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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Thomas I. Anderson, Sr. v. State of Alaska, Alaska Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (4/19/2019) sp-7352

Thomas I. Anderson, Sr. v. State of Alaska, Alaska Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (4/19/2019) sp-7352

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THOMAS I. ANDERSON SR.,                           ) 

                                                  )   Supreme Court No. S-16872 

                       Appellant,                 ) 

                                                  )   Superior Court No. 3AN-17-06733 CI 

        v.                                        ) 

                                                  )   O P I N I O N 

STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT                       ) 

OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF                    )   No. 7352 - April  19, 2019 

MOTOR VEHICLES,                                   ) 


                       Appellee.                  ) 


               Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

               Judicial District, Anchorage, Erin B. Marston, Judge. 

               Appearances:  Thomas I. Anderson Sr., pro se, Anchorage, 

               Appellant.  Michael A. Stanker, Assistant Attorney General, 

               Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, 

               for Appellee. 

               Before:    Bolger,   Chief  Justice,  Winfree,   Stowers,  and 

               Maassen, Justices. [Carney, Justice, not participating.] 

               MAASSEN, Justice. 


               A  motorist  appeals  the  superior  court's  dismissal  of  his  claim  that  the 

Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) failed to properly transfer a motorcycle endorsement 

from his California driver's license to his new Alaska license in 1992.  The court decided 

that  the  motorist's  claim,  filed  in  2017,  was barred by  the  statute  of  limitations,  the 

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doctrines of laches and exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the governing DMV 

regulations.  The court also awarded the DMV attorney's fees calculated pursuant to the 

Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2) schedule.  The motorist appeals. 

               We affirm the superior court's decision primarily on laches grounds.  The 

motorist filed his claim 25 years after the DMV's alleged mistake, long past the time the 

DMV could reasonably be expected to have retained any evidence relevant to its defense.  

We also affirm the award of attorney's fees, which the motorist did not oppose in the 

superior court, because the scheduled award is not plainly erroneous. 


               This  case  was  decided  on  the  pleadings;  we  therefore  take  as  true  the 

following  allegations  of  the  complaint.1    Thomas  I.  Anderson  Sr.  completed  a 

"Motorcycle  Safety  Rider's  Course"  at  Fort  Ord,  California,  in  1983,  while  he  was 

serving in the military.  As a result he "[w]as certified through the Motorcycle Safety 

Foundation" and was "informed . . . that the certification was good in all 50" states.  He 

moved  to  Alaska  in  1987,  and  his  California  driver's  license,  with  its  motorcycle 

endorsement,  allowed  him  to  continue  operating  his  motorcycle  legally  on  Alaska's 

roads as long as he continued on active military duty.  

               Anderson was discharged in 1992 and acquired an Alaska driver's license.  

Although he did not notice at the time, his Alaska license "did not reflect the motorcycle 

endorsement that was on the California [l]icense," and the DMV failed to inform him that 

the endorsement was not transferred "or that there were other requirements to continue 

to operate his motorcycle on Alaska['s] highways and/or roads."  Anderson nonetheless 

continued    driving    his  motorcycle     until  2007,    when    he   registered    a  new 

       1       State  v.  Jennings,  555  P.2d  248,  251  (Alaska  1976)  ("In  reviewing  [a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings], all well-pleaded allegations of the non-moving 

party must be accepted as true."). 

                                              -2-                                          7352 

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"motorcycle/scooter" with the DMV and, at about the same time, learned that his license 


lacked a valid motorcycle endorsement.   When he asked for one, the DMV informed 

him that he needed first "to take a written and road test[] and complete a motorcycle 

safety rider's course."  Anderson took and passed the written test "involuntar[il]y" in 

2007, but since then he has declined to take the road test and safety course on the ground 

that  his  1983  training  in  California,  along  with  the  DMV's  failure  to  transfer  the 

California endorsement in  1992, entitles him to an Alaska endorsement without further 

proof of his competence.  Several times over the past decade he has asked the governor's 

office to help him resolve the matter, though without success.  

