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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Mark A. Rosenbaum v. Pamela Shaw (3/13/2020) sp-7430
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
MARK A. ROSENBAUM, )
) Supreme Court No. S-17061
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 3AN-02-12127 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
PAMELA SHAW, )
) No. 7430 - March 13, 2020
Appellee. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, Jennifer Henderson, Judge.
Appearances: Eva Gardner, Ashburn & Mason, Anchorage
(limited appearance); Gavin Kentch, Law Office of Gavin
Kentch, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellant; Mark A.
Rosenbaum, pro se, Delray Beach, Florida, Appellant.
Michael Gershel, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen,
and Carney, Justices.
STOWERS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case involves an obligor father who never missed a child support
payment to the obligee mother for their minor child. The father retired and began
collecting Social Security retirement benefits. As a result, the child became eligible to
receive a derivative monthly children's insurance benefit (CIB) from the Social Security
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Administration (SSA). The mother received four years of CIB payments in addition to
regular monthly child support payments from the obligor; the law allows the CIB
payments to be credited against the child support obligation. However, neither parent
notified the Alaska Department of Revenue, Child Support Services Division (CSSD)
that they were receiving CIB payments for their daughter. After four years of
overpayments, CSSD discovered the CIB payment from SSA and credited the father
more than $47,000 in child support overpayment.
The father filed suit, asking the superior court for a judgment against the
mother for overpaid child support. He also requested reimbursement or credit for
overpaid health insurancepremiums. Thesuperior court deniedreimbursementfor either
overpayment. The father appeals. We conclude that the mother should retain the
overpayments from the father, and we affirm the superior court on this issue; we also
affirm its ruling declining to order reimbursement or credit for overpaid health insurance
premiums.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Mark Rosenbaum and Pamela Shaw are the biological parents of a
daughter, born August 2002. Mark and Pamela separated before their daughter was born
and were initially awarded joint legal and shared physical custody. Mark has been
paying child support to Pamela for most of the daughter's life. Mark's child support
payment included half of the cost of the daughter's health insurance. Before this case
Mark's child support payment was last modified in 2009.
In 2012 Mark retired and moved to Florida; the daughter remained with
Pamela in Alaska. In March Mark began receiving Social Security retirement benefits.
Because of this the daughter became eligible to receive CIB payments, and Mark
received and retained them on her behalf until 2014. In 2014 Pamela learned of the CIB
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payments, and upon her request SSA redirected future payments to her. Mark repaid
SSA the money he had received on the daughter's behalf and these funds were paid to
Pamela.
Mark continued to pay child support while Pamela was receiving CIB
payments. He apparently was unaware that the CIB payments could be credited against
his child support obligation until October 2016 when SSA notified CSSD of the CIB
payments, and CSSD contacted Mark to inform him that he had an overbalance of
$47,432. Pamela was also apparently unaware until late 2016 that CIB payments could
be credited against Mark's child support obligation. Mark stopped paying child support
in November 2016.
The child support order provided that Pamela "must purchase health
insurance for the child because such insurance is available at reasonable cost through her
employer, union or otherwise." The insurance cost was to be divided equally between
the parties. In 2012 Pamela lost her job and was no longer able to provide health
insurance for the daughter. Under such circumstances, the child support order provides
that if insurance is available to one parent at a reasonable cost, that parent must purchase
health insurance for the daughter. Pamela asked Mark to add their daughter to his
insurance. Mark did so and in January 2013 began paying a monthly premium of
$275.42 for the daughter's coverage. Pamela later stated that Mark never informed her
that the daughter was on his insurance and never provided her with an insurance card for
1 and the
the daughter. Pamela subsequently enrolled the daughter in Denali KidCare,
daughter was enrolled until the summer of 2017 when, according to Pamela, she learned
1 Denali KidCare "is an expansion of the Medicaid Program in Alaska" that
provides coverage to children and teens who meet the income guidelines. See Denali
KidCare Alaska's Children's Health Insurance Program , D IV. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS.,
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dhcs/Pages/denalikidcare/default.aspx(lastvisitedOct.15, 2019).
