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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System v. Gallion (3/14/2003) sp-5672

Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System v. Gallion (3/14/2003) sp-5672

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
                                

ANCHORAGE POLICE & FIRE  )
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,       )    Supreme Court No. S-9880
                              )
             Appellant,            )    Superior Court No. 3AN-98-
4563 CI
                              )
     v.                       )    O P I N I O N
                              )
JACK GALLION, MICHAEL         )    [No. 5672 - March 14, 2003]
CROTTY, JOHN YOUNG,           )
CARROLL GRANT, ANTHONY   )
PROVOST, DOUGLAS K. BOHAC,    )
and ANCHORAGE POLICE AND )
FIRE RETIREES ASSOCIATION,    )
                              )
             Appellees.            )
________________________________)


          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Third   Judicial    District,
          Anchorage, John Reese, Judge.

          Appearances:  Douglas J. Serdahely and  David
          J. Mayberry, Patton Boggs LLP, Anchorage, for
          Appellant.    Peter  J.  Maassen,   Ingaldson
          Maassen,    P.C.,   and   Peter   Gruenstein,
          Gruenstein    &   Hickey,   Anchorage,    for
          Appellees.

          Before:   Matthews,  Eastaugh,  Bryner,   and
          Carpeneti,  Justices.  [Fabe, Chief  Justice,
          not participating.]

          EASTAUGH, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION

           The  superior court held the Board of Trustees of  the

Anchorage  Police  & Fire Retirement System in indirect  criminal

contempt for violating a court order that approved a class action

settlement.  Indirect criminal contempt requires finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that the respondent violated an order willfully.

Because  the  superior  court found  that  the  system  willfully

violated the court's order, because we conclude that the evidence

supports  that  finding and that the order was  unambiguous,  and

because we also conclude that there is no indication the superior

court applied the wrong standard of proof, we affirm.

II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

           The  Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System (APFRS,

or  system)  from 1994 to 1997 consisted of three  benefit  plans

(Plans I, II, and III) that provided retirement, disability,  and

death benefits for Municipality of Anchorage police officers  and

fire   fighters.   At  pertinent  times  the  board  of  trustees

administering  the  APFRS  consisted  of  eight  members.1    The

Anchorage  mayor appointed the board's eight members;  four  were

chosen from the mayor's administration and four were chosen  from

a list of persons nominated by the APFRS membership.2

           As  of  1994 Plan I was 135% funded, Plan II was  112%

funded,  and Plan III was 89% funded; thus, Plans I and  II  were

over-funded, Plan III was under-funded, and the three plans  were

over-funded  in  the  aggregate.3(Alaska 1997),  describes  these

circumstances  in detail.  In 1994 the Anchorage Assembly  passed

Anchorage Ordinance 94-95, combining the plans and requiring that

the assets of Plans I and II fund Plan III.4  APFRS members sued,

challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.5  We held  in

Gallion v. Municipality of Anchorage (Gallion I) that the  assets

of  the three plans could not be combined to fund all three plans

to  the detriment of the members of Plans I and II, and that  the

surpluses  of  each of those plans had to be used  for  the  sole

benefit of its members.6

           Following  our  remand, APFRS members filed  a  second

class  action (Gallion II) in which they claimed that  the  APFRS

board  had not used the funds' surpluses for the benefit  of  the

members  in  compliance  with  our decision  in  Gallion  I.  The

members, represented by class counsel, sought to recover some  of

the  monies  by  "either  reduc[ing] contributions,  increas[ing]

benefits, or both."  In March 2000 the class, the board, and  the

Municipality  of Anchorage entered into a Conditional  Settlement

Agreement  (CSA, or agreement) to settle Gallion I,  Gallion  II,

and two other lawsuits.7 Among other things, the CSA provided for

distributing  funds  from  the three plans  to  their  respective

members, provided for a one-time reversion of $40 million to  the

municipality, and provided for attorney's fees for class counsel.

