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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Daggett v. Feeney (6/16/2017) sp-7179
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
JAMES WILLIAM DAGGETT and )
NADIA TORA DAGGETT, )
) Supreme Court Nos. S-15799/15819
Appellants and )
Cross-Appellees, )
) Superior Court No. 3HO-11-00359 CI
v. )
)
O P I N I O N
RICHARD L. FEENEY, )
) No. 7179 - June 16, 2017
Appellee and )
Cross-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Homer, Charles T. Huguelet, Judge.
Appearances: James William Daggett and Nadia Tora
Daggett, pro se, Anchorage, Appellants. Lindsay Wolter,
Homer, for Appellee.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger,
and Carney, Justices.
CARNEY, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A property owner cancelled a contract to install a wind turbine on his
property and sued the contractor to recover his down payment. The contractor filed a
counterclaim for breach of contract. The superior court concluded that the contractor
was required to be licensed by the State and had misrepresented its licensing status. It
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
also concluded that the contractor could not maintain the counterclaim because the
contractor was unregistered. The court ordered the contract rescinded and the contractor
to return the down payment less a setoff covering costs incurred in the transaction. The
contractor failed to pay and the court amended the judgment to include the contractor's
individual owners and a successor company. The contractor's individual owners appeal
the licensing determination and the amended judgment. The property owner cross-
appeals the setoff calculation. We conclude that the court erred only in its setoff
calculation.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
This case involves a cancelled contract between Richard Feeney and
Alaskan Wind Industries (AWI), a renewable energy contractor, for the sale and
installation of a wind turbine on Feeney's property in Homer. AWI was the trade name
for Daggett LLC, owned by James and Nadia Daggett. The Daggetts owned several
similarly named organizations, as well as Standard Steel, Inc.
Feeney and his wife, Elizabeth Bashaw, began discussing the purchase of
a wind turbine with AWI representatives in the summer of 2009. In these discussions
AWI was often represented by sales representative Erik Schreier and occasionally by
Nadia Daggett. The parties dispute whether Schreier told Feeney and Bashaw that AWI
1 and bonded as a steel erection contractor and whether Schreier promised
was licensed
to make sure neighboring landowners would not oppose the turbine's installation. But
the parties agree that they discussed AWI's successful installation of another turbine in
the same area without opposition from neighboring landowners.
1 Theparties and thesuperior courtfrequentlyusedtheterm"license"to refer
to registration under AS 08.18.011-.061.
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The parties ultimately signed a contract in October 2010, with Schreier
signing on behalf of AWI. The contract was on AWI letterhead and did not mention
Daggett LLC. It required AWI to provide and install a wind turbine, a 49-foot tower,
and an inverter. The contract expressly affirmed that AWI was "qualified by law as a
licensed steel erector in the state of Alaska" and allocated to Feeney the responsibility
for "meet[ing] all builders['] permit requirements, variances, [and] height restriction
waivers."
Bashaw paid the 60% down payment of $32,880 immediately after the
contract was signed. AWI then ordered the wind turbine from a California-based
supplier and had it shipped to Alaska. AWI began digging the turbine's foundation in
November 2010. The work was soon stopped by Bashaw because a neighbor was
concerned that the 49-foot turbine would violate a subdivision land-use covenant. AWI
agreed that Feeney and Bashaw could take a few months to resolve the conflict with their
neighbor.
In late November the neighbor formally notified Feeney and Bashaw of a
land-use covenant that prohibited structures over 35 feet tall in the subdivision and
threatened legal action if the project moved forward. In December Bashaw emailed
Nadia Daggett saying, "We need to get this contract cancelled as soon as possible,
especially since it is illegal and you were aware that was so when it was signed." Despite
discussions during the first half of 2011 to try to reach a mutually agreeable solution
regarding contract cancellation and refund, the parties were unable to reach an
agreement.
B. Proceedings
Feeney filed suit in early December 2011, naming AWI, James Daggett,
and Nadia Daggett as the defendants. Feeney alleged that AWI and its representatives
had "assured" him that they were familiar with the subdivision covenants, that the wind
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----------------------- Page 4-----------------------
turbine would not violate them, and that AWI would check with Feeney's neighbors to
make sure they did not object to the turbine. Feeney asked the court to rescind the
contract and order the return of his down payment, "less any offset which the court
deems appropriate"; he also requested an accounting to determine the offset amount.
AWI's answer admitted that it had entered into a contract with Feeney and
asserted wrongful rejection of the turbine delivery as an affirmative defense. AWI also
filed a counterclaim, alleging that Feeney had materially breached the contract by
refusing to accept full performance and pay the full price for the turbine. James and
Nadia Daggett filed separate answers raising affirmative defenses that they were not
party to the contract between Feeney and AWI and were not liable to Feeney under
2
AS 10.50.265, which limits LLC members' liability to third parties.
