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Wyatt v. Estate of Wyatt (3/7/2003) sp-5671
Wyatt v. Estate of Wyatt (3/7/2003) sp-5671
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
RONALD F. WYATT, )
) Supreme Court No. S-9087
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 1KE-92-1070
CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
ESTATE OF DIANE E. WYATT, )
) [No. 5671 - March 7, 2003]
Appellee. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District,
Ketchikan, Larry C. Zervos, Judge.
Appearances: Ronald F. Wyatt, pro se,
Seward. Donna C. Willard, Law Offices of
Donna C. Willard, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Having appealed his first-degree murder conviction for
the death of his wife, Ronald Wyatt obtained a stay of the
wrongful death civil lawsuit his late wife's estate brought
against him. In exchange, he agreed with her estate in open
court that ownership of disputed real and personal property would
vest in the estate if his criminal appeal was unsuccessful.
Wyatt argues that the agreement did not encompass his separate
property. We hold that it did, and therefore affirm the superior
court's interpretation of the agreement and its refusal to let
him use the property to hire defense counsel in the civil action.
We also affirm as to all other issues he raises.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Ronald Wyatt was charged in October 1992 with murdering
his wife of almost eight years, Diane Wyatt.1 A jury convicted
him of first-degree murder in 1993 and the Alaska Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction in 1997. We affirmed in May
1999.2
Diane Wyatt's sister, Susan Vik, was appointed special
administrator of Diane's estate in October 1992 to collect and
manage the estate's assets. On behalf of the estate, Vik filed a
civil wrongful death suit against Wyatt in October 1992. The
estate sought and obtained a restraining order against Wyatt to
ensure that he would not disturb assets that the estate could
potentially claim. Wyatt stipulated that his bank accounts would
be frozen pending the criminal case. He could use those accounts
only for living expenses and defense counsel in the criminal
prosecution.
In August 1994 the estate moved for partial summary
judgment to establish Wyatt's liability for Diane's death. In
September 1994 the estate again moved for partial summary
judgment and argued that Wyatt had no constitutional right to
counsel in the civil action. This motion responded to a letter
Wyatt wrote the superior court requesting more time to retain
substitute defense counsel in the civil case after his criminal
lawyer withdrew from Wyatt's civil case in May 1994, and after
the court-imposed deadline for pro bono services for the civil
action had expired. The court granted the estate's summary
judgment motion on the issue of Wyatt's right to counsel. Wyatt
moved for reconsideration, arguing that proceeding with the civil
trial would adversely affect his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination in his criminal appeal. In November 1994 the
superior court granted the estate's other motion for summary
judgment on the issue of Wyatt's liability for Diane's death,
based on the preclusive effect of Wyatt's criminal conviction.
In December 1994 Wyatt moved for reconsideration.
During a February 1995 hearing in the civil case,
Wyatt, the estate, and the superior court discussed staying the
wrongful death trial pending the criminal appeal. Wyatt,
representing himself, asked the court to stay the civil
proceedings until his criminal appeal was resolved. Counsel for
the estate suggested transferring all of the property to the
estate pending the appeal. If the appeal were successful, the
property would be disgorged and its status could then be
litigated. The parties and the court considered this proposal at
some length. The court explained that if Wyatt's appeal were
unsuccessful and his conviction was affirmed, the stay would be
lifted and the estate "could then transfer that property to
anybody, to use it, [or] do whatever they wanted to with it."
Wyatt answered, "If the appeal is not successful." The court
stated, "Exactly." It then confirmed that if the appeal was
successful, the property would return to its pre-agreement legal
status. The court asked Wyatt if "everything" the court had
explained was "clear," and Wyatt answered, "yes." Asked by the
court if he had "any questions," Wyatt answered, "no." Wyatt's
other comments made it clear he understood at the hearing that he
was entering into an agreement which would moot any dispute about
ownership of the property if his appeal were unsuccessful. For
example, he stated:
Well, what the - what we talked about
originally about the property being put in
the - just put on hold, you might say, and
then my appeal is successful, I'm back where
I was. If it's not, I'm out of luck.
The court made it clear that if Wyatt agreed to these terms
orally, "it becomes binding tonight," and that if Wyatt later
refused to sign papers transferring property, the court would
instruct the clerk to sign them.
