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Prentzel v. Alaska Dep't of Public Safety (8/23/2002) sp-5615
Prentzel v. Alaska Dep't of Public Safety (8/23/2002) sp-5615
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
H. THOMPSON PRENTZEL, III, )
) Supreme Court No. S-9979
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 4FA-99-2423
CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT)
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, TROOPER ) [No. 5615 - August 23, 2002]
DANIEL SCOTT, TROOPER DANE )
GILMORE, CAPTAIN WARREN )
TANNER, and COLONEL GLEN )
GODFREY, )
)
Appellees. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Ralph R. Beistline, Judge.
Appearances: H. Thompson Prentzel, III, pro
se. Richard Keck, Assistant Attorney
General, Fairbanks, and Bruce M. Botelho,
Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
State troopers arrested a man without a warrant because
they thought he was violating his court-imposed conditions of
release from a prior charge. He was never charged with violating
the release conditions. The man sued the State of Alaska and
individual Alaska State Troopers. Was it error to dismiss on the
pleadings his negligence claims against the state and his
negligence and 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the individual
troopers? Because the pleadings alone do not allow us to decide
the resulting issues, we reverse in part the dismissal of his
claims and remand for further proceedings.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Alaska State Troopers Daniel Scott and Dane Gilmore saw
H. Thompson Prentzel III walk down College Road in Fairbanks at
3:30 a.m. in October 1998 with a bottle of alcohol in his
possession.1 The trooper dispatcher informed Troopers Scott and
Gilmore that Prentzel, who had previously been charged with
driving while intoxicated (DWI), was subject to a court-ordered
condition of release that precluded him from possessing alcohol.
Troopers Scott and Gilmore then arrested Prentzel without a
warrant for violating his DWI release conditions.2 Prentzel was
later released without being charged with violating his release
conditions.
Prentzel filed a civil action in October 1999 against
the Alaska Department of Public Safety, Trooper Scott, Trooper
Gilmore, Captain Warren Tanner, and Colonel Glen Godfrey (the
"state defendants"), alleging false arrest, false imprisonment,
trespass to chattels, conversion, and negligence. The parties
disagree about the circumstances surrounding the arrest.
Prentzel's complaint stated that he was:
humiliatingly handcuffed in public for more
than 10 min.; detained in an unsanitary cell
without sink or toilet for more than 12
hours; manhandled by officers who falsely
charged [him] with resisting arrest . . .
[and] drug possession, [had] the humiliation
of having these false charges . . . printed
in the local newspaper . . . all resulting in
increased stress.
The state defendants denied these allegations and
asserted instead that Prentzel had resisted arrest. The state
filed an Alaska Civil Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss on the
pleadings. Prentzel then moved to amend his complaint to claim
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. 1988, and violations of his civil rights under
the Alaska Constitution. The state defendants did not oppose
amendment. The state defendants moved to dismiss the civil
rights claim and the state constitutional claim in June and July
2000 and to consolidate and dismiss Prentzel's other claims.
Prentzel opposed dismissal. On August 7, 2000 Prentzel moved for
permission to file a second amended complaint to add an
additional unknown state trooper as a defendant, and to allege
that the state defendants' actions were willful and carried out
with malice. On August 10 the superior court granted the state
defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint and held that
the second amended complaint would not change the outcome of the
ruling. The superior court also awarded the state defendants
prevailing party attorney's fees of $1,000.
Prentzel appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings.3 The state defendants can prevail
only if Prentzel's pleadings contain no allegations that would
permit recovery if proven.4
B. It Was Error To Dismiss Prentzel's Claims Against
Troopers Gilmore and Scott on the Grounds of Official
Immunity.
Prentzel argues that the superior court erred in
dismissing on official immunity grounds his claims against
Troopers Scott and Gilmore. Prentzel argues that Troopers Scott
and Gilmore exceeded the scope of their authority, thereby
forfeiting immunity, when they arrested Prentzel without a
warrant. Prentzel argues that AS 12.25.030 does not authorize
warrantless arrests for violations of DWI conditions of release.
He also argues that the allegation of malice in his proposed
second amended complaint created a factual dispute that precluded
judgment on the pleadings. The state defendants argue that
Troopers Scott and Gilmore "are immune from liability for making
an error in their personal deliberation, decision, and judgment
regarding the scope of their arrest authority." The state
defendants conclude that this immunity extends to state officials
who misinterpret the law.
