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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Resource Development Council, et al. v. Kevin Meyer, et al. (9/3/2021) sp-7554

Resource Development Council, et al. v. Kevin Meyer, et al. (9/3/2021) sp-7554

        Notice:    This  opinion   is  subject   to  correction  before  publication   in   the  PACIFIC  REPORTER.  

        Readers  are r   equested  to  bring  errors to the attention  of  the  Clerk  of  the  Appellate C  ourts,  

        303  K  Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501, phone   (907)  264-0608, fax   (907)  264-0878,  email  

        corrections@akcourts.gov.  



                 THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ALASKA  



RESOURCE  DEVELOPMENT                             )  

COUNCIL  FOR  ALASKA,  INC.;                      )                              

                                                      Supreme Court Nos. S-17834/17843  

ALASKA  TRUCKING                                  )   (Consolidated)  

ASSOCIATION,  INC.;  ALASKA                       )  

MINERS  ASSOCIATION,  INC.;                       )                                                

                                                      Superior Court No. 3AN-20-05901 CI  

ASSOCIATED  GENERAL                               )  

CONTRACTORS  OF  ALASKA;                          )                   

                                                      O P I N I O N  

ALASKA  CHAMBER;  and  ALASKA  )  

SUPPORT  INDUSTRY  ALLIANCE,                      )                                   

                                                      No. 7554 - September 3, 2021  

                                                  )  

                Appellants  and
                  )  

                Cross-Appellees,
                 )  

                                                  )  

        v.                                        )  

                                                  )  

VOTE  YES  FOR  ALASKA'S  FAIR                    )  

SHARE,                                            )  

                                                  )  

                Appellee  and                     )  

                Cross-Appellant,                  )  

                                                  )  

        v.                                        )  

                                                  )  

STATE  OF  ALASKA,  OFFICE  OF                    )  

LIEUTENANT  GOVERNOR,  and                        )  

LIEUTENANT  GOVERNOR  KEVIN  )  

MEYER,  in  an  official  capacity;  and          )  

DIVISION  OF  ELECTIONS,  and                     )  

DIRECTOR  GAIL  FENUMIAI,  in  an                 )  

official  capacity,                               )  

                                                  )  

                Appellees  and                    )  

                Cross-Appellees.                  )  

                                                  )  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                              Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third                                                             

                              Judicial District, Anchorage, Thomas A. Matthews, Judge.                                                            



                              Appearances:   Matthew Singer and Lee C. Baxter, Schwabe,                                                       

                              Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellants and                                                                      

                              Cross-Appellees.    Katherine Demarest and Margaret Paton                                                               

                              Walsh,              Assistant               Attorneys                  General,               Anchorage,                     and  

                              Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for State of                                                                       

                              Alaska Appellees.                         Robin O. Brena and Jack S. Wakeland,                               

                              Brena, Bell & Walker, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee and                                                                      

                              Cross-Appellant Vote Yes for Alaska's Fair Share.                                                  



                              Before:     Bolger,   Chief   Justice,   Winfree,   Maassen,   and  

                                                                                                                                    *  [Borghesan,  

                              Carney, Justices, and                         Matthews,Senior Justice.                                     

                              Justice, not participating.]  

                                                         



                              MAASSEN, Justice.
  

                                                            

                              MATTHEWS, Senior Justice, concurring in part.
  

                                                                                                                                  



I.             INTRODUCTION  

                                                             



                              This case involves a challenge to the lieutenant governor's decision that the  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



sponsors of an initiative, "An Act changing the oil and gas production tax for certain  

                                                                                                                                                                                 



fields, units, and nonunitized reservoirs on the North Slope," had collected enough  

                                                                                                                                                                               



signatures to allow the initiative to appear on the ballot in the 2020 general election.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



Entities opposed to the initiative argue that signatures should not be counted because the  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



signature  gatherers  -  the  circulators  -  falsely  certified  that  their  compensation  

                                                                                                                                                                



complied with Alaska election law.  

                                                                      



                              The statute governing circulator compensation allows them to be paid no  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



more  than  "$1  a  signature."                                            The  superior  court  decided  that  this  statute  was  

                                                                                                                                                                                      



               *  

               *              Sitting   by   assignment   made   under   article   IV,   section   11   of   the   Alaska  



Constitution  and  Alaska  Administrative  Rule  23(a).  



                                                                                             -2-                                                                                             7554  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

unconstitutional because it imposed an unreasonable burden on core political speech -                                                                                                 



"interactivecommunicationconcerning                                                  political change." Itthereforeconcluded                                                thatthe   



lieutenantgovernorproperlycounted thechallengedsignaturesandproperly                                                                                             certified the  



initiative petition for the ballot.                                   The entities opposed to the initiative filed this appeal.                                            



                             We   heard   oral   argument   in   August   2020   and   on   August   31   issued   a  



summary order affirming the superior court's judgment.                                                                          This opinion explains our                          



decision.  



II.            FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS           



              A.             Statutory Overview   



                             The   Alaska   Constitution   grants   citizens   the   power   to   enact   laws   by  

                     1   The initiative process begins when initiative sponsors submit an application  

initiative.                                                                                                                                                         

to the lieutenant governor.2  If the application and proposed bill satisfy constitutional and  

                                                                                                                                                                                    



statutoryrequirements,thelieutenant governor certifiestheproposedinitiativeand prints  

                                                                                                                                                                               

petition booklets to be circulated for signature gathering.3   During this step, the sponsors  

                                                                                                                                                                         



attempt to collect the signatures of qualified voters "equal in number to 10 percent of  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



those who voted in the preceding general election," representing "at least three-fourths  

                                                                                                                                                               



of the house districts of the state," with each of those house districts providing signatures  

                                                                                                                                                                      



"equal in number to at least seven percent of those who voted in the preceding general  

                                                                                                                                                                           



               1             Alaska Const. art. XI, § 1;                             see  AS 15.45.010 ("Provision and scope for use                                                



of the initiative").                     



              2              AS 15.45.020.  

                                      



              3              AS 15.45.070 ("Review of application for certification"); AS 15.45.030  

                                                                                                                                                                     

("Formofapplication");AS15.45.090("Preparation ofpetition"); AS15.45.080 ("Bases  

                                                                                                                                                                           

of  denial  of  certification");  6  Alaska  Administrative  Code  (AAC)  25.240  (2021)  

                                                                                                                                                                           

("Initiative, referendum, and recall petitions").  

                                                                             



                                                                                           -3-                                                                                  7554
  


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                                                 4  

election in the house district."                     



                                                                                                                                          

                      Signature gatherers, called circulators, are required to follow the rules set  

                                  5  Subsection (c) of that statute is central to this appeal. It provides:  

                                                                                                                                                

                 

out in AS 15.45.110. 



"A circulator may not receive payment or agree to receive payment that is greater than  

                                                                                                                                       



$1 a signature, and a person or an organization may not pay or agree to pay an amount  

                                                                                                                                  



that is greater than $1 a signature, for the collection of signatures on a petition."  Alaska  

                                                                                                                                   



Statute  15.45.110(e)  provides  that  a  violation  of  subsection  (c)  is  a  class  B  

                                                                                                                                          

misdemeanor.6  



                      The signatures collected in the petition booklets are submitted "as a single  

                                                                                                                                     

instrument" called the petition.7   Within 60 days of submission, the lieutenant governor  

                                                                                                                                

must  review  the  petition  to  determine  whether  it  was  properly  filed.8                                                   Alaska  

                                                                                                                                 



Statute 15.45.130 imposes a number of requirements on the process, including that  

                                                                                                                                        



circulators certify their compliance with AS 15.45.110(c).  Alaska Statute 15.45.130  

                                                                                                                              



states, in relevant part:  

                               



                      Before  being  filed,  each  petition  shall  be  certified  by  an  

                                                                                                                    

                      affidavit by the person who personally circulated the petition.  

                                                                                                                          

                      In determining the sufficiency of the petition, the lieutenant  

                                                                                                                  

                      governor  may  not  count  subscriptions  on  petitions  not  

                                                                                                                    

                      properly certified at the time of filing or corrected before the  

                                                                                                                    

                      subscriptions  are  counted.                      The  affidavit  must  state  in  



           4          AS 15.45.140(a).   



           5  

                                                                                                                           

                      See  AS.  15.45.130  (requiring  circulator  affidavits  stating  circulator's  

                                                                                                             

qualifications   and   attesting   to   circulator's   compliance   with   signature-gathering  

requirements).  



           6          "A person or organization that violates (c) or (d) of this section is guilty of  

                                                                                                                                           

a class B misdemeanor."  AS 15.45.110(e).  

                                                  



           7          6 AAC 25.240(c).  