           Superior Court Judge John Reese conducted a hearing on

March  17, 2000, approved the proposed CSA, and approved an award

of  attorney's  fees to class counsel.  The court  observed  that

some  class  members had filed objections, some of which  harshly

criticized class counsel, to the proposed award of fees to  class

counsel.   The  court's  oral comments explained  at  length  the

court's   reasoning   in  rejecting  those  objections   and   in

calculating  the amount of its fee award to class  counsel.   The

superior  court entered a written order on April 6, 2000 awarding

attorney's fees to class counsel.  The April 6 order also ordered

APFRS, when it distributed the funds to the members per the  CSA,

to  send each member a copy of the court's written findings along

with  a  copy of the transcript of the court's oral order.   This

requirement was intended to educate the members about the court's

reasons  for the fee award and was apparently intended to respond

to  members' criticism of class counsel.  Thus, the April 6 order

awarding attorney's fees provided:

          [S]o   that  the  APFRS  members  may   fully

          understand  the basis for the  court's  order

          with respect to attorneys' services and fees,

          it  is  further ORDERED that the APFRS  shall

          mail  at  the expense of the common  fund  to

          each  of  the APFRS members a copy  of  these

          findings  along with a copy of the transcript

          of  the court's oral order no later than  the

          date   enhancements   are   distributed    to

          retirees.

(Emphasis  added.)   The  April  6 order  therefore  contemplated

sending  out  copies of the transcript and findings at  the  same

time,  and  no  later  than the time the system  distributed  the

settlement payments to each APFRS member.

           Several  weeks  later, the board filed  a  motion  for

clarification  and interpretation of the CSA due to  the  board's

professed   concern   about   difficulties   in   making   timely

distributions.8  In response, the superior court issued a written

order  on  April 28 that stated: "1. When sufficient  funds  have

been  made available through liquidation of investments  to  make

all  payments,  all  payments  will  be  made.   2.  Neither  the

Municipality nor the attorneys, nor the members, get paid  before

anyone   else."    The  order  also  required   that   "5.    The

`educational' requirements of the settlement will be accomplished

within   the   time   allowed   by  the   liquidation   schedule.

Distribution will not be delayed to accomplish education."

           The  system  transferred money to class  counsel,  the

municipality, and some class members on May 18, 2000.  But  there

was  a  delay  of about three weeks before the system distributed

the  court's  findings regarding attorney's  fees.    The  system

first  sent  the  transcript to members as an  enclosure  with  a

letter  from the APFRS board dated June 8.9  On June 9 the system

filed  a document entitled Notice of Compliance with Court Order;

the  notice stated that the required mail-out was completed  June

7.

           On  June 21 class counsel moved for an order  to  show

cause  and  for  Rule  95 penalties; the motion  asked  court  to

sanction the board or its attorneys under Alaska Civil Rule 90(b)

or  Alaska Civil Rule 95.  Following briefing, the court  ordered

the  system  and  its counsel to appear and show cause  why  they

should  not  be  sanctioned  "for  violating  the  court's  order

concerning the timing of notification of the class members of the

attorney fee dispute resolution."

           After  conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior

court found that "the distributions were made before the June 8th

notice  [enclosing  the transcript] was sent."   "[D]istributions

were to the attorneys, the Municipality and 149 of the members  .

.  .  .   I  do  find that that is contrary to the  specific  and

unambiguous  language of the April 6th order, so the  system  did

violate that order, and in doing so defeated the purpose of  that

clause of the order."  The court then held the system in contempt

and  announced an intention to fine it $100.10  Counsel  for  the

system  argued that contempt required a willful violation of  the

order and that the evidence demonstrated that Charles Laird,  who

had  acted for the board, "did not intentionally defy the court's

order" and had an honest and good faith belief as to what he  was

required  to  do.   The  court nonetheless  held  the  system  in

contempt.  We discuss the court's comments in Part III.B of  this

opinion.