Feeney replied to AWI's counterclaim and amended his complaint seeking
to pierce the corporate veil and reach the Daggetts personally because of some confusion
3 Feeney expanded his claim for contract
about the Daggetts' various corporate entities.
rescission, alleging that rescission was justified because "AWI was not registered as a
general or specialty contractor with the State of Alaska" when it entered the contract, as
required by state law. Having discovered that AWI was no longer a registered business
and that the Daggetts had set up a new entity under the name Standard Steel, Inc., Feeney
also sought to add Standard Steel as a defendant.
2 AS 10.50.265 provides that "[a] person who is a member of a limited
liability company or a foreign limited liability company is not liable, solely by reason of
being a member, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in another manner, for
a liability of the company to a third party."
3 Because the superior court ultimately concluded that the correct entity was
Daggett LLC d/b/a Alaskan Wind Industries, we use that name throughout.
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----------------------- Page 5-----------------------
A two-day bench trial took place in Homer in November 2012. Feeney
testified that he had specifically asked Schreier whether AWI was a licensed and bonded
contractor and that Schreier had affirmed AWI was licensed and bonded. Feeney
explained that this information was important to him in deciding to purchase the wind
turbine. Schreier testified that Feeney had never asked about AWI's licensing status.
Nadia Daggett testified that she and James had believed wind energy
installers were not required to be licensed as construction contractors at the time of the
contract with Feeney. She stated that "[i]t was industry standard" not to carry a license
at the time and claimed that none of AWI's competitors had done so. Nadia also testified
that she had contacted the State and had been told there was no North American Industry
4 code for renewable energy installers. She further
Classification System (NAICS)
testified that in late 2010 a state licensing inspector had told them that renewable energy
contractors would be required to be licensed beginning in 2011.
The superior court issued a written opinion in favor of Feeney in July 2013.
The court decided that Feeney was entitled to rescission on the ground of
misrepresentation5 because AWI had misrepresented its licensing status, noting that "the
4 AS 43.70.020(a)(2) requires business licenses to include the lines of
business to be conducted, and the State uses some NAICS codes to determine lines of
business for this purpose. What is "Line of Business" or "LOB"? and "What is
"NAICS"?, in Line of Business/Alaska NAICS Code , D EP 'T OF COMMERCE, C MTY., AND
E C O N . DE V ., DI V . O F C O R P S ., BU S . & PR O F 'L L I C E N S I N G ,
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/cbpl/BusinessLicensing/AKLOBandNAICS.aspx
(last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
5 See Foster v. Cross , 650 P.2d 406, 409 (Alaska 1982) (holding that, to void
a contract, a party must show that the other party "made a false representation of material
fact which was actually and justifiably relied upon" (first citing Cousineau v. Walker ,
613 P.2d 608, 612 (Alaska 1980); then citing Halpert v. Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730, 733
ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (A M. L AW
(1970); and then citing R
(continued...)
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----------------------- Page 6-----------------------
[c]ontract itself expressly establishe[d] that '[AWI was] qualified by law as a licensed
steel erector in the State of Alaska.' " The court concluded that wind energy installers
were required to be licensed as steel erection contractors because tower-mounted wind
6 adopted pursuant to
turbines qualify as "steel towers and pylons" under regulations
AS 08.18.0137 and AS 08.18.024.8 And the court found that AWI had been "neither
licensed nor bonded as a 'steel erection contractor' " when the contract was executed.
The superior court noted that there was "evidence to suggest" that AWI had
known it needed to be licensed because it had previously held a specialty contractor
license which expired in 2009, before execution of the contract. The court found AWI's
representation of its licensing status to be a misrepresentation of a material fact, and it
pointed to Feeney's testimony that he would not have entered into the contract without
it. The court therefore concluded that Feeney was entitled to rescission of the contract
based on AWI's misrepresentation of its non-licensed status because he " 'actually and
9 The court
justifiably relied upon' a 'false representation of a material fact.' "
accordingly ruled that Feeney was entitled to reimbursement of his down payment.
But the superior court noted that Feeney's position on the issue of licensing
appeared "pretextual." It believed Feeney had "unilaterally cancelled" the contract to
5 (...continued)
INST . 1981))).
6 See 12 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 21.510(a)(3) (2012).
7 AS 08.18.013 authorizes regulations that categorize and require the
registration of contractors.