                                    



           8          AS 15.45.150.  

                             



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                        substance . . . (6)  that the circulator has not entered into an                  

                        agreement   with   a   person   or   organization   in   violation   of  

                        AS 15.45.110(c)                . . . .  



(Emphasis added.)   

            B.          Factual Background                      9  



                        Vote Yes for Alaska's Fair Share (Fair Share) filed a petition to place its  

                                                                                                                                                          



initiative, 19OGTX, "An Act changing the oil and gas production tax for certain fields,  

                                                                                                                                                   



units, and nonunitized reservoirs on the North Slope," on the statewide ballot.   The  

                                                                                                                                                      



lieutenant governor approved Fair Share's application in October 2019, and the Division  

                                                                                                                                               



accordingly printed petition booklets for circulation.  Fair Share hired a professional  

                                                                                                                                       



signature-gathering company, Advanced Micro Targeting, Inc., to circulate the petition  

                                                                                                                                                



booklets and obtain therequired signatures. FairShareeventually submitted 786 petition  

                                                                                                                                                 



booklets in support of the initiative; 544 of these were from circulators employed by  

                                                                                                                                      



Advanced Micro Targeting.  

                                                      



                        In March 2020 the lieutenant governor sent a letter informing Fair Share  

                                                                                                                                                    



that its initiative petition had been "properly filed" and would be placed on the 2020  

                                                                                                                                                     



general election ballot.  

                                            



            C.          Proceedings  



                         Six entities opposed to the initiative (which we refer to collectively as  

                                                                                                                                                          



"Resource Development Council," the first one named) filed a complaint in superior  

                                                                                                                                               



court challenging the lieutenant governor's decision that the initiative could be placed  

                                         



on the ballot. Resource Development Council asserted that the circulators employed by  

                                                                                                                                                          



Advanced  Micro  Targeting  were  paid  more  than  $1  a  signature  in  violation  of  

                                                                                                                                                         



AS 15.45.110(c).  It alleged that Fair Share paid Advanced Micro Targeting $72,500,  

                                                                                                                                              



            9           At the motion to dismiss stage of litigation the court must treat "all factual                                            



allegations [of the complaint] as true."                                 Larson v. State, Dep't of Corr.                          , 284 P.3d 1, 6           

(Alaska 2012).                



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----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                                                                                                                              

that Advanced MicroTargetingoffered to pay circulators "$3,500-$4,000 per month plus  



                                                                                                                               

bonus, and that it expected 80-100 signatures per day, six days per week in return for  



                                                                                                                                 

such compensation." Resource Development Council characterized the legal issue as "a  



                                                                                                                               

math  question":            Assuming  a circulator  works 26  days in  a month  and  gathers 90  



                                                                                                                     

signatures a day, a circulator who is paid $3,750 a month receives $1.60 a signature,  



                                                                 

more than the amount allowed by statute.  



                                                                                                                        

                    Resource Development Council alleged that the affidavits of Fair Share's  



                                                                                                                    

petition circulators, submitted with its petition booklets, were necessarily untruthful  



                                                                                                                         

because they certified that the circulators had complied with AS 15.45.110(c) despite  



                                                                                                                        

having received payment of more than $1 a signature.  Resource Development Council  



                                                                                                                          

contended thatbecausetheaffidavits wereuntruthful, the lieutenant governor was wrong  



                                                                                                                     

to find the petition signatures "properly certified."  It asked for a declaratory judgment  



                                                                                                                            

that "petition booklets that are supported by false circulator affidavits have not been  



                                                                                                                               

properly certified under AS 15.45.130 and that the signatures in those booklets may not  



                                                                                                                            

be counted" and injunctive relief ordering the lieutenant governor to "invalidate those  



                                                                                                             

petition booklets and all subscriptions contained within those booklets as not properly  



                 

certified."  



                                                                                                                         

                    The State moved to dismiss the action, and Fair Share filed its own motion  



                                                                                                                        

to dismiss a few weeks later.  After limited discovery, Resource Development Council  



                                                                       

cross-moved for partial summary judgment.  



                                                                                                                             

                    The superior court held oral argument, then granted the State's and Fair  



                                                                                                                   

Share's motions to dismiss in a comprehensive written order. The court first concluded,  



                                                                                                                       

based on the plain language and legislative history of AS 15.45.110(c), that the payment  



                                                                                                                                

restriction of $1 per signature was unambiguous; the statute imposed a "hard limit" on  



all forms of circulator compensation, including hourly wages and salaries.  Thus, "if a  



                                                               -6-                                                         7554
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

circulator received payment that ended up being greater than $1 per signature, no matter                                                                                                                                 



how it was received, it seems the statute would prohibit it."                                                                                                      



                                    Given this reading of the statute, the court next considered whether the hard                                                                                                              



limit on compensation violated the free speech protections of the Alaska and federal                                                                                                                                   

                                     10  Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that because the provision  

constitutions.                                                                                                                                                                                                   



was  not  narrowly  tailored  to  meet  the  State's  compelling  interests,  it  was  an  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



unconstitutional  infringement  on  free  speech.                                                                                        The  court  then  rejected  Resource  

                                                                                                                                                                                                               



Development Council's request for an injunction invalidating the challenged signatures  

                                                                                                                                                                                                               



on  grounds  that  the  petitions  had  not  been  "properly  certified"  as  required  by  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



AS 15.45.130. The court held that the term "properly certified" "means that the petition  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



is 'complete' and contains the proper signatures of Alaskan voters."  It concluded that  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



invalidating signatures because of flaws in circulator affidavits would unduly penalize  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



Alaska voters who had no way of knowing how circulators were being paid or what they  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



said in their affidavits.  

                                                               



                                    Finally, anticipating an appeal, the court gave an alternative ground for its  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



holding:  that the mandate of AS 15.45.130 requiring the lieutenant governor to reject  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



signatures  because  of  a  circulator's  failure  to  properly  certify  them  was  also  an  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



unconstitutional  restriction  on  free  speech.                                                                             The  court  concluded  that  the  statutory  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



remedy - effectively disenfranchising voters who had no control over the circulator's  

                                                                                                                                                                                                           



certification - was not narrowly tailored to address the State's legitimate interests and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



instead "operate[d] like a sledgehammer on a mosquito."  

                                                                                                                                                             



                  10                See   U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an                                                                                                                          



establishment of religion, or                                                    prohibiting the free exercise                                                      thereof; or                     abridging   the  

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and                                                                                                                                        

to petition the government for a redress of grievances."); Alaska Const. art. I, § 5 ("Every                                                                                                                    

person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the                                                                                                                                            

abuse of that right.").                                     



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----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

                               Resource Development Council and Fair Share both appealed.                                                                                          Resource  



Development   Council   challenges   the   superior   court's   decision   that   the   lieutenant  



governor properly certified thepetitions and                                                          allowed theinitiative                           to appear on the ballot.                              



Fair    Share    challenges    the    superior    court's    decision    that    AS    15.45.110(c)    is  



unconstitutional; it argues that the statute is susceptible of a constitutional construction                                                                                 



that allows circulators to be paid by methods other than per signature.                                                                                               



                               The State argues that the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the                                                                                          



lieutenant governor "properly certified" the signatures; if so, it argues, we need not reach                                                                                                  



arguments about the statute's constitutionality.                                                               



III.            STANDARD OF REVIEW                          



                                                                                                                                                      11  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

                               We review grants of motions to dismiss de novo.                                                                               We apply our own  



                                                                                                                                                                                                 

"independent judgment to questions involving the constitutionality of a statute 'and will  



                                                                                                                                                                                                

adopt  the  rule  of  law  which  is  most  persuasive  in  light  of  precedent,  reason,  and  



                      12  

                    

policy.' " 



                                                     

IV.             DISCUSSION  



                                                                                                                                                                                                  

                               Our analysis and conclusion largely follow those of the superior court. We  



                                                                                                                                                         

first conclude that the "$1 a signature" limit of AS 15.45.110(c), by the statute's plain  



                                                                                                                                                                                                   

language  and  legislative  history,  is  intended  to  be  a  hard  cap  on  all  types  of  



                                                                                                                                                                                                    

compensation.   Second, we hold that the $1 a signature limit,  as  a hard cap, is an  



                                                                                                                                                                           

unconstitutional restriction on core political speech.  Finally, because AS 15.45.110(c),  



                                                                                                                                                                                    

an unconstitutional statute, is the basis for Resource Development Council's argument  



                                                                                                                                                                                                  

that the petitions were not properly certified, we hold that the lieutenant governor did  



                                               

properly certify the petitions.  