                On March 31, 2017, Anderson again renewed his driver's license and again 

asked  the  DMV  to  give  him  a  motorcycle  endorsement.    This  time  he  showed  a 

photocopy of his decades-old, expired California driver's license, but the DMV again 

"failed to reinstate" his motorcycle endorsement.   

                In May 2017, proceeding pro se, Anderson filed a complaint in which he 

"respectfully  ask[ed]  the  court  to  mandate  that  [the  DMV]  restore  [his]  motorcycle 

endorsement  .  .  .  as it  should have been  done" in  1992 when he  first  surrendered his 

California license in exchange for an Alaska one.  The DMV filed an answer and a few 

months later moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 12(c).  

The  DMV  argued  that  Anderson's  claim  accrued  in  1992, when  he  transferred  his 

license, and was now barred by a  10-year statute of limitations.  The DMV also argued 

that "forc[ing it] to address an alleged error that occurred decades ago" would violate due 

process, because "[t]he records related to this transaction are long gone and it would 

likely  be  impossible  to  reconstruct  what  occurred  through  witness  testimony."    The 

        2       Anderson  explained  at  oral  argument that he  discovered his  lack  of the 

proper endorsement not from the DMV but from a friend who looked at his license and 

saw that the endorsement was missing.    

                                                   -3-                                                7352 

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DMV  also  relied  on  the  doctrine  of  laches  and  Anderson's  failure  to  exhaust  his  

administrative remedies.  Finally, the DMV relied on its regulations to contend that it 


lacked authority to transfer an endorsement from a license that had expired so long ago.   

                 Anderson did not file an opposition to the motion, and the superior court 

granted it, relying "on the legal analysis in . . . the DMV's motion."  The court awarded 

the  DMV  attorney's  fees  of  $809.67  pursuant  to  the  schedule  of  Alaska  Civil  Rule 

82(b)(2) for cases resolved short of trial and without a money judgment.  

                 Anderson now appeals.  



                 "We review the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo."   

"The application of laches may raise three issues for review."5  The first - whether the 

equitable defense of laches may be applied to the plaintiff's claim - presents a question 


of  law  we  review  de  novo.     The  second  -  "whether  the  facts  demonstrate  an 

unreasonable delay and a resulting prejudice" - presents questions of fact we review 


for clear error.   And the third issue - whether, based on the facts, it was appropriate to 

apply the laches doctrine - is a question reserved to the superior court's discretion, and 

        3        2 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 90.420(j ) (2019) ("The department 

will waive the road test requirement  .  .  . for an applicant for . . . renewal of a driver's 

license if the (1) applicant previously possessed the same class of driver's license [from] 

. . . another state . . . and (2) driver's license was expired . . . less than five years from the 

current date of application.").  

        4        Cornelison v. TI G Ins., 376 P.3d  1255,  1267 (Alaska 2016). 

        5        Kollander v. Kollander, 322 P.3d 897, 902 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Burke 

v. Maka, 296 P.3d 976, 979 (Alaska 2013)). 

        6        Id. 

        7        Id. (quoting Burke, 296 P.3d at 979). 

                                                     -4-                                                 7352 

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we review it to determine whether that discretion has been abused.   "The trial court has 

broad discretion to sustain or deny a defense based on laches."9 

                The interpretation of a regulation is a question we review de novo.10  We 

review  issues  not  properly  raised  in  the  trial  court  for  plain  error.11    "A  plain  error 

involves an 'obvious mistake' that is 'obviously prejudicial.' "12 


        A.      The  Superior  Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Applying  The 

                Laches Defense To Anderson's Claim For Injunctive Relief. 

                The specific relief Anderson seeks by his complaint is a "mandate that the 

Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles restore [his] motorcycle endorsement . . . as it should 

have been done at the time of [transference], at no cost to [him]."  Traditionally, a suit 

asking the court to order a government official to act in a certain way is an action for 

mandamus.13  The writ of mandamus was abolished in Alaska many decades ago by court 

rule, but the type of relief once provided by the writ may still be "obtained by appropriate 

        8       Id. at 903. 

        9       Keener v. State, 889 P.2d  1063,  1066 (Alaska  1995). 

        10      Pease-Madore v. State, Dep 't of  Corr., 4 14 P.3d 671, 674 (Alaska 2018). 

        11      Riddle v. Lanser, 42 1 P.3d 35, 52 (Alaska 2018). 

        12      In  re  Hosp italization  of   Gabriel  C.,  324  P.3d  835,  838  (Alaska  2014) 

(quoting Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 773 (Alaska 2011), overruled on other grounds 

by In re Hosp italization of  Naomi B., ___ P.3d ___ (Alaska 2019)). 

