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Dena' Nena' Henash, a/k/a Tanana Chiefs Conference, Inc. v. Ipalook (5/21/99) sp-5119
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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in
the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of
the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone
(907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
DENA' NENA' HENASH, a/k/a )
TANANA CHIEFS CONFERENCE, ) Supreme Court Nos. S-8248/8268
INC., )
) Superior Court No.
Appellant and ) 4FA-95-2745 CI
Cross-Appellee, )
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
CATHERINE N. IPALOOK, )
)
Appellee and ) [No. 5119 - May 21, 1999]
Cross-Appellant. )
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks,
Jay Hodges, Judge.
Appearances: Michael J. Walleri, Tanana Chiefs
Conference, Inc., Fairbanks, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
James M. Hackett, Law Offices of James M. Hackett, Inc., Fairbanks,
for Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Toby N. Steinberger, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General,
Juneau, for Amicus Curiae State of Alaska.
Before: Matthews, Chief Justice, Compton,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Bryner, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Catherine Ipalook filed a claim for unpaid overtime and
liquidated damages pursuant to the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA)
against her former employer, Tanana Chiefs Conference, Inc. (TCC).
She alleged that her position as Patient Hostel Manager (PHM) was
improperly classified as exempt from overtime. TCC counterclaimed
for a complete offset of any damages, alleging that Ipalook had
breached her fiduciary duty to TCC during her prior tenure as
president.
Following a bench trial, the court held that Ipalook's
position was not exempt from overtime payment and held that she had
not breached her fiduciary duty. It awarded Ipalook $77,412.02 in
unpaid overtime, an equal amount in liquidated damages, prejudgment
interest from the date of the complaint, attorney's fees, and
costs. TCC appeals the finding that Ipalook did not breach her
fiduciary duty and also appeals the award of liquidated damages.
Ipalook cross-appeals from the amount of the overtime pay award and
from the prejudgment interest award. We affirm the judgment in
favor of Ipalook but reverse the damages award.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Catherine Ipalook served as the president of TCC from
March 1990 until March 1991. During her tenure as president, TCC
operated a Patient Hostel in Fairbanks. [Fn. 1] TCC classified the
PHM position as exempt from overtime compensation under the AWHA
both before and during Ipalook's tenure as president.
On June 19, 1994, TCC hired Ipalook as the PHM. While
Ipalook was in this position, TCC continued to treat the PHM
position as exempt. TCC paid Ipalook a salary of $1,916.65 per
month and provided her an apartment on the premises of the hostel.
As PHM, Ipalook worked at the hostel during the day, but was also
on-call twenty-four hours a day from 5:00 p.m. on Sunday until 5:00
p.m. on Friday.
A few months after she was hired as PHM, Ipalook filed a
grievance, complaining that she was not accorded proper status as
supervisor over the hostel. TCC agreed with Ipalook, but her
immediate supervisor continued to deny Ipalook actual supervisory
status.
Ipalook resigned from the PHM position on August 18,
1995. On November 21 she filed a wage claim under the AWHA,
arguing that she was never actually a supervisor, and was therefore
not exempt from overtime compensation. She alleged that she should
have been paid overtime for the twenty-four hours per day that she
was on-call.
TCC argued that the position was properly classified as
exempt since Ipalook was a supervisory or executive employee. It
also raised two breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims. Ipalook
then filed a third-party complaint against the current president
and the current personnel officer of TCC, seeking indemnification
from them if she was found liable on either of TCC's counterclaims.
The case was tried to the superior court. The court held
that Ipalook was supposed to have been a supervisor, but was never
actually given supervisory authority, even after the grievance
process. It thus held that Ipalook's position was not exempt from
overtime compensation. The court further held that Ipalook had not
breached her fiduciary duty to TCC, and that even if she had, her
breach was not the legal cause of TCC's liability for overtime
compensation.
The court held that Ipalook was entitled to $77,412.02 in
overtime pay and an equal amount in mandatory liquidated damages.
It calculated the award of overtime based solely on Ipalook's
hourly rate, instead of using the parties' stipulated rate, which
combined her hourly rate with the value of the employer-provided
apartment. In addition, it awarded prejudgment interest from the
date Ipalook filed her complaint instead of from each pay period
for which overtime was owed.
