulated an auto lease for
a BMW, portraying it as a company car when it was actually for
his own personal use.
Hixson in essence is attempting to reargue on appeal
her case below. However, Judge Zervos did not abuse his
discretion in excluding the car from Sarkesians income and in
allowing Sarkesian to deduct a portion of his housing allowance
from his income. Commentary III.B to Civil Rule 90.3 states that
[e]xpense reimbursements and in-kind payments such as use of a
company car, free housing or reimbursed meals should be included
as income if the amount is significant and reduces living
expenses. Sarkesian presented testimony at trial that the
disputed reimbursements did not reduce his living expenses. He
testified that the automobile lease had been terminated and that
the vehicle was not subsequently replaced. Sarkesian also
testified that one of the levels of his house is used exclusively
as a business office. The level has its own separate entrance
and is equipped with standard business equipment. This testimony
supports Judge Zervoss conclusion that the auto lease was no
longer relevant to calculating Sarkesians income and that he
could deduct one-third of the monthly rent of his house from his
housing allowance. While it may be possible to interpret matters
as Hixson suggests, it is not clear that Judge Zervos has made a
mistake in his factual determinations. His ruling is therefore
affirmed.
B. The Superior Court Erred by Reinstating the Income Cap
Despite the Settlement Agreement to the Contrary.
In the settlement agreement reached following the
remand of their divorce case after the first appeal, the parties
agreed that Sarkesian would make monthly child support payments
in excess of what would have been required had Rule 90.3s income
cap been imposed. The settlement agreement incorporated by
reference the superior courts June 1, 1992 findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which explicitly waived the cap because of
the lifestyle advantages the children would have enjoyed had the
family stayed together. In their settlement agreement, the
parties further expressed [their] intent . . . to end this
litigation, to stop the possibility of further appeals and to
prevent the expenditure of additional attorneys fees. Hixson
argues that because Sarkesian entered into a settlement of child
support, agreeing to an award above that required by Civil Rule
90.3, he has given up his right to seek modification of the child
support award.
In Flannery v. Flannery, we held that an agreement to
waive the income cap for calculation of child support may later
be modified due to a material change in circumstances.13 But the
change in circumstances must not be anticipated at the time the
agreement is signed, and the drop in income must appear to be
permanent, not temporary.14 Judge Zervos, after finding more than
a fifteen percent reduction in Sarkesians income, applied Rule
90.3s $84,000 income cap as the basis of Sarkesians child support
obligation. Judge Zervos found there to be a material change in
circumstances due to the decline in Sarkesians income.
Judge Zervos distinguished the present case from
Flannery, where we warned against allowing obligors to use a
motion for modification of child support as a back door by which
to circumvent an earlier agreement to waive the income cap.15
First, Judge Zervos concluded that in contrast to Flannery, where
waiver of the income cap had been a part of the initial divorce
settlement,16 Sarkesian here acquiesced to the amount of child
support only after extensive litigation, after the court had
ordered the cap to be waived, and when the only issue remaining
was whether the childrens needs justified the waiver. Second,
Judge Zervos reasoned that the adjustment to Sarkesians income
brought him close to the income cap and that the amount in issue,
if the cap is breached, is de minimus.
We reject the superior courts first line of reasoning
and reiterate our holding in Flannery that modifications of child
support cannot be used as a means to circumvent an agreement to
waive the income cap.17 Because they are, in essence, contracts,
settlement agreements freely entered into do not lose their
binding nature because extraneous circumstances exist at the
time.18 It therefore does not matter that Sarkesian signed the
settlement agreement only after extensive litigation. Sarkesian
still signed the agreement with full knowledge of its contents.19
Sarkesian presumably believed that the agreement, including the
waiver of the income cap, was in his best interests and that he
was being compensated by not having to face further litigation
and its inherent risks.
