Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions


Touch N' Go
®, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother.

 

You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Edward Chinuhuk, Herman Malutin, and Christopher Wasili v. State of Alaska (9/18/2020) sp-7482

Edward Chinuhuk, Herman Malutin, and Christopher Wasili v. State of Alaska (9/18/2020) sp-7482

           Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P                    ACIFIC  REPORTER.  

           Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

                                                                                                                        

           303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email  

                                                                                                                          

           corrections@akcourts.us.  



                      THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA                                       



EDWARD  CHINUHUK,  HERMAN                                            )  

MALUTIN,  and  CHRISTOPHER                                           )     Supreme  Court  Nos.  S-16993/17003/  

WASILI,                                                              )     17004  (Consolidated)  

                                                                     )     Court  of  Appeals  Nos.  A-11574/11600/  

                                Petitioners,                         )     11716  (Consolidated)  

                                                                     )  

           v.                                                                                                                                

                                                                     )     Superior Court Nos. 3AN-09-09305 CR,  

                                                                                                                                      

                                                                     )     3AN-09-09927 CR, 4BE-06-00846 CR  

                     

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                     )  

                                                                                               

                                                                     )     O P I N I O N  

                                Respondent.                          )  

                                                                                                                       

                                                                     )     No. 7482 - September 18, 2020  

                                                                     )  



                     P                                                                                             

                        etition for Hearing in File No. S-16993 from the Court of  

                                                                                                        

                     Appeals of the State of Alaska, on appeal from the Superior  

                                                                                                        

                     Court  of  the  State  of  Alaska,  Third   Judicial  District,  

                                                                                                                   

                     Anchorage, Gregory Miller, Judge.  Petition for Hearing in  

                                                                                                                   

                     File No. S-17003 from the Court of Appeals of the State of  

                                                                                                                   

                     Alaska, on appeal from the Superior Court of the State of  

                                                                                                           

                     Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael Spaan,  

                                                                                                                 

                     Judge.   Petition for Hearing in File No. S-17004 from the  

                                     

                     Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska, on appeal from the  

                                                                                                         

                      Superior  Court  of  the  State  of  Alaska,  Fourth  Judicial  

                                                                           

                     District, Bethel, Michael Spaan, Judge.  



                                                                                                       

                     Appearances: Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender,  

                                                                                                                

                     and  Quinlan  Steiner,  Public  Defender,  Anchorage,  for  

                                                                                                         

                     Petitioners. Timothy W. Terrell, Assistant Attorney General,  

                                                                                                       

                     Anchorage,  and  Kevin  G.  Clarkson,  Attorney  General,  

                                         

                     Juneau, for Respondent.  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                                          Before:                                       Bolger,  Chief  Justice,  Stowers,  Maassen,  and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                                           Carney, Justices.  [Winfree, Justice, not participating.]  



                                                                                                                  

                                                           STOWERS, Justice.
  

                                                                                                                                               

                                                           CARNEY, Justice, dissenting.
  



I.                           INTRODUCTION  



                                                          Petitioners are sex                                                            offenderswho received prison sentences with some time                                                                                                                                                                         



 suspended  and  probation  imposed  pursuant  to  a  statute  that  mandated  suspended  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



imprisonment and probation as part of their initial sentences.  The statute provided that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



the probationary term could not be suspended or reduced.                                                                                                                                                                                                           After being released from                                                                       



prison, repeatedly violating the conditions of probation, and having all of their formerly                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



 suspended time reinstated, the petitioners moved for discharge from probation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Their  



motions were denied because the statute mandating probation required the petitioners to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



 serve the entire probationary term, even if they no longer had suspended time remaining                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



as an incentive to comply with probation.                                                                                               



                                                          While their cases were pending before the court of appeals, the statute was                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



repealed.    The court of appeals held the statute's repeal was not retroactive, and it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



affirmed the denial of their motions.                                                                                                                           We granted their petition for hearing.                                                                                             



                                                          We conclude based on the statute's text and legislative history that courts                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



have no discretion to reduce a sex offender's probation below statutory minimums.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       We  



also conclude that the statute's repeal does not retroactively apply to the petitioners. We                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



therefore affirm the court of appeals and deny the petitioners the relief they seek.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



                                                                                                                                                                                       -2-                                                                                                                                                                          7482
  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

II.          FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS          



             A.            Facts  

                                                                                                      1  concerns three sex offenders who  

                           This consolidated petition for hearing                                                                                                   

were  sentenced  pursuant  to  former  AS  12.55.125(o),2  

                                                                                                                                                                  

                                                                                                                     which  was  in  effect  from  



                                                  3 

                                                                                                                                        

April 2006 to July 2016.   These three are among a larger group of sex offenders who  



                                                                                                                                                   

sought to vacate their periods of probation, exchanging longer periods of incarceration  



                                                                                                                                                                      

for  freedom from the  supervision  associated  with  probation.                                                                 Each  was  denied  the  



             1             The    three    petitioners    -    Edward    Chinuhuk,    Herman    Malutin,    and  



Christopher Wasili - were appellants in a consolidated appeal to the court of appeals.                                                                                        

Chinuhuk v. State                  , 413 P.3d 1215, 1217 (Alaska App. 2018).                                              They filed a consolidated        

petition for hearing to this court, which we granted.                                                      Two other appellants before the                            

court of appeals, William Alexie and Ross Apangalook,                                                           id.  at 1215, are not petitioners         

in the cases before this court.                             



             2             Section .125(o), ch. 14, § 7, SLA 2006 (repealed 2016), added additional  

                                                                                                                                                         

conditions  to  the  sentences  for  sex  offenders,  whose  punishment  is  defined  by  

                                                                                                                                                                      

AS 12.55.125(i), as follows:  

                                         



                           Other than for convictions subject to a mandatory 99-year  

                                                                                                                                   

                           sentence, the court shall impose, in addition to an active term  

                                                                                                                                         

                           of  imprisonment  imposed  under  (i)  of  this  section,  a  

                                                                                                                                              

                           minimum period of . . . (2) suspended imprisonment of three  

                                                                                                                                         

                           years and a minimum period of probation supervision of 10  

                                                

                           years  for  conviction  of  a  class  A  or  class  B  felony,  or  

                                                                                                                                             

                           (3)  suspended imprisonment of two years and a minimum  

                                                                                                                               

                          period of probation supervision of five years for conviction  

                                                                                                                             

                           of a class C felony.  The period of probation is in addition to  

                                                                                                                                              

                           any sentence received under (i) of this section and may not be  

                                                                                                                                              

                           suspended  or  reduced.                           Upon  a  defendant's  release  from  

                                                                                                                                        

                           confinement in acorrectional facility, the defendant is subject  

                                                                                                                                     

                           to this probation requirement and shall submit and comply  

                                                                                                                                   

                           with the terms and requirements of the probation.  

                                                                                                         



             3             See ch. 14, §§ 7, 15, SLA 2006 (enacting provision); ch. 36, §§ 179, 188,  

                                                                                                                                                                    

SLA 2016 (repealing provision).  

                                            



                                                                                   -3-                                                                            7482
  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

opportunity to do so, and they challenge those rulings. Facts specific to each of the three                                                                                                                                                        



petitioners follow.   



                                        1.                  Edward Chinuhuk   



                                        Edward Chinuhuk was convicted of attempted sexual abuse of a minor in                                                                                                                                               



the second degree, and in June 2010 he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with                                                                                                                                                               



three years suspended, and placed on probation for five years.  He repeatedly violated   



his probation conditions by "drinking and being re-arrested immediately upon release"                                                                                                                                                     



and was made to serve portions of his previously suspended sentence.                                                                                                                                                      By his sixth            



violation in December 2012, he had served all but about eight months of his suspended                                                                                                                                              



sentence.   



                                        Chinuhuk   and   his   probation   officer   agreed   that   he   should   serve   this  



remaining   time,   and   Chinuhuk   requested   that   he   thereafter   be   discharged   from  



                               4  

probation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                     The State opposed, arguing that Chinuhuk could not reject his probation.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                

It argued that his conviction for a sexual felony kept him subject to probation under  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

former AS 12.55.125(o), asserting that "probation is a mandatory component" of sex  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

offenders' sentences because the legislature mandated that sex offenders be monitored  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

and treated after release.   The superior court determined that because the length of  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

probation was "specifically mandated by thelegislaturein AS 12.55.125(o)," it could not  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

grant Chinuhuk's motion to reject probation. Chinuhuk was sentenced to the remainder  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

of his suspended sentence and ordered to continue on probation upon his release.  



                    4                   See   Brown v.                             State,   559   P.2d   107,   111   n.13   (Alaska 1977)                                                                                         ("[U]nder  



Alaska's statutes governing probation the defendant can refuse probation if he deems the                                                                                                                                                                 

terms too onerous.").         