TCC appeals from the superior court's findings that
Ipalook did not breach her fiduciary duty and from the award of
liquidated damages. However, it does not appeal the court's
finding that Ipalook was a non-exempt employee or the amount of the
overtime awarded to Ipalook. Ipalook cross-appeals from the amount
of the overtime award and from the amount of the prejudgment
interest award.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court's Findings that Ipalook Did Not Breach
Her Fiduciary Duty Were Not Clearly Erroneous. [Fn. 2]
TCC raised two breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims
against Ipalook to offset any damages the court awarded to her.
First, it claimed that Ipalook breached her fiduciary duty while
president of TCC by failing to correctly classify the PHM position.
Second, it claimed that Ipalook breached her continuing fiduciary
duty by failing to disclose to TCC, prior to filing her lawsuit,
that the PHM position was erroneously classified.
The superior court held that TCC's counterclaims against
Ipalook were not viable because Ipalook did not breach her
fiduciary duty to TCC, and even if she had, her breach did not
cause TCC's liability because the actions of the current TCC
president, Will Mayo, were subsequent superceding events. TCC
argues that the court's findings that Ipalook was not liable for
breaching her fiduciary duty were not supported by the evidence.
The first issue is whether the superior court's finding
that Ipalook did not breach her fiduciary duty while president was
clearly erroneous. "A corporate officer or director stands in a
fiduciary relationship to his corporation. Out of this relation-
ship arises the duty of reasonably protecting the interests of the
corporation."[Fn. 3] A fiduciary relationship requires the person
"to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the
one imposing the confidence."[Fn. 4]
Here, the superior court found that Ipalook relied on her
department heads in personnel matters, as authorized by TCC's own
personnel policies. It also found that the course of conduct of
both Ipalook and Mayo was to respond to a problem when it came to
their attention. Furthermore, it found that during Ipalook's term,
no problem regarding overtime or wage and hour matters came to her
attention as president.
We hold that these findings would allow the superior
court to find that Ipalook did not breach her duties while
president, because she reasonably delegated personnel matters, but
would have dealt with any personnel issues that came to her
attention. These actions would be sufficient to "reasonably
protect[] the interests of the corporation."[Fn. 5]
We also hold that the superior court's factual findings
were not clearly erroneous. Ipalook admitted at trial that while
in office, she did not take any affirmative action to insure that
TCC complied with the AWHA, and never investigated any written job
description or classification, including the classification of the
PHM position. However, Ipalook also testified that she delegated
responsibility for personnel matters to her department heads and to
the personnel officer. She specifically stated that updating job
descriptions was the responsibility of the personnel officer. She
also testified that she would examine a personnel matter if it came
to her attention, and would refer it to legal counsel if necessary.
However, no wage and hour problems had confronted her while
president.
This testimony was supported by the testimony of the
current personnel officer, who testified that it was her
responsibility to properly classify positions. She also testified
that re-classification had historically been done by the personnel
officer, and that personnel matters were usually delegated by the
president.
Further, the current president stated that the decision
of whether a position was exempt or non-exempt would be determined
when the position was first created, and that the president would
be involved in that decision. He also testified that when the PHM
position was first created in the mid-1980s, it was recognized as
exempt and has retained that classification from that time. In
addition, he testified that he did not investigate the PHM's
classification; instead, he relied on his personnel officer to
ensure that the position was properly classified.
This testimony demonstrates that it was reasonable for
Ipalook to rely on the original classification of the PHM position,
because the position opened before Ipalook's tenure as president.
Since the classification had already been determined and since she
had properly delegated personnel matters to her personnel officers
and department heads, her failure to investigate when there was not
a specific problem was not a breach of fiduciary duty.
The second issue is whether the superior court's finding
that Ipalook did not breach her continuing fiduciary duty by
failing to disclose TCC's liability until she filed her lawsuit was
clearly erroneous. This claim is similar to a claim of fraud by
non-disclosure, which is one type of breach of fiduciary duty. [Fn.
6] "'Fraud can be established by silence or non-disclosure when a
fiduciary relationship exists between parties . . . . The
fiduciary has a duty to fully disclose information which might
affect the other person's rights and influence his action.'"[Fn.