Moreover, although the superior court recognized that
Sarkesians adjusted annual income of $85,015.41 is quite close to
the income cap of $84,000, this does not justify reduction of
child support to an award based on the income cap. Our concern
in Flannery was that the 15% rule not be used as a means by which
a parent who, because of a settlement agreement, pays child
support well above that required by the income cap, could turn
around and reduce the child support payments to the amount
derived from the income cap even though the parents ability to
pay child support above that required by the income cap remains
intact.20 In other words, in the context of an agreement to waive
the income cap and pay child support in excess of Rule 90.3s
requirement, the mere fact of a fifteen percent change in income
does not necessarily constitute a change of circumstances
entitling the obligor to a reduction in support based on the
income cap.21 As we stated in Flannery,
[w]e think that in context of an agreement
like the Flannerys, the 15% rule can be used
to demonstrate materiality, but the
comparison cannot be between the amounts
Michael agreed to pay and what the rule
minimally requires.[22]
Because Sarkesians reduction in income, while exceeding fifteen
percent, does not reduce his income to the level of the income
cap, applying that cap to Sarkesian is inconsistent with our
decision in Flannery. As we suggested in Flannery, where an
obligors income is significantly reduced but still exceeds the
cap, multiplying the obligors uncapped changed income by the
pertinent percentage yields the support the parties presumptively
would have specified had that been the obligors income when they
entered into their agreement.23 Thus, the child support award
should have been based on Sarkesians actual reduced income of
$85,015.41, not the income cap of $84,000. And although the
resulting difference in child support is, according to the
superior court, only $22.84 a month, we cannot agree that this
amount is de minimus or in itself justifies application of Rule
90.3s income cap.24
C. Sarkesians Alimony Obligation Did Not Automatically
Terminate When Hixson Remarried.
The trial court ordered Sarkesian to pay $1,000 per
month of rehabilitative alimony for a period of thirty months.
This order was adopted in the settlement agreement, which
required Sarkesian to pay the same $1,000 per month for the
remaining thirteen of the original thirty months.25 When Hixson
remarried in June 1995, Sarkesian ceased paying the remaining
nine alimony payments, alleging that Hixsons marriage eliminated
his obligation to pay. Sarkesian filed a motion to clarify the
status of his alimony obligations on December 18, 2000. Judge
Zervos reiterated that the alimony has always been rehabilitative
alimony and accordingly reaffirmed Sarkesians obligation to make
the remaining nine monthly payments despite Hixsons remarriage.26
To support his claim that he did not need to pay Hixson
alimony when she remarried, Sarkesian points to the holding in
Voyles v. Voyles that by the act of remarriage, the formerly
dependent spouse elects to abandon the alimony provision
established at the termination of the spouses preceding marriage.27
Reorientation alimony, which we have stated is appropriate to
allow the requesting spouse an opportunity to adjust to the
changed financial circumstances accompanying a divorce, can at
the discretion of the trial court terminate upon remarriage.28
However, in Musgrove v. Musgrove, this court held that remarriage
does not automatically terminate rehabilitative alimony.29
Rather, rehabilitative alimony, which is awarded for a short
duration and a specific purpose limited to job training or other
means directly related to entry or advancement within the work
force, 30 can be modified only when there is a material and
substantial change in circumstances related to its purpose.31
Sarkesian presented no argument that Hixson ceased upon
remarriage to engage in those rehabilitative activities for which
alimony was originally granted. Instead, Sarkesian argues that
the settlement agreement effectively provides for reorientation
alimony instead of rehabilitative alimony because it removes the
requirement that Hixson obtain any job training or education.
This characterization is not entirely correct. The
settlement agreement upon which Sarkesians argument is based only
states that payments to Hixson will be made without any further
argument about, or monitoring of, [Hixsons] schooling by the
defendant or his counsel. It does not state that she need not
obtain education or job training. The superior court at the time
labeled this spousal support as rehabilitative alimony.
Furthermore, in response to Sarkesians motion to clarify his
alimony obligations, the superior court determined that the
alimony had always been and remained rehabilitative alimony. In
reaching this conclusion, the superior court rejected the precise
argument that Sarkesian is making now. As we have stated
previously: The superior court has wide discretion in making
alimony determinations. We will not interfere with such
determinations unless the superior court abused its discretion.32
There is no abuse of discretion here. Consequently, we affirm
Judge Zervoss decision to consider the alimony as rehabilitative
and to require that Sarkesian pay it despite Hixsons remarriage.
D. Sarkesian Is Required To Pay Unreimbursed Medical
Costs.
1. Braces and contact lenses
In the initial divorce decree, Sarkesian was ordered to
pay the entire deductible and all other costs not covered by the
[childrens health care] policy. This was affirmed by the later
settlement agreement, which provided that [a]ll provisions of
[the June 1, 1992 order] relating to child support issues shall
remain in full force and effect. Judge Zervos, in the June 18,
2001 superior court opinion from which this appeal originates,
examined the medical bills that Hixson provided relating to the
childrens orthodonic treatment and ordered Sarkesian to reimburse
her for the total amount of the bills.
