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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Tybus v. Holland (10/15/99) sp-5194

Tybus v. Holland (10/15/99) sp-5194

Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication 
in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers are requested to bring errors to 
the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, 
Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.



			THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
	

	DONALD PETER TYBUS,			)
							)	Supreme Court Nos. S-8559/8560
   				Appellant/		)
   				Cross-Appellee,	)	Superior Court No.
							)	3AN-95-7735 CI
		v.					)
							)	O P I N I O N
	CATHERINE ELLEN HOLLAND,		)
							)	[No. 5194 - October 15, 1999]
   				Appellee/		)
   				Cross-Appellant.	)
		______________________________)




Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of 
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage,
	Dan A. Hensley, Judge.


Appearances: William T. Ford, Anchorage, for 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.  Deidre S. Ganopole, 
Anchorage, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.


Before:  Matthews, Chief Justice, Eastaugh, 
Fabe, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.  


FABE, Justice.


I.	INTRODUCTION

Donald Tybus and Catherine Holland appeal various aspects 
of the superior court's property division and alimony award.  
Because the superior court acted within its discretion when it set 
the date of separation, classified Catherine's student loans as 
marital, distributed the marital estate unequally, distributed 
pensions through the use of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders 
(QDROs), awarded a judgment lien to Catherine to ensure that Donald 
would pay marital debts, awarded rehabilitative alimony to 
Catherine, and ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney's 
fees, we affirm on those issues.  We remand for the limited purpose 
of ensuring that QDROs were entered for all of the parties' 
pensions.
II.	FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Catherine Ellen Holland and Donald Peter Tybus were 
married in 1983 in New York.  They had no children.
When the couple married, Donald had a master's degree in 
architecture and worked for the federal government as an architect, 
while Catherine had a G.E.D. and had finished one year of college. 
 Shortly before they married, Catherine received a full scholarship 
to college but at Donald's request moved with Donald to California 
instead of continuing school.  In California, Catherine worked for 
the federal government as a clerk-typist.  After four years in 
California, Donald received a job transfer to Virginia.  Catherine 
quit her job to supervise the couple's move.  In Virginia, she 
began working for the government again but did not retain any 
seniority from her previous government service.  After two years in 
Virginia, Donald was transferred to Germany.  Catherine's seniority 
did not transfer and she was effectively demoted.  In 1990 Donald 
was transferred to Washington, D.C.  Catherine was promoted, but 
her promotion was rescinded when Donald was transferred to Alaska.

In 1994 Catherine obtained her B.A. in business.  She 
wished to continue her education by obtaining a master's degree in 
either psychological counseling or business.  After consulting with 
Donald, she decided to obtain the counseling degree even though it 
would lead to less of a financial benefit.
In September 1995 Donald moved out of the marital home 
and filed for divorce.  The couple entered marital counseling, but 
the counseling was unsuccessful.  In April 1996 Donald had the 
locks changed on the marital home to keep Catherine out; Catherine 
testified that she then knew the marriage was really over.  In 
October Catherine briefly believed that the couple would reconcile, 
but when Donald told her he did not wish to preserve the marriage, 
Catherine finally accepted that the marriage had ended.
After the parties separated in 1996, Catherine decided 
that she needed to earn an M.B.A. in order to support herself.  She 
opted to finish her counseling degree, then in progress, after she 
learned that she would have fewer M.B.A. requirements if she 
completed the counseling degree.  Catherine obtained her master's 
degree in psychological counseling in 1997, incurring $10,000 in 
student loans.
Judge Dan A. Hensley held trial in October 1997 in 
Anchorage.  Donald asked the court to divide the couple's property 
and award attorney's fees.  Catherine requested property division, 
spousal support, and attorney's fees.

