| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
|
You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Republican Governors Association v. Alaska Public Offices Commission and Walker Mallot for Alaska (4/30/2021) sp-7522
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS )
ASSOCIATION, ) Supreme Court No. S-17768
)
Appellant,
) Superior Court No. 3AN-18-10129 CI
)
v.
) O P I N I O N
)
ALASKA PUBLIC OFFICES
) No. 7522 - April 30, 2021
COMMISSION and WALKER )
MALLOTT FOR ALASKA, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, Erin B. Marston, Judge.
Appearances: Stacey C. Stone, Holmes Weddle & Barcott,
P.C., Anchorage, for Appellant. Laura E. Wolff, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, and Clyde "Ed" Sniffen, Jr.,
Acting AttorneyGeneral,Juneau, for Appellee Alaska Public
Offices Commission. No appearance by Appellee Walker
Mallott for Alaska.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and
Carney, Justices. [Borghesan, Justice, not participating.]
BOLGER, Chief Justice.
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
I. INTRODUCTION
A national political organization engaged an Alaska media consultant to
reserve over $1 million worth of television advertising time prior to the 2018
gubernatorial primary race. The national organization did not register with the Alaska
Public Office Commission, which administers the state's campaign financelaws, and did
not report the reservations to the agency. The Commission concluded that this conduct
violated a statute requiring all entities to register before making any "expenditures,"
includingpromises or agreements to transfer something ofvalue, to influenceanelection.
The superior court affirmed the Commission's decision on appeal. The
national organization now appeals to us, arguing that the Commission defined
"expenditures" too broadly. But we conclude that the Commission reasonably
interpreted the campaign finance statute to include agreements to purchase television
advertising, even when these agreements are not legally binding. We therefore affirm
the superior court's decision affirming the Commission's order.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
TheAlaskaPublicOffices Commissionisanonpartisan agency responsible
for implementing and enforcing Alaska's campaign finance laws, including those
mandatingdisclosureofcontributions and expenditures.1 An"expenditure"is statutorily
defined as "a purchase or a transfer of money or anything of value, or promise or
agreement to purchase or transfer money or anything of value, incurred or made for the
purpose of . . . influencing the . . . election of a candidate."2
All entities are required to
1 See AS 15.13.020 (establishing Commission); AS 15.13.030 (setting out
duties of Commission); AS 15.13.380 (authorizing enforcement by Commission).
2 AS 15.13.400(6)(A).
-2- 7522
----------------------- Page 3-----------------------
register with the Commission prior to making such an expenditure, and an expenditure
3
must be reported; if the expenditure changes, the report must be promptly updated. The
Commission uses these reports to monitor for potential campaign finance violations and
makes the information publicly available to help the electorate make informed voting
choices.4
The Republican Governors Association (RGA) is a national political
organization that seeks to elect and support Republican governors across the United
States. In April 2018 RGA announced in a press release that it had reserved $1.5 million
worth of television advertising time for Alaska's upcoming gubernatorial election. It
explained that "[b]y booking these ad reservations ahead of other campaigns and groups,
the RGA will save considerable resources" and "ensur[e] [RGA's] resources will be the
most efficient on the field." RGA never registered with the Commission or reported the
television advertising reservations.
Many of RGA's media reservations specifically identified the date and
shows during which the advertisements were scheduled to run, although others listed
only a date range and number of spots reserved. The reservations were documented on
forms labeled as "[c]ontract[s]," although RGA did not pay for the reservations and the
forms were not signed.
RGA engaged Pinpoint Media, Inc. (Pinpoint), a media consulting agency
working with RGA in several states during the 2018 elections, to make these
reservations. Pinpoint "assisted RGA with reserving placement of advertising with
3 See AS 15.13.050(a) (requiring "each person other than an individual" to
register before making expenditures); AS 15.13.040 (requiring expenditures to be
reported); 2 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 50.321(g) (2021) (requiring changes to
be reported).