Sarkesian claims that because he was paying child
support in excess of the income cap, he should not have been
required to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses since those
costs should have been included in calculating the economic needs
of the children for which the higher payments were justified.33
However, shifting these expenses to Sarkesian was part of the
settlement agreed to by Sarkesian. He can and does argue that
the cost shifting for future unreimbursed medical expenses should
be changed, but it appears clear that absent such a modification,
costs such as contact lenses and braces are something Sarkesian
agreed not to litigate when he signed the settlement agreement.
Sarkesian is therefore liable to Hixson for these expenses.
2. Future unreimbursed medical expenses
In his June 18, 2001 order, Judge Zervos ordered that
Sarkesian pay four-fifths of all future unreimbursed medical
expenses, with the other fifth to be paid by Hixson. Sarkesian
contends that this disparity is unjustified given Hixsons
employment and her recent marriage. Sarkesian argues that at the
very least Civil Rule 90.3(d)(2) requires that the first $5,000
of unreimbursed medical expenses be split evenly.34
The superior court found that Sarkesians yearly income
is $85,015.41. By Sarkesians own admission, Hixson can be
expected to earn only about $22,000 per year. Sarkesian thus
earns almost four times as much as Hixson and could reasonably be
expected to contribute four-fifths of the unreimbursed medical
costs, as the court found. Sarkesians interpretation of Civil
Rule 90.3(d)(2) is also incorrect. The first sentence states
that health care costs should be shared equally unless the court
finds good cause to allocate them otherwise. In the present
case, the superior court did find reason to allocate these costs
disproportionately, namely the parties relative incomes. This
was not an abuse of discretion. The last sentence of Civil Rule
90.3(d)(2) does not require, as Sarkesian asserts, that only
those unreimbursed medical expenses exceeding $5,000 be allocated
according to the financial circumstances of the parents. Rather,
it requires that the superior court allocate those expenses
exceeding $5,000 according to ability to pay regardless of how
the court allocated the first $5,000 of expenses. In other
words, this sentence does not negate the ability of the superior
court to deviate from an equal distribution of unreimbursed
medical costs if it finds good cause to do so.
E. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Denying Sarkesian
Attorneys Fees.
Sarkesian argues that the superior court should have
awarded him attorneys fees because he prevailed on the central
issue of the modification of his child support obligation. The
standard of review for awards of attorneys fees is abuse of
discretion35 and Judge Zervos did not abuse his discretion. Judge
Zervos initially declined to award Sarkesian attorneys fees
because both sides had prevailed on significant issues and
because Sarkesians income was greater than Hixsons. Judge Zervos
observed that while Sarkesian prevailed on reducing child
support, re-imposing the income cap, and reducing his child
support obligations during extended visitations, Hixson prevailed
on transportation costs, unreimbursed medical costs, and in
adjusting Sarkesians income upward from what he himself asserted.
In a subsequent order reconsidering attorneys fees, Judge Zervos
recognized that the respective incomes of the parties should not
matter, but added that Sarkesian was being denied attorneys fees
due to past dishonesty and sharp litigation practices36 which
increased the effort that Hixson needed to exert to defend
herself. Judge Zervos therefore presented justifiable reasons
for declining to award attorneys fees. Because of the
difficulties created by Sarkesian during the litigation and
because both parties prevailed on significant issues, it was not
an abuse of discretion to deny attorneys fees.
V. CONCLUSION
The superior courts decision to impose Rule 90.3s
income cap is REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the superior
court to award child support based on Sarkesians reduced income
of $85,015.41, an amount that still exceeds the cap. All other
decisions of Judge Zervos as they relate to these divorce
proceedings are AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 The children are Michael Jr., born September 1985 and
Brittany, born May 1987. Both children are still minors.
2 We ordered the superior court to undertake this
analysis according to the standards for rehabilitative alimony.
If these standards were not met, the superior court was permitted
to consider the alimony as reorientation alimony.
3 The rule provides in relevant part: A final child
support award may be modified upon a showing of a material change
of circumstances as provided by state law. A material change of
circumstances will be presumed if support as calculated under
this rule is more than 15 percent greater or less than the
outstanding support order.
4 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(3).
5 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(g).
6 Flannery v. Flannery, 950 P.2d 126, 129 (Alaska 1998).
7 Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1216 (Alaska
1989) (citation omitted).