           The  court  also  found the system's attorney,  Robert

Klausner,   in contempt and assessed, but suspended,  a  "nominal

penalty" of $10 against him.

           The APFRS appeals from the order holding the system in

contempt.  Klausner has not appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

          A.   Standard of Review

           We  review  de  novo  a  legal determination  of  what

elements  are  necessary to prove indirect  criminal  contempt.11

Relying  by  analogy  on  the standard of  review  applicable  in

deciding  whether  a court has made findings  on  each  necessary

element  of  a  statutory violation,12 we  will  review  de  novo

contempt  citations imposed under Alaska Civil Rule 90(b).13   We

exercise our independent judgment in deciding whether a court has

made  factual  findings  satisfying each  element  necessary  for

indirect contempt.  We review for clear error factual findings  a

court makes in deciding whether to hold a respondent in contempt.14

     B.   The  Superior  Court  Found the  Necessary  Element  of
          Willfulness  When  It  Held  the  System  in   Indirect
          Criminal Contempt of Court.
          
           The  superior  court held the system in  contempt  for

disobeying  the  April  6 order.15  This  contempt  was  criminal

because the sanction served a punitive, as opposed to a coercive,

function.16  The contempt was indirect because the court did  not

witness or hear the conduct constituting the contempt.17

           The  system argues that the superior court  misdefined

and  misapplied  the  elements  of  indirect  criminal  contempt,

because it omitted the requirement that the violation be willful.18

The  system also suggests that the court failed to find a willful

violation.

          We described in Taylor v. District Court for the Fourth

Judicial  District the inquiry a court must make  concerning  the

element   of  willfulness  in  determining  whether  an  indirect

contempt has occurred.19  There we said:

          In  order  for there to be contempt  it  must

          appear   that  there  has  been   a   willful

          disregard or disobedience of the authority or

          orders   of   the   court.    Whether    such

          willfulness  exists  is something  the  court

          cannot  be aware of from its own observations

          in  the  courtroom and without  inquiry  from

          other  sources.   Without  such  inquiry  the

          court  cannot ascertain the operational facts

          from    which   an   inference   of   willful

          disobedience  or  disregard  of  the  court's

          authority or orders can be drawn.[20]

           In  this case, the system's alleged noncompliance with

the  court's  orders  was  not observed by  the  superior  court;

rather,  it  was  brought  to  the  court's  attention  by  class

counsel's motion for an order to show cause.21

           In  Taylor we stated that willfulness is the mens  rea

requirement for criminal contempt.  "When a criminal contempt  is

involved,  all  elements  of  the  offense,  including  that   of

willfulness,  must  be  proven  beyond  a  reasonable   doubt."22

"Willfulness is established by proof of conscious action and does

not  require  a  showing  of  specific  intent."23   We  said  in

Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts that "[i]f it  is

proved that a party had notice of the court's order and was aware

of  the requirements but failed to comply with the order, in  the

absence  of explanation of the reason for such failure,  a  court

could  infer it to be intentional."24  But we held in  Bayless  &

Roberts that "[n]o findings of fact were made as to Continental's

intent in disobeying the court's order."25

           During the show cause hearing the superior court heard

testimony  from  Charles  Laird,  the  APFRS  director  and   the

administrator  charged  with  implementing  the  court's  orders.

Laird   explained  how  he,  the  APFRS  lawyer,  and  the  staff

interpreted the orders, and discussed why he believed the  system

was  in  compliance.   Laird explained  the  lengthy  process  of

distributing  the funds.  He described sending out  inquiries  to

the  APFRS  members  to determine in which form  each  wished  to

receive  payment,   receiving  the  responses,  and  issuing  the

checks.  He explained that this process could not be done in  one

day.   He  therefore did not interpret the April 6 order to  mean

that the letters transmitting the court's findings had to be sent

on the first day any checks went out.  The order referred to "the

date enhancements are distributed to retirees."   Laird testified

that the process did not take place on just one day.  Instead, he

understood  the  order's reference to "the date enhancements  are

distributed  to  retirees" to refer  to  the  span  of  time,  as

described  in  the  CSA,  in which the system  was  compelled  to

complete  the process - by late spring or early summer  of  2000.