8 AS 08.18.024 describes specialty contractors.
9 See Foster, 650 P.2d at 409 (citing Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 612; Halpert,
267 A.2d at 733; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1)).
-6- 7179
----------------------- Page 7-----------------------
avoid the threatened suit from his neighbor and doubted he would have objected to
AWI's non-licensed status without that threat. The court suggested it would take this
into account as an equitable consideration in determining AWI's recovery amount.
The superior court also addressed AWI's counterclaim for breach of
contract. Although it was "inclined to entertain the merits" of AWI's counterclaim
because Feeney's termination of the contract was "suspect," the court concluded that the
counterclaim was barred by AS 08.18.151, which provides that a contractor "may not
bring an action . . . for breach of a contract for which registration is required" unless the
contractor can show it "was a registered contractor . . . at the time of contracting."
Having already decided AWI was required to be licensed as a steel erection contractor
and was not licensed at the time of the contract, the superior court concluded AWI was
barred from bringing the counterclaim. The court rejected the Daggetts' argument that
AWI was exemptfromAS08.18.151 under the"finishedproducts"exemptionexpressed
in AS 08.18.161(5), because the wind turbine "bec[a]me a permanent, fixed part of a
structure" and was not a finished product as contemplated in the exemption.
Nonethelessthesuperiorcourtexplainedthat even an unlicensed contractor
may recover "any sums which may be equitably due [it]" through a setoff against the
damages to be paid. It relied on Sumner Development Corp. v. Shivers , in which we held
that a setoff against the plaintiff's recovery is appropriate if a contract has been partially
performed and the plaintiff would receive a windfall from retaining the benefit of the
10 Here the court
partially performed work in addition to receiving contract damages.
allowed a setoff because Feeney was "not without unclean hands" and "AWI suffered
substantial financial loss as a result of" Feeney's cancelling the contract.
10
517 P.2d 757, 765-66 (Alaska 1974) (quoting S & Q Constr. Co. v. Palma
Ceia Dev. Org., 3 Cal. Rptr. 690, 692 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
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----------------------- Page 8-----------------------
The superior court determined that AWI was entitled to a setoff for any
resale costs, out-of-pocket costs, and incidental costs it had incurred in partially
performing the contract. It did not award a setoff for resale costs because it calculated
that AWI had not lost money on resale but instead made a small profit. The court
awarded out-of-pocket expenses that were incurred following execution of the contract,
which included commissions, the cost of shipping the turbine to Alaska, and the
materials, equipment, and labor used to begin creating the foundation. The court also
awarded certain incidental expenses mainly related to moving the turbine to its new
purchaser. The total setoff was $9,609.06.
The superior court expressly withheld judgment on the question whether
Feeney could seek recovery of his down payment from anyone other than AWI. But the
court concluded that if Feeney was not able to recover his reimbursement from AWI, it
would "consider whether Defendants James and Nadia Daggett, or any entity registered
to them or otherwise owned by them, should be held liable."
In December 2013 the superior court issued a final judgment awarding
Feeney$23,270.94 indamages (theamount ofthedown payment minus AWI's equitable
setoff), plus pre- and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees, and court costs, for a total
of $36,010.15. The court authorized Feeney to seek to amend the judgment to permit
recovery from the other defendants if AWI failed to satisfy the judgment within 90 days,
suspending the ordinary timeline established by Alaska Civil Rule 59(f) and allowing
Feeney to file within 120 days of the entry of judgment.
When AWI did not satisfy the judgment within 90 days, Feeney filed a
motion to amend the final judgment, naming James Daggett, Nadia Daggett, and
Standard Steel as additional defendants. The Daggetts objected to both their individual
liability and that of Standard Steel. They also opposed the superior court's decision to
allow Feeney to move to amend after the Civil Rule 59(f) time limit had expired.
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----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
The superior court issued an amended final judgment in December 2014.
The court found that the "primary contractor entity" Feeney had contracted with was
Daggett LLC d/b/a AWI, but that Feeney had not had notice that Daggett LLC was the
principal because the contract named only AWI and "did not disclose the existence of"
Daggett LLC. And the court explained that because the contract only used the AWI
trade name, Feeney was not given notice that he was contracting with a limited-liability
entity. The court therefore concluded that James and Nadia Daggett were personally
liable to Feeney as agents of an undisclosed principal on the contract, with Erik Schreier
11
acting as their subagent.
The superior court also concluded that Standard Steel was liable to Feeney
as AWI's successor under the "mere continuation" and "continuity of enterprise"
12
exceptions to the general rule that a corporation is not liable for its predecessor's acts.
The court found that Standard Steel was "simply a change in name and corporate form"
from Daggett LLC, noting that Standard Steel continued the LLC's renewable energy
and wind turbine installation business at the same address and website; that "[t]he
Daggetts remained the sole stockholders and officers of the new entity"; and that the new
entity did business as "Alaska's Wind Industries," a "negligible change" from its
previous name. The court thus concluded that Standard Steel was liable to Feeney as the
successor to AWI.