                11             DeRemer v. Turnbull                               , 453 P.3d 193, 196 (Alaska 2019).                                 



                12  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

                                Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 322 (Alaska 2009) (quoting State v.  

                                                                                        

Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)).  



                                                                                                  -8-                                                                                         7554
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                               A.	                           Alaska Statute 15.45.110(c)'s "$1 A Signature" Limit On Circulator                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

                                                             Compensation Is A Hard Cap On All Types Of Compensation.                                                                                                                                                                               



                                                             Our first task is to interpret the plain language of AS 15.45.110(c).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  The  



provision reads: "A circulator may not receive payment or agree to receive payment that                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



is greater than $1 a signature, and a person or an organization may not pay or agree to   



pay an amount that is greater than $1 a signature, for the collection of signatures on a                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



petition."     The parties disagree on                                                                                                                                the statute's proper                                                                              interpretation.     The reading   



advanced by Resource Development Council - and accepted by the superior court - is                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



that the statute prohibits a circulator from receiving payment that totals more than $1 per                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



 signature collected regardless                                                                                                       ofhowthecirculator is paid; thus, a circulator who collects                                                                                                                                                                       



200 signatures may be paid no more than $200 regardless of the amount of time and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



effort put into collecting those 200 signatures.                                                                                                                                                                   The alternative interpretation, advanced                                                                                                    



by the State and Fair Share, is that the $1 a signature limit applies                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 only when the                                       



circulator's   compensation   is   based   on   the   number  of   signatures   collected.     This  



interpretation allows for other compensation methods - for example, an hourly wage   



or a salary - that are not calculated on a per-signature basis and therefore may exceed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 $1 a signature.      



                                                             "When determining a statute's meaning, we consider three factors:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       'the  



language of the statute, the legislative history, and the legislative purpose behind the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

                                             13          "We begin with the text and its plain meaning, and we use a 'sliding-scale  

 statute.' "                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



approach' to interpret the language.  '[T]he plainer the statutory language is, the more  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be.' "14  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



                               13                             Cora G. v. State, Dep't of Health &Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ,  



461 P.3d 1265, 1277 (Alaska 2020) (quoting                                                                                                                                                                    Alaska Ass'n of Naturopathic Physicians                                                                                                    

v.  State, Dep't of Commerce,Cmty. & Econ. Dev.                                                                                                                                                                                  , 414 P.3d 630, 634 (Alaska 2018)).                                                                                              



                               14                            State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 436 P.3d 984, 992 (Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              (continued...)  



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----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

                                  1.              Plain language   



                                 First,   we   agree   with   the   superior   court's   conclusion   that   "[t]he   plain  



meaning of the words [of AS 15.45.110(c)] suggest[s] no ambiguity." The statutory cap                                                                                                                          



is not restricted to per-signature payment methods, though the legislature could have                                                                                                                       



drafted the statute that way; rather, the cap applies to a circulator's "payment" without                                                                                                           



 suggesting that theremight                                        be exceptions. The                              statute's plain language supports only the  



interpretation that the $1 per signature cap is a hard cap that applies regardless of how                                                    



the circulator is paid.                  



                                 2.               Legislative history   



                                  Considering   the   statute's   unambiguous   language,   legislative   history  



 supporting a contrary intent must be very convincing before we will conclude that the                                                                                                                          



                                                                                                 15  

 statute means other than what it says.                                                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                                        But the legislative history only bolsters our  



                                                                                                                                                                                               

conclusion that the statute is intended to apply a hard cap to all forms of circulator  



                          

payment.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                 As introduced in the Senate in 1998, Senate Bill 313 prohibited circulator  



                                                                                                                                                                                                  

payment calculated on a per-signature basis while expressly allowing other payment  



methods:  



                                                                                                                                                                    

                                 A  sponsor  may  not  receive  payment  or  agree  to  receive  

                                                                                                                                                                                 

                                 payment, and a person or an organization may not pay or  

                                                                                                                                                                                   

                                  agree to pay, for the collection of signatures on a petition if  

                                                                                                                                                              

                                  any part of the payment is based on the number of signatures  

                                                                                                                                                                           

                                  collected.  This subsection does not prohibit a sponsor from  



                 14               (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                         

2019) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (first quoting  Ward v. State,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                             

Dep't of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 98 (Alaska 2012); then quoting State v. Fyfe, 370 P.3d  

                                                                       

 1092, 1095 (Alaska 2016)).  



                 15              Id.  

                                          



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----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                        being paid an amount that is not based on the number of                                                  

                        signatures collected                 .[16]  



Senator  Bert  Sharp,  the  bill's  sponsor,  explained  in  committee  that  while  the  bill  

                                                                                                                                                      



prohibited per-signature compensation, "[p]ayment would still be allowed by the hour  

                                                                                                                                        

or any other method."17   Likely referring to federal precedent,18  Senator Sharp observed  

                                                                                                                                             



that a complete prohibition on "payments of any kind for obtaining signatures on an  

                                                                                                                                                   



initiative" had been declared unconstitutional, but that - according to the advice of  

                                                                                                                                                         



legislative counsel - "other states have at least prohibited payments by the signature,  

                                                                                                                                           



and that has stood up in court so far."  Had the bill been passed into law in the form  

                                                                                                                                                    



introduced by Senator Sharp, it would have categorically banned per-signature payment  

                                                                                                                                              



while explicitly exempting other payment methods from regulation.  

                                                                                                        



                        But the bill language was amended in committee to change the flat ban on  

                                                                                                                                                         



per-signature payment to the $1 a signature cap and to remove the language explicitly  

                                                                                                                          

applying limitations to per-signature payment only.19   The House Finance Committee's  

                                                                                                                                      



discussion of the bill focused on the constitutionality of a total payment ban and the  

                                                                                                                                                       



merits of a signature-based compensation system.  On the second day of discussion,  

                                                                                                                                         



Chairman  Gene  Therriault  explained  that  the  proposed  amendment  -  which  was  

                                                                                                                                        



ultimately adopted - "would allow you to pay per signature up to $1 per signature, but  

                                                                                                                                                        



it would cap it at that amount. So [he] wanted to make it clear to individuals that that cap  

                                                                                                                                                       



            16          S.B. 313, 20th Leg,. 2d. Sess. (1998) (emphasis added).                                 



            17          Hearing on S.B. 313 Before the Sen. Jud. Comm., 20th Leg., 2d Sess. at  

                                                                                                                                                          

25:58  (Mar. 18, 1998) (testimony of Sen. Bert Sharp).                                



            18          See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988) (holding Colorado's flat ban  

                                                                                                                                                       

on circulator payment unconstitutional).  

                                          



            19          H. Committee Substitute for Senate Bill (H.C.S.S.B.) 313, 20th Leg., 2d  

                                                                                                                                                        

Sess. (1998).  

           



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----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

on the payment has not been found to be unconstitutional.                                                   An outright ban of any             



                                                                                    20  

payment has been found to be unconstitutional."                                         



                       Representative  John  Davies  objected  to  the  amendment;  he  favored  

                                                                                                                                        



requiring an hourly or daily compensation method out of concern that per-signature  

                                                                                                                               



compensation schemes encourage "in your face and overly aggressive" circulators:  

                                                                                                                                                        



"If . . . they're going to get paid by the piece and by each signature, they're going to be  

                                                                                                                                                  



much  more  aggressive  about  going  after  every  individual  person  out  there  than  

                                                                                                                                              

otherwise."21   He saw the amendment as imposing a limit on all forms of compensation,  

                                                                                                                             



unlike the bill's original language:  "[T]he amendment would limit the amount of money  

                                                                                                                                           



that you could pay, [whereas] the existing language only limits the way in which you  

                                                                                                                                    

make payment.22                 Representative Davies thought the amendment language was more  

                                                                                                                                             

                                                                                   23   But the amendment passed, and the  

likely to be subject to a constitutional challenge.                                                                                              

                                                                   

bill as amended was enacted into law.24  

                                                                      



                       In 2009 several representatives introduced a bill to amend the initiative  

                                                                                                                                       

                                          25   The proposed amendment included changes to the wording  

statutes in various ways.                                                                                                               

                                 



of AS 15.45.110(c): removing the "$1 a signature" cap, prohibiting any payment "based  

                                                                                                                                           



on the number of registered voters who signed the petition," and expressly allowing  

                                                                                                                                       



            20         Hearing  on  S.B.  313  Before  the  H.  Fin.  Comm.,  20th  Leg.,  2d  Sess.  at  32:40  



(May  8,   1998)  (statement  of  Rep.  Gene  Therriault).  