7] Even if Ipalook had a continuing fiduciary duty to disclose
this type of information, TCC would still have to prove that
Ipalook "had knowledge of material facts which [she] failed to
disclose to [TCC], and that [TCC] would have acted differently had
it known such facts, thereby avoiding damages."[Fn. 8]
The superior court found that Ipalook, while president,
did not fail to disclose any information about the non-exempt
status of the PHM position, because she did not have specific
knowledge of the matter at the time. The court also found that
Ipalook did not breach any continuing fiduciary duty, because the
position was historically treated as exempt, and the issue of
whether it was properly classified only came to Ipalook's attention
after her employment as PHM had ended.
These findings are supported by the evidence. Ipalook
testified that she did not know that the position was non-exempt
until she spoke with her attorney after she had resigned as PHM.
TCC failed to present any contrary evidence to show that Ipalook
knew that the position was improperly classified before that time.
Therefore, Ipalook did not fail to disclose information that could
have relieved TCC of liability. We thus hold that the superior
court's finding that Ipalook did not breach her continuing
fiduciary duty was not clearly erroneous. [Fn. 9]
B. The Mandatory Award of Liquidated Damages under the
Alaska Wage and Hour Act Is Constitutional. [Fn. 10]
The trial court held that former AS 23.10.110(a), which
was in force until August 22, 1995, applied to this case. [Fn. 11]
It thus held that Ipalook was entitled to $77,412.02 in mandatory
liquidated damages. TCC argues that this award violates its
federal substantive and procedural due process rights and its state
equal protection rights.
1. The mandatory award of liquidated damages does not
violate the substantive or procedural due process guarantees of the
United States Constitution.
TCC argues that former AS 23.10.110 violates the
substantive due process guarantees of the United States
Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court, though, has held that
the former version of the liquidated damages provision in the
Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which mandated liquidated
damages, is constitutional. [Fn. 12] It stated:
The liquidated damages for failure to pay the
minimum wages under sections 6(a) and 7(a) are compensation, not a
penalty or punishment by the Government. The retention of a
workman's pay may well result in damages too obscure and difficult
of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages. Nor can it
be said that the exaction is violative of due process. It is not
a threat of criminal proceedings or prohibitive fines, such as have
been held beyond legislative power by the authorities cited by
petitioner. Even double damages treated as penalties have been
upheld as within constitutional power.[ [Fn. 13]]
TCC argues that this case is distinguishable because
under the AWHA liquidated damages are a form of punitive damages.
[Fn. 14]
Providing for mandatory liquidated damages as a penalty
is not arbitrary, and it serves important state policies by
deterring and punishing violations of the AWHA. The stated policy
behind the AWHA is to protect "the health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers."[Fn. 15] We have emphasized that "the
liquidated damages provision of AWHA is intended to further the
policy behind the AWHA by punishing the violating employer."[Fn.
16] The liquidated damages provision is also intended to deter
violations of the act. [Fn. 17] These policies are rational, and
are reasonably served by the mandatory liquidated damages
provision.
Further, this court has affirmed the award of mandatory
liquidated damages pursuant to the AWHA in several cases. [Fn. 18]
Our strong support of mandatory liquidated damages under the AWHA
in the past suggests that this court should not find this statute
arbitrary or irrational.
The fact that we have labeled the liquidated damages
provision as punitive in nature does not make the statute
arbitrary. We thus hold, as the Supreme Court did in Missel, that
the mandatory award of liquidated damages does not violate due
process.
TCC also argues that the liquidated damages award
violates substantive due process because it is excessive. But a
liquidated damage provision set by statute does not present the
dangers of arbitrary and excessive awards that are inherent in jury
awards. Here, the legislature has already determined a reasonable
amount for liquidated damages. Mandating a penalty equal to the
unpaid overtime compensation is not so obviously unreasonable or so
excessive that it violates substantive due process.
TCC also argues that the mandatory award violates
procedural due process because this court does not review the
award. TCC cites Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg which holds that a state
system which did not provide for judicial review of the amount of
punitive damages violated procedural due process because appellate
courts must ensure that jury awards of punitive damages do not
result in arbitrary or irrational deprivations of property. But
the danger of arbitrary or irrational awards does not exist where
the formula for liquidated damages is statutorily prescribed. We
thus reject both of these arguments.
2. The mandatory award of liquidated damages does not
violate the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution.