He  testified that he believed he was complying with the  court's

orders by sending the letters on June 8 - before the process  was

completed - as opposed to sending the letters simultaneously with

the  payments.   This  was  the only testimony  the  court  heard

regarding  the  system's alleged contempt.  But there  was  other

evidence  before the court.  This evidence included the  April  6

order itself, the court file containing memoranda about how  that

order was to be interpreted and applied, the clarifying April  28

order,  the  text  of  the board's June 8  letter  to  the  class

members,  and  copies  of  May  and June  correspondence  between

counsel  concerning what the system needed  to  do  and  when  it

needed to do it to comply with the April 6 order.

            After  receiving  the  Laird  testimony,  the   court

announced  that  it was holding the system in contempt.   Counsel

for  the  system asked the court to clarify its findings  on  the

issue  of  willfulness.  Earlier in the hearing,  the  court  had

articulated  its  understanding  of  the  elements  of  contempt,

stating,  "There has to be a court order, and they have  to  have

notice of the court order, and they have to have violated a court

order,  and  they  have to have been in a position  to  have  not

violated it."  In response to counsel's inquiry about  the  issue

of willfulness, the court stated:

          I  do  not  find  that  Mr.  Laird  is  being
          dishonest. . . .  But the fact is  the  board
          did  something contrary to the specific terms
          of my order.  Mr. Laird is not the one that's
          on  the hot seat here today.  It's the system
          that  violated my order. . . .  I  find  that
          the  board, I don't know if it was Mr. Laird,
          I don't know if it was some particular member
          of   the  board,  it  might  have  been   Mr.
          [Klausner], it might have been somebody  from
          the  Municipality, it might have been the man
          in  the  moon.  I don't know who it was,  but
          somebody influenced the board and caused  the
          board  to make a decision in sending out  the
          contradiction of my findings at the same time
          as  the findings after they were supposed  to
          have  sent  them  out,  with  the  particular
          intent  of  defying my order and  interfering
          with the impact of my order, and they are  in
          contempt for doing that. . . .  They've acted
          like  the thugs we put in the jury box  every
          day  handcuffed  together,  saying  we  don't
          respect  the  law,  they  don't  respect  the
          court.   That's contempt.  They ought  to  be
          ashamed  of themselves.  I'm very sorry  they
          did  this in the first place, and I'm  really
          sorry that they didn't come in here today and
          say we got carried away by emotional stuff  .
          . . and we're sorry we got caught up in that.
          We  don't mean the court any disrespect.  But
          they  didn't  come in here and say  that,  so
          they're in contempt.[26]
(Emphasis added.)

           The  system's  attorney then argued that  the  system,

acting  through  Laird, "did not intentionally defy  the  court's

order."  The court responded, "I find to the contrary .  .  .  ."

The  court  later observed, in  discussing Klausner's role,  that

"his  client's  purpose as I mentioned before seems  culpable  in

that it seems tied in with an intent to interfere with and negate

the rulings [of] the court."

          Thus, the court first found that the system had decided

to send out the letter contradicting the court's findings, "after

they  were  supposed to have sent them out, with  the  particular

intent of defying my order and interfering with the impact of  my

order.  .  .  ."  Second,  by announcing  that  "I  find  to  the

contrary,"  the  court expressly rejected the system's  assertion

that  the  system  did not intentionally defy the  order.   These

findings  satisfy  the  requirement of a willful  violation.   We

therefore  reject the system's argument that the court misdefined

the elements of contempt and failed to find a willful violation.

           It  does  not  matter that the court,  when  it  first

discussed the contempt sanction, did not specifically mention the

willfulness element.  After the system's attorney asked the court

about  that  element at the hearing, the court made the  findings

quoted above.