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----------------------- Page 4-----------------------
that the daughter was covered under Mark's insurance plan. Mark stated that he told
Pamela in January 2013 that he added the daughter to his health insurance, and he
claimed that since June 2013 he had received notification of 18 claims that had been
processed for the daughter's healthcare needs.
B. Proceedings
In August 2017 Mark filed a motion in superior court for entry of judgment
to recover overpaid child support and health insurance premiums. He explained that
CSSD had told him that it would collect the $47,432 overpayment from Pamela but
needed a judgment from a court directing it to do so. He also contended that he was
entitled to repayment from Pamela for half of the $275.42 monthly health insurance
premiums he had been paying for the daughter's coverage since January 2013 - a total
of $7,574.05.
Pamela opposed Mark's motion, arguing that the rule against retroactive
modification of child support barred Mark's request for repayment of health insurance
premiums. As to the child support overpayment, Pamela acknowledged that "a child
support obligor is entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit for CIB paid to a child" and that
"previously uncredited CIB payments can be retroactively credited against the obligor's
support arrears." But she argued that this court "has never authorized . . . an affirmative
recovery of support payments resulting from the crediting of CIB payments." Pamela
urged the superior court to conclude that "the overage resulting from the CIB payments
should not be credited against subsequent months to reduce [Mark's] future obligation"
and that "the overage does not create a right of recovery against [Pamela]."
Mark filed a reply brief and requested an evidentiary hearing. Mark
explained that he wished to call a CSSD representative to describe the mechanics of the
relevant administrative code - 15 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 125.475 - that
he argued "clearly sets out [his] right to recover his out of pocket additional child support
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payments." Pamela disagreed that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. The superior
court scheduled oral argument and explained that it expected argument on the legal
question of the "interpretation of the relevant code sections" pertaining to whether Mark
could recover the overpayment, "not presentation of evidence."
Mark moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court was overlooking
"theprincipleofjudicialdeferenceto agencyinterpretation and applicationofthestatutes
[the agency] operates under." Mark again requested an evidentiary hearing to present
his witness from CSSD. Pamela opposed, arguing that CSSD's "view of the matter"
should not be entitled deference and that whether Mark could recover the overpayment
was the court's decision. In January 2018 the court denied Mark's motion for
reconsideration, ruling that "[t]here is no ambiguity in 15 AAC 125.475 itself such that
the Court requires further evidence regarding CSSD's interpretation of the code."
After holdingoral argumentthecourt denied Mark'srequest forajudgment
for recovery of health insurance premiums and for recovery of his overpayment of child
support. The court directed CSSD to "withdraw from its accounting of the child support
account of [the daughter] the overpayment credit accorded to [Mark] that resulted
from . . . the crediting of the CIB payments received on behalf of the minor child." The
court ruled that CSSD should credit Mark for "ongoing CIB payments up to the amount
of [Mark's] monthly child support obligation." (Emphasis in original.) The court
explained that the majority approach of other state courts is not to allow recovery for past
child support overpayments created by duplicativechild support and CIBpayments. The
court also noted the "obvious concern surrounding an obligor parent building up a
support credit to then subsequently decline to provide support in reliance on the
overpayment, or to demand repayment." The court modified Mark's support obligation
to $1,221 per month going forward based on his then-current income and purchase of
health insurance for the daughter. It indicated that Mark "will only be responsible for
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paying the amount by which his obligation exceeds [the daughter's] CIBpayment." This
appeal followed.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question whether to allowreimbursement or credit for an overpayment
resulting from duplicative child support and CIB payments is a question of law we
review de novo.2
Our duty under this standard is "to adopt the rule of law that is most
3
persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy." "The proper method of calculating
4
child support is a question of law, which we review de novo . . . ."
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Determining That Mark Was Not
Entitled To Reimbursement Or Credit For Child Support
Overpayments.
The main question presented on appeal is whether Mark can recover
through reimbursement or credit against future payments a $47,432 child support
overpayment.5
As explained above, the superior court answered this question in the
2 See Hermosillo v. Hermosillo, 962 P.2d 891, 893 (Alaska 1998); Pacana
v. State of Alaska, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enf't Div., 941 P.2d 1263, 1264
(Alaska 1997).