                                                                                                                             -4-                                                                                                                   7482
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                    2.        Herman Malutin  

                                             



                    Herman Malutin was convicted of the same offense as Chinuhuk, and he  

                                  



was given the same sentence in August 2010. He also violated his probation repeatedly,  

                                                                                                                  



although his non-compliance was more closely related to the underlying offense: he was  

                                                                                                                             



residing with minor children, continuing to cultivate his apparent pedophilia, and failing  

                                                                                                                         



to attend sex offender treatment. He and the State exchanged arguments similar to those  

                                                                                                                           



described in Chinuhuk's case, and Malutin's motion to reject probation was similarly  

                                                                                                                     



denied.   Like Chinuhuk, he was ordered to serve his remaining suspended time and  

                                                                                                                             



remained subject to probation after his release.  

                                                                        



                    3.        Christopher Wasili  

                                                    



                    Christopher Wasili was charged with sexual assault in the second degree,  

                                                                                                                        



and in June 2007  he was sentenced  to  seven  years'  imprisonment,  with  two  years  

                                                                                                           



suspended, and placed on probation for five years. Wasili had four probation violations  

                                                                                                                    



for failing to update his address information in the sex offender registry, failing to report  

                                                                                                                          



to his probation officer, failing to obtain permission from his probation officer before  

                                                                                                                         



changing his residence, and consuming alcohol.  Like the other petitioners, Wasili's  

                                                                                                                      



motion to reject probation was denied, and his remaining suspended time was imposed  

                                                                                                                      



without relief from the balance of his probationary term.  

                                                                              



          B.        Proceedings  



                    All three offenders (collectively Chinuhuk) asked the court of appeals to  

                                                                                                                                



reverse the denial of their motions and permit them to end their terms of probation; the  

                                                                                                                              



                                                               -5-                                                        7482
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                                                     5  

court consolidated their appeals.                        While the cases were on appeal, the legislature enacted                      



                                    6                                                                      7  

Senate Bill (S.B.) 91,                                                               

                                      which repealed former AS 12.55.125(o). 



                       Chinuhuk's  motion  to  reject  probation  was  denied  on  the  basis  of  

                                                                                                                                              



section .125(o).               Noting  that section's repeal, Chinuhuk  moved  to have his appeal  

                                                                                                                                       



declared moot and his case remanded for entry of an order terminating his probation.  

                                                                                                                                                    



The  State  opposed,  arguing  that  Alaska's  saving  statute  AS  01.10.100  precluded  

                                                                                                                                 

AS   12.55.125(o)'s   repeal   from   affecting   Chinuhuk.8                                             Chinuhuk   replied   that  

                                                                                                                                          



AS  01.10.100  did  not  apply  to  him  because  the  repeal  of  section  .125(o)  did  not  

                                                                                                                                            



extinguish a penalty but instead restored a right:  his right to refuse probation.  

                                                                                                                                     



                      After the parties had filed their motion papers with the court of appeals, but  

                                                                                                                                             



before the court issued its decision, the legislature passed Senate Bill (S.B.) 54, which  

                                                                                                               

                                         9  As enacted in 2017 AS 12.55.125(q) substantially reinstated  

added AS 12.55.125(q).                                                                                                            

                   

the language of AS 12.55.125(o) but with some variations.10  

                                                                                  



           5           Chinuhuk,  413  P.3d  at   1217.  



           6          Id.  



           7           Ch.  36,  §   179,  SLA  2016.  



           8          AS  01.10.100(a)  provides  in  pertinent  part:   "The  repeal  or  amendment  of  



a  law  does  not  release  or  extinguish  any  penalty  .  .  .  incurred  .  .  .  unless  the  repealing  or  

amending  act  so  provides  expressly.   The  law  shall  be  treated  as  remaining  in  force  for  

the   purpose   of   sustaining   any   proper   action   .   .   .   for   the   enforcement   of   the   .   .   .  

penalty  .  .  .  ."  



           9           Ch. 1, § 34, 4SSLA 2017.  

                                                          



           10          Compare ch. 1, § 34, 4SSLA 2017, with ch. 14, § 7, SLA 2006.  

                                                                                                                         



                                                                       -6-                                                               7482
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                       The court of appeals rejected Chinuhuk's argument that his appeal was                                     



                                             11  

rendered moot by S.B. 91.                                                                                                             

                                                 In doing so, the court was influenced by the U.S. Supreme  

                                                                                                               12  which dealt with an  

                                                                                                                                                 

                                                                                                

Court's decision in Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero,  

                                                                                                                        13   The Supreme  

analogous claim involving changes to federal drug sentencing laws.                                                                    

                                                                                                               



Court concluded in Marrero that the defendant's sentence was a substantive component  

                                                                                                                                  

of his prosecution under the prior law, and - applying a similar saving statute14  - it  

                                                                                                                                                   



rejected the defendant's argument that he should benefit from recent statutory changes  

                                                                                                                                       

allowing drug offenders to apply for parole.15                                      Following this example, the court of  

                                                                                                                                                 



appeals concluded that Chinuhuk was not entitled to reject probation simply because of  

                                                                                                                                                  



the repeal of AS 12.55.125(o); therefore S.B. 91 did not moot his appeal or direct its  

                                                                                                                                                 

outcome in his favor.16   The court of appeals did not acknowledge the passage of S.B. 54  

                                                                                                                                                 

in its issued opinion.17  

                      



            11         Chinuhuk,  413  P.3d  at   1217.  



            12         417  U.S.  653  (1974).  



            13         Chinuhuk,  413  P.3d  at   1217.  



            14         Marrero  involved  consideration  of  1  U.S.C.  §  109  (1970),  which  states  in  



pertinent   part:     "The   repeal   of   any   statute   shall   not   .   .   .  release   or  extinguish   any  

penalty   .   .   .   incurred   under   such   statute, unless the   repealing   Act   shall   so   expressly  

provide,  and  such  statute  shall  be  treated  as s   till  remaining  in  force  for  the  purpose  of  

sustaining  any  proper  action  .  .  .  for  the  enforcement  of  such  penalty  .  .  .  ."  



            15         Marrero, 417 U.S. at 657-64.  

                                                             



            16         Chinuhuk, 413 P.3d at 1218.  

                                                               



            17         See id. at 1215-20.  

                                        



                                                                        -7-                                                                 7482
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

                                                                                                                                  18  

                     On   the   merits,   the   court   of   appeals   also   sided   with   the   State.                               It  



acknowledged that probation is generally a contractual arrangement which the offender                                         

                 19  But the legislature has the power to create mandatory probation, and the  

can reject.                                                                                                                           



legislative history of section .125(o) convinced the court of appeals that the legislature  

                                                                                                                           

had intended to exercise this power.20   The court of appeals denied relief to Chinuhuk.21  

                                                                                                                        



                      Chinuhuk filed a petition for hearing, which we granted.  While his case  

                                                                                                                                     



was on appeal before this court, the legislature amended AS 12.55.125(q) again as part  

                                                                                                                                     

of House Bill 49.22              Effective July 2019 AS 12.55.125(q) now contains substantively  

                                                                                                                      

identical language to former AS 12.55.125(o).23  

                                                     



III.       STANDARD OF REVIEW  

                                          



                     "The interpretation of a statute . . . is a question of law to which we apply  

                                                                                                                                   

                                                24     "[W]e  interpret  the  statute  according  to  reason,  

our  independent  judgment."                                                                                             

                             



practicality, and common sense, considering the meaning of the statute's language, its  

legislative history, and its purpose."25  "We do not mechanically apply the plain meaning  

                                                                                                                              



rule, using instead a sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, in which 'the  

                                                                                                                                     



           18        Id.  at   1218-20.  



           19        Id.  at   1219.  



           20        Id.  at   1219-20.  



           21        Id.  at   1220.  



           22         Ch.  4,  §  74,  FSSLA  2019.  



           23         Compare  id.,  with  ch.   14,  §  7,  SLA  2006.  



           24        State  v.  Fyfe,  370  P.3d   1092,   1094  (Alaska  2016)  (alteration  in  original)  



(quoting  Alaska  Judicial  Council  v.  Kruse,  331  P.3d  375,  379  (Alaska  2014)).  



           25        Id.  at   1095  (alteration  in  original)  (quoting  State,  Div.  of   Workers'  Comp.  



v.  Titan  Enters.,  LLC,  338  P.3d  316,  320  (Alaska  2014)).  



                                                                   -8-                                                             7482
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

plainer thestatutory              languageis,          themoreconvincing theevidenceofcontrary                                    legislative  

purpose or intent must be.' "                    26  



IV.        DISCUSSION  



                                                                                                                               

                       We   begin   with   a   general   discussion   of   probation   as   historically  



                                                                                                                                               

implemented in Alaska.  Next, we analyze the core issues presented in this case.  In our  



                                                                                                                                             

view  this  case  presents  two  primary  questions:                                     first,  whether  the  trial  court  had  



                                                                                                                                          

discretion to revoke Chinuhuk's probation and second, whether section .125(o)'s repeal  



                       

changes this analysis.  