        13      See Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587, 587 (Alaska 1965) (characterizing an 

action "which  sought to require the  Secretary of  State to order a recount of the votes 

which  had  been  cast"  in  a  particular  election  district  as  an  action  "in  the  nature  of 

mandamus"); Mandamus, BRYAN A.  GARNER,  DICTIONARY  OF LEGAL USAGE  (3d ed. 

2011) (identifying mandamus as a writ issued by "a superior court . . . to compel a lower 

court  or  a  government  officer  to  perform  mandatory  or  purely  ministerial  duties 


                                                   -5-                                               7352 

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action  or  by  appropriate  motion  under  the  practice  prescribed  in"  the  Alaska  Civil 


Rules.    One appropriate action in the nature of mandamus that is recognized by the 

Civil Rules is an action for a mandatory or reparative injunction.15  Claims for injunctive 

relief are equitable in nature,16 and the equitable doctrine of laches is therefore available 

as a defense to them.17 

                 The defense of laches requires that the defendant "show two 'independent' 

elements":  "(1) that the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in bringing the action, and 

         14      Alaska R. Civ. P. 91(b); see  Wade, 407 P.2d at 587 n.1 (citing rule). 

         15      See  Alaska  R.  Civ.  P.   65  (establishing  procedure  for  issuance  of 

injunctions).  A "mandatory injunction 'orders an affirmative act or mandates a specified 

course of conduct.' "  Cook Inlet Fisherman 's Fund v. State, Dep 't of  Fish & Game, 357 

P.3d  789,  794  n.11  (Alaska  2015)  (quoting  Mandatory  Inj unction,  BLACK 'S  LAW 

DICTIONARY  (10th  ed.  2014)).   "A  reparative  injunction  is  an  equitable  remedy  that 

'order[s] defendants not only to refrain from engaging in wrongful conduct in the future, 

but also to take actions that alleviate some of the harm caused by their past conduct."  

Carlson v. Renkes, 113 P.3d 638, 640 n.2 (Alaska 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Rhonda  Wasserman,  Equity  Transf ormed:  Preliminary  Inj unctions  to  Require  the 

Payment of  Money , 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 630 n.23 (1990)).  See Miguel v. McCarl, 291 

U.S. 442, 452 (1934) (holding that a request for retirement pay via mandatory injunction 

was "in effect equivalent to a writ of mandamus, and governed by like considerations"); 

Fallini v. Hodel, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986) ("When the effect of a mandatory 

injunction  is  equivalent  to  the  issuance  of  mandamus  it  is  governed  by  similar 


         16      See State  v. First Nat 'l Bank  of  Anchorage,  660 P.2d 406, 424  (Alaska 

1982) (holding that defendant was not entitled to jury trial because the right does not 

apply  "[w]hen  only  equitable  relief  is  sought,"  and  "the  State  sought injunctive  and 

restitutory relief only");  Calista  Corp . v. DeYoung, 562 P.2d 338, 339 (Alaska  1977) 

(stating that  "[t]his  is  an  equitable  action  in  the nature  of  a  complaint  for injunctive 


         17      City  & Borough  of  Juneau  v. Breck,  706  P.2d  313,  317  (Alaska  1985) 

(holding "that the equitable defense of laches is a bar to [plaintiff's] claims of injunctive 


                                                     -6-                                                 7352 

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(2) that this unreasonable delay has caused undue harm or prejudice to the defendant."18  

Both  elements  are  plainly  met  in  this  case  on  the  undisputed  facts.    The  crux  of 