Judge Hensley set the date of separation as April 1996, 
the date that Donald changed the locks on the marital residence. 
 The primary assets to be divided at trial were: the marital 
residence, valued at $11,000 after adjusting for the mortgage, 
credit card and other consumer debt in the amount of $21,039, 
Catherine's student loans in the amount of $10,000, $3,962 in tax 
refunds, two automobiles, a variety of personal property, and a 
dog.  Each party also possessed a retirement account.  At the 
request of the parties, the court divided Donald's Civil Service 
pension and Catherine's Thrift Savings Plan equally through a QDRO.
At the time of trial, Catherine's earning capacity was 
$32,000 per year while Donald's was $65,000 per year.  Donald also 
testified that he expected to receive an inheritance of 
approximately $130,000 within one or two years after trial.  
Because the trial court found that Catherine had limited earning 
potential, it distributed the marital estate unequally in her 
favor.  Catherine received one of the cars, the tax refunds, a 
$2,000 advance on marital assets, and approximately one-third of 
the personal property, for a total of $12,985 in assets plus her 
share of the pensions.1   Donald received the other car, the marital 
residence, approximately two-thirds of the personal property, the 
consumer debt, the student loans, and the dog, for a net liability 
of $9,778 plus his share of the pensions.

To allay Catherine's concerns that Donald's late payment 
of bills in her name would negatively affect her credit rating, 
Judge Hensley awarded Catherine a judgment lien in the amount of 
the debts in her name, secured by Donald's expected inheritance.
Because it found that the unequal division of the marital 
estate did not rectify the disparity in earning power between the 
parties, the trial court also awarded Catherine rehabilitative 
alimony.  The court ordered Donald to pay Catherine $750 per month 
for two years so that Catherine could go back to school and earn an 
M.B.A.
Finally, the court ordered that both parties pay their 
own attorney's fees.
Donald appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its 
discretion by classifying the student loans as a marital liability, 
unequally distributing the property, requiring security for 
Donald's payment of the marital debts, and awarding rehabilitative 
alimony to Catherine.  Catherine cross-appeals, arguing that the 
trial court abused its discretion by setting the date of separation 
as April 1996 and requiring each party to bear his or her own 
attorney's fees.
III.	STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Trial courts exercise broad discretion in the division of 
marital assets.2   Property division upon divorce is a three-step 
process.  First, the court determines what property is marital and 
thus available for division.3   We generally review classification 
of property for an abuse of discretion,4  although classification of 
some items may present a question of law to which we apply our 
independent judgment.5   Second, the court places a monetary value 
on the marital property.6   We will reverse this factual 
determination only if it is clearly erroneous.7   Third, the court 
equitably distributes the marital property.8   We review this step 
for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless the division is 
clearly unjust.9   We review a trial court's award of rehabilitative 
alimony, determination of the date of separation, and decision 
whether or not to award attorney's fees for an abuse of 
discretion.10 
IV.	DISCUSSION
A.	The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Set 
the Date of Separation as April 1996.

The proper date after which property should be classified 
as post-marital is "ordinarily the date of the functional 
termination of the marriage."11   Alaska law has defined this as the 
point at which "the marriage has terminated as a joint enterprise"
or when a couple is no longer "functioning economically as a single 
unit."12   Determination of the separation date is a fact-specific 
inquiry.13 
Here, the trial court set the date of separation as April 
1996, when Donald changed the locks on the marital residence.  
Judge Hensley found that Donald did not clearly communicate to 
Catherine before that time his wish to end the marriage but that 
when he changed the locks to exclude her from the home, "at that 
point both parties should have understood that the relationship was 
terminated." We agree.
Catherine argues that "the changing of the locks had 
little effect on the parties' relationship"because they continued 
to have a sexual relationship until October 1996.  This argument 
has no merit.  First, as Donald points out, Catherine cites no 
authority for the proposition that sexual contact between the 
parties is a dispositive factor in determining date of separation. 
 And even though some situations might exist in which a couple's 
continuing intimate relationship indicated their desire to keep the 
marriage intact, this is not such a case.

Catherine reasons that it would be unfair to allow one 
party to "unilaterally effect a 'final separation' by forming a 
subjective intent to end the marriage, even as they are giving a 
contrary message to their spouse and continuing to engage in 
conjugal relationships." But Donald adequately communicated his 
intent to end the marriage when he re-keyed the marital home.  
Indeed, Catherine herself testified that she first recognized that 
the marriage was over when Donald changed the locks.  Although she 
also testified that she briefly believed that the couple's one 
later sexual episode might indicate that Donald had changed his 
mind, we agree with the superior court that the marriage was 
functionally over and that Catherine and Donald were no longer part 
of a joint enterprise in April 1996.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 
Classified Catherine's Student Loans as Marital.