            21         Id.  at  34:16  (statement  of  Rep.  John  Davies).  



            22         Id.  at  36:33.  



            23         Id. at 36:48.  

                                  



            24         Id.  at  38:00;  Ch.  80,  §  2,  SLA   1998.  



            25         House  Bill  (H.B.)  36,  26th  Leg.,   1st  Sess.  (Jan.  20,  2009).  



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----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

circulator payment based on "an hourly wage or salary."                                           26  This language was deleted          



                                   27  

before any hearings.                    



                       This legislative history falls far short of convincing us that the legislature,  

                                                                                                                                   



when it enacted AS 15.45.110(c) in 1998, intended the payment cap to cover only one  

                                                                                                                                               



type of circulator compensation - payment by the signature - while allowing other  

                                                                                                                                            



payment methods.  Legislative history in fact supports the superior court's conclusion  

                                                                                                                     



that the statute means what it says.  

                                                    



                       3.         The canon of constitutional avoidance  

                                                                                      



                       "If  an  ambiguous  text  is  susceptible  to  more  than  one  reasonable  

                                                                                                                                 



interpretation,  of  which  only  one  is  constitutional,  the  doctrine  of  constitutional  

                                                                                                                             



                                                                                                                       28  

                                                                                                                                               

avoidance directs us to adopt the interpretation that saves the statute."                                                   Fair Share and  

                                                                                                          



                                                                                                                                     

the  State  rely  on  this  doctrine  to  argue  that  AS  15.45.110(c)  should  be  narrowly  



                                                                                                                                               

construed to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation.  The superior court rejected this  



                                                                                                                                                   

analytical approach, concluding that the statute's plain language would not allow it.  



                                                                                                                                         

                       We agree with the superior court.  The plain language of Alaska's statute,  



                                                                                                                                             

as explained above, applies the per-signature cap without exception.  Because the plain  



                                                                                                                                                

language of the statute is unambiguous and legislative history does not contradict the  



                                                                                                                                               

statute's plain meaning, there is only one reasonable interpretation of the statute.  If that  



                                                                                                                                             

one reasonable interpretation means that the statute is unconstitutional - which is what  



            26         Id.  § 5.   



            27  

                                                                                                                                              

                       Sponsor Substitute for House Bill (S.S.H.B.) 36; 2009 House Journal 582;  

                                                                                                                               

see  Ch.  73  SLA  2010.                     We  have  noted  the  difficulty  in  finding  any  "interpretive  

significance" in legislative inaction.                           Univ. of Alaska v. Tumeo                     , 933 P.2d 1147, 1156         

                                                                                                                                      

(Alaska 1997) ("Silence can be evidence of intent; however, it is difficult to decipher  

                                                                                   

what is meant when nothing has been said.").  



            28         State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 436 P.3d 984, 992 (Alaska  

                                                                                                                                        

2019).  



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----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

we conclude in the discussion that follows - the statute cannot be saved by a strained                                                                                                                                      



reading.    



                                      [W]e may not read into a statute that which is not there, even                                                                                             

                                      in the interest of avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality,                                                    

                                      because "the extent to which the express language of the                                                                                                       

                                      provision can be altered and departed from and the extent to                                                                                                       

                                      which the infirmities can be rectified by the use of implied                                                                                       

                                      terms is limited by the constitutionally decreed separation of                                                                                                     

                                      powerswhich                            prohibits this courtfromenacting legislationor                                                                              

                                      redrafting defective statutes."                                                    [29]  



We conclude that the canon of constitutional avoidance is inapplicable and that we  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

therefore must consider the statute's constitutionality.30  

                                                                                                                                                              



                   B.	                Alaska Statute 15.45.110(c)'s "$1 A Signature" Cap On All Types Of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

                                      CompensationIs AnUnconstitutional Restriction On Political Speech.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



                                      1.	                Legal framework  

                                                                           



                                      In Meyer v. Grant the United States Supreme Court applied an exacting  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



 scrutiny standard to a Colorado statute that made it a felony to pay people for circulating  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

initiative petitions.31                                       The Court held that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



Amendments, arriving at that conclusion through essentially four steps that are helpful  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



                   29                Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz                                                                                      , 170 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska                            



2007) (quoting                             State v. Campbell                                 , 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975),                                                                overruled on other                    

grounds by Kimoktoak v. State                                                          , 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 1978)).                                         



                   30                 See Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 139 n.16 (Alaska 2019)  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

(Bolger, C.J., dissenting) ("If a statute is susceptible of  no reasonable construction  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                

avoiding constitutional problems, this court is under a duty to nullify the statute or, if  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

possible, theparticular provisionfound offensivetotheconstitution."(quoting Kritz,170  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

P.3d at 196 n.54)).  

                                  



                   31                 486 U.S. 414, 415-16, 420 (1988).  

                                                                                                                                         



                                                                                                                    -14-	                                                                                                             7554
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

in our analysis of the issues on this appeal.                         32  



                                                                                                                                           

                      First, the Court found that the act of circulating a petition is an exercise of  

                                                                                                     33   Circulating a petition  

                                                                                                                                  

                                                                                             

core political speech and falls within that fundamental right. 



necessarily involves "both the expression of adesirefor political change and a discussion  

                                                                                                                             

of the merits of the proposed change."34                               A petition circulator "will at least have to  

                                                                                                                                           



persuade [potential signers] that the matter is one deserving of the public scrutiny and  



debate that would attend its consideration by the whole electorate.  This will in almost  

                                                                                                                



every case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and why its advocates  

                                                                                                                 

support it."35         This type of "interactive communication concerning political change . . .  

                                                                                                                                             

is appropriately described as 'core political speech.' "36  

                                                                                       



                      Second, the Court identified two ways the Colorado statute burdened this  

                                                                                                                                         



core political speech:  (1) by limiting "the number of voices who will convey [initiative  

                                                                                                                               



proponents'] message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limit[ing] the size of  

                                                                                                                                           



the audience they can reach," and (2) by making it "less likely that [initiative proponents]  

                                                                                                                           



will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus  

                                                                                                                                       



           32         Id.  at  416.   The  test  articulated  in  Meyer  is  no  less  protective  of  free  speech  



rights in this context than we would find to  be the case  under the Alaska Constitution.   

We  therefore  do  not  analyze  the  issues  separately  under  state  and  federal  law.   Cf.  In  re  

Tiffany  O., 467 P.3d 1076, 1081 n.16 (Alaska 2020)  (explaining  that analysis of faith- 

based  objections to  medical  treatment  would be  analyzed  under  Alaska  Constitution's  

free exercise  clause  because  we  have  interpreted  it  to  require more  protective standard  

than  federal  law  interpreting  First  Amendment).  



           33         Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22.  

                                                       



           34         Id. at 421.  

                                



           35         Id.  



           36         Id. at 421-22.  

                                



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----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

                                                                                                                                           37  

 limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion."                                                                 The Court   



held that because the payment ban "trenches upon an area in which the importance of                                                                            



First   Amendment   protections   is   at   its   zenith[,]   .   .   .   the   burden   that   Colorado   must  

 overcome to justify this criminal law is well-nigh insurmountable."                                                          38  



                         Third, the Court noted Colorado's justifications for the payment ban:  its  

                                                                                                                                                             



 interests in ensuring grassroots support for state-wide initiatives and protecting the  

                                                                                                                                                             

 integrity of elections.39  

                       



                         Fourth, the Court held that the State failed to demonstrate that its concerns  

                                                                                                                                                   

justified the law's burden on political expression.40                                              The Court observed that the state  

                                                                                                                                                          



 interest in ensuring grassroots support wasalready metby the requirement that initiatives  

                                                                                                                                                 

have the support of a certain number of signers.41                                                 And the Court held that the state  

                                                                                                                                                          



 interest in protecting the integrity of the election process did not make it "necessary to  

                                                                                                                                                               

burden appellees' ability to communicate their message."42   The Court saw no evidence  

                                                                                                                                                  



 supporting the proposition that a professional circulator would be more likely than a  

                                                                                                                                          



volunteer to accept false signatures; it noted that other provisions of the statute provided  

                                                                                                                                                  



 criminal sanctions that already "deal expressly with the potential danger that circulators  

                                                                                                                                                



             37          Id.  at 422-23.  The  Court  took  "judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  it  is  often  



more  difficult  to  get  people  to  work  without  compensation  than  it  is  to  get  them  to  work  

 for  pay."   Id.  at  423  (quoting   Urevich  v.   Woodard,  667  P.2d  760,  763  (Colo.   1983)).  