4 AS 15.13.030(5) and (7).
-3- 7522
----------------------- Page 4-----------------------
Alaska television stations" and filed documents with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) stating that it had reserved media time on RGA's behalf. In keeping
with industry practice, RGA did not pay Pinpoint for its work in Alaska, although several
reservations note Pinpoint's expected commission. RGA did not report Pinpoint's work
to the Commission.
Shortly after Mike Dunleavy won the Alaska Republican gubernatorial
primary, RGA transferred its media reservations to Families for Alaska's Future -
Dunleavy (FFAF), an Alaska-based group formed to support Dunleavy's campaign. The
transfer was done by Pinpoint, which asked stations to "change the advertiser name to
[FFAF] on all RGA orders that we booked a few months ago." The next day RGA
contributed $400,000 to FFAF, and FFAF paid Pinpoint $380,900 for "[m]edia
[p]lacement in [the] Anchorage [m]arket." All four television stations listed in the FFAF
payment to Pinpoint were named in the reservations originally made by Pinpoint for
RGA.
The day after the transfer, the treasurer of incumbent governor Bill
Walker's reelection campaign (Walker-Mallott) noticed a local article reporting that
FFAF, backed by RGA, had spent over $1.1 million on advertising in support of
Dunleavy. After sifting through FCC files, the treasurer discovered multiple contracts
for advertising time in RGA's name. Walker-Mallott then filed an expedited complaint
5 alleging RGA's earlymediareservations constituted
againstRGAwith theCommission,
expenditures and RGAshouldhaveregistered withtheCommission beforemakingthem.
5 Walker-Mallot also filed an expedited complaint against FFAF. Because
FFAF never reported the transfer of RGA's reservations, the Commission imposed a fine
against FFAF; FFAF did not appeal.
-4- 7522
----------------------- Page 5-----------------------
B. Procedural History
At an initial hearing on October 2, 2018, the Commission concluded there
were sufficient grounds to grant expedited review. RGA and Walker-Mallott appeared
at the expedited hearing two days later. The Commission considered exhibits from both
parties. Walker-Mallotsubmitted RGA'sAprilpressrelease, RGA's mediareservations,
documents transferring those reservations to FFAF, excerpts from the Commission's
campaign disclosure manual, and a form filed with the FCC on RGA's behalf by
Pinpoint.
RGA submitted affidavits from its chief financial officer and a Pinpoint
media consultant stating that RGA had not paid for any media reservations. The Pinpoint
consultant added that the reservations she had placed were non-binding and that one
media company had cancelled some of its reservations. RGA also submitted two letters
from media companies explaining that media reservations were "not guaranteed until
payment is received" and could be cancelled or revised by the advertiser.
Walker-Mallott called a media marketing consultant and a political
campaign manager as witnesses. They testified that television advertising reservations
are taken very seriously by media entities, as they remove airtime from the market and
are rarely cancelled. As one said, "[I]f you expect to do business with that station in the
future, you have to pay the bill." The witnesses also explained why media consultants
provide a valuable service to advertisers: they can place reservations at lower prices and
more advantageous times, and deny their clients' competitors access to preferred time
slots. They agreed that it is industry practice for consultants to receive a commission
when the reservations are paid for, rather than being paid directly by their clients. And
they said that however the consultants are paid, the consultants work for the
organizations seeking to place reservations, not for the media companies.
-5- 7522
----------------------- Page 6-----------------------
The Commission determined that both reserving television air time and
hiring Pinpoint to do so constituted expenditures and that RGA had violated Alaska
election law by making these expenditures before registration. The Commission ordered
6 RGA appealed to the superior court.
RGA to register and pay a civil penalty of $4,500.
The superior court affirmed the Commission's decision. It concluded that
the Commission's definition of "expenditure" was "the most reasonable interpretation"
of the term and that substantial evidence supported its determination that both RGA's
media reservations and its engagement of Pinpoint constituted expenditures. The court
thus affirmed the civil penalty assessed against RGA and awarded the State 20% of its
attorney's fees as the prevailing party.