TCC also argues that the provision violates the equal
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution, because it
irrationally distinguishes between good faith employers who
violated the AWHA prior to the amendments and those who violated
the act after the amendment, by punishing only the former with
liquidated damages.
We rejected a similar argument in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Anderson. In Alyeska Pipeline, we held that the
1980 amendment to AS 09.30.070, which raised the interest rate from
8% to 10.5%, and only applied to judgments entered after the
effective date of the act, was not a violation of state or federal
equal protection guarantees:
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S.
502, 505, 31 S. Ct. 490, 491, 55 L. Ed. 561, 563 (1911) ("[T]he
14th Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to
have a beginning, and thus to discriminate between the rights of an
earlier and later time."); Polelle v. Secretary of Health,
Education & Welfare of the United States, 386 F. Supp. 443, 444 n.4
(N.D. Ill. 1974) ("Plaintiff's argument that making this amendment
non-retroactive denies equal protection borders on the
frivolous."); see also Application of Brewer, 430 P.2d 150, 153
(Alaska 1967) ("To make . . . legislation prospective in operation
only . . . satisfies constitutional requirements of equal pro-
tection so long as the law in operating prospectively does not
invidiously discriminate between different classes of persons").[]
Here, the legislature has changed its policy and now
allows a good faith defense to the award of liquidated damages. It
chose to apply this amendment prospectively to agreements entered
into after August 22, 1995. However, the distinction created
between employers who fail to pay overtime before and after the
effective date is not discriminatory, and is based on a rational
decision by the legislature. We thus reject TCC's equal protection
argument.
C. The Superior Court Erred in Failing to Use the Parties'
Pretrial Stipulation to Determine Ipalook's Overtime Compensation
Rate.
Pursuant to the Civil Pretrial Order, the parties filed
their written Pretrial Stipulation at the time of the pretrial
conference. In relevant part, the stipulation provides:
4. that the state minimum wage, at all
relevant times during employment of Plaintiff Cathi Ipalook as the
Patient Hostel Manager with Defendant TCC, was $4.75 an hour;
5. that Plaintiff Cathi Ipalook's
straight time rate of compensation as Patient
Hostel Manager with Defendant TCC, at all times relevant, was
$15.38 per hour, which rate includes the fair market value of the
employer's provided apartment[.]
(Emphasis added.)
Ipalook argues on cross-appeal that the trial court erred
in refusing to use the stipulated rate of $15.38 per hour as the
"regular rate of pay"to calculate her overtime compensation rate.
She argues that the stipulation was intended to be an issue
stipulation -- that the market value of the apartment should be
included in the "regular rate of pay"-- and a factual stipulation
-- that the combined hourly rate and value of the apartment was
$15.38 per hour.
TCC argues that the stipulation was only intended to
demonstrate that Ipalook was paid two-and-a-half times the state
minimum wage. It argues that interpreting the stipulation as
Ipalook suggests would be beyond the intent of the parties and
would be a stipulation of law that was not binding on the superior
court.
The superior court accepted the factual stipulation in
the agreement -- that the value of Ipalook's hourly rate combined
with the fair market value of the employer-provided apartment was
$15.38 per hour. However, it did not accept the legal or issue
stipulation -- that the stipulation fixed the regular rate of pay
to calculate Ipalook's overtime compensation rate. It stated that
it is unfair to base Ipalook's regular rate on
Ipalook's compensation of $11.05 per hour, plus the hourly
equivalent of the fair value of the apartment provided, because
Ipalook in fact received the apartment.
Thus the court concludes that [the]
regular rate for purposes of calculating the amount of Ipalook's
unpaid overtime should be based upon $11.05 per hour, instead of
being based upon a combination of $11.05 an hour, plus the hourly
equivalent of the fair value of the apartment, or the amount of
$15.38 an hour which includes the fair value of the apartment.
Consequently the appropriate overtime
rate, at time and a half, . . . is $16.58 an hour, instead of the
figure of $23.08 an hour used by Ipalook's expert witness Ms.
Jacqueline Briskey, CPA, (the higher amount of $23.08 an hour
includes the hourly equivalent of the fair value of the apartment).