The superior court ruled that Prentzel's arrest was "an
exercise of Trooper discretion," and that governmental immunity
protects Troopers Scott and Gilmore from liability for
misinterpreting their authority to arrest Prentzel under AS
12.25.030.5 The superior court also denied Prentzel's August
2000 motion to amend his complaint to add a charge of willful and
malicious conduct because it ruled that the amendment would "not
change the outcome herein."
Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) allows parties to amend their
pleadings by leave of court; leave is to be granted when justice
requires.6 We have held that "the trial court has broad
discretion in allowing or denying proposed amendments after the
initial period has passed under [Rule 15(a)]."7 Typical reasons
for denying leave to amend include the added expense and
increased burden the opposing party is likely to face as a result
of the amendment.8 But a party should be permitted to amend if
there is no showing that amending would cause injustice.9
It does not appear that the superior court based its
decision to deny Prentzel's second attempted amendment on grounds
of increased burden, added expense, or potential injustice to the
state defendants. Instead, the superior court concluded that
Prentzel's second amended complaint would not alter the legal
grounds for dismissing Prentzel's claims.
The superior court's ruling would have been correct if
Prentzel's amendment would have been fruitless.10 This would have
been the case if the immunity protecting Troopers Scott and
Gilmore were absolute, because an allegation of malice will not
defeat absolute immunity.11 But if the officers are entitled to
immunity it must be qualified, not absolute, immunity.12 We have
stated that "[u]nder a rule of qualified immunity, a public
official is shielded from liability only when discretionary acts
within the scope of the official's authority are done in good
faith and are not malicious or corrupt."13 Prentzel claimed in
his rejected second amended complaint that the actions of
Troopers Gilmore and Scott "were made with malice toward
[Prentzel]." Whether they acted maliciously is a factual
question not suitable for disposition on the pleadings when a
complaint properly pleads malice.14 We therefore hold that it was
error to deny the amendment and to rule that the doctrine of
official immunity entitled Troopers Gilmore and Scott to judgment
on the pleadings.
C. It Was Error To Dismiss Prentzel's Negligence Claim
Against the State and Officers Tanner and Godfrey.
1. The pleadings do not preclude the possibility that
the state defendants owed Prentzel an actionable
duty.
Prentzel contends that Captain Tanner and Colonel
Godfrey "failed in their duty to train and supervise Sergeant
John Doe, Trooper Scott and Trooper Gilmore concerning the scope
of their lawful authority to arrest a person without a warrant
when such person is not committing an offense." The state
defendants argue that Captain Tanner and Colonel Godfrey owed
Prentzel no duty to be error-free in their supervision and
training of Troopers Scott and Gilmore because Troopers Scott and
Gilmore themselves owed no duty to Prentzel to be error-free in
their arrest. But whether Captain Tanner and Colonel Godfrey
owed Prentzel a duty cannot be conclusively resolved by resort to
this simple syllogism. Instead, we have stated that an
actionable duty of care is a public policy question involving:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent
of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability,
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.[15]
Prentzel urges us to hold that the state owes a duty to
its citizens to supervise and train state troopers so that they
do not make mistakes like the one made by Troopers Scott and
Gilmore. Inadequate police training can be actionable,16 but we
are reluctant to decide whether any duty was owed in this case
based on the limited fact inferences permissible from the
pleadings alone. Although determining whether an actionable duty
exists is a legal question,17 the factual context can be a helpful
indicator of the public policy questions at issue.18 Prentzel's
amended complaint does not rule out the existence of actionable
training and supervision duties.19 We hold that the dismissal of
the training and supervision claim cannot be sustained on a
theory the pleadings alleged no actionable duty.
2. Determining whether Captain Tanner and Colonel
Godfrey are entitled to immunity for supervision
and training of the arresting officers requires
further development of the underlying facts.
Prentzel next argues that the state is not entitled to
discretionary function immunity under AS 09.50.250(1).20 He
asserts that "[n]o discretion" in the matter of his arrest "was
vested in [the state], Colonel Godfrey, Captain Tanner, Sergeant
Doe, Trooper Scott or Trooper Gilmore."