3 Pacana, 941 P.2d at 1264 (quoting Barber v. Barber, 915 P.2d 1204, 1209
n.10 (Alaska 1996)).
4 Faulkner v. Goldfuss, 46 P.3d 993, 996 (Alaska 2002).
5 The superior court recalculated Mark's child support obligation as $1,221
per month. Mark did not appeal this recalculation. The practical effect of allowing Mark
to credit the $47,432 overpayment against future child support payments would be that
Pamela would receive only $1,052 monthly in CIB payments and the additional $169 of
Mark's monthly child support obligation ($1,221 minus $1,052 equals $169) would be
deducted from the $47,432 credit, resulting in Pamela not receiving the additional $169
each month.
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negative. The court directed CSSD to remove the credit from Mark's account and to
allow only future CIB payments to be credited against the child support obligation in the
month the CIB payment is received.
1. Pacana v. State
Mark contends that "[t]here is potentially a very simple resolution to this
6 and asserts that both parties and the superior court
appeal." He points to Pacana v. State
agreed below that Pacana answers the central question in this appeal. He argues that
under Pacana it has been "settled law in Alaska for at least twenty years that this type
of overpayment is recoverable." Mark says we need only look to Pacana to decide this
appeal, but in the alternative he argues that "persuasive caselaw, public policy, and
constitutional principles" support his position.
In Pacana we addressed "whether a parent can receive credit for CIB
payments made before the parent moves to modify child support."7 We observed that
the majority rule among other states is that "CIB payments made prior to a motion to
8 We adopted the majority rule,
modify are credited against child support obligations."
concluding that Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2), which restricts retroactive modification of
a child support order, allows "automatic credit against child support arrearage for CIB"
without first requiring the party to file a motion to modify.9 We explained that CIB
payments are different than most other nonconforming payments (i.e., voluntary
payments such as cash gifts to children) because they are "regular monthly payments and
6 941 P.2d 1263.
7 Id. at 1264.
8 Id. at 1265.
9
Id. at 1266.
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----------------------- Page 8-----------------------
the custodial parent is aware of them," and "they can [therefore] be credited against a
10
child support obligation."
We then addressed whether overpayments -resulting fromCIBpayments
and garnishments of Social Security disability income together totaling more than the
parent's monthly child support obligation - could be credited against child support
arrearages accrued after the children started receiving the CIB payments but before the
garnishments began.11 We concluded:
An overpayment issue is present here. It is the result
of [CSSD's] garnishments rather than any CIB payments that
exceed the support order. After approximately September
1993, [CSSD] was garnishing [obligor's] disability benefits
and his permanent fund dividend. Between the garnished
benefits and the CIB payments, [obligor] was effectively
paying his children more than $1,000per month, although the
support order awarded only $750. We conclude that
[obligor's] arrearage accruing after September 1993 should
be canceled. [Obligor's] overpayments after that date will
offset other [post-disability] arrearages.[12]
We also commented in dictum on what happens if the monthly CIB
payment alone exceeds the obligor's monthly child support obligation:
[Obligee] claims that the minority rule is more
equitable if monthly CIB payments exceed the awarded child
support. In this circumstance, obligor parents might wish to
credit the overpayment amount against a future support
obligation or force the custodial parent to repay this amount.
Nonetheless, most courts following the majority rule treat the
excess payment during the obligor's disability as a gratuity to
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1267.
12 Id.
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the children, so that the custodial parent does not owe the
[13]
obligor.
As explained above Mark argues that we need look only to Pacana to
decide this appeal in his favor, as he asserts the Pacana court determined that "an
overpayment resulting from combined 'normal' support payments and CIB payments is
not to be treated as a gratuity to the child." (Emphasis in original.) Mark's reading
misconstrues Pacana. In Pacana we addressed only whether overpayments resulting
from CIB payments plus "normal" support payments can be credited against arrearages.
We did not make a sweeping ruling as to whether overpayments resulting from CIB
payments plus "normal" support payments are a gratuity. While we chose not to treat
the overpayments as a gratuity in Pacana, there is reason to distinguish between
overpayments offsetting past arrearages, as was at issue in that case, and overpayments
serving as a basis for future credit or reimbursement, as is requested in this case. Pacana
therefore does not resolve the question presented by this appeal.