                                                                                                                                                 

                       We employ a textual analysis and an examination of legislative history to  



                                                                                                                                

conclude  that  the  trial  court  had  no  discretion  to  modify  the  terms  of  Chinuhuk's  



                                                                                                                                              

probation.  We also conclude that the repeal of section .125(o) was not retroactive and  



                                                                                        

thus did not reestablish Chinuhuk's right to refuse probation.  



                                                                

           A.          Probation Systems In Alaska  



                                                                                                                                       

                       As  both  parties  note,  Alaska  law  usually  permits  a  court  to  impose  



                                                                                                                                   

probation only in lieu of some other punishment.  Alaska Statute 12.55.080 authorizes  



                                                                                                                                              

a superior  court to  "suspend  .  .  .  the sentence or  a portion thereof[] and place the  



                                                                                                                                           

defendant on probation . . . upon the terms and conditions [it] considers best."  In Kelly  



                                                                                                                                                

v.  State  the  court  of  appeals  described  suspension  as  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  



                                                                                                                                            

probation: "When a court sentences a defendant to serve a probationary period, the court  



                                                                                                                                                 27  

                                                                                                                                                      

must suspend a portion of the sentence or else the probationary term is meaningless." 



                                                                                                                                                

Alaska Statute 12.55.090(b) permits a court to "revoke or modify any condition of  



                                                                                                                                              

probation [or] change the period of probation."  The court of appeals held in Kelly that  



           26          Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage                                 , 333 P.3d 5, 11 (Alaska 2014)                



(quoting  McDonnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.                                            , 299 P.3d 715, 721 (Alaska           

2013)).  



           27          842 P.2d 612, 613 (Alaska App. 1992).  

                                                                                



                                                                       -9-                                                                 7482
  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

if a superior court imposes the entirety of a probationer's suspended sentence following                                                             

a probation violation, the court has no subsequent authority to impose probation.                                                                           28  



                          The parties agree about this principle, and it serves as the usual approach  

                                                                                                                                                      



to probation in Alaska.  They also agree that the legislature can abrogate this approach,  

                                                                                                                                                     

                                                                    29     In  Auliye ,  the  court  of  appeals  analyzed  the  

as  recognized  in  State  v.  Auliye.  

                                                                                                                                                                 

legislature's amendments to AS 04.16.050, a statute prohibiting underage drinking.30   A  

                                                                                                                                                                     

now-repealed  version  of the statute31   required  that a convicted  youth  be placed  on  

                                                                                                                                                                  



probation; the sentencing court had no discretion in this regard, and the youth "[could]  

                                                                                                                                                        

not refuse probation."32                         The court of appeals distinguished the automatic, mandatory  

                                                                                                                                                   

probation created by former AS 04.16.050 from Alaska's usual probation scheme.33  

                                                                                                                                                



                          A central question in this case concerns whether section .125(o) abrogated  

                                                                                                                                                     



the  usual  probationary  rules  as  to  sex  offenders  punished  under  section  .125(i).  

                                                                                                                                                                         



Chinuhuk's core argument is that, in enacting AS 12.55.125(o), the legislature left the  

                                                                                                                                                                  



standard probation regime unchanged but for two departures:  

                                                                                                  



             28           See  id.  at  613-14  ("[The  defendant]  violated  her probation  and  the  court  



imposed  all  of  the  time  it suspended.   .   .   .  Revocation  of   [her]  probation  in  its  entirety  

necessarily  extinguished  all  duties   [she]  had that  were  conditioned  exclusively  on  her  

probationary  status.").  



             29           57 P.3d 711 (Alaska App. 2002).  

                                                                              



             30           Id. at 713-15.  

                                      



             31           The Auliye court analyzed AS 04.16.050 as amended in 2001.  Id. at 715  

                                                                                                                                                     

n.14; see ch. 65, §§ 1, 2, SLA 2001.  The probation provisions were repealed in 2016.  

                                                                                                                                                                         

See ch. 32, § 9, SLA 2016.  

                                          



             32           Auliye , 57 P.3d at 715-16.  

                                                              



             33           Id. at 717.  

                                      



                                                                                -10-                                                                          7482
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                                                                                                         

                               [Alaska Statute 12.55.125(o)] modifies sections .080  

                                                                                                          

                    and  .090  in  two  ways:               First,  a  court  no  longer  has  the  

                                                                                                  

                    discretion to decide whether to impose a suspended sentence;  

                                                                                                

                    rather, a court must impose a minimum period of suspended  

                                                                                                    

                    imprisonment              when        sentencing          a    defendant          under  

                                                                                                  

                    AS 12.55.125(i). Second, in imposing a suspended sentence,  

                                                                                                           

                    a court no longer has the discretion to decide the length of the  

                                                                                                              

                    probationary period accompanying that sentence; rather, a  

                                                                                               

                    court   must   impose   a   minimum   period   of   probation  

                                                                                                    

                    supervision            when        sentencing            a    defendant           under  

                           

                    AS 12.55.125(i).  



                                                                                            

                              Apartfromthesetwo modifications,[AS12.55.125(o)]  

                                                                                                           

                    did not otherwise alter the statutory framework governing the  

                                                                               

                    imposition of probationary sentences.  



                                                                                                                     

Chinuhuk contends that the narrow effect of these changes, combined with a legislative  



                                                                                                                    

record that is ambiguous on the point, is insufficient to conclude that the legislature  



                                                                                

intended to abrogate the usual probationary regime.  



                                                                                                                                

                    The  State  argues  that  the  legislature  instead  created  a  third  form  of  



                                                                                                   

probation in AS 12.55.125(o).  The State asserts that, unlike the usual scheme but like  



                                                                                                                            

the mechanismdescribed in Auliye , section .125(o) mandated a period of probation when  



                                                                                                                                

sentencing a defendant under section .125(i).   But unlike the probation described in  



                                                                                                                      

Auliye , AS 12.55.125(o) also required suspended imprisonment to provide an incentive  



                                                            

to comply with the terms of probation.  



                                                                                                                            

                    The core disagreement between the parties concerns what happens when  



                                                                                                                               

the probationer has served the entirety  of  the suspended term but has not been on  



                                                                                                                                     

probation for the required amount of time. Chinuhuk argues that the usual rules govern.  



                                                                                                                        

He asserts that courts have no authority to continue to impose probation in the absence  



                                                                                                                              

of suspended imprisonment.  The State maintains that even when a sex offender has  



                                                                                                                      

served the suspended term in its entirety, probation "cannot be refused and . . . cannot  



                                  

be terminated early."  



                                                               -11-                                                        7482
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

                   B.	                The   Trial   Court   Had   No   Authority   To   Reduce   The   Terms   Of  

                                      Chinuhuk's Probation.   



                                      1.	                Chinuhuk's   probation   imposed   under   section   .125(o)   was   a  

                                                         mandatory part of his initial sentence.                                                 



                                      We begin with a textual analysis and then examine the legislative history                                                



of former AS 12.55.125(o).                                                      We conclude from the statute's text that Chinuhuk's initial                                                                                           



sentence consisted of a period of imprisonment as outlined in AS 12.55.125(i) plus                                                                                                                                                       



mandatory   minimum probation                                                                as   required   by   AS   12.55.125(o).    A   review   of   the  



legislative history corroborates this conclusion.                                                     



                                                         a.                 Textual analysis of section .125(o)                                              



                                      The penultimate sentence of former AS 12.55.125(o) is key in this case:                                                                                                                                            



"The period of probation is in addition to any sentence received under (i) of this section                                                                                                                                        

and may not be suspended or reduced."                                                                           34  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

                                      We believe "reduced" refers to the "period of probation."  This is the most  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

natural  reading  of  the  sentence.                                                                  The  subject  of  the  sentence  is  "[t]he  period  of  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

probation."  The sentence contains two verbs: "is" and "may."  The period of probation  



                                                                                                                                                                                               35  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

"is in addition to any sentence received under [AS 12.55.125(i)]."                                                                                                                                     It also "may not  



                                               36  

               

be . . . reduced." 



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                      The harder question concerns what the word "suspended" references. The  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

sentence's grammatical structure supports the conclusion that "suspended" also refers  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

to the "period of probation."  But we find this reading hard to reconcile because it does  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

not comport with common usage.   A court typically does not "suspend probation."  