Anderson's  complaint  is  that  the  DMV  acted  unlawfully  in  1992,  when  it  failed  to 

transfer  the  motorcycle  endorsement  from  his  California  license  to  his  replacement 

Alaska  license.    He  claims  he  was  surprised  15  years  later  when,  in  2007,  a  friend 

informed him that his license lacked the proper  endorsement.  Even  assuming it was 

reasonable  for  Anderson  to  be  unaware  of  this  himself  for  15  years,19  it  was  not 

reasonable for him to wait yet another ten years to file suit complaining of alleged DMV 

misfeasance that by then was 25 years in the past.  Many courts have found delays of this 

length and even much shorter to be unreasonable as a matter of law for laches purposes.20 

        18     Id. at 315 (citing Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8,  15 (Alaska  1976)). 

        19     See Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250, 263 (Alaska 1971) ("It is both just and 

accurate  to presume  that  all reasonable  drivers  know  and  obey  the  law."); Santos  v. 

District of  Columbia, 940 A.2d 113, 117 (D.C. App. 2007) ("Driver's licensing schemes 

are ubiquitous and familiar to all motorists, and compliance with their requirements is 

not  onerous.");  State  v.  DeJesus,  347  N.W.2d  111,  115  (Neb.  1984)  (stating  that 

defendant "is presumed to know the requirements of" state statutes regarding driver's 


        20     See,  e.g.,  EEOC  v.  Prop ak  Logistics,  Inc.,  884  F.  Supp.  2d  433,  443 

(W.D.N.C.  2012)  (holding that  EEOC's  seven-year  delay  in pursuing  discrimination 

claim against employer was unreasonable as matter of law); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, 

Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("We find that Hot Wax's twenty-year 

delay [in filing false advertising claim against competitor] is unreasonable as a matter of 

law."); Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Int 'l, Ltd., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7 13, 726 (Cal. 

App. 2007) (holding that ten-year delay in pursuing trade dress infringement claim was 

unreasonable as a matter of law); In re First Bap tist Church of   Webster, 283 P.2d 503, 

505 (Kan.  1955) (finding that 23-year delay in church hierarchy's suit to dissolve local 

church was unreasonable as matter of law); Town of  Brewster v. Sherwood Forest Realty, 

Inc., 778 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Mass. App. 2002) ("Whether the owner delayed unreasonably 

in seeking to vacate a foreclosure decree after learning of its entry is a question of fact, 

but we agree with the judge that the twenty-three year delay here - a time longer than 


                                               -7-                                            7352 

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               Prejudice is also apparent on the undisputed facts.  As the DMV points out, 

its  document retention policy is required by  statute  and  set  out in regulation, 2 AAC 

90.475.    The  regulation  requires  that  records  of  non-commercial  driver's  license 

applications, denials, suspensions, revocations, cancellations, and disqualifications "will 

be  retained  by  the  department  for  a  period  of  15  years  following  the  entry  into  the 

department's database," after which the DMV "will destroy" the records "with no further 

activity"  pursuant  to  the  public  records  maintenance  requirements  of  AS  40.21.21  

Anderson has not disputed - either here or in the superior court - the DMV's claim 

that it would no longer have records of a  1992 licensure.  And we agree with the DMV 

that  it  is  highly  unlikely  to  find  witnesses  who,  especially  in  the  absence  of  any 

documentary record, can testify about the circumstances of Anderson's 1992 application.  

               We have approved use of the laches doctrine in circumstances where the 

delay was less obviously unreasonable and prejudicial.  In Kollander v. Kollander we 

reviewed a superior court's finding that a former wife unreasonably delayed in bringing 

a  claim  for pension  benefits  under  a  1992  qualified  domestic  relations  order.22    The 

pension administrator had paid the former wife her "share of her former spouse's pension 

        20     (...continued) 

the statute of limitations for recovery of land - was unreasonable delay as a matter of 

law.");  Christian  v.  Christian,  985  S.W.2d  513,  515  (Tex.  App.  1998)  (holding  that 

where divorced  spouse "made no effort to prosecute her contempt motion" for "over 

thirteen years," the delay was "unreasonable as a matter of law, and the trial court had 

no discretion to conclude otherwise"). 