             38          Id. at 425 (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1447 (10th Cir. 1987)).  

                                                                                                                                                      



             39          Id.  



             40          Id.  



             41          Id. at 425-26.  

                                     



             42          Id. at 426.  

                                     



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----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                                                                                                             43  

might be tempted to pad their petitions with false signatures."                                                   Further, according to the              



Court, "the risk of fraud or corruption, or the appearance thereof, is more remote at the                                                                

                                                                                                          44   The Court concluded that  

petition stage of an initiative than at the time of balloting."                                                                                        



the complete prohibition on payment thus failed to withstand exacting scrutiny and was  

                                                                                                                                                       

unconstitutional.45  

                                   



                         Several appeals courts later considered less restrictive laws under a less  

                                                                                                                                                       



demanding standard.  In 2006 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an Oregon  

                                                                                                                                                



initiativeamending thestateconstitutiontoprohibitper-signaturepayment for circulators  

                                                                                                                                           

while explicitly allowing other forms of compensation.46                                                   Because the law was not as  

                                                                                                                                                          



restrictive  as  the  one  at  issue  in  Meyer,  the  court  analyzed  the  initiative  using  a  

                                                                                                                                                           



framework the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted in Initiative & Referendum  

                                                                                                                                        



Institute v. Jaeger, involving North Dakota's similar prohibition of only per-signature  

                                    

payment.47            The Jaeger court noted that while "[s]evere burdens on speech trigger an  

                                                                                                                                                          



exacting standard in which regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling  

                                                                                                                                          



            43          Id.  at  426-27  (noting  that  it  was  "a  crime  to  forge  a  signature  on  a  petition,"  



"to  make  false  or  misleading  statements  relating  to  a  petition,"  "or  to  pay  someone  to  

sign   a  petition,"   and   that   each  page   of   the  petition   must   warn   voters   not   to   sign   the  

petition  unless  they  understood  the  initiative  and  that   forging   a   signature  would be   a  

felony).  



            44          Id.  at  427.  



            45          Id.  at  420,  428.  



            46          Prete  v.  Bradbury,  438  F.3d  949,  952  (9th  Cir.  2006).   The  initiative  read:   



"It   shall   be   unlawful   to   pay or receive   money   or   other   thing   of   value   based   on   the  

number of signatures  obtained on an  initiative or referendum  petition.  Nothing herein  

prohibits  payment  for  signature gathering  which is not based, either directly or  indirectly,  

on  the  number  of  signatures  obtained."   Or.  Const.  art.  IV,  §   1b.  



            47          Prete, 438 F.3d at 963 (citing Initiative &Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241  

                                                                                                                                                       

F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2001)).  

                                   



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----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

                                                                                                           48  

state interest, . . . lesser burdens receive a lower level of review."                                          



                                                                                                                           

                      The Eighth Circuit in Jaeger determined that the prohibition of only per- 



                                                                                                                               

signature compensation imposed just such a "lesser burden" because it merely regulated  

                                                                                                                       49    The  court  

                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                            

one  payment  method  without  banning  payment  entirely  as  in  Meyer .  



concluded that the state "ha[d] produced sufficient evidence that the regulation [was]  

                                                                                                                                     

necessary to insure the integrity of the initiative process."50                                         And the Ninth Circuit  

                                                                                                                                   



followed suit in Prete, deciding that the similar Oregon initiative also imposed a "lesser  

                                                                                                                                    



burden"  and  therefore  should  be  given  a  "  'less  exacting  review'  under  which  an  

                                                                                                                                          



'important regulatory interest[]' will support a finding that the measure is a 'reasonable,  

                                                                                                                          

nondiscriminatory restriction[].' "51                         The court upheld the initiative under this "less  

                                                                                                                                      



exacting review," concluding that the state had met its burden of proving that the law  

                                                                                                                                        



was reasonably related to an "important regulatory interest in preventing fraud and  

                                                                                                                                        



forgery in the initiative process" while the plaintiffs were unable to prove that the law  

                                                                                                                           

significantly burdened their ability to collect signatures.52  

                                                                           



                      The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the same framework to reach  

                                                                                               



                                                                                                   53  

a different conclusion in Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters.                                            Backers of a proposed  

                                                                                                                               



constitutional amendment  challenged  an  Ohio  statute  that  prohibited  the  receipt  of  

                                                                                                                                          



           48         Jaeger,   241   F.3d   at   616   (first   citing   Timmons   v.   Twin   Cities  Area  New  



Party,   520   U.S.   351,   358-59   (1997);   then   citing  Buckley   v.  Am.   Constitutional  Law  

Found.,  Inc.,  525  U.S.   182,  208  (1999)  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring)).  



           49         Id. at 617.  

                                



           50         Id. at 618.  

                                



           51         Prete, 438 F.3d at 968 (alterations in original) (quoting Ariz. Right to Life  

                                                                                                                                        

Political Action  Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2003)).  

                                                                                                             



           52         Id. at 970-71.  

                                



           53         518 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2008).  

                                                             



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----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

compensation for circulating initiatives "on a fee per signature or fee per volume basis"                                                                         



                                                                                                                                                                           54  

and also prohibited the payment of compensation "except on the basis of time worked."                                                                                           



The challengers asserted that its political consulting firm was only willing to work on a  

                                                                                                                                                                             



fix-fee contract based on a per signature or per volume basis; the statute "increased the  

                                                                                                                                                                         



cost of qualifying [the challengers'] proposed amendment, made it more difficult to raise  

                                                                                                                                                                      



money  necessary  to  fund  the  initiative  effort,  and  [caused  them  to  refrain]  from  

                                                                                                                                                                    



attempting to qualify the proposed amendment for the ballot so long as the Statute was  

                                                                                                                                                                       

in force."55  

      



                           The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Jaeger, Prete, and a Second  

                                                                                                                                                                

Circuit case - Person v. New York State Board of Elections56  - that had followed  

                                                                                                                                                            

Jaeger and Prete to uphold a similar ban on per-signature compensation.57                                                                               From these  

                                                                                                                                                                    



cases the court concluded, first, that the question of "the character and magnitude of the  

                                                                                                                                                                         



burden created by" the challenged law was "fact-intensive," as restrictions on circulator  

                                                                                                                                                            



payment could "impact political expression in at least three related but distinct ways":  

                                                                                                                                                                                



(1) reducing "the number and hours of voices which will convey the message"; (2)  

                                                                                                                                                                        



limiting the size of the petition's audience; and  (3) lowering "the likelihood that a  

                                                                                                                                                                            

measure will qualify for the state wide ballot."58                                                The court observed that "[a] circulator  

                                                                                                                                                            



plays a crucial role in the petition process because the circulator both has to express the  

                                                                                                                                                                         



petitioner's desire for political change and has to discuss the merits of the proposed  

                                                                                                                                                            



              54           Id.  at 377-78; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.111(B), (D) (West 2021).                                                                            



              55           Deters, 518 F.3d at 378.                 



              56           467 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2006).  

                                                                         



              57           Deters, 518 F.3d                  .  at 381-83.   



              58           Id.  at 383.   



                                                                                   -19-                                                                             7554
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

                59  

change."             And finally, the court recognized that "the availability of other payment                                                



methods might reduce the burden, [but] the extent to which the more effective means are                                                                  

foreclosed is an important consideration."                                  60  



                                                                                                                                                       

                        The Sixth Circuit next reviewed the record and concluded that there was  



                                                                                                                                                    

"no genuine issue of material fact (1) that Ohio's per-time-only requirement would make  



                                                                                                                                                 

proposing and qualifying initiatives more expensive" by, among other things, barring  



                                                                                                                                          

fixed-price contracts, making it difficult to predict a campaign's cost, and decreasing  



                                                                                                                                                    

circulator incentive; "and (2) that professional coordinators and circulators would likely  

                                                                         61  Weighing the significance of this burden, the  

                                                                                                                                                         

not work under a per-time-only system." 



court determined that "the broader ban on the types of payment and harsher criminal  

                                                                                                                                               



sanctions for violations" meant that the Ohio statute "lies closer to the complete ban in  

                                                                                                                                                          

                                                                                                         62  The burden on the exercise  

Meyer than the partial bans in the other circuit court cases."                                                                                  

                                                                                             

of core political speech was therefore "significant."63   Subjecting the statute to "exacting  

                                                                                                                                             



scrutiny" review, the court was unconvinced by the state's argument that the statute was  

                                                                                                                                                       



narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest in eliminating election fraud, and it  

                                                                                                   

affirmed the lower court's judgment that the statute was unconstitutional.64  

                                                                                                                                                



                        We have not addressed the specific issue of circulator payment before, but  

                                                                                                                                                         



we have announced principles that parallel federal law and guide our analysis here.  

                                                                                                                                                                



            59          Id.  



            60          Id.  



            61          Id.  at 383-85.   



            62          Id. at 386.  

                                    



            63  

                                    

                        Id. at 386-87.  