Donald challenges both the superior court's 
classification of Catherine's student loans as marital property and 
the court's allocation of that debt to him.  With regard to the 
loans' classification, Catherine responds that Donald waived this 
argument by not raising it in the lower court.  We agree.

We will not consider arguments that parties fail to raise 
in the lower court, let alone arguments they have conceded below, 
unless the trial court committed plain error.14   Here, Donald argued 
below only that the court should allocate the student loan debt to 
Catherine, not that it was a non-marital debt.  Indeed, he included 
the student loans in the list of marital property in his trial 
brief.  In closing argument, Donald's attorney stated that the 
loans "should remain on Catherine's side of the ledger"but did not 
argue that they were non-marital debts.  Accordingly, we decline to 
consider the classification argument because Donald waived it.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Its Unequal Division of 
the Marital Property.

Donald argues generally that the overall division of 
property, including the court's assignment of Catherine's student 
loans to him, was unfair.  In particular, he argues that the record 
did not justify the trial court's decision to allocate all the 
marital debts to Donald.  We disagree.
When dividing marital property, trial courts must 
consider the so-called Merrill factors,15  now codified at AS 
25.24.160(a)(4).  Although a fifty-fifty distribution of marital 
assets is presumptively the most equitable,16  trial courts have 
broad discretion to fashion property settlements and may divide the 
assets and liabilities unequally if they find that such a division 
is just after consideration of the statutory factors.17  

Here, the trial court discussed each applicable statutory 
factor and stated that it based its decision to distribute the 
marital assets unequally primarily on the parties' unequal earning 
power, stations in life, and conduct during the marriage.  The 
trial court specifically focused upon its factual finding that 
Catherine's earning power was less than half of Donald's.
Donald does not dispute this rationale or point to any 
statutory factor that the trial court failed to consider; indeed, 
he concedes that the trial court's factual findings regarding 
unequal earning power "might have justified a property division in 
Catherine Holland's favor." But he insists that the trial court's 
findings did not "justify ordering [him] to pay all of the marital 
obligations." Although the trial court's property division 
certainly favored Catherine, it does not rise to the level of being 
clearly unjust.  Donald's income at the time of trial was $65,000 
per year, and he testified that he took home about $4,000 per 
month, compared to Catherine's annual salary of $32,000 and monthly 
earnings of $1,800.  And while Catherine testified that she was 
borrowing money and living "bare to the bone,"Donald testified 
that he had monthly disposable income of over $2,200.  Under these 
circumstances, the trial court committed no error in allocating the 
marital debt to Donald.
D.	The Trial Court Was Not Required to Value the Retirement 
Benefits, but Erred in Failing to Consider whether 
Catherine Had a Federal Employment Retirement System 
Benefit.


Donald next contends that the trial court erred because 
it did not value both parties' pensions, instead dividing each 
pension equally through entry of a QDRO.  QDROs allow superior 
courts to retain jurisdiction over nonvested pensions and order 
payments of the former spouse's portion of the pension when it 
vests.18   Although Catherine responds by arguing the merits of this 
issue, we hold that Donald has waived this argument.
As stated above, we will not consider arguments on appeal 
if the parties failed to raise those arguments in the lower court, 
let alone arguments they have conceded below, unless we find that 
the trial court committed plain error.19   In its oral findings, the 
trial court noted that "[t]his case was tried under the assumption 
that the court would simply divide each pension equally through a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order." Not only was this valuation 
method a premise underlying the trial, but both Catherine and 
Donald explicitly asked the court to deal with the pensions in this 
manner.  In her trial brief, Catherine stated to the court that 
"[t]he parties' pensions and retirement benefits should be divided 
equally with QDROs." Donald also asked the court to value and 
distribute the pensions in this manner, telling the court that 
"[t]he parties agree that their respective federal pensions should 
be divided by appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Orders." 
Accordingly, Donald waived his claim that the trial court was 
required to value and divide the pensions. 