        21     See also 4 AAC 59.015(a) (2016) (requiring every state agency to "prepare 

a records retention schedule for all agency records and submit the schedule to the state 

archivist"); AS 40.2 1.030(b)(11) (requiring state archivist to "receive records retention 

schedules  from the  agencies  and  submit them to the  attorney  general  for review  and 


        22     322 P.3d 897, 899 (Alaska 2014). 

                                                -8-                                            7352 

----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

in accelerated lump sum payments from 2007 to 2008," but in 2012 she brought a claim 


asserting that she was entitled to lifetime monthly payments instead.    The superior court 

found that her claim was barred by laches, and we affirmed.24  With regard to the element 

of unreasonable delay, we noted that the former wife had received a letter explaining the 

accelerated payout  in  2007, had  accepted payments  thereafter,  and yet had  taken no 

action   for   five  years   "other   than   attempted   communication  with   [the  pension 

administrator] and consultation with several attorneys, none of whom took any action on 

her behalf."25  As for prejudice, we affirmed the trial court's finding based primarily on 

the "dissipation and reasonably expected loss of evidentiary materials" over the years 

since the parties' property division.26 

                 In Laverty  v. Alaska Railroad  Corp .,  we  reviewed  the  superior  court's 

decision to apply laches to a citizen-taxpayer's suit to enj oin enforcement of a contract 

for the extraction of gravel near a residential neighborhood.27  The citizen-taxpayer filed 

suit a little over a year after learning of the contract, but we noted that he had exhausted 

his  "attempts to resolve his  grievances without  litigation  .  .  . more than  four months 

before he brought suit" and in the meantime knew that the contractor "had undertaken 

an expensive rezoning and conditional use permit application process."28  We concluded 

that under the circumstances we were "left with no definite and firm conviction that the 

        23       Id. 

        24       Id. at 899, 906. 

        25       Id. at 904. 

        26       Id. at 905. 

        27       13 P.3d 725, 727-28 (Alaska 2000). 

        28       Id. at 729. 

                                                     -9-                                                 7352 

----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

superior court abused its discretion in applying laches as a defense to  [the plaintiff's] 

request to enj oin performance of the gravel contract."29   

                We conclude that, on the undisputed facts, the superior court did not abuse 

its discretion by applying the doctrine of laches to bar Anderson's claim that the DMV 

acted improperly in  1992 when it allegedly failed to transfer his California motorcycle 

endorsement to his Alaska license. 

        B.      The  DMV's  Regulations  Did  Not  Require  It  To  Issue  Anderson  A 

                Motorcycle Endorsement In 2007 Or 2017. 

                Anderson appears to allege that the DMV compounded its 1992 mistake on 

two  subsequent  occasions:   in  2007, when  it  "allowed  [Anderson's] registration  and 

collection   of   fees   for   a   motorcycle/scooter"   while   denying   him   a   motorcycle 

endorsement; and again in 2017, when it once more refused to issue the endorsement 

despite the fact that Anderson showed DMV personnel a photocopy of the California 

driver's license he had surrendered in  1992.  But the action Anderson demanded of the 


DMV was not required by its governing regulations. 

                First,  the  regulations  do  not  provide  for  transfer  of  an  out-of-state 

motorcycle endorsement that expired many years ago.  Renewal of expired endorsements 

does  not  appear  to  be  separately  addressed,  but  2  AAC  90.420(h)  provides  that  the 

"renewal of a license that has expired for more than one year" (emphasis added) must 

involve a road test "[u]nless the applicant is eligible for a waiver under (j ), (l), or (n) of 

this section."  Subsection (j ) - the only one of the three waiver sections relevant here31 

        29      Id. 

        30      Anderson does not challenge the regulations' validity, arguing instead that 

the DMV failed to comply with them.  