                   34                 Ch. 14, § 7, SLA 2006 (repealed 2016).                                                         



                   35                 Id.  



                   36                 Id.  



                                                                                                                     -12-	                                                                                                              7482
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

Rather, it suspends execution of a sentence.                                                                                   Determining that "suspend" refers to the                                                                    



execution of a sentence rather than the period of probation is also much more in line with                                                                                                                                              



                                            37  

common usage.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

                                      But if we conclude "suspended" refers to execution of a sentence, we must  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

harmonize  that  with  our  earlier  conclusion  that  "reduced"  refers  to  the  period  of  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

probation. We struggle with how the verbs "suspended" and "reduced" can refer to two  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

different  subjects  within  the  same  sentence.                                                                                            We  could  conclude  that  the  word  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

"suspended" is superfluous.  Perhaps the legislature simply meant that a trial court has  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

no discretion to reduce the period of probation imposed under section .125(o), and  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

"suspended"  does  not  modify  this  interpretation  in  any  meaningful  way.                                                                                                                                             But  this  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

conclusion does not comply with our strong preference to give every word in a statute  



                                           38  

                 

some meaning. 



                   37                 The phrase "suspended probation" has never been used in any case in                                                                                                                                     



Alaska.  A search of Alaska and related federal cases reveals 22 reported cases where                                                                                                                                             

these words have been used together.                                                                      In 21 of those cases, the words were separated by                                                                                  

a comma or a period, and "suspended" referred to the execution of the sentence, not                                                                                                                           

probation.   See, e.g.                                  ,  Garrett v. United States                                           , 471 U.S. 773, 779 n.1 (1985).                                                          In the one         

remaining case, the Ninth Circuit referred in passing to a non-party in the case as having                                                                                                                                       

been "sentenced to five months of suspended probation."                                                                                                         United States v. Capriola                                              , 537   

F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1976).                                                        The best reading we can offer is that the court meant the                                                                                            

non-party had the execution of his sentence suspended in exchange for five months of   

probation.   In contrast, the phrase "suspended sentence" appears 189 times in reported                                                                                                                                     

Alaska cases and 282 times in related federal cases.                                                                             



                   38                 See Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 761 (Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

 1999) ("We . . . presume 'that the legislature intended every word, sentence, or provision  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect, and that no words or provisions are  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

superfluous.'  "  (quoting  Rydwell  v.  Anchorage  Sch.  Dist.,  864  P.2d  526,  530-31  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

(Alaska 1993))).  

                        



                                                                                                                    -13-                                                                                                              7482
  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                           To solve this problem we are guided by the provision's placement within                                                              



                                                                                                                                                     39  

the   section   of   the   criminal   procedure   code   dealing   with   sentencing.                                                                       Alaska  

                                                                                                                       40  Thatthelegislaturechose  

                                                                                                                                                                  

                                                                                                       

Statute12.55.125generally concerns sentencing for felonies. 



to  place  former  AS  12.55.125(o)  within  this  section  leads  us  to  conclude  that  the  

                                                                                                                                                                      



legislatureconsidered imprisonment and probation togethertoconstituteasex offender's  

                                                                                                                                                         

initial  sentence.41                    That  is,  a  sex  offender  receives  a  "sentence"  comprised  of  an  

                                                                                                                                                                       



incarceration  period  conforming  to  the  guidelines  contained  in  section  .125(i)  

                                                                                                                                                             



accompanied by the probation described in section .125(o).  

                                                                                                       



                           Interpreting section .125(o) in this way also resolves our concern over the  

                                                                                                                                                                       



word "suspended" in this provision.  The period of probation is a mandatory part of the  

                                                                                                                                                                       



sex offender's initial sentence.  In other words, that part of the initial sentence "may not  

                                                                                                                                                                       

                                                      42    The directive that this part of the sentence "may not be  

be suspended or reduced."                                                                                                                                               

                                   



suspended or reduced" is necessary because without it a court could conclude it could  



alter the terms of the mandatory probation prescribed by section .125(o) during initial  

                                                                                                                                                                 



sentencing, much as a court has discretion under the usual rules to set the terms of  

                                                                                                                                                                        



probation under AS 12.55.080.  

                                         



             39            See City of Kotzebue v. State, Dep't of Corr.                                         , 166 P.3d 37, 42 n.16 (Alaska               



2007)   (observing   that   statutory   interpretation   requires   examination   not   only   of   the  

"particular language at issue but also . . . the 'language and design of the statute as a                                                                            

whole' " (quoting                    Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.                                                 , 21 P.3d 344, 351             

(Alaska 2001))).   



             40            It is titled:  "Sentences for imprisonment for felonies."  AS 12.55.125.  

                                                                                                                                                  



             41            Had the legislature intended the probation imposed under section .125(o)  

                                                                                                                                                              

to be more like normal probation, it could have, for example, included this provision with  

                                                                                                                                                                    

the statutes that concern probation instead of with those that deal with sentencing.  See,  

                                                                                                                                                                     

e.g., AS 12.55.080-.100.  

                  



             42            Ch. 14, § 7, SLA 2006 (repealed 2016).  

                                                                                              



                                                                                  -14-                                                                            7482
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                                                       b.                Legislative history analysis of section .125(o)                                                               



                                     Our review of the legislative history supports this conclusion.                                                                                                                  Senator  



Gretchen Guess testified during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Senate Bill                                                                                                                                              



(S.B.) 218 about the importance of subjecting sex offenders on probation to mandatory                                                                                                                           



polygraph tests:   



                                     [Alaska Statute 12.55.125(o)] is, I think, a very important                                                                             

                                    part of this bill.                          Because what it does is ensure that anyone,                                                        

                                     when they do get off, is on automatic probation and therefore                                                                              

                                     can be polygraphed.                                       And it's one of the ways that we can                                                            

                                     actually protect the public and keep sex offenders who've                                                                                      

                                     gotten out of jail, if they get off, we don't need to go back to                                                                                              

                                     trial - they're on probation for a certain amount of time.                                                                                                   [43]  



In later testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Senator Con Bunde described  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



how mandatory probation and the polygraph requirement also provide an important  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



deterrent for repeat offenders:  

                                                       



                                     [T]his allows for mandatory probation as part of a regular  

                                                                                                                                                                                     

                                     sentencing. . . . Rather than take an early out and be under  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                    parole or probation, rather than be under any supervision,  

                                                                                                                                                                       

                                     [some  sex  offenders  will  instead  choose  to]  do  their  full  

                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                     sentence in an attempt then to not be under supervision. And  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                     again,  this  leads  to  the  recidivism  problem  that  we're  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

                                     concerned about. . . . This is mandatory probation, cannot be  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  

                                     suspended or reduced, and the defendant is subject to all the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                     rules of probation under this requirement -which, when this  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

                                    bill passes, would include the polygraph test.[44]  

                                                                                                                                                     



The then-current phenomenon of sex offenders choosing to serve their entire prison term  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                  43                 TestimonyofSen.Gretchen                                                    Guess at 9:58:45-9:59:15,Hearingon                                                                    S.B.218   



Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 19, 2006).                                                                                                     



                  44                 Testimony of Sen. Con Bunde at 2:39:47-2:40:47, Hearing on H.B. 353  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 15, 2006).  

                                                                                                                                                                          



                                                                                                                 -15-                                                                                                           7482
  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                            45  

without probation "[led] to the recidivismproblem" that the legislature was addressing.                                                                           



                                                                                                                                                      

The legislature's cure was a special kind of probation: it had to be imposed, and it could  



                                                      46  

                                       

not be suspended or reduced. 



                                                                                                                                                            

                         Chinuhuk concedes this testimony could support our interpretation. But he  



                                                                                                                                             

notes that the testimony concerns a version of the bill that lacked mandatory suspended  



                                                                                                                                                   

sentences.  He suggests that subsequent amendments to S.B. 218 in March 2006 change  



                                                                                                                                                    

this analysis. The legislature amended the bill after Senator Bunde's testimony to couple  

                                                                              47     Chinuhuk  offers  this  as  proof  that  the  

                                                                                                                                                          

suspended  imprisonment  with  probation. 



legislature did not intend to depart from the usual scheme provided for in AS 12.55.080.  

                                                                                                                                                                  



The  State  counters  that  the  legislature  inserted  suspended  imprisonment  into  later  

                                                                                                                                                       



versions of S.B. 218 "to make the probation more effective as a practical matter," not to  

                                                                                                                                                             



make it identical to probation imposed under section .080.  Deputy Attorney General  

                                                                                                                                                 



Susan  Parks  testified  before  the  House  Finance  Committee  and  provided  the  best  

                                                                                                                                                        



explanation we have found regarding the purpose of these changes:  

                                                                                                             



                         The original bill mandated that there be probation for sex  

                                                                                                                                 

                         offenses. Well, probation only has teeth if there's suspended  

                                                                                                                     



            45           See id.   



            46           See  ch. 14, § 7, SLA 2006 (repealed 2016).                                      The dissent characterizes the                    



probation  imposed  under  AS  12.55.125(o)  as  "meaningless"  under  the  theory  that  

                                                                                                                                                        

without suspended imprisonment to serve as an incentive to comply with probation, the  

                                                                                                                                                           

probation would have no purpose.                                     But the dissent ignores the crucial fact that the                                    

legislature intended probation, and the new polygraph test requirement, to be                                                              mandatory  

for sex offenders. If sex offenders could treat their probation as optional, they could also  

                                                                                                                                                         

circumvent the polygraph test requirement.   Such an outcome would run counter to  

                                                                                                                                                            

legislative intent.  