           It also does not matter that the court did not specify

who  caused the board to defy the order.  It was the system which

the  court  held in contempt.  It also does not matter  that  the

court stated that it did not find that Laird was being dishonest,

because the court found that "somebody influenced the board"  and

caused it to act "with the particular intent of defying my  order

. . . ."

     C.   The Finding of Willfulness Was Not Clearly Erroneous.

           We also conclude that there was sufficient evidence to

support  the  finding  of  willfulness.   This  included  Laird's

testimony  that  he had written the first draft  of  the  board's

letter, but that it was "reviewed by a number of people before it

was  finalized."  This testimony permits an  inference  that  the

reason  the information was mailed untimely was delay in drafting

and  revising  the  letter  the board wanted  to  send  with  the

intention of contradicting and "undermining" the court's  reasons

for the award and the court's comments responding to criticism of

class  counsel.  Further, the court's stated purpose for ordering

the   informational   mail-out  requires   an   inference   that,

notwithstanding   Laird's   personal   innocence,   the    system

collectively recognized the importance of simultaneously  sending

the  court's comments when it made any payments to members of the

class.   This evidence also permits an inference that the  system

willfully violated the order by beginning to make payments to the

class  members  some  three  weeks before  it  sent  the  court's

explanatory comments.

          We also reject the system's assertions that the April 6

order  was  ambiguous.   The  order specified  that  the  court's

comments were to be sent to "each of the APFRS members . .  .  no

later  than  the date enhancements are distributed to  retirees."

This  language made it clear that payment could not be made to  a

member  before the information was sent to that member.  Further,

as appellees argue on appeal, there is no indication the system's

attorney,    Klausner,   thought   the   information-distribution

requirement  was  ambiguous.   The  letters  class  counsel   and

Klausner exchanged in May and early June 2000 strongly imply that

Klausner understood that the information was to have been  mailed

when  the  payments began.  As the days passed and class  counsel

became  more  strident and even threatened  a  contempt  request,

Klausner  never  asserted  that  the  mail-out  requirement   was

ambiguous  or  that  the system had months in  which  to  comply.

These  exchanges  also  tend  to  confirm  the  superior  court's

suspicion  that  the  system intentionally  delayed  sending  the

court's comments to the members until the board could prepare and

send  its  letter  "contradicting" the  court's  attorney's  fees

findings.

           The  system also argues that because it was impossible

to  make  all of the payments simultaneously, it also would  have

been  impossible to comply with the April 6 order if it had  been

written  as  the court interpreted it.  But the impossibility  of

paying  each  member on the same day did not prevent  the  system

from distributing the information to each member at the same time

it  paid  that  member, or from sending the information  to  each

member before it made the first payment to any member.

          D.   Standard of Proof

           The system contends that the court failed to apply the

reasonable  doubt  standard  of  proof.   The  reasonable   doubt

standard of proof applies to criminal contempt proceedings.27  The

superior  court  did not specify the standard  of  proof  it  was

applying  to  the  contempt proceeding.  We have  held  in  other

contexts that a trial court need not explicitly state all of  its

factual findings so long as its findings are "adequate to  reveal

its reasoning process."28  Courts elsewhere have held that a trial

court  need  not  explicitly state the standard of  proof  it  is

applying  if there is no dispute about the applicable standard.29

We  will  normally assume that the trial court  has  applied  the

correct  standard.         The  court's August  22  clarification

order,  which  explained the changes to  which  Klausner  was  to

respond  at  the August 23 hearing, cited AS 09.50.010(5).   That

statute  defines contempt to include "disobedience  of  a  lawful

judgment,  order, or process of the court."  Thus, the court  was

aware  that a violation of AS 09.50.010(5) encompassed violations

of  court  orders.   The court was of course aware  that  it  had

required the system to show cause why it should not be sanctioned

for   violating  a  court  order.   Reported  Alaska   case   law

establishes  that subsection .010(5) deals with criminal,  rather

than  civil,  contempt,  at least if the court's  purpose  is  to

punish  rather than coerce.30  The sanction here had no  possible

coercive  effect.  It is undisputed that the elements of criminal

contempt  are subject to a beyond a reasonable doubt standard  of

proof in Alaska.  Decisions so holding are cited and described in

the annotations to AS 09.50.010.31  From this we can safely assume

the superior court recognized and applied the correct standard.