Donald raises one other point regarding the QDROs, 
however.  He notes that the trial judge's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law make no mention of any Federal Employee 
Retirement System (FERS) benefits.  Review of the record indicates 
that there was a dispute at trial as to whether Catherine has any 
FERS accounts; she testified that she did not, while Donald 
asserted before and during trial that Catherine did possess such an 
account.  The trial court's order divided Donald's retirement 
benefits and ordered that Catherine's Thrift Savings Account be 
equally divided as well.  But it made no mention of Catherine's 
FERS benefits.  This indicates that the court may not have entered 
a QDRO for every existing retirement pension.  Accordingly, we 
remand so that the court can determine whether Catherine does have 
a FERS account.20   If so, the court should enter a QDRO 
appropriately dividing that pension between the parties.
5. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Required Donald to 
Use His Non-marital Inheritance as Security for Payment 
of Marital Debts.

Donald next contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it granted Catherine a judgment lien for 
payment of the bills in her name secured by Donald's expected 
inheritance.  In entering this order, the trial court discussed 
Donald's history of poor money management and unpaid bills and 
Catherine's concerns that Donald's uneven payment of bills in her 
name would negatively affect her credit rating.

First, Donald argues that there is no need for a judgment 
lien because the record does not support the finding that Donald 
might fail to make the required payments.  This claim has no merit. 
 Donald testified that he had made late payments or skipped 
payments on a variety of bills in his own and Catherine's name and 
stated that "for the last three or four years, I have not done a 
good job of paying bills as far as on time"due to a lack of 
organization.  Based on this record, the trial court had ample 
reason to be concerned that Donald might not timely pay off all of 
the marital debts.
Second, Donald argues that using the inheritance for 
security is tantamount to ordering Donald to use separate property 
to pay marital debts.  But as Catherine notes, the trial court did 
not actually order that he use non-marital funds to pay any marital 
bills; it merely granted Catherine a way to ensure that bills in 
her name would be paid.  Moreover, Alaska law supports the idea 
that trial judges have discretion to require security for payment 
of marital debts; we have held that although trial courts are not 
required to secure indebtedness, "creative suggestions [for 
providing security] . . . come within the ambit of the superior 
court's discretion."21   The trial court here did not abuse that 
discretion, and we thus affirm its decision to require security.
F.	The Trial Court's Award of Rehabilitative Alimony Was Not 
an Abuse of Discretion.

Both Donald and Catherine argue that the trial court's 
award of rehabilitative alimony was an abuse of discretion.  Donald 
contends that no alimony at all was warranted, while Catherine 
maintains that the alimony awarded was insufficient.  We reject 
both claims and affirm the rehabilitative alimony award.  

A trial court awards rehabilitative alimony to enable a 
party to complete education, job training, or other "means directly 
related to the end of securing for one party a source of earned 
income."22   Alimony awards are allowable when "just and 
necessary,"23  and "[t]his court leniently reviews awards of limited 
duration, such as the one here."24   The party seeking rehabilitative 
alimony should present an educational or job training plan so that 
the reviewing court can determine whether a support award is 
necessary and appropriate.25 
At trial, Catherine presented a plan to increase her 
earning capacity.  She testified that she wanted to enter an M.B.A. 
program costing $10,000 to $14,000.  The program would take four 
years to complete and would result in an earning capacity in excess 
of $40,000 per year.26   The trial court ordered Donald to pay 
Catherine $750 per month for two years so that Catherine could go 
back to school and earn an M.B.A.

Donald attacks the award of rehabilitative alimony on 
three grounds.  First, he claims that the record does not support 
the court's finding that Catherine made career sacrifices to 
further his career.  This argument is meritless.  The evidence 
supports a finding that during the marriage, the couple moved from 
New York to California, to Virginia, to Germany, to Washington, 
D.C., and then to Alaska.  Each time, Donald received a promotion 
or a lateral transfer, while Catherine was demoted or laid off.  
Donald attempts to rebut this evidence by pointing out that neither 
spouse enjoyed living in California and that Catherine's continuing 
education did allow for some career advancement.  These points are 
only tangentially relevant because they do not counter the large 
quantity of evidence showing that Catherine limited her career to 
further Donald's.  Donald thus has failed to show that the trial 
court's findings were clearly erroneous.  