We have adopted a "planning/operational" dichotomy for
identifying those governmental acts entitled to discretionary
function immunity under AS 09.50.250.21 "A planning decision is
one that involves policy formulation, whereas an operational
decision involves policy execution or implementation."22 Planning
decisions are entitled to discretionary function immunity;
operational decisions are not. Prentzel argues that any
decisions made by the state in supervising and training troopers
in making arrests - specifically arrests for violations of DWI
bail conditions - are operational.
Distinguishing between operational and planning
decisions is a legal question. Nonetheless, "our decisions
identifying discretionary functions have invariably involved
cases decided on summary judgment; we have never affirmed a
dismissal based on the pleadings alone."23 We recognize that some
facets of training and supervising are more likely than others to
involve planning, rather than operational, activities.24 But we
cannot decide without some factual context whether the training
and supervisory activities Prentzel attributes to Captain Tanner
and Colonel Godfrey involved planning functions entitling them to
discretionary function immunity. They were therefore not
entitled to dismissal of those claims on a discretionary function
immunity theory.
D. Prentzel's Pleadings Do Not Require Dismissal of the
1983 Claim Against the Individually Named Officers and
Troopers.
Prentzel's amended complaint sought money damages and
injunctive relief against the "defendants" under 42 U.S.C. 1983
for certain alleged customs and policies of the Alaska State
Troopers.25 The superior court dismissed Prentzel's 1983
damages claim, stating:
Because states and state agencies cannot be
sued under 1983, since they are not
"persons" for 1983 purposes, and the Alaska
State Troopers are an agency, created by a
statute as a division of the Department of
[Public] Safety, Prentzel's [ 1983 claim] is
dismissed to the extent that [it] seeks
monetary damages from a state agency.
Prentzel does not argue that the superior court erred
by dismissing his 1983 claim against the state. But he argues
that the superior court erred by not construing his 1983 claim
to cover the individual defendants, as well as the state.
Prentzel's amended complaint and proposed second amended
complaint sought relief against "defendants." Prentzel here
contends that "defendants" included not only the state, but also
the individual troopers and officers.26
Allegations in a pro se complaint are sometimes held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.27 As such, we consider whether the superior court should
have read the term "defendants" in Prentzel's complaint to
include the individually named troopers and officers.28
Because federal law defines the elements of and
defenses to a federal cause of action, we look to federal law to
determine the scope of Prentzel's rights and defendants'
qualified immunity.29
Prentzel's 1983 claim can be broken down into two
categories: a claim against the arresting troopers and a claim
against the troopers' supervisors. Before addressing these
categories, however, we first must consider a threshold legal
question applicable to both categories: whether Prentzel intended
to sue the individual defendants in their personal or in their
official capacities.
Prentzel's 1983 claim did not specifically allege in
what capacities the defendants acted. If his complaint is read
to allege that the troopers simply executed official policy, the
troopers could not be held liable for damages under 1983,
because officials acting in their official capacities cannot be
the subjects of 1983 damages suits.30 But if his complaint is
read to assert that the troopers acted in their personal
capacities when they allegedly violated his federal rights, it
may assert a actionable 1983 damages claim.31 Because the
parties did not brief this issue below and have not briefed it on
appeal, and because the limited proceedings to date do not permit
us to decide it as a matter of law, we decline to reach the
issue. But the following comments are appropriate.