The agreement was then reduced to writing, but Wyatt
objected to several terms. The superior court determined that
the stay order reflected the oral agreement and entered the stay
order in May 1995. When Wyatt refused to sign the stay order,
the superior court instructed the clerk to sign on Wyatt's
behalf. Wyatt filed a motion in July 1995 to stay the superior
court's order. His motion was ultimately denied.
After the court of appeals affirmed Wyatt's criminal
conviction in May 1997, the transfer of property began. The
superior court in the civil lawsuit ordered in April 1998 that
funds be transferred to the estate. Wyatt objected to the
transfer and requested funds from the transferred property so he
could hire counsel to defend himself in the civil case. The
superior court rejected Wyatt's motion. Wyatt filed a motion for
reconsideration in September 1998. He claimed again that some of
the transferred property belonged to him. The superior court
again rejected Wyatt's claims. The superior court stated that
the settlement agreement governed the transfer of funds to the
estate. It also stated that "[s]ince [the civil] case has been
settled long ago, there is no pending complaint that Mr. Wyatt
can assert cross-claims or counterclaims against."
Wyatt appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In determining the validity and scope of the agreement
between Wyatt and the estate, "[t]he intent of the parties is to
be determined by the surrounding facts and circumstances of each
case, and is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard."3 We
review the superior court's enforcement of the agreement for
abuse of discretion.4 We review Wyatt's constitutional issues de
novo.5 We review the superior court's award of attorney's fees
and costs for abuse of discretion.6
B. Wyatt's Oral Agreement with the Estate at the
February 1995 Hearing Encompassed All the Disputed
Property.
Wyatt makes two principal arguments regarding the oral
agreement reached at the February 1995 hearing: first, that the
oral agreement did not cover all of the property Wyatt owned
individually or jointly with his late wife; and second, that the
superior court erred in finding that the written agreement
reflected the oral agreement. We conclude that the court did not
err.7
1. The February 1995 oral agreement covered
all property individually or jointly owned by
Ronald Wyatt.
Wyatt orally offered to give the estate ownership of,
or legal title to, Wyatt's "various assets, personal, real, and
cash" in exchange for a stay of the civil trial.
Accepting the offer, the estate agreed to delay
prosecuting its civil claims against Wyatt until his criminal
appeal concluded. It also agreed that if Wyatt's criminal appeal
was successful, the estate would disgorge Wyatt's property, and
the parties would litigate at that point.
We have held that "[t]he formation of a valid contract
requires an offer encompassing all essential terms, unequivocal
acceptance by the offeree, consideration, and an intent to be
bound."8 A settlement agreement satisfying these elements forms
a binding contract between the settling parties.9 The bilateral
exchange of promises between Wyatt and the estate was sufficient
consideration to form a contract.10
We will hold an agreement unenforceable if its terms
are not reasonably certain.11 But the superior court carefully
explained to Wyatt the relevant terms of the proposed agreement,
and emphasized the importance of Wyatt's understanding. Any
possible doubt about the agreement's scope was removed when the
superior court explained that the agreement covered all of
Wyatt's property:
The agreement is that all this property[:]
. . . [the] real estate here, [the] personal
property here, [the] negotiable instruments,
and [the] cash. All that property would be
transferred to the estate, in the name of the
estate.
There is no reasonable doubt about what property the agreement
covered. Moreover, the record makes it clear that Wyatt actually
understood that the agreement covered even separate property he
owned individually. Wyatt's recognition that the agreement
covered his personal savings bonds illustrated his understanding
of the agreement's scope. The superior court did not clearly err
in determining that the agreement covered separate property Wyatt
owned individually.
2. The superior court did not err in
finding that the written agreement reflected the
parties' oral agreement.
Wyatt argues that the superior court's May 1995 stay
order did not conform to the parties' February 1995 oral
agreement.12 Wyatt's primary objection to the written stay order
is that it did not contain a complete and accurate inventory of
Wyatt's joint and separate ("personal") property, including "U.S.
Bonds and over $200,000" in assets. Wyatt argues that the estate
materially misrepresented the oral agreement when it drafted the
May 1995 written stay order for approval by the superior court.
