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Robertson v. American Mechanical, Inc. (7/19/2002) sp-5595
Robertson v. American Mechanical, Inc. (7/19/2002) sp-5595
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
JOHN ROBERTSON, )
) Supreme Court No. S-10048
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-00-01558 CI
)
AMERICAN MECHANICAL, INC., ) O P I N I O N
and ALASKA NATIONAL )
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Appellees. ) [No. 5595 - July 19,
2002]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Ralph R. Beistline, Judge.
Appearances: Arthur L. Robson, Robson Law
Office, Fairbanks, for Appellant. Michael P.
McConahy, McConahy, Zimmerman & Wallace,
Fairbanks, for Appellees.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
John Robertson appeals the superior court decision of
January 26, 2001, that upheld both the Alaska Workers'
Compensation Board's dismissal of his amended report of
occupational injury as well as its subsequent denial of his
petition for reconsideration and rehearing. Robertson argues
that the Board erred by finding that his amended claim was barred
by res judicata, collateral estoppel, untimeliness, laches,
equitable estoppel, and quasi-estoppel. Because the Board
correctly dismissed Robertson's amended claim on the basis of res
judicata, we affirm the superior court's decision.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
John Robertson began working for American Mechanical,
Inc., (AMI) in February 1994 as a house painter and texturer on a
project at Fort Wainwright. He continued to work for AMI until
December 1995. While working for AMI, Robertson went to North
Pole Chiropractic Clinic on September 2, 1994, for what he
believed to be a back strain. He began periodic chiropractic
adjustments for this back problem. On October 27, 1994,
Robertson returned to the North Pole Chiropractic Clinic for a
back injury allegedly suffered on October 26. He visited the
North Pole Chiropractic Clinic regularly between September 2 and
the end of January 1995.
One and one-half years after the injury, on April 24,
1996, Robertson visited orthopedist Dr. Carl Unsicker at the
Fairbanks Clinic, complaining of back pain and numbness in his
right leg. Dr. Unsicker examined Robertson and took x-rays (but
did not order an MRI), finding that Robertson had a "good range
of motion," and likely suffered from "[l]umbar degenerative disc
disease, L5/S1," which he determined "was probably preexistent to
the onset of his discomfort." He recommended Ibuprofen as
needed.
Robertson next consulted orthopedic surgeon Dr. Roy
Pierson on May 16, 1996. Robertson reported to Dr. Pierson that
he was injured on the job in October of 1994. Dr. Pierson
examined Robertson, and following an MRI, diagnosed him as having
a herniated nucleus pulposus in the L5-S1 area, with right lower
extremity neuropathy. Dr. Pierson recommended epidural cortisone
injections, which Robertson declined, citing concerns over
insurance coverage. Dr. Pierson prescribed Naprosyn, and put
Robertson on "light duty work lifting less than 30 lbs. and
limited bending [and] stooping [for] 2 months."
Robertson did not officially report the injury to AMI
until June 4, 1996, following his consultations with Dr. Pierson.
However, he claims that his supervisor knew of his injury in the
fall of 1994. Unfortunately, his supervisor subsequently moved
out of state and has since died, making Robertson's assertion
impossible to verify. AMI's human resources manager asserted
that the company had no notice of his back problem until
Robertson filed his claim, a year and a half after the injury.
Robertson filed a report of occupational injury on June
4, 1996, reporting a lower back injury on October 26, 1994. The
Board heard his claim for benefits on June 5, 1997. The Board
denied Robertson's claim in its decision and order dated July 22,
1997. The Board found that Robertson presented sufficient
evidence to raise the presumption of compensability. However, it
found that AMI produced substantial evidence that overcame the
presumption and that Robertson failed to establish his claim by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Robertson moved for a modification of this decision.
The Board denied his motion, concluding that it was "solely a
back-door attempt to reopen and retry the employee's case," and
that Robertson had "not presented sufficient evidence to support
a rehearing and modification . . . ." Robertson appealed this
denial of modification to the superior court. Superior Court
Judge Charles R. Pengilly affirmed the Board's denial of the
motion for modification on procedural grounds, noting that even
absent Robertson's procedural failure the court would affirm the
Board's decision on substantive grounds. Robertson did not
appeal the superior court's decision.
On the same day that he filed his first appeal in the
superior court, Robertson filed an amended report of occupational
injury. This amended claim was functionally identical to his
original report, but argued that his injury may have occurred as
early as September 1, 1994, as opposed to October 26 as
originally claimed. The Board dismissed Robertson's amended
claim on the basis that it was barred by res judicata and
collateral estoppel, as well as by its untimeliness under AS
23.20.100(a) and AS 23.30.105(a), and by the equitable principles
of laches, equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel.