           There  is  no indication the court applied some  other

standard.  The court did not mention the lesser preponderance  or

clear  and  convincing standards.  The contempt hearing commenced

with  an oral argument by Klausner's counsel that emphasized  the

punitive  nature of the proceedings against Klausner.   Referring

to the size of the maximum potential fine, counsel also requested

a jury trial and analogized to Baker v. City of Fairbanks,32 which

counsel  described as stating that a large enough  fine  connotes

criminal conduct.

           Given  the context of these arguments, and absent  any

reason  to  think  otherwise, we assume  the  court  applied  the

correct standard of proof.

IV.  CONCLUSION

           For  these  reasons, we AFFIRM the order  holding  the

system in contempt.

_______________________________
1    Former Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 03.85.030-.040.
2    AMC 03.85.030(B), (C).
3     Gallion v. Municipality of Anchorage (Gallion I), 944  P.2d
436, 438-39
4    Id. at 439.
5    Id. at 439-40.
     6    Id. at 443.
7     The class members moved for summary judgment in 1999.   The
superior court held that the board owed a fiduciary duty only  to
the members.  It ruled that the members had no right to increased
benefits,  but it directed the board to recommend a  proposal  to
the  municipal assembly addressing the surplus.  The municipality
intervened  and  cross-moved  for  summary  judgment  seeking  to
establish  a  reversionary interest in the  surplus.   The  court
denied  the  municipality's  motion,  finding  no  such  interest
existed. Despite this order, the CSA granted the municipality $40
million from the surplus.
8    The system claimed that distributing the funds was a gradual
process  that  required  the system to liquidate  investments  to
produce  cash  for  distribution, educate the members  about  the
payments,  and wait for each recipient to determine in what  form
he  or  she wanted to receive payment before distribution of  the
funds could begin.
9     The  board's letter stated that it contained "court-related
materials  from the hearing" on attorney's fees and  stated  that
they were sent because class counsel had asked the superior court
to  order  that  they be sent.  The letter then stated  that  the
board considered that sending the materials was a "waste of trust
assets."  The  letter also told members that the board  "believed
that the award of additional [class counsel attorney's] fees,  to
be deducted from [members'] benefit payments, was wrong."
10     The parties do not distinguish between the system and  the
board for purposes of the issues on appeal.
11     Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979) (holding
that  on  questions of law we adopt rule "that is most persuasive
in light of precedent, reason, and policy").
12     E.g., A.B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d
946,  950  (Alaska 2000) (citation omitted) ("Whether  the  trial
court's  findings comport with the child in need of aid  statutes
is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.").
13    Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90(b) reads:

          For  every  contempt  other  than  [contempts
          committed in the presence of the court], upon
          a proper showing on ex parte motion supported
          by  affidavits, the court shall either  order
          the  accused  party  to show  cause  at  some
          reasonable time, to be therein specified, why
          he  should  not be punished for  the  alleged
          contempt, or shall issue a bench warrant  for
          the  arrest  of such party.  Such  proceeding
          may  be commenced and prosecuted in the  same
          action or in an independent proceeding either
          by the state, or by the aggrieved party whose
          right  or  remedy  in  an  action  has   been
          defeated or prejudiced or who has suffered  a
          loss  or  injury  by the act  constituting  a
          contempt.
14     Matanuska Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Rewire the Board,  36  P.3d
685,  700-01  (Alaska  2001) (noting clear  error  standard  when
reviewing  contempt  orders is "consistent with  the  deferential
review  used  by courts in other jurisdictions" and citing  cases
illustrating deferential standards of other states).
15    The system's briefs focus on the April 6 order.  In its oral
contempt  order the superior court explicitly mentioned only  the
April  6  order but also seemed to take the April 28  order  into
consideration.
16     Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 763 (Alaska 1971) (citing
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911)).
17    See Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774, 779 (Alaska App. 2001).