2. Cases from other states
Mark and Pamela cite various out-of-state cases to support their positions
on appeal. Mark argues that "the evolving national trend in this area is toward allowing
a trial court flexibility and discretion when ruling on support overpayment, rather than
constraining it with a more rigid approach that does not allow consideration of case-
specific factual and equitable factors." Mark urges us to adopt a discretionary approach
that allows the court to consider whether reimbursement or credit for overpayment is
warranted. Pamela counters that the majority view favors denying reimbursement and
that the recent trend towards reimbursement Mark points to is not as persuasive as he
claims, both because some of the cases he cites involve different factual situations and
13
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
because some of the cases involve courts interpreting statutes that affirmatively allow
reimbursement.
Many of the cases Mark and Pamela cite are not factually analogous to this
case, as they involve situations where the obligee parents received retroactive lump-sum
CIB payments because the obligor parents were approved for Social Security disability
14 The obligee's receipt of the lump-sum
benefits and were paid retroactive benefits.
payment effectively duplicated the months of child support the obligor had been paying
while the obligor's disability application was pending. These cases are distinguishable
because this case does not involvechild support payments madewhileanapplication was
pending. Instead, in this case the obligor was making child support payments while SSA
was providing CIB payments and the obligor did not realize that he was overpaying until
four years later.
This case is analogous to some out-of-state cases, a number of which
support the superior court's decision not to permit reimbursement of duplicative child
15 the Kansas
support and CIB payments. In In re Marriage of Stephenson & Papineau
16
Supreme Court discussed its prior holding in Andler v. Andler . The factual situation
in Andler was analogous to this case; Harold Andler was making monthly child-support
payments while the children were also receiving CIB payments due to his disability.17
The court explained that Harold "did not have an obligation to make an additional child-
14 See Hamilton v. Reynolds, 5 N.E.3d 1053, 1055 (Ohio App. 2013)
(involving retroactive lump-sum payment of benefits that duplicated already paid child
support monies); In re H.J.W. &M.E.W. , 302 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. App. 2009) (same);
Paulhe v. Riley , 722 N.W.2d 155, 157-58 (Wis. App. 2006) (same).
15 358 P.3d 86, 88-90 (Kan. 2015).
16 538 P.2d 649 (Kan. 1975).
17 Stephenson, 358 P.3d at 88.
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support payment each month beyond the [CIB] payment because the [CIB] payment
18
fulfilled his obligation in the same month the child-support obligation became due."
The court stated that "[t]he [CIB] payment satisfied the court's child support order,
meaning [Harold's] personal child-support payments were duplicative at the time he
made them - and thus these additional child-support payments were truly gratuitous."19
Accordingly, the court in Andler did not allow recovery of the duplicative gratuitous
payments, and the court in Stephenson reaffirmed this holding.20
In Department of Human Services v. Austin the obligor sought credit
against his child support arrearages for voluntary payments he made while his child was
also receiving CIB benefits.21 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held with little
explanation that the obligor "fail[ed] in his burden to prove equity entitles him to
additional credit by reimbursement for child support payments he voluntarily made
during the relevant time period of the child's receipt of [CIB payments]."22
In Wicker v. Hallman an obligor was overpaying his child support by $200
23 The
a month for seven years, the money being directly withheld from his paychecks.
Alabama Court of Appeals explained that its "review of decisions from other
jurisdictions indicates that the prevailing rule is that a parent who has voluntarily
18 Id. at 89.
19 Id.
20 Id. However, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to extend the holding to
child support payments made during the pendency of a Social Security disability
application. Id. at 89-90, 100.
21 232 P.3d 936, 938 (Okla. App. 2010).
22 Id. at 939 (emphasis in original).
23 245 So. 3d 627, 628-29 (Ala. App. 2017).
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exceeded the amount of payments owed on his or her child-support obligation is not
24
entitled to a credit or setoff against future child-support payments."
The father
25 He stated
contended that "he did not voluntarily overpay his child-support obligation."