We look to the nature of Prentzel's claim, the relief
sought, and the course of proceedings to determine whether he
intended to sue the defendants in their personal or official
capacities.32 Prentzel's amended complaint and proposed second
amended complaint allege that the "defendants" were effectuating
"customs or policies" under color of state law when they
allegedly violated his federal rights. This implies that
Prentzel claimed that the defendants were acting in their
official capacities when they committed the complained-of
actions. Prentzel's opposition to the state's motion to dismiss
his 1983 claim expresses no intention to sue the defendants in
their personal capacities. But Prentzel's pleadings request both
monetary and injunctive relief, and monetary relief is only
available in personal-capacity lawsuits.33 Furthermore, the
parties do not agree on appeal whether the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity, and qualified immunity is
likewise only available in personal-capacity lawsuits.34
1. Troopers Scott and Gilmore
The state defendants argue that Prentzel's claim
against Troopers Scott and Gilmore is "preposterous" because
neither of these arresting troopers "had ever engaged in any of
[the] so-called customs and policies of the AST that Prentzel
alleges."35 If the troopers were simply executing official
policy, they could not be held liable under 1983. But if, as
Prentzel's pleadings impliedly allege, Troopers Scott and Gilmore
violated Prentzel's federally created rights while they were
acting under color of state law, they could be personally liable
under 1983.36
The distinction between personal and official capacity
is critical in determining liability under 1983. If Troopers
Scott and Gilmore acted in their official capacities there would
be no 1983 liability for damages because "neither a State nor
its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons'
under 1983."37 Prentzel's amended complaint and proposed second
amended complaint allege that the "defendants" violated 1983 by
effectuating under color of state law "customs or policies" that
deprived him of federally created rights. The state defendants
argue that Troopers Scott and Gilmore believed that Prentzel was
either committing a crime in their presence or violating his
conditions of release. They argue that Troopers Scott and
Gilmore carried out the arrest in their official capacity. We
cannot determine from the pleadings alone whether Troopers Scott
and Gilmore acted beyond the scope of their official capacities
in arresting Prentzel. We therefore cannot determine at this
stage of the litigation whether Prentzel has a viable 1983
claim for damages against Troopers Scott and Gilmore.38
Prentzel further argues that it was an abuse of
discretion to deny his motion to amend his complaint to allege
malice expressly. We held in Part III.C in context of the state
tort claim against Troopers Scott and Gilmore that denial was an
abuse of discretion. But it was not an abuse of discretion in
context of the 1983 claim. The Supreme Court purposely
disposed of the subjective element of the immunity defense, and
"[b]are allegations of malice" are now effectively irrelevant to
a 1983 claim.39
We hold that it is not obvious from the pleadings alone
that Prentzel's 1983 claim against Troopers Scott and Gilmore
is without merit.40 We remand for reinstatement of that claim.
But we also hold as to the 1983 claim that it was not error to
deny the motion to amend to allege malice.
2. Captain Tanner and Colonel Godfrey
Prentzel argues that the 1983 claims against "the
individual defendants were improperly dismissed." His argument,
as discussed above, is that the term "defendants" in his
complaint included the individual defendants and was not limited
to the state agency. Prentzel's brief does not mention Captain
Tanner and Colonel Godfrey with respect to his 1983 claim. But
his proposed second amended complaint states that the "customs
and/or policies of defendants deprive[d] [him] of rights secured
to him under the United States Constitution." He does not
specify the customs or policies to which he refers, but he is not
required to specify them at the pleading stage.41
The Supreme Court has held that "the inadequacy of
police training may serve as the basis of 1983 liability only
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to
the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact."42
We held in Hildebrandt v. City of Fairbanks that "training can
justifiably be said to represent . . . policy . . . [when] `the
need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policy-makers . . . can reasonably be said to
have been deliberately indifferent to the need.' "43 We allowed
the 1983 claim to go forward in Hildebrandt because it was
against the City of Fairbanks, which is a "person" for purposes
of 1983.44 But Captain Tanner and Colonel Godfrey are employees
of a state agency, which is not a "person" for purposes of 1983
suits.45
A 1983 claim would lie against Captain Tanner and
Colonel Godfrey if Prentzel could show that they adopted, outside
their official capacities, the customs or policies he alleges,
causing violations of his civil rights.46 This would require
evidence of their personal involvement in a violation of
Prentzel's rights, and not simply evidence of their status as
supervisors of Troopers Scott and Gilmore. "A supervisor may be
liable under 1983 only if there exists either (1) his or her
personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful
conduct and the constitutional violation."47 A sufficient showing
of personal involvement could include demonstrating that Captain
Tanner and Colonel Godfrey "created a policy or custom under
which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the
continuance of such a policy or custom,"48 or showed deliberate
indifference in supervising Troopers Scott and Gilmore.49
It is not apparent from Prentzel's brief how he thinks
Captain Tanner and Colonel Godfrey acted in their personal
capacities in allegedly violating his federally created rights.
The amended complaint and proposed second amended complaint do
not allow us to determine whether the actions of Captain Tanner
and Colonel Godfrey were outside the scope of their official
capacities, and they do not permit us to ascertain the possible
merits of Prentzel's claim. But on remand Captain Tanner and
Colonel Godfrey will be entitled to learn through discovery how
Prentzel believes they violated his federally created rights.