            64  

                                    

                        Id. at 387-88.  



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----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                                                                                                                           65  

"Speech relating to ballot initiatives . . . is entirely protected."                                                            We apply exacting     



                                                                       66  

scrutiny to core political expression.                                                                                                            

                                                                             Under even exacting scrutiny, " 'a significant  



                                                                                                                                                                    

interference with protected rights . . .' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a  



                                                                                                                                               

sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary  

                                                             67     "[A] provision burdening the exercise of political  

                                                                                                                                                       

abridgement of . . . freedoms." 

speech must be 'narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' "68  

                                                                                                                                                



                          2.          Analysis  



                          Having determined that AS 15.45.110(c) imposed a flat $1 a signature cap  

                                                                                                                                                                



regardless of payment method, the superior court went on to decide that this flat cap  

                                                                                                                                                                



amounted to an unconstitutional restriction on political speech.  We agree.  

                                                                                                                                    



                          The legal question presented falls squarely within the Supreme Court's  

                                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                              69    First, "[p]etition circulation . . . is  

exacting scrutiny framework in Meyer v. Grant .                                                                                                                    

                                                                                  



 'core  political  speech,'  because  it  involves  'interactive  communication  concerning  

                                                                                                                                                

political change.' "70                      "First Amendment protection for such interaction . . . is 'at its  

                                                                                                                                                                  



             65           State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union                               , 978 P.2d 597, 606-07 (Alaska 1999).                        



             66           Id.   at 603 (stating that "limitations on core First Amendment rights of                                                               



political expression" must satisfy exacting scrutiny (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.  

                                                                                                                                                               

 1, 44-45 (1976), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in McConnel v.  

                                                                                                                                                                    

FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003))).           



             67           Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).  

                                                                                                                                                



             68           Id.  (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce , 494 U.S. 652, 657  

                                                                                                                                                               

(1990), rev'd on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).  

                                                                                                                                             



             69           486 U.S. 414, 421-28 (1988).  

                                                                     



             70           Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999)  

                                                                                                                                                          

(quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422).  

                                                        



                                                                               -21-                                                                          7554
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

zenith.' "   71  



                                                                                                              

                    As the superior court concluded, a hard cap on circulator compensation  



                                                                                                                           

burdens this core political speech by "significantly inhibit[ing] communication about  



                                                                                                                            

proposed political change."  In reaching this conclusion the court acknowledged some  



                                                                                                                    

of the unique geographic challenges that initiative sponsors face in Alaska, especially  



                                                                                                                                 

given the statutory requirement that they obtain signatures from a certain percentage of  

                                                                            72 - meaning that "[i]t is not enough  

                                                                                                                         

voters in three-fourths of the state's house districts 



for a circulator to stand on the sidewalk in front of a shopping mall in Anchorage and  

                                                                                                                              



gather signatures." The court gave a pointed example of these challenges by contrasting  

                                                                                                                   



House Districts 20 and 32:  

                                     



                    District 20 covers Downtown Anchorage while District 32  

                                                                                                            

                    covers Kodiak, Cordova and Seldovia. The required number  

                                                                                                    

                    of signatures for an initiative (7%) is roughly the same [in  

                                                                                                           

                    these two districts] (413 vs 439), but the effort necessary to  

                                                                                                     

                    assure the minimum number of signatures from each district  

                                             

                    is far different.  



                                                                                                                             

A circulator could perhaps obtain scores of signatures in an hour by standing on the right  



                                                                                                                                 

street corner at the right time in downtown Anchorage.  But to get the same number in  



                                                                                                                        

a geographically vast house district with isolated and relatively small population centers,  



                                                                                                                       

like District 32, would require significantly more time, travel, and effort, and payment  



                                                                                                                            

of $1 a signature would unlikely be sufficient to attract anyone other than the most  



                                                                                                                       

devoted volunteer. These challenges would likely reduce the number of people initiative  



                                                                            

sponsors could reach and make it less likely that the sponsors would be able to secure  



                                                                                                                             

enough signatures within the required time to place the initiative on the ballot.   The  



          71        Id.  at   187  (quoting  Meyer,  486  U.S.  at  425).  



          72        See  AS   15.45.140.  



                                                              -22-                                                             7554  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

 superior court correctly recognized that the $1 a signature cap, by thus burdening core                                                                                                                                                                                         



political speech, was subject to exacting scrutiny.                                                                                                                   



                                             Resource Development Council argues that the record is devoid of any                                                                                                                                                                  



 evidence of a particular burden on Alaskans' free speech rights, and the State agrees.                                                                                                                                                                                                           



They point out that in                                                     Meyer  the factual record had been developed at trial, while in                                                                                                                                              



Prete  both sides presented affidavits in a preliminary injunction proceeding.                                                                                                                                                                                   Here, in   



contrast, the superior court made its decision at an early stage of the litigation based on                                                                                                                                                                                            



the allegations in the pleadings and on exhibits consisting only of legislative history                                                                                                                                                                                



materials.   But we are not persuaded that factual development through discovery was                                                                                                                                                                                             



necessary. The facts underlying the superior court's finding of a burden on core political                                                                                                                                                                          



 speech - consisting primarily of observations about state geography - are clearly                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                                                  73  and not seriously disputed.  

 subject to judicial notice                                                                                                                                                          



                                             Resource Development Council also challenges the court's finding of a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 significant burden on free speech by arguing that  there  are more efficient ways of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



gathering signatures than flying around the state at great expense; circulators could be  

                                                                                                                                                                                              



posted at hub airports, Costco stores, regional hospitals, and other sites where residents  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



of "far-flung house districts" may typically be found passing through or temporarily  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



                      73                    See,e.g.                   ,  Edgmon v. State, Officeof Lieutenant Governor,                                                                                                               Div. ofElections                                      ,  



 152 P.3d 1154, 1158 (Alaska 2007) (in recount appeal, taking "judicial notice that unlike                                                                                                                                                                                

 some communities in the state, Anchorage is a community with home [mail] delivery for                                                                                                                                                                                                

a significant portion of its residents");                                                                                          Varilek v. City of Houston                                                               , 104 P.3d 849, 852                                   

 (Alaska 2004) (noting that "Alaska's geographic and political boundaries" are subject  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

to judicial notice); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1370 n.34 (Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 1987)  (taking  judicial  notice  of  Anchorage  population  in  context  of  legislative  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

reapportionment challenge); Fischer v. Stout, 741 P.2d 217, 221 n.7 (Alaska 1987) (in  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

recount appeal, taking "judicial notice that human beings are of insufficiently diminutive  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

 stature to dwell comfortably" in post office boxes); cf. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423 ("We can  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

take judicial notice of the fact that it is often more difficult to get people to work without  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

compensation than it is to get them to work for pay." (quoting Urevich v. Woodard, 667  

                                                                                                     

P.2d 760, 763 (Colo. 1983))).  



                                                                                                                                         -23-                                                                                                                                  7554
  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

residing.   Resource Development Council also suggests that initiative sponsors could                                                                                                                                     



mail petition booklets to rural Alaska and have the signed booklets mailed back, pointing                                                                                                                          



to ongoing and signature-gathering efforts in a statewide recall campaign using unpaid                                                                                                                                 



volunteer circulators.                                      



                                    But we must give exacting scrutiny to any law that reduces the size of the                                                                                                                   



audience initiative sponsors can reach with their message.                                                                                                         In  Meyer, when the U.S.                                  



 Supreme Court analyzed Colorado's full ban on circulator compensation, it concluded                                                                                                                         



that the law burdened free speech by making it less likely that the sponsors would                                                                                                                                     



"garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                                                                                              74        Those  same  

their   ability   to   make   the   matter  the   focus   of   statewide   discussion."                                                                                                                                   



                                                                                                                                                                                       75  

concerns exist here, as the superior court explained, quoting Meyer : 

                                                                                                                                                                    



                                    The  same  fundamental  policies  that  caused  the  Supreme  

                                                                                                                                                                            

                                    Court to take pause similarly apply when a circulator can be  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

                                    paid pocket change as opposed to no pay whatsoever:  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                            

                                    size of the audience proponents can reach is limited; it is less  

                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                    likely that proponents will garner the number of signatures  

                                                                                                                                                                          

                                    necessary to place the matter on the ballot; and [this] limits  

                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                    their  ability  to  "make  the  matter  the  focus  of  statewide  

                                                                                                                                                                          

                                    discussion."  



                                                                                                                                                                                                               

The superior court rightly recognized that the State has a compelling interest in "ensuring  

                                                                                                                                                                76     But as the Court held in  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

the integrity of the election process and preventing fraud." 