RGA now appeals to us.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the superior court has acted as an intermediate court of appeal, we
review the administrative decision directly.7 We apply the substantial evidence standard
to questions of fact, affirming the agency's findings where there is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."8
6 Citing a violation of AS 15.13.050(a), the Commission calculated RGA's
maximum fine as $8,900 under AS 15.13.380(d) (providing for civil penalties) and
AS 15.13.390(a) (providing penalty amount). It reduced the penalty because of RGA's
status as an "inexperienced filer[ ]."
7 Studley v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 389 P.3d 18, 22 (Alaska 2017).
8 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong , 77 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Alaska 2003)
(quoting Grove v. Alaska Constr. & Erectors, 948 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1997)).
-6- 7522
----------------------- Page 7-----------------------
9
We review agency interpretations of statutes under one of two standards.
The reasonable basis standard, under which we defer to the agency's interpretation
unless it is unreasonable, applies "when the question involves fundamental policy
10 In contrast, we substitute our own judgment
decisions or administrative expertise."
"where the agency's specialized knowledge and experience would not be particularly
11 We need not resolve which standard applies
probative on the meaning of the statute."
in this case, as the Commission's interpretation is "the most persuasive in light of
precedent, reason, and policy"12 and thus passes under either standard of review.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Commission's Interpretation Of "Expenditure" Is Reasonable.
Under Alaska law, "each person other than an individual" must register
with the Commission "[b]efore making an expenditure in support of . . . a candidate."13
An expenditure includes a "promise or agreement to purchase or transfer money or
9 Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., Div. of Oil & Gas , 261
P.3d 412, 419 (Alaska 2011).
10 Eberhart v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 426 P.3d 890, 896 (Alaska 2018)
(quoting Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 42 (Alaska 2007)).
11 Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res ., 254 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska
2011) (quoting Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. Hammond, 726 P.2d 166, 175 (Alaska
1986)).
12 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 77 P.3d at 1231 (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d
1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)) (applying the independent judgment standard); see also
Eberhart, 426 P.3d at 896 ("We do not need to resolve which standard applies in this
case because [the Commission's] interpretation is the most logical and reasonable
interpretation of the statute.").
13 AS 15.13.050(a).
-7- 7522
----------------------- Page 8-----------------------
14
anything of value." Because neither "promise" nor "agreement" is statutorily defined,
the Commission argues that the terms should be interpreted according to their common
usage and given a broader meaning than "contract."
An agreement is "an expression of greater breadth of meaning and less
technicality [than a contract]. Every contract is an agreement; but not every agreement
15 The term can include "any arrangement between two or more persons
is a contract."
intended to affect their relations (whether legal or otherwise) to each other."16 Similarly,
"a promise is an expression leading another person justifiably to expect certain conduct
on the part of the promisor."17 Only if "by reason of other operative facts the promise
is recognized as creating a legal duty" is it a contract.18 Therefore, the Commission
argues, the statute cannot be limited to valid contracts.
RGA objects that this interpretation is overbroad, arguing that a "promise
or agreement" requires all the elements of a valid contract: "an offer encompassing all
essential terms, unequivocal acceptance by the offeree, consideration, and an intent to
14 AS 15.13.400(6)(A).
15
Agreement , BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (quoting
2 S TEPHEN'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (L. Crispin Warmington ed.,
21st ed. 1950)).
16 Id.
17 Promise, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (quoting WILLIAM R.
NSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 6 n.3 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed.
A
1919)).
18 Id. (quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1A, at 4 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957)).
-8- 7522
----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
19
be bound." Even though the statute does not expressly require a contract, RGA claims
no agreement could be enforceable without "a meeting of the minds on material terms."
RGA therefore claims that because its reservations were not legally binding contracts,
they cannot have been expenditures.