18     In  L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska  1976),  we
explained that the four elements of contempt are:

          (1)  the existence of a valid order directing
          the  alleged contemnor to do or refrain  from
          doing  something and the court's jurisdiction
          to  enter  that  order; (2)  the  contemnor's
          notice of the order within sufficient time to
          comply  with  it;  . . . (3) the  contemnor's
          ability to comply with the order; and (4) the
          contemnor's  willful failure to  comply  with
          the order.

19    434 P.2d 679, 681 (Alaska 1967).

20    Taylor, 434 P.2d at 681 (citations omitted).
21      The  system  argues  that  class  counsel's  motion   was
insufficient because it was not supported by affidavits.  We have
ruled   that   the  purpose  of  Civil  Rule  90(b)'s   affidavit
requirement  is to ensure procedural due process for  the  person
charged.  Taylor, 434 P.2d at 681-82.  In Taylor we held that the
order to show cause specifying the contemptuous act satisfied the
notice requirement of procedural due process.  In this case,  the
motion  for  an  order  to  show cause  specified  the  allegedly
contemptuous  acts and delineated what actions the  system  would
have to defend.  An affidavit would have been redundant.  See id.
22     Continental Ins. Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d
398, 407 (Alaska 1976) (citations omitted).
23    Rollins v. State ex rel. Municipality of Anchorage, 748 P.2d
767,  771 (Alaska App. 1988) (citing Hentzner v. State, 613  P.2d
821, 826 (Alaska 1980)).
24    Bayless & Roberts, 548 P.2d at 407 (citations omitted).
25     Id. at 400.
26     "[T]he contradiction of my findings" is a reference to the
letter the board wrote and sent out to the members with the  copy
of the court's attorney's fees award.  The letter the board wrote
expressed, among other things, the board's disagreement with  the
court's April 6 order and attorney's fees award.
27     Continental Ins. Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d
398,  407  (Alaska 1976); Carter v. Brodrick, 750 P.2d  843,  845
(Alaska App. 1988).
28     Borchgrevink  v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132,  137  (Alaska
1997)  (holding in child custody context that court not  required
to  make "wrap-up" finding); see also Virgin v. Virgin, 990  P.2d
1040,  1047-48  (Alaska  1999) (noting that  requiring  "wrap-up"
finding "would unjustifiably elevate form over substance").
29     Ross  v.  Superior Court, 569 P.2d 727,  737  (Cal.  1977)
("[T]he  applicability  of  the  reasonable  doubt  standard   to
contempt proceedings has . . . been firmly established in a  long
line  of California decisions, and thus in the instant case there
is no reason to depart from the normal presumption that the trial
court properly followed established law."); Johnson v. De Toledo,
763  A.2d 28, 32 (Conn. App. 2000); In re C.T., 724 A.2d 590, 597
(D.C.  1999); State v. Kotis, 984 P.2d 78, 99 (Haw. 1999);  State
v. Hazelton, 985 P.2d 698, 701 (Kan. 1999); Ex parte Jackson, 911
S.W.2d  230,  234 (Tex. App 1995) ("While relator  is  apparently
correct  that  a `beyond a reasonable doubt' standard  should  be
applied, there is no evidence that a lesser standard was applied.
The  trial court, sitting without a jury is presumed to have used
the   correct  standard  of  proof  absent  a  showing   to   the
contrary.").
30    L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832 (Alaska 1976).
31    See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc.,
548 P.2d 398 (Alaska 1976).
32    471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).