The first issue is whether the parties intended the
stipulation to determine Ipalook's "regular rate of pay"to
calculate her overtime compensation rate. This court discussed the
construction of stipulations in Godfrey v. Hemenway, stating:
[T]he construction of stipulations is governed
by the rules of contracts. The primary concern of the courts is to
determine the intent of the parties. The courts look with favor on
stipulations designed to simplify, shorten or settle litigation, or
to save costs and will not give such stipulations a forced
construction. Thus, the "[l]anguage of a stipulation, whether it
be an agreed statement of facts or relates to other matters, will
not be so construed as to give it the effect of a waiver of a right
not plainly intended to be relinquished."
(Citations omitted.)
TCC argues that the only purpose of the stipulation was
to demonstrate that Ipalook was paid two-and-a-half times the
minimum wage to support its argument at trial that she was an
exempt executive employee. This argument is contrary to TCC's
conduct in the trial, however. It never raised either of the legal
issues which it now asserts (either that the apartment should not
be included in the regular rate of pay because it was provided for
the employer's convenience, or that the proper method of valuing
the apartment was to determine its reasonable cost to TCC). It
also never introduced any evidence to support these arguments or to
contradict the stipulated rate.
Further, Ipalook's "regular rate of pay"was never an
issue that was discussed by the parties prior to the court's
finding that it would not apply the stipulation. Ipalook's expert
calculated the market value of the apartment, which the parties
used to enter their stipulation. Her expert then used the
stipulated amount as the regular rate of pay to determine Ipalook's
total unpaid overtime compensation. TCC never contradicted any of
this evidence. We thus hold that the parties intended the
stipulation to determine completely Ipalook's "regular rate of pay"
to calculate her overtime compensation rate.
The second issue is whether this stipulation was binding
on the superior court. We have recognized a distinction between
stipulations "which merely foreclose consideration of a legal
issue,"and those "which seek to resolve without judicial scrutiny
a legal question." We have given effect to a stipulation which
foreclosed consideration of a legal issue, because issue
stipulations save time and money for the litigants and for the
court, and are often a negotiated compromise in the parties' legal
positions. "Sound judicial policy dictates that private settle-
ments and stipulations between the parties are to be favored and
should not be lightly set aside."
However, "'(a)lthough the parties' efforts toward
simplifying the issues in a case are always appreciated,
stipulations as to the law are not binding upon the court.'"
Stipulations as to law "may have a profound impact on third
parties, the public, and the judicial process itself. Accordingly,
we have refused to give effect to stipulations regarding a question
of law which unduly interfere with vital interests of the public or
which impermissibly impinge on judicial functions."
In Sitka, we held that a stipulation, which provided that
if the union prevailed the remedy would be damages paid to the
workers, included a waiver of any legal issue which would defeat
the award of damages. We held that the stipulation only barred
consideration of an issue, and was not a stipulation of a question
of law, even though the issue barred was a legal question of
general public importance. We emphasized three factors: (1)
resolving this case by referring to the parties' stipulation would
not "taint the future consideration of that important issue"; (2)
the impact on non-parties is inconsequential; and (3) the
stipulation did not impermissibly invade the prerogatives of this
court.
The stipulation in this case is an issue stipulation,
similar to the stipulation in Sitka -- instead of an invalid
stipulation on a question of law. As in Sitka, the stipulation
will not affect future consideration of the legal issue, will not
impact non-parties, and will not unduly invade our prerogatives.
We thus hold that the superior court erred by failing to use the
stipulation to determine the regular rate of pay to calculate
overtime pay. We vacate the damages award and remand for the court
to calculate the damages using the stipulated rate to determine
Ipalook's overtime compensation rate.
D. The Superior Court Should Determine on Remand Whether AS
09.30.070(b) Applies to this Cause of Action.
The superior court awarded prejudgment interest from
November 21, 1995, the date Ipalook filed her complaint. Ipalook
argues that the court should have awarded prejudgment interest from
the date of each pay period for which overtime was owed, because
that is when the cause of action accrued. She argues that AS
09.30.070(b), which limits the award of prejudgment interest to the
date the defendant received notice of the action, does not apply to
this action.
To determine whether the superior court correctly
calculated prejudgment interest, we must first determine whether AS
09.30.070(b) applies to this action. However, neither party
adequately briefed this issue. In several recent cases, we have
noted that AS 09.30.070(b) might only apply to actions for
"personal injury, death, or damage to property,"but we have not
yet resolved this issue.
In Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., we refused to reach the
issue of whether AS 09.30.070(b) applied to a contract claim
because neither party had adequately briefed the issue. However,
we also refused to find that the issue had been waived, instead
allowing the trial court to determine the issue on remand since
prejudgment interest would have to be recalculated on remand
anyway. We again follow this procedure. Since we are remanding
for the court to recalculate the amount of overtime compensation,
it would also have to recalculate the prejudgment interest award.
Thus, as we did in Hanson, we direct the superior court to deter-
mine on remand whether AS 09.30.070(b) applies to this action.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's findings that Ipalook did
not breach her fiduciary duties and reject TCC's arguments that the
award of mandatory liquidated damages is unconstitutional.
However, we VACATE and REMAND the damages award, because the
superior court erred in failing to use the parties' stipulated
regular rate of pay to calculate Ipalook's overtime compensation
rate. On remand, the superior court should allow the parties to
argue whether AS 09.30.070(b) applies to this action.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
The Patient Hostel provides lodging for patients who are
traveling into Fairbanks from outlying villages to receive medical
care.
Footnote 2:
When a case is tried to the superior court, we will only
review the court's factual findings to determine if they are
clearly erroneous. See State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 268
(Alaska 1970); see also Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a); Fairbanks Fire
Fighters Ass'n, Local 1324 v. City of Fairbanks, 934 P.2d 759
(Alaska 1997). A finding is not clearly erroneous unless, from a
review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. See Phillips, 470 P.2d at
268. We have emphasized that the trial judge, who has seen and
heard the testimony, is in a better position than an appellate
court to judge the credibility of witnesses and determine the
weight to attach to their testimony. See id.
Footnote 3:
Alvest, Inc. v. Superior Oil Corp., 398 P.2d 213, 215 (Alaska
1965) (emphasis added).
Footnote 4:
Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229, 232 (Alaska 1969) (footnote
omitted).
Footnote 5:
Alvest, 398 P.2d at 215.
Footnote 6:
See Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Schwartz, 915 P.2d 632, 634 (Alaska
1996).
Footnote 7:
Id. (quoting Carter v. Hoblit, 755 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Alaska
[Fn. 19]1988) (citations omitted)).
Footnote 8:
Id. at 635-36 (citing Carter, 755 P.2d at 1086).
Footnote 9:
Since we hold that the superior court's finding that Ipalook
did not breach her fiduciary duty to TCC was not clearly erroneous,
we do not reach the causation issue.
Footnote 10:
Constitutional issues are questions of law to which this court
applies its independent judgment. See Chiropractors for Justice v.
State, 895 P.2d 962, 966 (Alaska 1995).
Footnote 11:
Former AS 23.10.110 provides that an employer who fails to pay
overtime compensation is liable for liquidated damages in an amount
equal to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation. The award of
liquidated damages in this provision is mandatory. See Alaska
Int'l Indus., Inc. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240, 1249 (Alaska 1979).
The current version of AS 23.10.110 gives the court the discretion
to refuse to award liquidated damages or to award an amount less
than the amount of unpaid overtime compensation if it finds that
the employer acted in good faith. However, this amendment only
applies to "agreements entered into on or after August 22, 1995."
Ch. 37, sec. 4, SLA 1995. Since Ipalook began as PHM on June 19,
1994, the new amendment does not apply to this cause of action.
Footnote 12:
See Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572
(1942).
Footnote 13:
Id. at 583-84 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Footnote 14:
See Gore v. Schlumberger Ltd., 703 P.2d 1165, 1165-66 (Alaska
1985) (stating that liquidated damages in the AWHA are "a type of
punitive damages, not . . . a substitute for compensatory
damages"); see also Bobich v. Stewart, 843 P.2d 1232, 1236-37
(Alaska 1992).
Footnote 15:
McKeown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 820 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska
1991) (quoting AS 23.10.050(2)).
Footnote 16:
Id.
Footnote 17:
See id.
Footnote 18:
See, e.g., Alaska Int'l Indus., Inc. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240
(Alaska 1979) (holding that jury erred as a matter of law in
failing to award liquidated damages in an amount equal to the
overtime compensation award); McKeown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 820
P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1991) (holding that private settlements of
liquidated damages claims under the AWHA are void as contrary to
the strong policy behind the AWHA and its liquidated damages
provisions).
Footnote 19:
316 U.S. 572 (1942).
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