                     



            47           Compare Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 218 (FIN), § 7, 24th Leg.,  

                                                                                                                                                       

2d Sess. (Feb. 9, 2016), with House Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for  

                                                                                                                                                           

Senate Bill 218 (FIN), § 7, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Apr. 5, 2006).  

                                                                                                       



                                                                            -16-                                                                      7482
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                         time required so that if someone violates probation there's an                                               

                         ability to punish them.                     And so, section eight now mandates                  

                         that   there   be   suspended   time   so   that   every   sex   offender,  

                         unless they're getting the mandatory 99 years, this would                                            

                         require   a   certain   amount   of   suspended   time   so   that   that  

                         mandatory probation actually has some teeth in it.                                            [48]  



Clearly the legislature contemplated imposition of portions of suspended imprisonment  

                                                                                                                                         



for probation violations.  We decline to take this as far as Chinuhuk does, however, and  

                                                                                                                                                            



equate  this  with  an  intent  to  fully  embrace  probation  under  section  .080.                                                                  Park's  

                                                                                                                                                      



testimony suggests a continued emphasis on the importance of the mandatory probation.  

                                                                                                                                                                     



And   it   supports   the   State's   argument   that   the   legislature   coupled   suspended  

                                                                                                                                              



imprisonment with mandatory probation "to make the probation more effective as a  

                                                                                                                                                                 



practical matter."  

                  



                         2.	          The  trial  court  had  no  discretion  to  reduce  Chinuhuk's  

                                                                                                                                         

                                      probation at a subsequent hearing.  

                                                                                            



                         We have concluded from the statute's text and legislative history that the  

                                                                                                                                                              



legislature intended a sex offender's initial sentence to have two components:  a period  

                                                                                                                                                       



of imprisonment and a period of mandatory probation after the sex offender leaves  

                                                                                                                                                       



prison.   The legislature required some suspended time to act as an incentive for sex  

                                                                                                                                                             



offenders to comply with the terms of probation, and it contemplated that courts would  

                                                                                                                                                       



impose some portion or all of the suspended time for probation violations.  We next  

                                                                                                                                                           



answer whether a court may modify the term of probation after initial sentencing when  

                                                                                                                                                         



it imposes some portion of the suspended imprisonment.  

                                                                                



                         We conclude that a trial court has no discretion to reduce a sex offender's  

                                                                                                                                                



probation term below statutory minimums.   The statute requires minimum terms of  

                                                                                                                                                               



             48          Testimony of Susan Parks, Deputy Att'y Gen. at 1:50:52-1:51:24, Hearing  

                                                                                                                                                    

on S.B. 218 Before H. Fin. Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Mar. 7, 2006).  

                                                                                                                          



                                                                              -17-	                                                                            7482  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

probation and states unequivocally that the sentence prescribed by AS 12.55.125 "may                                                      



                                                     49  

not be suspended or reduced."                                                                                                                 

                                                           Because the trial court sentenced Chinuhuk to the  



                                                                                                                                   

statutory minimum period of probation defined in AS 12.55.125(o), it had no discretion  



                                                                    

to reduce his probation at a subsequent hearing.  



                                                                                                                                             

                       We also  believe that any  other  interpretation  of the statute would  run  



                                                   

counter to legislative intent.  During initial sentencing the trial court must prescribe at  



                                                                                                                                        

least  the  minimum  period  of  probation  outlined  in  section  .125(o).                                                     But  under  



                                                                                                                                         

Chinuhuk's suggested interpretation, trial court discretion at subsequent hearings would  



                                                                                                                                          

be governed by sections .090 and .110; section .125(o) would no longer control.  Thus,  



                                                                                                                                  

Chinuhuk argues, the trial court regains its discretion to set aside all of a sex offender's  



                                                         

probation after he leaves prison.  



                                                                                                                                           

                       But such a conclusion would lead to an absurd result. To understand why,  



                                                                                                                                       

we may consider the case of the sex offender who violates probation the day after leaving  



                                                                                                                                                

prison.  Chinuhuk does not explain why the legislature would cabin court discretion at  



                                                                                                                                         

initial sentencing only to allow such discretion immediately after the sex offender leaves  



                                                                                                                                 

prison.  Chinuhuk's suggested interpretation would allow sex offenders to effectively  



                                                                                                                                                     

forgo the mandatory probation and polygraph requirement that the legislature intended.  



                                                                                                                                   

Immediately after leaving prison the sex offender could violate the terms of probation  



                                                                                                                                   

and ask the court to exercise its newfound discretion to set aside his probation. Probation  

                                                                                                                                50 could be  

that the legislature mandated last for minimum periods of 5, 10, or 15 years 



reduced to months, weeks, or even a day.  We decline to adopt an interpretation that  

                                                                                                                                             



           49          Ch.   14,  §  7,  SLA  2006  (repealed  2016).  



           50         Id.  



                                                                      -18-                                                                     7482  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

would leave such a glaring loophole in the law because we do not believe the legislature                                           

so intended.         51  



                                                                                                                                        

            C.	        Section .125(o)'s Repeal Did Not Restore Chinuhuk's Right To Refuse  

                       Probation.  



                                                                                                                                         

                       Finally, we consider the extent to which therepealofsection.125(o) affects  



                                                                                                                                    

theoutcomein Chinuhuk's case. Weconclude that Alaska's saving statuteAS01.10.100  



                                                                                                                                         

denies the retroactive application of section .125(o)'s repeal. We also do not give weight  



                                                                                                                                                 

to Chinuhuk's argument that even if section .125(o)'s repeal was not retroactive as to  



                                                                                                                                   

him, he should have received the benefit of its repeal at subsequent probation revocation  



hearings.  



                                                                                                                  

                       1.	        S.B. 91's repeal of AS 12.55.125(o) was not retroactive.  



                                                                                                                             

                       The parties offer several ways to analyze the effect of S.B. 91's repeal of  



                                                                                                                    52  

                                                                                                                                     

section .125(o).  The State argues - and the court of appeals held                                                     - that Alaska's  



                                                                                                                                              

general saving statute bars section .125(o)'s repeal from having retroactive effect.  The  



                                                                                                                                           

saving statute prevents elimination of penalties or rights under repealed statutes when  



                                                                                       53  

                                                                                                                                                

those penalties attached or rights vested previously.                                      Because Chinuhuk was placed on  



                                                                                                                                               

probation as part of the "penalty" he incurred under section .125(o), the State argues the  



                                                                                                       54  

                                                                                                           

later repeal of that statute did not "extinguish [the] penalty." 



           51          See  Brooks  Range  Expl.  Co.  v.  Gordon,  46  P.3d  942,  945-46  (Alaska  2002)  



("[W]here  the  literal  interpretation  of  a statute would lead to  absurd  results,  courts  can  

interpret  the  words  of the  statute  to  agree  with the  intention of  the  legislature."  (citing  

Sherman  v.  Holiday  Constr.  Co.,  435  P.2d   16,   18-19  (Alaska   1967))).  



           52          Chinuhuk v. State, 413 P.3d 1215, 1217-18 (Alaska App. 2018).  

                                                                                                                          



           53          AS 01.10.100(a).  

                              



           54          See id.  

                               



                                                                      -19-	                                                                7482
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

                        Several factors support the State's argument. The court of appeals has held                                                 



                                                                                                              55  

that criminal "penalties are imposed at the time of sentencing";                                                                                      

                                                                                                                 this, combined with the  



                                                                                                                                                 

fact that Chinuhuk was placed on probation pursuant to section .125(o) as part of initial  



                                                                                                                                               

sentencing, erases any doubt that his term of probation was a "penalty" that the saving  



                                                                                                                                                  

statute  prevents  from  being  "extinguished"  by  section  .125(o)'s  repeal.                                                           The  U.S.  



                                                                                                                                          

Supreme Court's decision in Marrero provides analogous support: just as the defendant  



                                                                                                                                                

in that case was denied the benefits of post-sentencing revisions to the federal parole  



                                                                                                                                                       

regime because that would have violated the relevant saving statute as to his penalty, so  



                                                                                                                                                   

too  is  Chinuhuk  unable  to  benefit  from the  repeal  of  section  .125(o)  after  he  was  

sentenced.56  



                        Chinuhuk contends that Alaska's saving statute is narrower than it appears  

                                                                                                                                             



and was adopted solely to deal with the issue of abatement.   As Chinuhuk explains,  

                                                                                                                                           



saving statutes were designed to address the interplay between the common law doctrine  

                                                                                                                                             



of abatement and the constitutional bar to ex post facto legislation.  Under the doctrine  

                                                                                                                                             



of abatement a legislature that amends a statute repeals the older version, and pending  

                                                                                       

or potential prosecutions under the former law must be extinguished.57                                                          Because a new  

                                                                                                                                                    



prosecution cannot begin under the new statute based on pre-enactment conduct due to  

                                                                                                                                                        



            55          Helton  v.  State,  778  P.2d   1156,   1169  (Alaska  App.   1989).  



            56          See   Warden,  Lewisburg Penitentiary  v.  Marrero,  417  U.S.   653,   660-64  



(1974).  