Prentzel's responses may well make his 1983 claim vulnerable to
an immunity defense on summary judgment.
E. We Do Not Reach Prentzel's "Bivens" Claim Because the
Issue Is Inadequately Briefed.
Citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,50 Prentzel urges us to "recognize a cause of
action arising directly under the Alaska Constitution" due to "a
flagrant violation [for which Prentzel] has no available
alternative remedy." The state defendants argue that the
superior court "correctly found that the conduct alleged by
Prentzel was not a flagrant violation of Prentzel's rights," and
that Prentzel's claims are "identical to those already asserted
by Prentzel as common law torts."
Prentzel has inadequately briefed this issue. Even
applying a more relaxed standard for a pro se appellant, we will
not consider this issue on appeal.51 We have not previously
decided whether to recognize such a cause of action,52 and this
case does not provide a suitable opportunity to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the dismissal of Prentzel's negligence
claims against the state defendants and his 1983 claim against
Troopers Scott and Gilmore, Captain Tanner, and Colonel Godfrey,
and REMAND for further proceedings. We consequently also VACATE
the superior court's award of attorney's fees to the state
defendants. We AFFIRM the dismissal of Prentzel's damages claim
alleging a violation of the Alaska Constitution.
_______________________________
1 Because this appeal is taken from an Alaska Civil Rule
12(c) dismissal, we read the facts alleged in the pleadings and
the inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to
the non-movant. Hebert v. Honest Bingo, 18 P.3d 43, 46-47
(Alaska 2001).
2 The troopers also arrested Prentzel for resisting
arrest and possessing marijuana.
3 Hebert, 18 P.3d at 46 (citing Noey v. Bledsoe, 978 P.2d
1264, 1271 n.19 (Alaska 1999)).
4 Id. at 47 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 1368, at 527-28 (2d ed. 1990)).
5 AS 12.25.030 addresses, among other things, grounds for
arrest by a peace officer without a warrant. At the time of
Prentzel's arrest, AS 12.25.030 did not include arrest for
violating the conditions of release from a DWI charge.
6 The rule states in part that "a party may amend the
party's pleading only by leave of court . . . and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires." Alaska R. Civ. P. 15(a).
7 Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050,
1054 (Alaska 1986) (citations omitted).
8 Thompson's Estate v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 514 P.2d
1269, 1271 (Alaska 1973) (citation omitted).
9 Id.
10 See Kleinhans v. Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810
F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming denial of motion to
amend ERISA complaint under Federal Civil Rule 15(a) where
amendment to add punitive damages claim would be fruitless
because statute did not permit recovery of punitive damages).
11 Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 160
(Alaska 1987).
12 Samaniego v. City of Kodiak, 2 P.3d 78, 83-84 (Alaska
2000) ("[P]olice officers, as municipal officers, concurrently
enjoy qualified immunity for certain discretionary actions.");
see also 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
4.5, at 308 (Shephard's Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed. 1992)
("Generally speaking, absolute immunity applies only to judges,
legislators, and the highest executive officers of various levels
of state government[;] . . . other public officers are covered by
qualified immunity.").
13 See Aspen Exploration, 739 P.2d at 158 (citation
omitted) (explaining that allegations of malice generally create
factual disputes precluding summary adjudication).
14 Id. at 160 & n.24.
15 Guerrero v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 6 P.3d 250, 254
(Alaska 2000) (quoting D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch.
Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1981)).
16 See Hildebrandt v. City of Fairbanks, 863 P.2d 240, 245-
46 (Alaska 1993) (remanding 1983 inadequate police training
claim because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary
judgment).
17 Guerrero, 6 P.3d at 255.
18 Angnabooguk v. State, 26 P.3d 447, 452 & n.18 (Alaska
2001) (holding that internal rules and guidelines of state agency
do not create duty of care); Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d
78, 81 n.7 (Alaska 1995) (holding that internal administrative
and training manual used by police did not impose duty of care to
fleeing suspects).