Butthisappealdoesnot concerncontract enforcement. Thequestion before
us is whether RGA's actions constituted expenditures for the purposes of the campaign
20 And we see no indication that the drafters intended to limit
finance registration statute.
this statute's applicability to contracts.
When interpreting a statute, we "presume that no words or provisions are
superfluous and that the legislature intended 'every word, sentence, or provision of a
statute to have some purpose, force, and effect.' "21 The Alaska legislature could have
referred specifically to "contracts" if it meant to so limit the scope of the reporting
requirements. Instead, it chose the more expansive phrase "promise or agreement."22
We decline to narrow the statute's plain language without a good reason to do so.
The Commission's interpretation of "expenditure" reflects the purposes of
campaign disclosure laws: "providing for an informed electorate, deterring corruption,
and assisting in the detection of violations of contribution limitations."23 We have
previously recognized theimportanceofthesepurposes in interpreting campaign finance
statutes. In Libertarian Party of Alaska, Inc. v. State we upheld a regulation requiring
19 Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Alaska 1997).
20 AS 15.13.050.
21 Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage , 333 P.3d 5, 16 (Alaska 2014)
(quoting Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341, 345 (Alaska 2011)).
22 AS 15.13.400(7)(A).
23 Libertarian Party of Alaska, Inc. v. State, 101 P.3d 616, 621 (Alaska 2004).
-9- 7522
----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
disclosure of "soft money" contributions in addition to the "hard money" contributions
24
expressly regulated under the campaign disclosure statutes.
We reasoned that if the
Commission could not compel disclosure of soft money, then it could not meaningfully
25
track hard money, making the regulation reasonably necessary to implement the law.
Similarly, in Eberhart v. Alaska Public Offices Commission we concluded that the
Commission had reasonably defined government "money" to include governmental
resources and assets, namely a city government's email system.26 The Commission's
definition reflected the legislature's purpose - to prevent public funds from being used
in a political campaign -and so was "[t]he most reasonable interpretation of the term."27
In this case the Commission's interpretation of "expenditure" as broader
than "contract" furthers the disclosure law's purpose, which is to make money in politics
28 Timely registration and reporting allow the agency to correct potential
transparent.
violations and the public to evaluate candidates before going to the polls. As the superior
court recognized: "If there was no requirement to report debts, parties expending
24 Id. at 617.
25 See id. at 617, 622 (stating regulations are valid if they are "consistent with
and reasonably necessary to implement the statutes authorizing their adoption" and
upholding the soft money disclosure regulation because it "implements the act by aiding
in its enforcement, deterring evasions, and informing the public").
26 426 P.3d 890, 896 (Alaska 2018) (interpreting "money" as used in
AS 15.14.145, which prohibits government entities and personnel from using
government money to influence elections of state or municipal officials).
27 Id.
28 See Libertarian Party of Alaska, Inc., 101 P.3d at 622 (describing
"campaign finance disclosure requirements" as "intended to inform the electorate, deter
actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption, and aid in the detection of
violations of contribution and expenditure limits").
-10- 7522
----------------------- Page 11-----------------------
resources on a political campaign could wait until after the election to pay expenses and
report them then. This would defeat the purpose of having campaign finance disclosure
laws . . . ." The statute and the Commission's regulations thus require disclosure of
debts, contributions, and expenditures when they are created, changed, or cancelled. 29
RGAclaims that this "overbroad"reportingrequirementwouldfrustratethe
statute's purpose by "threatening to distort the public's understanding of what funds are
or will be spent and by whom." But the Commission's regulations anticipate
expenditures will change and require prompt reporting of those changes.30 Had RGA
registered with the Commission and reported the reservations in April, then reported the
transfer of reservations in August, it is unclear how voters would have been confused or
made less informed by access to this information. Instead, they would have learned that
RGA planned to support the eventual gubernatorial candidate and had secured $1.5
million in reservations for this purpose. Later voters would have learned that FFAF was
the beneficiary of RGA's efforts. This is precisely the sort of transparency the disclosure
laws are intended to achieve.