The estate responds by recounting Wyatt's acknowledgment in open
court that the oral agreement covered Wyatt's interest in the
couple's joint property and his separate property. The estate
argues that Wyatt's 1995 objections to the terms of the stay
order - including the estate's inventory of Wyatt's property -
were irrelevant because all of the property was covered in the
agreement. Given the scope of the oral agreement, see Part
III.B.1, we agree with the estate.
Moreover, we do not have to consider Wyatt's claim that
the estate prepared an incomplete inventory list; regardless of
the accuracy of the list, all of Wyatt's property was to be
transferred to the estate per the February 1995 agreement.13
Wyatt next argues that the February 1995 agreement
contemplated that no transfer would take place until all appeals
were completed, not just his appeal to the Alaska Court of
Appeals. The estate counters that Wyatt did not object to the
provision in the stay order explicitly referring only to Wyatt's
appeal to the court of appeals. The order, for example, referred
to the agreement to stay "until the decision of the Court of
Appeals of Wyatt's appeal in docket [N]o. A-5291." It referred
to the estate's agreement not to transfer property until ten days
"following affirmance of Wyatt's murder conviction by the Alaska
Court of Appeals in docket [N]o. A-5291." It also referred to
the estate's obligation to secure the property for the period
ending ten days "immediately following affirmance of Wyatt's
[murder] conviction by the Alaska Court of Appeals in docket
[N]o. A-5291." The estate also notes that the agreement
contained a provision by which Wyatt agreed that the "Impound
Period shall not be otherwise extended by subsequent appeal of
Wyatt's conviction to a higher federal or state appellate court
following the decision of the Alaska Court of Appeals on the
matter now pending before that court described as docket No. A-
5291." It referred also to "the Alaska Court of Appeals
resolution of Wyatt's appeal in A-5291."
As a result, the estate asserts that there is no
indication in the record that the superior court suggested to
Wyatt that "appeal" referred to any proceeding other than his
then-pending direct appeal in the court of appeals.14 Wyatt's own
statements during the February 1995 hearing refer only to one
appeal. His current interpretation of "appeal" is at odds with
the plain language of the oral agreement and the written stay
order.
Regardless, we do not have to decide whether the court
erred in interpreting "appeal" to mean only Wyatt's direct appeal
because we conclude that Wyatt was not harmed by this
interpretation. Per the February 1995 agreement, the estate held
all of Wyatt's assets in its name in exchange for entry of a stay
of the civil proceedings. Even if funds were transferred to the
estate before the final resolution of his claims on appeal, Wyatt
did not have access to any of his assets after the court entered
the stay order and therefore suffered no harm.15 The superior
court also did not err when it stated in its September 1998 order
that "[t]his agreement became a final court order by its own
terms, 10 days after the Court of Appeals upheld Mr. Wyatt's
conviction."
C. Wyatt's Remaining Arguments Do Not Require
Reversal.
1. Wyatt was not wrongfully denied counsel
in the civil proceedings.
Wyatt argues that he was wrongfully denied access to
funds, including the savings bonds he alleged to be separate
property, and that this denial violated his due process rights
under both the United States and Alaska Constitutions. But Wyatt
voluntarily entered into the February 1995 agreement with the
estate to transfer all property, joint or separate, to which he
had any claim. This disposed of the issue.
Wyatt further argues that if the superior court would
not grant Wyatt access to his funds, it should have appointed
counsel to represent Wyatt in the civil suit. But the superior
court stated in a November 1994 order that Wyatt "[had] not moved
this court for an appointment of counsel. [And] [i]n any event,
the court is without authority to appoint Mr. Wyatt counsel at
public expense." The superior court correctly relied on
precedent limiting appointment of counsel at public expense.16
Wyatt's situation was not one allowing such an appointment, and
in any event, Wyatt did not pursue the issue beyond the February
1995 agreement.
2. It was not error to deny Wyatt a stay in
the civil proceedings until he exhausted all
appeals of his criminal conviction.
Wyatt argues that the superior court's decision denying
Wyatt's motion for a stay of the civil proceedings violated
Wyatt's "Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."
Wyatt states that the superior court's refusal to grant a stay
prompted Wyatt to enter "into an unfavorable agreement [with] the
Estate to stay [the] proceedings." The estate responds that
because the case settled, the superior court was not required to
decide the issue.