Robertson requested that the Board reconsider its
dismissal of his amended claim, but the Board denied this
request, reiterating that his claim was barred by res judicata,
collateral estoppel, untimeliness, laches, equitable estoppel,
and quasi-estoppel, and saying that he had "not provided
sufficient basis for [] reconsideration and rehearing."
Robertson appealed the Board's dismissal of his amended
claim and its denial of reconsideration to the superior court.
In his appeal, Robertson argued that (1) the Board erred by
refusing to reconsider its denial of his amended report; (2) the
Board erred in accepting testimony of Dr. Unsicker over that of
Dr. Pierson; (3) Robertson should be covered by workers'
compensation whether his injury was caused on October 26 or
September 2, 1994; and (4) Robertson's claim was not barred by
laches, untimeliness, res judicata, or estoppel.
On January 26, 2001, Superior Court Judge Ralph R.
Beistline held that Robertson's claims were barred by res
judicata. Alternatively, he found that the Board's conclusions
of fact were supported by substantial evidence. He further
upheld, under a reasonable basis test, the Board's finding that
Robertson's amended claim was barred by untimeliness under AS
23.30.100(a) and AS 23.30.105(a). He declined to reach the
question of whether Robertson's amended claim was properly barred
for the other listed reasons. This appeal followed.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In cases in which the superior court has served as an
intermediate court of appeal of an agency decision, we will
independently review the merits of the administrative decision.1
We review an administrative agency's findings to determine
whether they are supported by substantial evidence.2 Substantial
evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."3 We will uphold the
Board's decisions as to the credibility of witnesses, if such
decisions are supported by substantial evidence,4 as "[i]t is not
this court's role to reweigh the evidence."5 We review questions
of law using our independent judgment.6
IV. DISCUSSION
Robertson's Amended Claim Was Barred by Res Judicata.
The Board found that the principles of res judicata
barred Robertson's amended claim. We have held that res
judicata, or claim preclusion, applies to workers' compensation
cases, however it is not always applied as rigidly in
administrative proceedings as it is in judicial proceedings.7
When applicable, res judicata precludes a subsequent suit
"between the same parties asserting the same claim for relief
when the matter raised was or could have been decided in the
first suit."8 It requires that "(1) the prior judgment was a
final judgment on the merits, (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment, and (3) the same cause
of action and same parties or their privies were involved in both
suits."9
In finding that the amended claim was barred by res
judicata, the Board found that "[t]he issue to be decided is
identical to that already litigated: whether the employee is
entitled to workers' compensation benefits for his lower back
condition. The employee does not assert that he sustained a
different injury on September 1, 1994. Indeed, the employee
admitted that the claims are identical."
We hold that Robertson's claim is barred by the rule
against claim splitting, which is "a conventional application of
the doctrine of res judicata."10 The rule against claim splitting
provides that "all claims arising out of a single transaction
must be brought in a single suit, and those that are not become
extinguished by the judgment in the suit in which some of the
claims were brought."11 When analyzing claim splitting, "the
relevant inquiry is not whether the two claims are grounded in
different theories, but whether they arise out of the same
transaction or core set of facts."12 Robertson had the option of
arguing in his original claim that he was either injured on
October 26, or alternatively that he was injured while working
for AMI on September 1 and aggravated the injury on October 26.
Because both claims are based on the same injury and the same
"core set of facts," these claims should have been brought
together. Because they were not, Robertson's amended claim is
barred by res judicata.13
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Board correctly dismissed Robertson's
amended claim on the basis of res judicata, we AFFIRM the
superior court's decision.
_______________________________
1Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603, 606-07 (Alaska 1999).
2Grove v. Alaska Constr. & Erectors, 948 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska
1997).
3Id. (quoting Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044, 1046
(Alaska 1978)).
4Williams v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Alaska
1997).
5DeYonge v. NANA/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90, 94 (Alaska 2000) (citing
Miller, 577 P.2d at 1049).
6Phillip Weidner & Assocs., Inc. v. Hibdon, 989 P.2d 727, 730
(Alaska 1999).
7McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska
1989).
8State v. Smith, 720 P.2d 40, 41 (Alaska 1986).
9Tope v. Christianson, 959 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Alaska 1998).
10McDowell v. State, 23 P.3d 1165, 1167 n.9 (Alaska 2001).
11Osborne v. Buckman, 993 P.2d 409, 412 (Alaska 1999).
12McDowell, 23 P.3d at 1167.
13Because we hold that Robertson's amended claim is barred by res
judicata, we do not reach his arguments that the Board erred in
giving more weight to Dr. Unsicker's diagnosis of his injury than
to Dr. Pierson's, or that his injury should be covered by
workers' compensation regardless of whether the injury occurred
on September 1, 1994, or October 26, 1994.