19 Our decisions addressing duties owed by public
officials and related immunity issues usually do not involve
dismissals at the pleadings stage. Guerrero, 6 P.3d at 261 &
n.77 (holding that dismissal on pleadings on discretionary
function immunity grounds was inappropriate). See also
Hildebrandt, 863 P.2d at 245 (holding that material fact relating
to adequacy of supervision defeats summary judgment on 1983
inadequate training claim).
20 AS 09.50.250 provides in part:
A person . . . having a . . . tort claim
against the state may bring an action against
the state in a state court that has
jurisdiction over the claim. . . . However,
an action may not be brought under this
section if the claim
(1) . . . is an action for tort, and is
based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of
a state agency or an employee of the state,
whether or not the discretion involved is
abused . . . .
21 E.g., Guerrero, 6 P.3d at 259; State v. Abbott, 498
P.2d 712, 721 (Alaska 1972) (adopting "planning/operational"
approach).
22 Guerrero, 6 P.3d at 259.
23 Id. at 261.
24 See generally id. at 261-62 (discussing
planning/operational distinction); CIVIL ACTIONS 2.7, at 113-
14, 2.10, at 125-26 (same). But see Biscoe v. Arlington
County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
supervising and instructing is operational, not planning).
25 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
26 Prentzel's proposed second amended complaint includes a
claim against "Sergeant John Doe." Because the parties do not
discuss whether this unnamed officer may properly be a defendant
in this current action, we do not reach this issue.
27 E.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
28 The parties do not brief the issue of injunctive
relief, and we do not reach it. We refer throughout only to
Prentzel's 1983 damages claim.
29 Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 259 (Alaska 2000).
30 In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, the
Supreme Court held that "neither a State nor its officials acting
in their official capacities are `persons' under 1983." 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Court reasoned that damages suits
against officials in their official capacities are no different
from suits against the state itself. Id. On the other hand,
suits for injunctive relief under 1983 may be brought against
officials acting in their official capacities because " `official-
capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the state.' " Id. at n.10 (citation omitted).
31 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (citation
omitted); see also Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 135 (Md. 2000).
32 Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61-62 (4th Cir. 1995)
(describing and adopting majority approach to determining nature
of 1983 claim when plaintiff fails to specifically allege
capacity).
33 Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166.
34 Id.
35 The state defendants add that Troopers Scott and
Gilmore arrested Prentzel on only a single occasion. Arrest on a
single occasion is not likely to constitute a "custom" or
"policy." See 1 SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION 6:38, at 6-129 (4th ed. 1997) ("A single incident of
police officer misconduct . . . is clearly not sufficient.").
36 Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166; see also Okwa, 757 A.2d at
135.
37 Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
38 We do not reach the issue whether Troopers Scott and
Gilmore are entitled to qualified immunity because there are
unresolved factual issues as to whether they acted in their
official or personal capacities.
39 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 & n.30
(1982); see also Okwa, 757 A.2d at 138.
40 Troopers Scott and Gilmore are entitled to protection
from the 1983 claim on official immunity grounds if they can
establish that a reasonable officer could have believed that
their conduct was lawful, even if it actually was not. But as a
pleading matter Prentzel did not have to allege both that their
conduct was unlawful and that no reasonable officer could have
thought that it was lawful.
41 To survive dismissal of the 1983 claim against
Captain Tanner and Colonel Godfrey, the complaint must at least
allege training or supervision failures. Meza v. Lee, 699 F.
Supp. 325, 326-27 (D. Nev. 1987). Prentzel's complaint satisfies
this minimal requirement by alleging that Captain Tanner and
Colonel Godfrey negligently failed to train and supervise
Troopers Scott and Gilmore.
42 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see
generally NAHMOD, 6:33 to 6:37, at 6-117 to 6-129 (discussing
requirements for pleading custom).
43 863 P.2d 240, 246 (Alaska 1993) (quoting City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).
44 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that local governments may be sued
as "persons" under 1983 for unconstitutional policies,
practices, and customs); see also NAHMOD 6:5, at 6-15 to 6-19.
45 Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66.
46 Respondeat superior does not apply in 1983 actions.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also NAHMOD 3:91, at 3-246 to 3-
247.
47 Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
48 Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted); see also NAHMOD 6:38, at 6-129 to 6-130.
49 See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.
50 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
51 Martinson v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 989 P.2d 733, 737
(Alaska 1999) (citation omitted).
52 Brown, 14 P.3d at 261-62.