The record contains no decision by the superior court
denying Wyatt a stay and Wyatt points to none in his brief. The
superior court requested and received extensive briefing from
both parties on Wyatt's previous stay motion, but it did not deny
Wyatt a stay before it conducted the February 1995 hearing.
After Wyatt made his stay proposal at that hearing, the parties
agreed to terms staying the civil trial and the court stayed the
proceedings per their agreement.
There is consequently no merit to Wyatt's claim that
the superior court's "denial of his motion for a stay" violated
his constitutional rights.
3. It was not error to grant partial
summary judgment to the estate on the basis of
Wyatt's criminal conviction.
Wyatt argues that the superior court erred in granting
the estate partial summary judgment in the civil lawsuit based on
his conviction in the criminal case. Wyatt argues that his
criminal conviction should not have been given preclusive effect
in the civil case because it was still being appealed, and that
there was consequently no final judgment to be given preclusive
effect. The estate responds that the judgment in the criminal
case was final upon its entry and that the superior court
properly granted summary judgment.
We have repeatedly held that the pendency of an appeal
is irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata and collateral
estoppel.17 We have acknowledged that "[t]he difficulty with the
rule that a judgment retains its preclusive effects even if it is
appealed is that a second judgment based on the preclusive
effects of the first one should not stand if that judgment is
reversed."18 But that difficulty has no bearing on Wyatt's case.
His conviction was upheld when he appealed to the court of
appeals and when he petitioned for hearing to this court.19 Nor
will "resolution of the appeal in the first action . . . preclude
the second action entirely."20 Reversal of the conviction, and
indeed, acquittal of the criminal charge, would not have
prevented the estate's wrongful death civil suit from succeeding.21
We acknowledge the possibility that the success of a
given appeal may be so highly probable that giving preclusive
effect to the judgment may be ill-advised.22 But this case
provides no opportunity to consider how that issue should be
resolved. And it would seem that an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5)
motion to vacate any judgment resting on the preclusive effect of
the earlier judgment following its reversal would provide
adequate relief in that situation.23
Wyatt argues that the superior court erred in granting
summary judgment because he claims issues remain to be presented
to appellate courts as part of Wyatt's post-conviction motion.
Wyatt does not offer any explanation why these issues could not
have been raised in his earlier appeal. Moreover, to give effect
to Wyatt's argument we would have to ignore the results in
Wyatt's unsuccessful criminal appeal and petition for hearing.
Wyatt does not adequately explain why appeals from any collateral
proceedings are relevant. The preclusive effects of Wyatt's
criminal conviction are not defeated by the pendency of any
post_conviction relief proceeding.24
The superior court did not err in granting partial
summary judgment to the estate.
4. The superior court did not err in
denying Wyatt's discovery request.
Wyatt argues that it was error to deny his discovery
request for information about the estate's inventory of property.
He asserts that this denial of discovery denied his due process
rights. Wyatt has inadequately briefed the issue, even under the
more relaxed standard we apply to pro se litigants.25 We will not
consider the issue on its merits. But as we noted in Part
III.B.2, the inventory list is not relevant to the outcome of
this case.
5. The superior court did not err in awarding costs
to the estate.
Wyatt argues that the superior court erred in awarding
attorney's fees and costs to the estate because the estate
allegedly co-mingled all costs and fees from the civil and
probate proceedings.
We agree with the estate's assertion that the
attorney's fees issue is not before us because the superior court
did not award attorney's fees to the estate.
The estate responds to Wyatt's costs argument by
contending that the superior court separated the civil and
probate matters in awarding costs to the estate. The court
stated that it was adjusting the court award "to reflect only
those costs incurred after the parties reached their agreement."
The court's award is not facially defective, and Wyatt's
conclusory argument does not identify any particular costs
erroneously awarded. It appears to us that the court carefully
reviewed the estate's expenses before awarding it $2,318.25 in
costs. Wyatt summarily asserts that the estate "co-mingled" the
costs of the probate and civil proceedings, but fails to
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in awarding
costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's decisions in all
respects.