            57          See   United   States   v.   Tynen,   78   U.S.   88,   93   (1870)   ("When   repugnant  



provisions   .   .   .   exist   between   two   acts,   the   latter   act   is   held,   according   to  all  the  

authorities  to  operate  as  a  repeal  of  the  first  act,  for  the  latter  act  expresses  the  will  of  the  

government  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  offences  shall  be  subsequently  treated.");  id.  

at  95  ("By  the  repeal  of  .  .  .  the  act  .  .  .  all  criminal  proceedings  taken  under  it  fell.").  



                                                                          -20-                                                                    7482
  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                                                                                                   58  

the bar on ex post facto legislation,                                                                    some offenders can escape justice.                                                                  Chinuhuk  



contends   that   saving   statutes   such  as   Alaska's   are   designed   solely   to   address   this  



technical issue.                           He claims that because laws that ameliorate penalties do not implicate                                                                                                

                                                            59 the saving statute does not prohibit their retroactive application.  

ex post facto concerns,                                                                                                                                                                                    



                                    We disagree that the Alaska saving statute is limited to situations where the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



repeal of a statute would have abated a prosecution at common law.  The language of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



AS 01.10.100 is clear.  It states that a law's repeal or amendment "does not release or  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

extinguish any penalty . . . incurred . . . under that law."60                                                                                                  After repeal or amendment  

                                                                                                                                                                                                           



"[t]he law shall be treated as remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

action or prosecution for the enforcement of the . . . penalty."61  Nothing in this language  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



implies  that the saving  statute only applies to situations where prosecutions would  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



otherwise be barred by operation of common law abatement and the prohibition against  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



                  58                See Doe v. State                           , 189 P.3d 999, 1003 (Alaska 2008) ("An ex post facto law                                                                                         



is   a   law   'passed   after   the   occurrence   of   a   fact   or   commission   of   an   act,   which  

retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed.' These                                                                                                                                  

constitutional prohibitions bar the legislature from enacting any law that 'punishes as a                                                                                                                                              

crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more                                                                                                                                            

burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or which deprives one                                                                                                                                              

charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act                                                                                                                                            

was committed.' " (footnote omitted) (first quoting                                                                                          In re Estate of Blodgett                                         , 147 P.3d      

702, 711 (Alaska 2006); then quoting                                                                    State v. Anthony                              , 816 P.2d 1377, 1378 (Alaska                                  

 1991))).  



                  59                 Cf. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (holding that the ex post  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

facto  clause  bars  legislation  that  makes  punishment  more  burdensome  after  its  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

commission); Doe, 189 P.3d at 1003 (holding the same).  

                                                                                                                                        



                  60                AS 01.10.100(a).  

                                               



                  61                Id.  



                                                                                                                -21-                                                                                                         7482
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

 ex post facto legislation. Indeed, our holding here is consistent with how courts in other                                                        

jurisdictions have interpreted similarly worded saving statutes.                                                 62  



                                                                                                                                                        

                        2.	         Chinuhuk's argument that he is "sentenced" anew each time he  

                                                                                        

                                    is returned to probation is unpersuasive.  



                                                                                                                                                        

                        Chinuhuk offers an alternative theory for relief.  He asserts that "when he  



                                                                                                                                

 appears before the court on a petition to revoke his probation, that is a new sentencing  



                                                                                                                                         

proceeding, at which he may take advantage of ameliorative sentencing provisions  



                                                                                                                       63  

                                                                                                                                        

 currently in effect." Chinuhuk cites our decision in Gilligan v. State                                                    for the proposition  



                                                                                                                                                              

that the punitive effects of a probation revocation proceeding constitute a "sentencing."  



                                                                                                                                                        

In that case, we determined that we had jurisdiction to hear an offender's appeal after he  



                                                                                                                                              64  

                                                                                                                                                        

violated the conditions of probation and his suspended sentence was reimposed.                                                                     In so  



                                                                                                                                                        

holding, we stated that the imposition of a suspended sentence "was a 'sentence of  



                                                                                                                                                      

imprisonment  lawfully  imposed'  within  the  meaning  of  the  statutes  providing  for  



                                65  

                  

 sentence review." 



                        In State v. Stafford the court of appeals declared that Alaska's case law  

                                                                                                                                                      



trends  toward  "applying  ameliorative  sentencing  provisions  to  defendants  not  yet  

                                                                                                                                                      



            62          See,  e.g.,   United  States  v.  Bradley,  455  F.2d   1181,   1191  (1st  Cir.   1972),  



aff'd  sub  nom.  Bradley  v.  United  States,  410  U.S.  605  (1973)  ("We  do  not  agree  that  [the  

 federal  saving  statute]  is limited  to  those  statutes  the repeal  of  which,  at common  law,  

would  have  abated  a  cause  of  action  or  prosecution.");  United  States  v.  Kirby,  176  F.2d  

 101, 104   (2d   Cir.   1949)   (relying   on  plain   language   of   federal   saving   statute  without  

considering  doctrine  of  abatement  to  conclude  that  repealed  sentencing  statute  remained  

in  effect).  



            63          560 P.2d 17 (Alaska 1977).  

                                                               



            64          Id. at 18.  

                                   



            65          Id. at 19 (quoting AS  12.55.120(a) and AS 22.05.010(b)).  

                                                                                                       



                                                                          -22-	                                                                    7482
  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

sentenced."66  Therefore, if we adopt the premise that Chinuhuk was "sentenced" each                                                          



time his probation was revoked, then                                                Stafford could direct the superior court to treat                                              



section .125(o) as repealed when adjudicating Chinuhuk's suspended imprisonment and                                                                                                   



probation at subsequent proceedings.                                                The effect would be to return Chinuhuk to the                                               



ambit of the default probation regime and allow him to reject his remaining probation.                                                                                 



                             We find Chinuhuk's reliance on                                            Gilligan  unpersuasive.   In   Gilligan  we  



were   concerned   with   the   procedural   aspects   of   appellate   jurisdiction   and   judicial  

                67      This  case  deals  with  the  substantive  aspects  of  the  saving  statute.                                                                                We  

review.                                                                                                                                                                             



considered in Gilligan the scope of former Alaska Appellate Rule 21(b), which required  

                                                                                                                                                                           

appeals to be filed within "30 days after [the] sentence was imposed."68  Gilligan's appeal  

                                                                                                                                                                                

of his probation revocation was filed more than 30 days after his initial sentence.69                                                                                               The  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



State argued the "sentence" referred to in Rule 21(b) was the offender's initial sentence  

                                                                                                                                                                           

and that we therefore did not have jurisdiction to hear his appeal under Rule 21(b).70  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



Had we ruled in favor of the State we would have likely eliminated judicial review of  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



almost all judgments reinstating imprisonment at probation revocation hearings.  We  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



               66             129  P.3d  927,  930  (Alaska  App.  2006).  



               67            See  generally  560  P.2d   17.  



               68            The  Appellate  Rules  have   since  been  restyled.   At  the  time,  Rule   21(b)  



provided:   "(b)  Notice  of  Appeal.   Written  notice  of  appeal  from  a  sentence  .  .  .  shall  be  

filed  with  the  clerk  of  the  superior  court  which  imposed the sentence  not  later  than  30  

days  after  sentence  was  imposed."   Id.  at   18  n.1.  



               69            Id. at 18.  

                                          



               70            Id.  



                                                                                          -23-                                                                                    7482
  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

therefore construed the meaning of "sentence" in the context of Rule 21(b) more broadly                                                         

to include re-sentencing at a probation revocation hearing.                                                71  



                         As  a  preliminary  matter,  we  note  the  Appellate  Rules  have  been  

                                                                                                                                                    



 significantly restyled since Gilligan, and the rules now couch appellate review in terms  

                                                                                                                                                    

of final "judgment," not based on when a "sentence" is imposed.72                                                            The issue of what  

                                                                                                                                                     



constitutes a "sentence" therefore would not arise today under the facts of  Gilligan.  

                                                                                                                                                                



Moreover, we expressly limited our interpretation of "sentence"in thatcase to be "within  

                                                                                                                                                 

the meaning of the statutes providing for sentence review."73                                                   We see no need therefore  

                                                                                                                                              



to extend our interpretation of the word "sentence" in the context of a now-rewritten  

                                                                                                                                    



 appellate rule governing jurisdiction to situations not before us in Gilligan.  