RGA next argues that the Commission's interpretation of "expenditure"
would allow it to arbitrarily and selectively investigate all private negotiations and
crafting of political strategy. This concern lacks support in the record. The
Commission's regulations and manuals clarify that expenditures include both paid and
incurred expenditures; they require expenditures to be reported when thedeal in question
29 See AS 15.13.040 (requiring reporting of contributions and expenditures);
2 AAC 50.321(g) (requiring prompt amendments to reports).
30 2 AAC 50.321(g).
-11- 7522
----------------------- Page 12-----------------------
is made, instead of when the expenditure is invoiced or paid. 31 This interpretation has
been consistent since at least 2011 when the Commission last updated its manual, and
RGA points to no inconsistencies or abuses in its application.
We conclude that the Commission's interpretation of "expenditure" to
include promises or agreements that are not contractually binding is the most reasonable
32 We therefore affirm the
in light of our precedent, statutory text, and legislative intent.
superior court's decision on this point.
B. TheCommission's Findings WereSupportedBySubstantialEvidence.
Having accepted the Commission's interpretation of "expenditures" to be
broader than "contracts," we conclude substantial evidence supports its finding that
RGA's media reservations and RGA's engagement of Pinpoint both constituted
expenditures. We thus affirm the superior court's decision on this issue as well.
1. The media reservations were expenditures.
RGA argues that the reservations did not constitute an agreement because
they were preliminary in nature - more akin to a budgeting decision or an "intention to
expend." It points to the few reservations that were cancelled, as well as the transfer of
31 See ALASKA PUB. O FFICES COMM'N ., C ANDIDATE CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE
MANUAL 29 (2011) ("The date that an implied or express promise to pay for goods or
services is made is the date to be used for reporting purposes."); 2 AAC 50.321(c)
(requiring group entities to report as required by AS 15.13.040(b) and (c) and non-group
entities to report as required by AS15.13.040(j)); see also AS 15.13.040(b)(3) (requiring
group entities to report "all expenditures made, incurred, or authorized"),
(j)(4) (requiring non-group entities to report "all expenditures made, incurred, or
authorized").
32 See Eberhart, 426 P.3d at 896 (citing legislative intent in determining
Commission's interpretation was the most reasonable); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Alaska 2003) (adopting "the rule of law that is most
persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy" in de novo review (quoting Guin v.
Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979))).
-12- 7522
----------------------- Page 13-----------------------
the reservations to FFAF, which eventually paid the media companies, as proof that no
true agreement between RGA and the media companies existed. But later changes or
cancellations do not negate the existence of an agreement - the Commission's rules
anticipate them. Organizations must report expenditures when made; if they are
33
subsequently changed, the changes must be reported to the Commission as well.
Substantial evidence shows the reservations were not simply budgeting
decisions. The record supports a conclusion that all parties expected the reservations to
be effectuated, as most of them were. The Commission considered witness testimony
that television stations take reservations "very, very seriously." The media consultant
RGA engaged to place reservations with several media companies could only expect to
be paid if the reservations were finalized. The agreements with media companies
identify prices, times, and dates for the advertisements to run. These were not internal
budgeting decisions. They were agreements with third parties to purchase something of
value, even if the agreements were not yet legally binding.34
And the reservations themselves had value. RGA now claims that by
making the reservations it was merely "shaking a big fist" and letting it be known that
RGA had money to invest, but even this claim admits the reservations had some value.
Furthermore, RGA invested the time and effort to hire a media consultant and secure its
desired time slots. By doing so, as RGA claimed in its press release, it "ensur[ed] [its]
resources will be the most efficient on the field." Witness testimony supports the
Commission's argument that by removing advantageous time slots from the market,
33 2 AAC 50.321(g).
34
See AS 15.13.400(6)(A) (defining an expenditure to include a "promise or
agreement to purchase or transfer money or anything of value").
-13- 7522
----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
RGA denied its opponents access to them. RGA then transferred this valuable benefit
to FFAF.