26 But
that he believed the state was collecting the correct amount from his paychecks.
he also testified that he knew he was supposed to be paying only $900, that $1,100 was
being withheld from his checks, and that this went on for seven years.27 In denying his
request forreimbursement,thecourtexplained that "voluntary overpayments madeunder
a mistaken belief as to their legal consequences cannot be used as a credit against future
child-support payments."28
Some state courts have adopted a position contrary to that of the superior
court. In Rathbone v. Corse the Vermont Supreme Court allowed reimbursement when
the obligor made child-support payments during a period when the child was also
receiving CIB payments.29 The court explained that "[a]llowing reimbursement for
payments during the pendency of an application would encourage obligor parents to
30 The
continue support payments as they await the outcome of their SSDI applications."
court further reasonedthat "[t]heavailabilityofreimbursement for thesepaymentsdenies
24 Id. at 630.
25 Id. at 632.
26 Id. at 632-33.
27 Id. at 633.
28 Id.
29 124 A.3d 476, 482-83 (Vt. 2015).
30 Id. at 482.
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a shirking obligor the ability to use tomorrow's retroactive credit as a justification for not
meeting today's obligations." 31
In In re Marriage of Allen the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed whether
to apply credit for both a duplicative lump-sum CIB payment and duplicative monthly
CIB payments.32 The court looked to the Arizona Supreme Court Guidelines used to
determine the amount of child support appropriate in a given situation based on "all
relevant factors."33 In interpreting those guidelines, the court concluded that the trial
court's determination that the obligor should receive credit for duplicative monthly
payments was in line with the applicable guideline.34 The court remanded for the trial
court to issue a judgment and order for the obligor's repayment if the trial court made
requisite findings based on the consideration of "all relevant factors."35 Thus the court
allowed the trial court discretion in fashioning reimbursement or credit based on
applicable guidelines governing child support overpayments, but this result was based
on Arizona's Supreme Court Guidelines. We have not adopted similar guidelines for
Alaska.
In summary, many of the out-of-state cases cited by the parties are
distinguishablefromthis casebecausethey involved retroactivelump-sumpayments that
duplicatedchild-support payments madewhileadisability application was pending. The
reasoning and policy cited in those cases are thus of limited use in deciding this case.
31 Id. at 483.
32 386 P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Ariz. App. 2016).
33 Id. at 1289 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-320(D)).
34 Id. at 1291.
35 Id. at 1291-92.
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Of the factually analogous cases discussed above, we find those in support of the
superior court's ruling more persuasive. We agree that voluntary overpayments made
while SSA is making CIB payments cannot be used as a credit or setoff against future
child support payments and cannot be reimbursed. If a parent has no arrearages and
makes duplicative child support payments even after SSA begins making CIB payments,
we will treat those duplicative payments as a gratuity. Such overpayments may not be
recovered in the future.
3. Other Alaska cases
We observe some cases that we previously decided on different grounds
also support the general proposition that voluntary overpayments should not be
reimbursed or credited against future payments. In Epperson v. Epperson we held that
the obligor's "past voluntary contributions in excess of his support obligation [did] not
36
constitute good cause for reducing his future child support obligation."
And in Ruppe
v. Ruppe we cited Epperson and explained, "Even if [obligor] had paid [obligee] too
much during the interim period, it was error to credit any voluntary overpayment against
37 We referenced our previous holding that "it is contrary to the
his future obligations."
purpose of Civil Rule 90.3 to offset such contributions against future child support
payments except in exceptional circumstances."38
4. Public policy
Mark also argues that "sound public policy benefits result from declining
to treat [his] overpayment as a gratuity and rather allowing reimbursement."
36 835 P.2d 451, 453 (Alaska 1992).
37 358 P.3d 1284, 1292 (Alaska 2015).
38
Id. (quoting Epperson, 835 P.2d at 453).
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He cites the out-of-state cases involving retroactive lump-sum CIB payments in which
courts concluded that it is a perverse consequence "to encourage an obligor to withhold
direct support for several years, in order to create an arrearage against which derivative
benefits could later be credited, rather expressing a strong preference for continued
payment and later reimbursement." Mark's comparison is inapposite. This policy goal
is relevant when dealing with retroactive lump-sum CIB payments and the period an
obligor might wait for a Social Security disability application to be processed, but is
irrelevant when an obligor makes child support payments while the obligee also receives
monthly CIB payments that satisfy the obligor's obligation.