                                                                                                                         



                         We may also distinguish this case from the facts in Stafford. In Stafford the  

                                                                                                                                                         



court of appeals considered whether the "penalty" saved by AS 01.10.100 accrued as of  

                                                                                                                                                           

 a defendant's commission of the offense or as of sentencing.74                                                         After conducting an  

                                                                                                                                                         



 exhaustive review of our prior decisions, the court of appeals concluded the key date was  

                                                                                                                                                       

                                        75   In the consolidated cases before the court in Stafford, however,  

the date of sentencing.                                                                                                                       

                     

none of the defendants had been sentenced at all when the new statute was passed.76                                                                       In  

                                                                                                                                                          



deciding that ameliorative sentencing provisions should apply to the defendants in that  

                                                                                                                                                       



             71         Id.  at 19.   



             72          See  Alaska  R.  App.  P.  202  (stating that  appeals  may  be  taken  from  final  



judgments),  204(a)(1)  (requiring notice  of  appeal  to  "be  filed  within  30  days  from  the  

 date  shown  in  the  clerk's  certificate  of  distribution  on  the  judgment  appealed  from").  



             73          Gilligan, 560 P.2d at 19.  

                                                                 



             74          129 P.3d 927, 928-33 (Alaska App. 2006).  

                                                                                           



             75         Id. at 929-33.  

                                    



             76         Id. at 928.  

                                    



                                                                           -24-                                                                     7482
  


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

case, the        Stafford   court did not consider whether the rule should extend to sentence                                      



                                                                              77  

modifications at probation revocation                          hearings.                                                                  

                                                                                 Weconcludethatthe Stafford ruledoes  



                                                                                                                                              

not apply to those situations.   To do otherwise would run counter to the purpose of  



                             

Alaska's saving statute.  



V.         CONCLUSION  



                                                                                                                                            

                      We AFFIRM the court of appeals on all grounds.  Chinuhuk, Malutin, and  



                                                                                                                            

Wasili remain subject to mandatory probation imposed under former AS 12.55.125(o)  



                                                                               

to the extent they have remaining probation to serve.  



           77  

                                       

                      See id. at 927-34.  



                                                                     -25-                                                                    7482  


----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

CARNEY, Justice, dissenting.                  



                               I respectfully disagree with the court's decision that the legislature created                                                                          

                                                                                             1  and continues even after the imposition of all  

a type of probation that is "meaningless"                                                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                                       2     Instead I believe that the  

of the suspended time upon which its meaning depended.                                                                                                                               

                                                                                                                



legislature identified a problem:  dangerous sexual offenders were being released from  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



prison too soon and without the benefit of treatment designed to reduce the chance that  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



they would commit new offenses. I believe further that the legislature crafted a solution  

                                                                                                                                                                                   



to that problem:  it increased the mandatory sentences for sexual felony offenses and  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



required, as a part of the increased sentences, mandatory periods of probation.  

                                                                                                                                                                                      

                               In lengthy and at times confusing committee meetings,3   the legislature  

                                                                                                                                                                              



considered and amended legislation that ultimately included the sentence on which so  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



                                                                                                                                                                                                     4  

much attention now focuses:  the "penultimate sentence of former AS 12.55.125(o)."   

                                                                                                                                                                   



                1              See Kelly v. State                     , 842 P.2d 612, 613 (Alaska App. 1992) ("When a court                                                               



sentences a defendant to serve a probationary period, the court must suspend a portion                                                                                               

of   the   sentence   or  else   the   probationary   term   is   meaningless.");   see   also   Planned  

Parenthood of Alaska                                  v.  Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 735 (Alaska 2010) (Winfree, J.,                                                                                

concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Any purported regulation of conduct must                                                                                                       

include consequences, otherwise it is meaningless . . . .").                                                               



               2               Opinion at 9-10.  

                                                         



               3               For example,alegislatorrequestedthataDepartment ofCorrections official  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

clarify the practice of "flat-lining" sentences to avoid a parole requirement to submit to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   

polygraph examinations. See Testimony of Sen. Con Bunde at 9:38:18-9:38:37, Hearing  

                                                                                                                                                                                     

on S.B. 218 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 2, 2006).  In response  

                                                                                                                                                                                   

the official clarified both what "flat-timing" was and discussed "mandatory parole" - a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

component of felony sentences entirely distinct from probation. See Testimony of Portia  

                                                                                                                                                                                          

Parker, Deputy Commissioner, Dep't of Corr. at 9:38:39-9:39:59, Hearing on S.B. 218  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

Before the S. Fin. Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 2, 2006).  

                                                                                                                               



               4               Opinion at 12.  

                                                         



                                                                                               -26-                                                                                        7482
  


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                      5  

I share the court's impression that this sentence could have been more artfully worded.                                                                   



                                                                                                                                                  

But I cannot join in its pages of "reconcil[ing]" the sentence's meaning in a way that  

                                                                        6  of English to create a type of probation that  

                                                                                                                                                  

                                                            

"does not comport with common usage" 



                                                                                                                                                      7  

Alaska's courts, including this one, have recognized as "meaningless" for decades.   

                                                                                                                                       



Instead, I believe that we should understand the legislature's intent in a way that is  

                                                                                                                                                     



consistent with its overall solution to the problem it was addressing and consistent with  

                                                                                                                                                



the "common usage" of language and, in particular, the specialized language of Alaska's  

                                                                                                                                         



criminal justice system.  

                             



                       As  the  court  notes,  the  legislature  aimed  to  address  "the  recidivism  

                                                                                                                                     



problem" caused by sex offenders choosing to serve prison time without probation  

                                                                                                                       

following their release.8   The legislature used a two-pronged approach: first it increased  

                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                  9  Then, following a senator's suggestion  

the mandatory sentences for each sexual felony.                                                                                       

                                                                       

that mandatory probation be included in the newly increased sentences,10 it amended the  

                                                                                                                                                   



proposed legislation to require just that, but neglected to require that the sentences  

                                                                                                                                       



            5          Opinion  at   12-14.  



            6          Opinion  at   12.  



            7          See  Kelly  v.  State,  842  P.2d  612,  613  (Alaska  App.   1992).  



            8          Opinion   at   15-16   (quoting   Testimony   of   Sen.   Con   Bunde   at   2:39:47- 



2:40:47,  Hearing  on  H.B.  353  Before  the  H.  Judiciary  Comm.,  24th  Leg.,  2d  Sess.  (Feb.  

 15,  2006)).  



            9          Committee Substitute for Senate Bill (C.S.S.B.) 218,  § 4, 24th Leg., 2d  

                                                                                                                                                    

Sess. (2006).  

           



            10         Testimony of Sen. Con Bunde at 2:39:47-2:40:47, Hearing on H.B. 353  

                                                                                                                                                 

Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 15, 2006).  

                                                                                                             



                                                                        -27-                                                                   7482
  


----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

                                                11  

include suspended time.                              The legislature added an additional requirement of suspended                                         



time after testimony from the deputy attorney general in charge of criminal matters                                                                            



explained that "probation only has teeth if there's suspended time so that if someone                                                                       

                                                                                                          12   The legislation was amended to  

violates probation there's an ability to punish them."                                                                                                                     



"now mandate[] that there be .  .  . a certain amount of suspended time so that . . .  

                                                                                                                                                                          

mandatory probation actually has some teeth in it."13  

                                                                                                 



                           The legislative changes to sentences for sexual felonies were dramatic.  

                                                                                                                                                                                



Where previously an offender convicted of sexual assault in the first degree was subject  

                                                                                                                                                                 

to a presumptive sentencing range of 8 to 12 years,14 with probation and suspended time  

                                                                                                                                                                      



left  to  the  discretion  of  the  sentencing  court,  following  the  amendments  the  same  

                                                                                                                                                                   

offender  faced a minimum range  of  20  to 30  years15   and,  due to  the newly  added  

                                                                                                                                                                  



AS 12.55.125(o), a mandatory probationary period of 15 years, with 5 years suspended  

                                                                                                                                                          

during  that  time.16                      By  spelling  out  these  requirements,  section  .125(o)  prohibited  

                                                                                                                                                         



sentencing courts from sentencing an offender to even a lengthy prison term without  

                                                                                                                                                               



              11           C.S.S.B.  218,  §  7,  24th  Leg.,  2d  Sess.  (2006).  



              12           Testimony  of  Susan  Parks,  Deputy  Att'y  Gen.  at  1:50:52-1:51:07,  Hearing  



on   S.B.   218   Before   H.   Fin.   Comm.,   24th   Leg.,  2d   Sess.   (Mar.   7,   2006);   House  

Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for Senate  Bill  218, § 7, 24th Leg., 2d  

Sess.  (2006).  