Expendituresare"promise[s]oragreement[s]to purchaseor transfer money
35 Substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that the
or anything of value."
reservations were agreements or promises, that they had value, and that RGA made them
for the purposes of influencing an election. We thus conclude that RGA's reservations
constituted expenditures.
2. Engaging Pinpoint Media's services was an expenditure.
RGA claims that because it never paid Pinpoint, Pinpoint's work could not
have led to an expenditure. This again conflicts with the Commission's interpretation
of expenditures as reportable when an agreement is made, not when the debt is invoiced
or paid. And by RGA's logic, engaging a media consultant would rarely be reportable,
as it is industry practice for consultants to be paid on commission.
RGA argues that "[t]here is no evidence that the RGA and [Pinpoint] had
made any promise or agreement for payment or future payment from the RGA." But
witness testimony shows that Pinpoint performed a valuable professional service for
which it would expect a standard commission of $200 to $225,000. Many of RGA's
reservation sheets expressly calculate a 15% commission for Pinpoint on the sale.
Pinpoint's work for RGA in Alaska began well before Dunleavy was identified as the
general-election candidate or the reservations were transferred to FFAF. It is reasonable
36
to assume that Pinpoint expected something of value in return for its services.
35 AS 15.13.400(6)(A).
36 Indeed, Pinpoint did seem to receive something of value in return for its
services. Only one day after Pinpoint effectuated the transfer of the media reservations
to FFAF, RGA contributed $400,000 to FFAF. That same day, FFAF paid $380,900 to
(continued...)
-14- 7522
----------------------- Page 15-----------------------
We conclude that substantial evidence shows theexistenceofan agreement
between RGA and Pinpoint and that this agreement constituted an expenditure. We
therefore affirm the superior court's decision on this issue.
C. RGA Is Not Exempt From Registration.
Finally, RGA asserts that because it is not a "group," it need not register
37
with the Commission prior to making expenditures.
It insists Walker-Mallott conceded
this at a preliminary hearing. These claims find no support in the record or the statute
38
in question.
RGAalleges Walker-Mallott "specificallyconceded that the[Commission]
would have to set a new precedent" to find that RGA must register with the Commission.
But Walker-Mallott only urged the Commission to "set a precedent" by granting the
matter expedited review. Walker-Mallott also stated that "[the Commission] needs to set
the precedent" that political organizations "should play by all the rules." Despite this
rhetoric, we conclude that requiring political organizations to follow the law is not
unprecedented.
Under the registration statute, any "person other than an individual" must
39 A "person" may be a group or a "nongroup
register before making expenditures.
36 (...continued)
Pinpoint for "TVMediaProduction"and "MediaPlacement in [the]AnchorageMarket."
37 RGA claims a recent Commission staff report supports its argument. But
the staff report addresses only when an entity can be required to register "as a group."
The report actually contradicts RGA's claim, stating that "AS 15.13.050 simply requires
registration beforeexpenditure -it doesnot specifically requireregistration as agroup."
38 See AS 15.13.050(a) (requiring any "person other than an individual" to
register before making expenditures).
39 AS 15.13.050(a). RGA does not claim to be an "individual," elsewhere
(continued...)
-15- 7522
----------------------- Page 16-----------------------
40
entity." A "person" is statutorily defined as including "a corporation, company,
41
partnership, firm, association, organization, . . . or society."
Regardless of whether
RGA is a "group," it is certainly a "person" under this definition. Therefore, RGA was
subject to the registration statute's requirements. We thus affirm the superior court's
decision that RGA is not exempt from registration.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's decision affirming the Commission's
order assessing a fine against the Republican Governors Association.
39 (...continued)
defined as "a natural person." AS 15.13.400(11).
40 AS 15.13.400(14) (defining "person" as having "the meaning given in
AS 01.10.060" and including "a labor union, nongroup entity, and a group").
41 AS 01.10.060(8).
-16- 7522
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