Pamela also makes policy arguments for why we should deny credit or
reimbursement. Pamela explains that "we should be hesitant to create a . . . rule that
strips the money from the child's household after the money has already been provided
for the child." She further asserts that "reimbursement could wreak havoc for the
custodial household where it is allowed for payments made months or years in the past,
when the CIB monies would likely have been long since budgeted and expended." We
find Pamela's arguments persuasive.
5. Conclusion
No Alaska statute or case law controls our resolution of this issue, and we
recognize that there are valid arguments on both sides. The question comes down to a
balancing of competing policies as articulated by out-of-state cases as well as the
superior court and parties. We determine that the policies articulated in In re Marriage
39 40
of Stephenson & Papineau and Wicker v. Hallman, as well as Pamela's articulated
policy argument, are more persuasive, and we conclude that it is more fair to allocate the
39 358 P.3d 86, 89-90 (Kan. 2015).
40 245 So. 3d 627, 628-29 (Ala. App. 2017).
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----------------------- Page 16-----------------------
risk of loss to Mark. He was the parent making the overpayments, and he had every
opportunity to notify CSSD. And, in agreement with the superior court, we are "further
mindful of obvious concern surrounding an obligor parent building up a support credit
to then subsequently decline to provide support in reliance on the overpayment, or to
demand repayment." Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's order regarding
overpayment.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Not Allowing Mark
Reimbursement Or Credit For 50% Of The Daughter's Health
Insurance Premiums.
Mark also argues that the superior court erred by refusing to order Pamela
to reimburse him for his $7,500 overpayment in health insurance premiums for covering
the daughter. The superior court ruled that Mark's claim for reimbursement for health
insurance premiums was barred by the law against retroactive modification of child
support; the court did adjust Mark's future support payments by deducting half the cost
of the health insurance he was purchasing. The court explained that because health
41
insurance offsets are part of child support,
Rule 90.3(h)(2)'s bar on retroactive
modification disallows Mark from receiving retroactive credit for the health insurance
42 The court found that Mark had not "notified CSSD of his
premiums he paid.
assumption of the child's health insurance cost at the time he commenced it in 2013."
The child support order states:
41 AS 25.27.900(12)(B)(ii) (" '[S]upport order' includes a judgment, decree,
or order . . . for any or all of the following . . . payment of health care costs or
maintenance of health insurance.").
42 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(h)(2) ("No Retroactive Modification. Child
support arrearage may not be modified retroactively, except as allowed by
AS 25.27.166(d) [disestablishment of paternity]."); Kyte v. Stallings, 334 P.3d 697, 699
(Alaska 2014) ("Alaska law prohibits retroactive modification of child support orders;
the parent's obligation can be changed only prospectively.").
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If there is no health care coverage for the child and insurance
becomes available to a parent at reasonable cost, that parent
must purchase the insurance after giving notice to the other
parent. The cost of the insurance must be divided between
the parents equally unless a different division of the cost is
ordered. Without further order of the court, the monthly
child support obligation will . . . decrease by 50% of the cost
of the insurance if the obligor purchases it, unless otherwise
ordered.
It is disputed whether Mark gave Pamela notice of his purchase of health insurance. If
Mark did give notice, then his child support obligation automatically decreased by half
of what he was paying for the insurance when he started purchasing it; no further court
action was necessary. His continued full payment would therefore have been a voluntary
overpayment which, as we discussed above, is not subject to reimbursement or credit.
The child support order does not address the situation in which Mark purchases
insurance without giving notice to Pamela. Notwithstanding, it would create perverse
incentives to deny reimbursement or credit if Mark did give notice, but to allow
reimbursement or credit if Mark failed to give notice; Mark would receive a preferable
outcome for failure to abide by the child support order's notice requirement. Despite the
ambiguity of the child support order, the outcome is not dependent on whether Mark
gave Pamela notice of the insurance purchase; either way he cannot receive
reimbursement or credit. We affirm the superior court's denial of any health insurance
premium reimbursement.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's order in all respects.
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