_______________________________
1 The facts relevant to Wyatt's petition for hearing in this
court are discussed in Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109, 110-12
(Alaska 1999).
2 Id. at 116.
3 Juliano v. Angelini, 708 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Alaska 1985)
(citing Thrift Shop, Inc. v. Alaska Mut. Savs. Bank, 398 P.2d
657, 658_59 (Alaska 1965)).
4 Dickerson v. Williams, 956 P.2d 458, 462 (Alaska 1998).
5 VinZant v. Elam, 977 P.2d 84, 86 (Alaska 1999).
6 Gold Bondholders Protective Council v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 658 P.2d 776, 779 (Alaska 1983).
7 The three categories of property at issue here are Wyatt's
separate property (held by Wyatt before the marriage); the
decedent's separate property; and the Wyatts' joint marital
property.
8 Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Alaska 1997)
(citations omitted).
9 Singh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1193, 1199
(Alaska 1993).
10 See Beluga Mining Co. v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 973
P.2d 570, 578 (Alaska 1999).
11 Davis, 938 P.2d at 1006.
12 Wyatt cites Thrift Shop v. Alaska Mutual Savings Bank, 398
P.2d 657 (Alaska 1965), in support of his argument that "it is
essential that acceptance of the offer be unequivocal and in
exact compliance with the requirements of [Wyatt's] offer." But
this case is clearly distinguishable from Thrift Shop, in which
we held that no oral contract existed; the parties' intent in
Thrift Shop did not become manifest until the terms were later
reduced to writing. In comparison, as noted in Part III.B.1, the
record demonstrates that Wyatt understood that there was an oral
agreement and understood the scope of the agreed-upon property
transfer.
13 Wyatt's brief repeats and rephrases in different ways his
argument about the estate's inventory of the property. We reject
all of these attempts for the same reason: Wyatt explicitly
agreed to the transfer of all property in which he potentially
had a claim.
14 The superior court, in discussing Wyatt's proposal stated:
"Once the appeal comes down, if it's affirmed, the stay would be
lifted . . . . On the date that the appeal comes down, plus 10
days, the estate could then transfer that property to anybody, to
use it, do whatever they wanted to with it."
15 Wyatt invokes AS 13.12.803(f) in arguing that "[a] stay in
the civil proceedings . . . should have been [an] absolute
right." But AS 13.12.803 addresses the effect of homicide on
intestate succession, wills, trusts, and other property and
interest transfers. It does not affect the estate's wrongful
death claim in the civil proceedings, and it has no bearing
whatsoever on Wyatt's voluntary agreement with the estate to stay
those proceedings.
16 Langfeldt-Halland v. Saupe Enters., Inc., 768 P.2d 1144,
1146 & n.23 (Alaska 1989) (stating that "an indigent person has
no right to appointed counsel in most civil cases, although
certain exceptions exist in the areas of termination of parental
rights, child custody, paternity suits, and civil contempt
proceedings") (citations omitted).
17 Lyman v. State, 824 P.2d 703, 705 (Alaska 1992) (applying
rule to collateral estoppel); Holmberg v. State, Div. of Risk
Mgmt., 796 P.2d 823, 829 (Alaska 1990) (stating that "[a] final
judgment retains all of its res judicata effects pending
resolution of an appeal of the judgment") (citation omitted);
Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co., 794 P.2d 949, 951-52
(Alaska 1990) (applying rule to collateral estoppel).
18 Holmberg, 796 P.2d at 829 (citations omitted).
19 Wyatt, 981 P.2d at 112, 116.
20 Holmberg, 796 P.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
21 One reason is that the burden of proof is more stringent in
a criminal action than in a civil action. See, e.g., United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)
(ruling that double jeopardy does not bar civil forfeiture
proceeding following acquittal on related criminal charges).
22 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 4433 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that "[i]n some
cases, litigants and the courts have collaborated so ineptly that
the second judgment has become conclusive even though it rested
solely on a judgment that was later reversed").
23 Lyman, 824 P.2d at 705 & n.7.
24 See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22 (stating that "it
has been ruled that the preclusion effects of a criminal
conviction are not defeated by the pendency of a post_conviction
proceeding that attacks the conviction") (citation omitted).
25 Martinson v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 989 P.2d 733, 737 (Alaska
1999).