        31      Subsection (l) applies to an applicant for "a Class R license" (for operating 

ATVs  and  snowmachines),  see  2  AAC  90.2 10(b)(2)(G)  (2019),  and  subsection  (n) 


                                                  -10-                                               7352 

----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

- allows waiver of the road test only if the applicant's driver's license expired "less than 

five years from the current date of application."  As of 2007, when Anderson first sought 

waiver  of the road test, his motorcycle  endorsement had been  expired  for  at  least  15 


               Second, while the regulations do provide for waiver of the motorcycle skills 

test in some circumstances, they do not require it here.  2 AAC 90.420(k) provides that 

the  DMV  "may waive the motorcycle  skills test  for  an  applicant who  submits to the 

department  proof  of  the  applicant's  successful  completion  of  a  Motorcycle  Safety 

Foundation Course or another motorcycle  safety program or course acceptable to the 

department."    "[T]he  term   'may'  generally  denotes  permissive  or  discretionary 

authority."32  The DMV's regulations do not further define the limits to its discretion, but 

its manual informs the public that waiver based on a safety course completion certificate 

"is valid to waive the road test for one year."33  According to Anderson, he completed 

his safety course in  1983, 24 years before he asked the DMV to give him credit for it.  

The DMV's refusal to do so is consistent with its regulatory authority, as well as with the 

       31      (...continued) 

applies to an applicant "with military commercial motor vehicle experience who seeks 

a commercial driver's license."  

       32      Garrison  v.  Dixon,  19  P.3d  1229,  1236  (Alaska  2001)  (alteration  in 

original) (quoting Gerber v. Juneau Bartlett Mem 'l Hosp ., 2 P.3d 74, 76 (Alaska 2000)). 


OPERATOR MANUAL ii (2015),; see also 

Motorcy cle License, DEP 'T OF ADMIN ., (last 

visited Feb. 28, 2019) ("An applicant for an M1, M2, or M3 license may have the written 

and road testing requirements waived by completing a Motorcycle Safety Foundation 

course and presenting the completion certificate to the DMV.  The certificate is valid to 

waive the test for the current or previous calendar year.").  

                                             -11-                                          7352 

----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

State's  "compelling  interest  in  maintaining  highway  safety  by  ensuring  that  only 

qualified drivers operate motor vehicles."34 

                 We conclude that, in light of the DMV's governing regulations, the superior 

court did not err by dismissing Anderson's claims based on his 2007 and 2017 requests 

that the DMV transfer his long-expired California motorcycle endorsement.   

        C.       There Is No Plain Error In The Superior Court's Award Of Attorney's 

                 Fees Pursuant To The Rule 82(b)(2) Schedule.  

                 Finally, Anderson challenges the superior court's award of attorney's fees, 

arguing that he cannot afford to pay them.  He did not oppose the DMV's attorney's fees 


motion in the superior court, however, so we review his challenge only for plain error. 

                Alaska  Civil  Rule  82(b)(2) provides  that  for  cases  involving no  money 

judgment  and resolved  short  of  trial,  "the  court  shall  award  the prevailing party  .  .  . 

20 percent of its actual attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred."  The superior 

court adhered to the schedule in this case when it awarded the DMV $809.67, calculated 

as 20 percent of the DMV's reasonable and actual attorney's fees.  We have repeatedly 

held that "awards of attorney's fees made pursuant to the schedule set out in Rule 82 are 

presumptively correct, and the superior court need not make any findings in support of 

the award."36  Besides citing his alleged inability to pay - which he did not argue below 

and was therefore never developed as a factual matter - Anderson does not explain how 

the court abused its discretion.  We see no plain error in the presumptively correct award. 

        34      State v.  Terry ,  179 A.3d  378,  387  (N.J. 2018); see State v. Arnold,  379 

N.W.2d  322,  324  (S.D.  1986)  ("We  find  the  state  driving  licensure  requirement  to 

achieve  the  compelling  state  interests  of  maintaining,  protecting,  and  regulating  the 

public safety, the use of its public thoroughfares, and those who drive thereon, and to be 

the least restrictive means for so doing."). 

        35      See Lord v.  Wilcox, 813 P.2d 656, 660 (Alaska  1991). 

        36       Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 2 1, 4 1 (Alaska 2014). 

                                                   -12-                                               7352 

----------------------- Page 13-----------------------


            The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 

                                     -13-                                  7352 

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