8 State, Dept of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div.,
ex rel. Hawthorne v. Rios, 938 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Alaska 1997).
9 Brown v. State, Dept of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles,
20 P.3d 586, 587 (Alaska 2001).
10 Flannery, 950 P.2d at 129.
11 Byars v. Byars, 945 P.2d 792, 795 (Alaska 1997).
12 Id.
13 950 P.2d at 131.
14 Id. at 132 (citing Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289, 291-
92 (Alaska 1979)).
15 950 P.2d at 134.
16 Id. at 128.
17 See 950 P.2d at 134.
18 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, ch. 8,
Introductory Note (1981) (In general, parties may contract as
they wish, and courts will enforce their agreements without
passing on their substance. . . . The principle of freedom of
contract is itself rooted in the notion that it is in the public
interest to recognize that individuals have broad powers to order
their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises.).
19 The superior court stated that it would treat the
settlement order the same as if [it were] reached upon agreement
of the parties as opposed to rulings rendered by the court.
20 950 P.2d at 132 (If the presumption [of the
applicability of the 15% rule] were available in such a case, an
obligor who agreed to pay child support more than 15% greater
than the support required by Rule 90.3 could seek a modification
immediately after signing the agreement.).
21 Id. (As we stated in Bunn, [t]he 15% rule is a rule of
materiality, not a definition of what constitutes a change of
circumstances. There must be a change of circumstances, either
factual or legal. ) (quoting Bunn v. House, 934 P.2d 753, 758
(Alaska 1997)).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Because we hold that Sarkesians child support should be
based on his actual reduced income which exceeds the income cap,
we need not address Hixsons argument that the income cap is
unconstitutional.
25 Of this amount, four months were in arrearage and the
other nine months remained to pass.
26 The superior court on August 7, 1992 had entered an
order stating that the alimony award could be considered
reorientation alimony as opposed to rehabilitative alimony.
27 644 P.2d 847, 849 (Alaska 1982).
28 Edelman v. Edelman, 3 P.3d 348, 358 (Alaska 2000).
29 821 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Alaska 1991).
30 Id. at 1369 (quoting Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d
1211, 1215 (Alaska 1989)).
31 Musgrove, 821 P.2d at 1370.
32 Edelman, 3 P.3d at 358 (citations omitted).
33 This court has previously held that contact lenses and
orthodontia are reasonable medical expenses. Cedergreen v.
Cedergreen, 811 P.2d 784, 788-89 (Alaska 1991).
34 Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(d)(2) provides:
The court shall allocate equally between the
parties the cost of reasonable health care
expenses not covered by insurance unless the
court orders otherwise for good cause. A
party shall reimburse the other party for his
or her share of the uncovered expenses within
30 days of receipt of the bill for the health
care, payment verification, and, if
applicable, a health insurance statement
indicating what portion of the cost is
uncovered. Reasonable, uncovered expenses
exceeding $5,000 in a calendar year will be
allocated based on the parties relative
financial circumstances when the expenses
occur.
35 Byars v. Byars, 945 P.2d 792, 795 (Alaska 1997).
36 The superior court provided several examples of
Sarkesians questionable litigation tactics:
In the prior case, Mr. Sarkes[ia]n
opened an account without Ms. Hixsons
knowledge even before the parties[]
separated. He diverted marital money into
this account. He was paid substantial
bonuses but did not disclose those bonuses
until well into the discovery stages of the
litigation. Even during the trial it was
disclosed that he hoarded large sums of cash
in his home. Mr. Sarkesian argues that the
prior dishonesty cannot be used as a basis to
deny attorneys fees because the result wold
be to effectively eliminate Civil Rule 82 in
all cases. But this is not correct.
Because of Mr. Sarkesians past
dishonesty and sharp litigation practices,
Ms. Hixson has been forced to question every
assertion made by Mr. Sarkesian in this child
support litigation. Not just because she
wanted to defeat Mr. Sarkesians motion, but
to insure that he was not doing what he has
done in the past unfairly hide assets or
income and mislead her. She was forced to
spend more time and energy and more resources
for investigation because she cannot trust
Mr. Sarkesian. It is obvious that Ms. Hixson
did not treat this motion like most child
support modification cases are handled. But
based on experience, she could not afford to
take Mr. Sarkesian at his word. Even
recently, as the court has noted before, Mr.
Sarkesians transaction with the BMW is, at
the very least, peculiar and suspicious.