Second, Donald argues that Catherine is already 
employable and does not need alimony.  We disagree.  We have 
approved alimony awards to spouses who were minimally employed at 
the time of divorce.27   Donald argues that we should not adopt a 
rule that would allow "already self-supporting [spouses] to further 
enhance their income capacity in the future"and instead should 
restrict alimony to divorcing spouses who are truly unable to 
support themselves.  But Judge Hensley found that Catherine's 
earning capacity was minimal and unlikely to increase without 
additional education.  The court noted that Catherine's earning 
capacity was $32,000 per year and that it was unlikely to increase 
without further schooling.  The court found that this income level 
was barely sufficient for Catherine's support: "[S]he can support 
herself at $32,000.00, but at a minimal level with no cushion to 
pay for unexpected expenses or anything but the necessities." This 
finding is supported by Catherine's testimony that she lived in an 
unsafe neighborhood and needed to borrow money to get by.  Under 
these circumstances, we will not disturb Judge Hensley's decision 
that rehabilitative alimony was necessary and just in this case.
Third, Donald contends that Catherine should not receive 
alimony payments to obtain her M.B.A. because she would already 
have an M.B.A. if she had not chosen to pursue her counseling 
degree.  This claim is meritless.  We have held in the past that 
spouses who advanced their employability through education during 
the marriage but still needed further education to be marketable 
were entitled to alimony.28 

On the other hand, Catherine argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion by awarding too little alimony.  At trial, 
Catherine requested $54,000 in alimony over a five-year period.  
She stated that although the cost of her schooling was only $10,000 
to $14,000, she wanted the extra money to move to a nicer 
neighborhood.  She argues now that the court abused its discretion 
by recognizing that she needed further education, but refusing to 
fund that education completely.  But the court had no duty to award 
alimony that would fully fund Catherine's plan.  Further, the trial 
court's actual award exceeded the tuition expenses that Catherine 
testified she would need to complete her M.B.A. program.  We 
therefore believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in making the award that it did.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
rehabilitation alimony award.
7. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Award Attorney's Fees 
to Catherine.

Citing Notkin v. Notkin,29  Catherine maintains that the 
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to award her fees 
because it ignored its own findings that Catherine's economic 
situation and earning power were inferior to Donald's.  In Notkin, 
we noted that "the relative economic situation and earning power of 
each party"were relevant to a trial court's decision to award 
attorney's fees.30   In support of her argument that the Notkin 
factors required an award of attorney's fees to her, Catherine 
cites the trial court's findings that Donald's earning capacity 
greatly exceeded hers, that her income was barely enough to live 
on, and that Donald was in a better position to pay the fees.  But 
we have repeatedly held that a party's economic situation includes 
more than simply earning power; the property division itself is 
relevant to the trial court's decision to award fees.31   In 
particular, we have stressed that a party who receives a property 
settlement sufficient to cover incurred attorney's fees should 
expect to pay his or her own attorney's fees.32 
The trial court here noted that "Donald is clearly in a 
better position to pay attorney's fees"-- presumably due to his 
greater earning potential -- but stated that "because of the 
unequal property division and the alimony order, I think it's 
equitable that each party be responsible for his or her own 
attorney's fees." Catherine has sufficient assets from the 
property award such that she can be reasonably expected to shoulder 
her own fees.  The trial court awarded Catherine $3,962 in cash 
from tax refunds.  She also received $2,023 in personal property, 
$2,000 cash from Donald as an advance on marital assets, and 
rehabilitative alimony of $750 per month for two years -- a total 
of $18,000 -- which exceeds the direct costs of obtaining her 
M.B.A.  These assets should be more than sufficient to pay for 
approximately $6,000 in attorney's fees.  Thus, the trial court's 
decision to require the parties to pay their own attorney's fees 
was not an abuse of discretion.