              13           Id. at 1:51:09-1:51:24.  

                                       



              14           Ch. 2, § 12, SLA 2005.  

                                                               



              15           Ch. 14, § 4, SLA 2006.  

                                                               



              16           Ch. 14, § 7, SLA 2006 (repealed 2016).  

                                                                                               



                                                                                   -28-                                                                             7482
  


----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

                   17  

probation;            suspending a portion of the mandatory minimum sentence in order to place                                                    

the offender on probation;18                                              

                                                   or reducing the mandatory probationary period even after  



                                                          19  

                                                 

service of a lengthy prison term. 



                                                                                                                                            

                        Section .125(o) makes clear the legislature's requirement that any sentence  



                                                                                                                                       

imposed  under  the  new  sentencing  scheme  was  required  to  include  a  mandatory  



                                                                                                                                                       

minimum period of probation, along with a mandatory minimum number of years of  



                                                                                                                                                        

suspended imprisonment for that probationary period. Section .125(o) was necessary to  



                                                                                                                                                   

ensure  that  sentencing  courts  did  not  exercise  their  discretion  in  a  manner  that  



                                                                                                                                                    

perpetuated the problem the legislature sought to remedy.  The amended statutes thus  



                                                                                                                                               

addressed both of the legislature's concerns:   sex offenders received notably longer  



                                                                                                                                         

prison  sentences  and  after  completing  them  were  required  to  abide  by  probation  



                                                                                                                                                       

conditions, including sex offender treatment, for a lengthy  probationary period.   If  



                                                                                                                                            

offenders did not comply with the conditions of their probation, they would be returned  



                                                                                              

to prison to serve the additional years that had been suspended.  



                                                                                                                                                

                        Thelegislature'samendment oflaws governing sentencing in felony sexual  



                                                                                                                                            

offenses thus significantly increased the punishment for such offenders and required  



                                                                                                                                                     

probation, including treatment, as part of their sentences.  But the amendments did not  



                                                                                                                                                        

create an unprecedented new version of probation.  Nor did the amendments attempt to  



            17          For   example,   a   court   could   no   longer  sentence   an   offender   to   40  



years - well above the minimum sentencing range - but decline to suspend at least 5                                                                      

years of the time in order to place the offender on probation.                             



            18          A court could no longer, for example, sentence a defendant to the minimum  

                                                                                                                                          

20 years and suspend 5 of those 20 years; instead the court was required to impose at  

                                                                                                                                                        

least 25 years before suspending the mandatory minimum 5.  

                                                                                                         



            19          Nor could a court take into account an offender's projected advanced age  

                                                                                                                                                     

upon  release  from  service  of  a  lengthy  sentence  by  concluding  that  a  lengthy  

                                                                                                                                            

probationary period would not be necessary and reducing the mandated period.  

                                                                                                                                  



                                                                          -29-                                                                    7482
  


----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

craft any kind of new enforcement mechanism to keep such an unprecedented creation                                                                                        



from being "meaningless."     



                             The court recognizes that probation requires suspended time in order to                                                                                   

                                                                                                                                                               20    Probation  

serve as the double-edged incentive and deterrent it was intended to be.                                                                                             



provides an incentive to an offender -compliance with probation conditions means that  

                                                                                                                                                                                    



the offender will never have to serve the additional years in prison that were suspended.  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



And it is intended to deter violations of probation by suspending the spectre of additional  

                                                                                                                                                                      



prison time as a consequence of violation.  

                                                                       



                             Each of the appellants felt probation's intended deterrent effect; each of  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



them ultimately served every day of the suspended portion of their prison sentence after  

                                                                                                                                                                                  



violating probation.  And each of them - along with their supervising Department of  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



Correctionsprobation officers -asked thatthey bereleased fromprobation after serving  

                                                                                                                                                                            



all of the time to which they had been originally sentenced.  

                                                                                                          

                             The court acknowledges that each of them served their entire sentence.21  

                                                                                                                                                                    



But  instead  of  adhering  to  long-established  precedent  barring  courts  from  adding  

                                                                                                                                                                           

additional probation to an offender's sentence22  it nonetheless decides that appellants  

                                                                                                                                                                     



remain subject to a special kind of probation and turns for support to the unique (and  

                                                                                                                                                                                 



              20             Opinion  at  9-10.  



              21             Opinion  at  4-5.  



              22             See,  e.g.,  Franzen  v.  State,  573  P.2d  55,  57  (Alaska  1978)  (recognizing  "no  



authority  under  Alaska  law  which  permits  the  court  to  impose  a  fixed  sentence,  require  

the  defendant  to  serve  that  sentence,  and  then  place  the  defendant  on  an  additional  period  

of  probation").  



                                                                                         -30-                                                                                   7482
  


----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

now   only   historical)   probation   once   imposed   on   youthful   offenders   convicted   of  



                                              23  

underage alcohol offenses.                         



                       In State v. Auliye the court of appeals granted the State's petition for review  

                                                                                                                                           



of a superior court's decision that a youth charged with possession or consumption of  

                                                                                                                                                   

alcohol was entitled to a jury trial.24                            The court held that because probation until the  

                                                                                                                                       



youth's 21st birthday was "automatic," sentencing judges were "empowered to impose  

                                                                                                                                          



penalties on these youths that are sufficiently severe to trigger the rights to jury trial and  

                                                                                                                                                

court-appointed counsel."25   In dicta before moving to its analysis of youths' entitlement  

                                                                                                                                   



to these rights, the court remarked that it was "at least arguable that" a court could forbid  

                                                                                                                                            

even first offenders from operating a motor vehicle until they turned 21.26   It is upon this  

                                                                                                                                                



comment by the court of appeals that the court today rests its approval of "meaningless"  

                                                                                                                             

probation.27  



                       Even assuming that a comment in a court of appeals opinion apparently  

                                                                                                                                    



approving a now-discontinued form of probation for minors convicted of possession or  

                                                                                                                                                   



consumption of alcohol supports the idea that probation need not include suspended  

                                                                                                                                    



time, it is not clear to me that the legislature intended to create such a type of probation  

                                                                                                                                      



for sexual offenders. For one, by virtue of her youth, and the statute's command that she  

                                                                                                                                                 

"may  not  refuse  probation,"28                       Auliye  "at  least  arguably"  faced  a  consequence  for  

                                                                                                                                                



            23         Opinion at 10-11.
     



            24         57 P.3d 711, 712 (Alaska App. 2002).
                   



            25
        Id. at 717.  

                                  



            26         Id.  



            27         See  Opinion at 9-11.       



            28         57 P.3d at 715 (quoting former AS 04.16.050(e) (2001)).  

                                                                                                             



                                                                       -31-                                                                  7482
  


----------------------- Page 32-----------------------

                                                                                                                                        29  

violating probation, even if her sentence was not imposed.                                                                                    But appellants do not face                          



an additional consequence if they violate probation; they have served the entirety of the                                                                                                            



time imposed                       upon   them in                     sentencing.     No   purpose   is served                                              by continuing                       their  



"meaningless" probation.   



                               A second difference between                                            Auliye   and appellants' position is that the                                                 



legislature   appeared   to   have   purposefully   crafted   the   unique   probationary   scheme  



imposed on the juvenile offender. The court of appeals detailed the evolving legislation                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                                                   30   The legislative  

that resulted in the unique "modified strategy" of automatic probation.                                                                                                             



history of AS 12.55.125(o) lacks any such intentional progress toward a probationary  

                                                                                                                                                                            



scheme  for  sexual  offenders  resulting  in  "meaningless"  probation.                                                                                                      Instead,  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



ambiguous statutory languageand legislativehistory reflectlegislativeconfusion leading  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



to an inartfully drafted statute.  

                                                       



                               What the legislative history does reveal is the legislature's intent to craft a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         



probationary scheme to address the problem of untreated sex offenders being released  

                                                                             



after serving relatively short sentences.  The increased length of appellants' sentences  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



and the requirement of sex offender treatment as a probation condition demonstrate that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



solution. Having served their entire sentences -the originally imposed prison time plus  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



the previously suspended time - appellants faced neither an incentive nor a deterrent  

                                                                                                                                           



during any continued probation.  Recognizing that continued probation was therefore  

                                                                                                                                                                                      



"meaningless," they and their probation officers requested that they be released from  

                                                                                                                                                                                                



probation.  Their requests should have been granted.  

                                                                                                         



                29             See  id.  



                30             See  id.  at  713-16.  



                                                                                                 -32-                                                                                                   7482  


----------------------- Page 33-----------------------

                                                                     I therefore dissent from the court's decision.                                                                                                                                                                                                31  



                                         31                          Because I would reverse the court of appeals decision, I do not reach the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



other arguments on appeal.                                                                               



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        -33-                                                                                                                                                                                                                     7482  

Case Law
Statutes, Regs & Rules
Constitutions
Miscellaneous


IT Advice, Support, Data Recovery & Computer Forensics.
(907) 338-8188

Please help us support these and other worthy organizations:
Law Project for Psychiatraic Rights
Soteria-alaska
Choices
AWAIC