Meyer, the means chosen to achieve the State's interests must be narrowly tailored.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



Alaska Statute 15.45.110(c) is not narrowly tailored because, unlike the statutes that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



                  74                Meyer,  486  U.S.  at  423.  



                  75                Id.  at  422.  



                  76                See  Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1,  4 (2006) ("A State indisputably has  



a  compelling  interest  in  preserving  the  integrity  of  its  election  process."  (quoting  Eu  v.  

S.F.  Cty.  Democratic  Cent.  Comm.,  489  U.S.  214,  231  (1989))).  



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----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

                                                                                     77  

survived less exacting scrutiny in                       Prete v. Bradbury                and   Initiative & Referendum     



                              78  

Institute v. Jaeger          ,                                                                                                       

                                 it "does not leave alternative methods for payment available" to  



                                                                                                                                          

initiative sponsors. And the State has other, less burdensome ways of countering fraud:  

                                                                                                                      79 that "deal  

                                                                                                                                 

                                                                                                            

the State may impose criminal sanctions, as evidenced by the existing statute, 



expressly  with  the  potential  danger  that  circulators  might  be  tempted  to  pad  their  

                                                                                                                                 

petitions with false signatures."80  

                                



                     In sum, AS 15.45.110(c) significantly burdens core political speech and is  

                                                                                                                                      



not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's interests.  Because it fails to meet Meyer 's  

                                                                                                                            



exacting scrutiny standard, it is unconstitutional.  

                                                   



           C.        The Petition Was "Properly Certified" Under AS 15.45.130.  

                                                                                                          



                     Alaska Statute 15.45.130 requires the lieutenant governor to review an  

                                                                                                                                     



initiativepetition todeterminewhether it"was properlyor improperly filed"forpurposes  

                                                                                                                           



of the next step - placing it on the ballot.   Among the statutory requirements for a  

                                                                                                                                       



properly filed petition is a certification by affidavit signed by "the person who personally  

                                                                                                                         

circulated the petition."81  

                                                                                                                         

                                         "In determining the sufficiency of the petition, the lieutenant  



                                                                                 

governor may not count subscriptions on petitions not properly certified at the time of  



           77        438  F.3d  949  (9th  Cir.  2006).  



           78        241  F.3d  614  (8th  Cir.  2001).  



           79        AS   15.45.110(e)  ("A  person  or  organization  that  violates  (c)  or  (d)  of  this  



section  is  guilty  of  a  class  B  misdemeanor.").  



           80        Meyer,  486  U.S.  at  426-27;  see  also  Citizens for                    Tax  Reform  v.  Deters,  518  



F.3d  375,  386  (6th  Cir.  2008)  (citing  "harsher  criminal  sanctions  for  violations"  as  one  

reason   Ohio   statute   "lies   closer to the   complete   ban   in  Meyer   than   the   partial   bans  

[upheld]  in  the  other  circuit  court  cases").  



           81        AS  15.45.130.  

                            



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----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

                                                                                                                                           82  

filing or corrected before the subscriptions are counted."                                                                                       A circulator's affidavit "must                             



state in substance" a number of things, including "that the circulator has not entered into                                                                                                                      



an agreement with a person or organization in violation of AS 15.45.110(c)," the "$1 a                                                                                                                                  

signature" payment cap.                                      83  



                                  Resource Development Council argues that because the circulators were  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



paid in violation of AS 15.45.110(c), their petition booklets were not "properly certified"  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



and,  under  AS  15.45.130,  the  lieutenant  governor  was  not  allowed  to  count  those  

                                                                                                                                                                                                            



booklets' signatures. However, it was not improper for the lieutenant governor to certify  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



petitions that did not comply with an unconstitutional requirement.  The petitions were  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



"properly certified" for purposes of AS 15.45.130.  

                                                                                                                                   



V.               CONCLUSION  



                                  We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.  

                                                                                                                                               



                 82              Id.  



                 83               AS   15.45.130(6).  



                                                                                                        -26-                                                                                                  7554  


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

                                                                     

MATTHEWS, Senior Justice, concurring in part.  



                                                                                                                                      

                    I agree with the result of today's opinion and with most of its reasoning.  



                                                                                                                               

In  particular,  I  agree  that  AS  15.45.110(c)  was  intended  to  apply  a  cap  of  $1  per  



                                                                                                                          

signature to all types ofcompensation, that it unconstitutionally restricts political speech,  



                                                                                                                                 

and  that  a  construction  of  the  statute  that  narrows  it  so  that  it  applies  only  to  



                                                                                                                             

compensation measured on a signature basis should not be employed. But I do not agree  



                                                                                                                            

that the language of the statute is "plain" in the sense that it could only apply to all forms  



                                                                                                                                 

of compensation.   Instead I think that the statute is textually ambiguous, but that its  



                                                                                                                     

legislative history makes its intended meaning clear and thus precludes a narrowing  



construction.  



                                                                                                                         

                    Alaska  Statute  15.45.110(c)  provides:                        "A  circulator  may  not  receive  



                                                                                                                                  

payment or agree to receive payment that is greater than $1 a signature, and a person or  



                                                                                                                      

an organization may not pay or agree to pay an amount that is greater than $1 a signature,  



                                                                                                                                    

for the collection of signatures on a petition."  In my view, the phrases "payment . . .  



                                                                                                                     

greater than $1 a signature" and "an amount . . . greater than $1 a signature" (emphasis  



                                                                                                                                

added) plausibly could refer only to payment arrangements on an "a signature" basis and  



                                                                                                                                

not to arrangements that are hourly or salary based.  There is a literal match between the  



                                                                                                                           

statutory ban on paying or agreeing to pay more than $1 a signature and contracts calling  



                                                                                                                                

for payment on an "a signature" basis. But it takes an additional mental step to apply the  



                                                                                                                          

ban to hourly or salaried contracts. While the broader application is permitted by normal  



                                                               

linguistic usage, it is not, in my opinion, required.  



                                                                                                                                

                    Moreover, the broader application can be applied only awkwardly to the  



                                                                                                                                 

prospective aspects of the statute.   Subsection .110(c) forbids agreements to pay or  



                                                                                                                     

receive more than $1 a signature. But no one entering into a contract to gather signatures  



                                                                                                                             

on a salaried or hourly basis can know in advance whether the agreement will be legal  



                                                                                                                                 

or illegal. Legality will depend on an unknown and prospectively unknowable factor -  



                                                             -27-                                                           7554
  


----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

whether the number of signatures ultimately obtained will exceed or fall short of the pay                                                                          



                                                                                                  1  

in   dollars   ultimately   earned   under  the   contract.                                                                                                      

                                                                                                       This  awkwardness  suggests  that  



                                                                                                                       

subsection .110(c) was meant to apply only to per-signature compensation.  



                                                                                                                                                      

                          Additionally,  while  prohibitions  on  per-signature  pay  for  signature  



                                                                                                                                                                     

gathering have been justified on the ground that this form of compensation creates an  



                                                                                                                                                                        2  

                                                                                                                                  

incentive for overbearing or fraudulent conduct on the part of the signature gatherers, 



applying a $1 per-signature cap to hourly and salaried contracts cannot be justified on  

                                                                                            



these grounds.  Incentives encouraging undesirable conduct are created when caps are  

                                                                                                                                                                    



imposed on hourly or salaried circulators.   Circulators may be moved to engage in  

                                                                                                                                                                     



overreaching or fraud upon realizing that their wages will be docked unless they pick up  

                                                                                                                                                                     



the pace of signature gathering.  This too suggests that the cap was meant to apply only  

                                                                                                                                                                 



to per-signature contracts.  

                                 



                          Notwithstanding these considerations, the legislative history of subsection  

                                                                                                                                                     



.110(c) is persuasive, and makes it clear, in my opinion, that the $1 a signature limit was  

                                                                                                                                                                   



intended to apply to all forms of compensation.   If the legislature had intended the  

                                                                                                                                                                   



subsection to apply only to pay on an "a signature" basis, surely the clarifying last  

                                                                                                                                                                   

sentence of the subsection as originally introduced would have been preserved.3  

                                                                                                                                                                



             1            Implicit in the superior court's                                 statement that "if a circulator received                      



payment   that   ended   up   being   greater   than   $1   per   signature,   no   matter   how   it   was  

received, it seems the statute would prohibit it" is a recognition that the legality of hourly                                                               

or salaried pay for circulators cannot be determined in advance.                                            



             2            Hearing on S.B. 313 Before the House Fin. Comm., 20th Leg., 2d Sess., at  

                                                                                                                                                                       

33:20-34:26 (May 8, 1998) (statement of Rep. John Davies); Opinion at 12; see Prete  

                                                                                                                                                               

v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (summarizing state's evidence related to  

                                                                                                                                                                      

fraud if circulators are paid per signature); Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241  

                                                                                                                                                                  

F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).  