V.	CONCLUSION
Because the superior court acted within its discretion 
when it set the date of separation, classified Catherine's student 
loans as marital, unequally distributed the marital estate, 
distributed pensions through the use of QDROs, awarded a judgment 
lien to Catherine to ensure Donald would pay marital debts, awarded 
rehabilitative alimony to Catherine, and ordered each party to pay 
his or her own attorney's fees, we AFFIRM those aspects of the 
court's decision.  But because the court may not have divided every 
existing retirement pension by a QDRO, we REMAND for that limited 
purpose.

Footnotes:

1 	This figure includes $2,000 that Donald paid Catherine 
pursuant to a pre-trial stipulation.
2 	See Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Alaska 1997).
3 	See Brotherton v. Brotherton, 941 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Alaska 
1997) (citing Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988)).
4 	See id. at 1243.
5 	See Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska 1994).
6 	See Brotherton, 941 P.2d at 1244 (citing Wanberg v. 
Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 570 (Alaska 1983)).
7 	See id.; Musser v. Johnson, 914 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Alaska 
1996).
8 	See Brotherton, 941 P.2d at 1244.
9 	See Cox, 882 P.2d at 914 (quoting Doyle v. Doyle, 815 
P.2d 366, 368 (Alaska 1991)).
10 	See Beard v. Beard, 947 P.2d 831, 834 (Alaska 1997) 
(attorney's fees); Hanlon v. Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229, 231 (Alaska 
1994) (date of separation); Bays v. Bays, 807 P.2d 482, 485 (Alaska 
1991) (rehabilitative alimony).
11 	Hanlon, 871 P.2d at 231.
12 	Id. at 231 (quoting Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 & 
n.7 (Alaska 1986)).
13 	See Hatten v. Hatten, 917 P.2d 667, 671-72 (Alaska 1996); 
Hanlon, 871 P.2d at 231.
14 	See Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 364 (Alaska 1988) 
(holding argument waived because litigant not only failed to raise 
argument in lower court but also because he "implicitly conceded"
the inapplicability of his argument).
15 	See Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547-48 n.4 (Alaska 
1962).
16 	See Miles v. Miles, 816 P.2d 129, 131 (Alaska 1991).
17 	See Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 651 (Alaska 1987).
18 	See Laing, 741 P.2d at 657-58.
19 	See Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 364.
20 	See Laing, 741 P.2d at 657-58 (directing trial courts  to 
enter orders, such as QDROs, retaining jurisdiction over nonvested 
pensions).
21 	See Money v. Money, 852 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Alaska 1993).
22 	Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986).
23 	Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Alaska 1987) 
(quoting AS 25.24.160(3)).
24 	Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 822 (Alaska 1994); see 
also Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247, 254-55 & n.9 (Alaska 
1997).
25 	See Myers, 927 P.2d at 327-29; Ulsher, 867 P.2d at 822 & 
n.5.
26 	Catherine's testimony was sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement set forth in Myers v. Myers, 927 P.2d 326 (Alaska 
1996), that a rehabilitation plan "identif[y] a career goal, a 
degree program aimed at realizing that goal, and a time frame 
during which the degree may be earned through reasonable 
diligence." Id. at 328.
27 	See Ulsher, 867 P.2d at 822.
28 	See Myers, 927 P.2d at 328.  
29 	921 P.2d 1109 (Alaska 1996).
30 	Id. at 1114 (quoting Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 
644 (Alaska 1989)).
31	See Money, 852 P.2d at 1165; Siggelkow v. Siggelkow, 643 
P.2d 985, 989 (Alaska 1982).
32 	See Money, 852 P.2d at 1165 (refusing to alter trial 
court's award of limited attorney's fees because the requesting  
party's portion of the property "includes more than enough cash to 
cover her remaining attorney's fees"); H.P.A. v. S.C.A., 704 P.2d 
205, 212 (Alaska 1985) ("Assuming that Husband possesses greater 
financial resources and greater earning capabilities, Wife's 
resources and capabilities are sufficient enough that a court could 
reasonably expect her to pay her own fees."); Siggelkow, 643 P.2d 
at 989 (reversing award of attorney's fees to wife and ordering 
parties to pay their attorney's fees because "Marilyn received a 
substantial property award from which she could have paid her 
attorney's fees").

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