                                                                            



             3            S.B. 313, § 1(c), 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 16, 1998) ("This subsection does  

                                                                                                                                                                 

                                                                                                                                               (continued...)  



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----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

                                The fact that the meaning of the statute is not plain on its face, and only                                                                                      



becomes clear when its legislative history is considered, does not mean that the court                                                                                                          



must employ the canon of constitutional avoidance when construing the statute, as Fair                                                                                                             



Share argues in its cross-appeal.                                            The canon is a rule of interpretation and should not be                                                                  



                                                                                                                                                                                                          4  

used to impose a construction that is not plausibly within the intent of the legislature.                                                                                                                     



Here,  as  I  have  indicated,  restricting  the  application  of  subsection  .110(c)  to  per- 

                                                                                                                                                                                                 



signature contracts would be contrary to the clear intent of the legislature.  

                                                                                                                                                    



                                The canon of constitutional avoidance is one of several tools available to  

                                                                                                                                           



courts to avoid the total invalidation of statutes that are only partially either potentially  

                                                                                                                                                                                   



or actually unconstitutional.  It is, as I have noted, a rule of interpretation, and it can be  

                                                                                                                                                                                                       



used only to narrow a statute in a manner that is at least plausibly consistent with the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



legislative intent underlying the statute.  The other most commonly used tool to avoid  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

total invalidation of a statute is the doctrine of severability.5  

                                                                                                                                                 



                3               (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                       

not prohibit a sponsor from being paid an amount that is not based on the number of  

                          

signatures collected.").  



                4              DeBartolo v. Florida, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 583-84 (1988) (stating that the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

rule of constitutional avoidance applies unless the proposed saving construction "is  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

plainly contrary to theintent ofCongress" and examining legislative history to determine  

                                                                                                                                                                                     

congressional   intent);   cf.   Richard   H.   Fallon,   Jr.,   Facial   Challenges,   Saving  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

Constructions, and Statutory Severability, 99 TEX. L. REV. 215, 231 (2020) ("[B]ecause  

                                                                                                           

saving constructions involve statutory interpretation, the acceptability of a proposed                                                                                                

saving              construction                      sometimes                     depends                on         contestable                    issues            of        interpretive  

methodology. These include such matters as the permissibility of reliance on legislative                                                                                            

history . . . ." ).              



                5              See Fallon, supra note 4, at 220 ("[F]acial challenges have the potential to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        

operate as 'wrecking ball[s].'  In understandable revulsion from invalidating too many  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

statutes on their faces - even when familiar tests of constitutional validity threaten them  

                                                                                                                                                                                                 

with condemnation - the Court has turned repeatedly to two limiting devices.  One is  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                                                                                                            (continued...)  



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----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

                           Severability applies only when a part of a statute, or an application of it, has                                                           



been found unconstitutional.                               It is not a rule of interpretation since it operates contrary                                    



to the legislative intent that all parts of a statute remain in effect.                                                               Rather, it is a rule          

                                                                              6   and  from  the  general  severability  clause  of  

derived   both   from   the   judicial   power                                                                                                                          

AS  01.10.030.7                     Severability,  as  AS 01.10.030 makes clear,  can  apply not only to  

                                                                                                                                                                        



separate valid from invalid portions of a statute, but to separate valid from invalid  

                                                                                                                                                              

applications of one provision of a statute.8  

                                                                    



                           The test for severability asks two questions:  (1) whether the portion or  

                                                                                                                                                                        



application of the statute remaining after the "offending portion of the statute" or the  

                                                                                                                                                                      



offending application of the statute "is severed" can be given legal effect and (2) whether  

                                                                                                                                                             



             5             (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                       

'narrowing'  or  'saving'  constructions.                                               The  other  is  statutory  'separability'  or  

                                                                                                      

'severability'. . . ." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).  



             6             2 N    ORMAN  J. S           INGER  & J.D. S             HAMBIE  SINGER, S                   TATUTES AND                 STATUTORY  



CONSTRUCTION, § 44:8, at 633 (7th ed. 2009) (stating that power of severability "flows                                                                          

from powers inherent in the judiciary").                 



             7	            Alaska Statute 01.10.030 provides:  

                                                                               

                           Any  law  heretofore  or  hereafter  enacted  by  the  Alaska  

                                                                                                                                   

                           legislature   which   lacks   a   severability   clause   shall   be  

                                                                                                                                           

                           construed as though it contained the clause in the following  

                                                                                                                        

                           language:  "If any provision of this Act, or the application  

                                                                                                                           

                           thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the  

                                                                                                                                            

                           remainder of this Act and the application to other persons or  

                                                                                                                                              

                           circumstances  shall  not  be  affected  thereby."                                                [Emphasis  

                                                                                                                            

                           added.]  



             8             See  supra  note7  (emphasizing  statutory  provision  for  severance  of  

                                                                                                                                                                       

unenforceable applications of statutes); see also Fallon, supra  note 4, at 233 ("The  

                                                                                                                                                                 

concept  of  statutory  severability  presents  many  complexities.                                                                       It  can  apply  to  

                                                                                                                                                                       

denominated provisions of a statute, to linguistic subunits within a provision, or to a  

                                                                                                                                                                          

single provision's various applications.").  

                                                                                      



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----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

the legislature would have wanted the portion or application of the statute remaining "to                                                                       

stand" in the event other provisions or applications of the statute "held bad should fall."                                                                         9  



                          Fair  Share  and  the  State  both  argue  that  the  canon  of constitutional  

                                                                                                                                            



avoidance  must  be  applied  to  restrict  the  application  of  subsection  .110(c)  to  per- 

                                                                                                                                                             



signature compensation to save that subsection from total invalidation.   But neither  

                                                                                                                                                        



argues that the doctrine of severability should be used to save valid applications of the  

                                                                                                                                                                



statute if the canon does not apply.  Because the issue of severability has not been raised  

                                                                                                                                                           



or briefed it is properly considered to be waived in this case.  

                                                                                                                       



                          Applying waiver here is no mere technicality.  Despite the fact that the  

                                                                                                                                                                



canon of constitutional avoidance and the doctrine of severability are closely related in  

                                                                                                                                                                  



purpose, they require the resolution of distinctly different issues. Both aspects of the test  

                                                                                                                                                                



for severability seemfairly debatable here. Thoughtful briefs and careful research would  

                                                                                                                                                          



be required to decide (1) whether the legislature would have wanted subsection .110(c)  

                                                                                                                                                        



to apply only to per-signature pay in light of the legislative rejection of that position in  

                                                                                                                                                                  



favor  of a broader  application  that  does  not foster  the anti-fraud  and  overreaching  

                                                                                                                                            



rationale that might justify the more narrow application; and (2) whether the subsection  

                                                                                                                                                  

even as so limited would be constitutional.10  

                                                       



                          In summary, I disagree with the reasoning of the opinion of the court only  

                                                                                                                                                             



insofar as I think the language of subsection .110(c) is ambiguous rather than plain.  

                                                                                                                                                                        



             9            Sonneman v. Hickel                    , 836 P.2d 936, 941 (Alaska 1992).                                    



             10  

                                                                                                                                                                        

                          Courts are divided as to whether a state may ban or limit per-signature pay.  

                                                                                                                                                                  

Compare Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2006) (permitting ban as  

applied),  and Initiative &Referendum                                    Inst. v.     Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2001)                            

                                                                                                                                                              

(permitting ban), with Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375, 388 (6th Cir.  

                                                                                                                                                               

2008) (precluding ban on all types of compensation other than "per-time-only"), and  

                                                                                                                                               

Indep. Inst. v. Gessler, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1280-81 (D. Colo. 2013) (precluding  

                                                                                     

limitation on per-signature compensation).  



                                                                             -31-                                                                           7554
  


----------------------- Page 32-----------------------

Nonetheless, because the legislative history of the statute clearly shows the legislature's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



 intent   to   apply  the   statute   to   all   forms   of   compensation,   I   agree   that   the   canon   of  



 constitutional avoidance should not be applied.                                                                                                                                                                                        I also believe that the State and Fair                                                                                                                            



 Share could have argued alternatively that the doctrine of severability, rather than the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 canon ofconstitutional avoidance, should beused                                                                                                                                                                                         to narrowtheapplication ofsubsection                                                                                                



 .110(c) to per-signature agreements, but they did not do so and that issue is therefore                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



properly considered waived.                                                                                                               Other than as noted I join in the opinion of the court in all                                                                                                                                                                                                           



respects.    



                                                                                                                                                                                                -32-                                                                                                                                                                                                   7554
  

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