11 See Jensen v. Alaska Valuation Serv., Inc. , 688 P.2d 161, 163 (Alaska
1984) ("An agent who makes a contract for an undisclosed or partially disclosed
principal will be liable as a party to the contract." (citing R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, §§ 321, 322 (A M. L AW INST . 1958))).
12 Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co. , 18 P.3d 49, 55-56 (Alaska 2001)
(explaining doctrine of successor liability).
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----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
James and NadiaDaggett representthemselvesin thisappealofthesuperior
court's initial decision issued in July 2013, the final judgment issued in December 2013,
and the amended final judgment issued in December 2014. They contest multiple
elements of these rulings. Feeney cross-appeals the court's determination of AWI's
setoff amount.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Interpretation of a statute is a question of law to which we apply our
independent judgment; we interpret the statute according to reason, practicality, and
common sense, considering the meaning of the statute's language, its legislative history,
13
and its purpose."
For mixed questions of law and fact, including applications of agency
14 15
law, we review legal questions de novo and review factual findings for clear error.
"A fact finding is not clearly erroneous unless the reviewing court has a definite and firm
16
conviction that a mistake has been made."
"We review the grant of an equitable remedy . . . for abuse of discretion,
but we review de novo any underlying questions of law and the application of law to
facts."17
13 Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage , 333 P.3d 5, 11 (Alaska 2014)
(citing Grimm v. Wagoner , 77 P.3d 423, 427 (Alaska 2003)).
14 See Foster v. Cross, 650 P.2d 406, 408 (Alaska 1982).
15 Diblik v. Marcy, 166 P.3d 23, 25 (Alaska 2007) (first citing Forshee v.
Forshee, 145 P.3d 492, 497 (Alaska 2006); then citing Keturi v. Keturi, 84 P.3d 408, 412
(Alaska 2004)).
16 Id. at 25-26 (citing Keturi, 84 P.3d at 412).
17 In re Estate of Fields, 219 P.3d 995, 1002 (Alaska 2009), as modified on
denial of reh'g (Dec. 16, 2009) (citing Riddell v. Edwards, 76 P.3d 847, 852 (Alaska
(continued...)
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Whether a party has standing to assert a given claim is a question of law
that we review de novo. 18
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Concluding That AWI Was
Required To Be Registered As A Specialty Contractor.
TheDaggetts arguethat thesuperior courtwas wrongto concludeAWI was
required to be registered as a specialty steel erection contractor, asserting that AWI was
exempted by an express exception covering contractors who install "finished products."
Feeney counters that wind turbine installation does not fall under the finished products
exemption. We conclude that the superior court correctly interpreted the statute and
regulations.19
17 (...continued)
2003)).
18 Keller v. French , 205 P.3d 299, 302 (Alaska 2009) (citing St. Paul Church,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the United Methodist Church,
Inc., 145 P.3d 541, 549-50 (Alaska 2006)).
19 In their statement of points on appeal, the Daggetts also challenge the
superior court's finding that AWI misrepresented its licensing status and the court's
subsequent conclusion that this misrepresentation was grounds for rescission. But they
do not explicitly contest these issues in their appellate briefing. In general, "issues not
briefed or only cursorily briefed are considered waived." Shearer v. Mundt, 36 P.3d
1196, 1199 (Alaska 2001) (citing Adamson v. Univ. of Alaska , 819 P.2d 886, 889 n.3
(Alaska 1991)). Because self-represented litigants are held to a less demanding
procedural standard, we will consider a self-represented litigant's argument if his or her
"briefing was such that [the court] could discern [the party's] legal arguments and [the
opposing party] could reply to them." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 370 P.3d 1070, 1083 (Alaska
2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458, 464 n.9 (Alaska
2004)). Feeney's brief does not discuss the issues. Even under the more lenient standard
for self-represented litigants, the Daggetts have waived this issue on appeal.
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1. The statute requires registration.
Alaska Statute 08.18.171(4) defines a contractor as "a person who, in the
pursuit of an independent business, undertakes or offers to perform . . . or submits a bid
for a project to construct, alter, repair, move, or demolish a building . . . or any type of
fixed structure, including excavation and site development and erection of scaffolding."
It further provides that " 'contractor' includes a general contractor, builder, mechanical
contractor, specialty contractor, and subcontractor." Alaska Statute 08.18.011 requires
all contractors to be registered with the Alaska Department of Commerce, Community,
20
and Economic Development.
Alaska Statutes 08.18.013 and .024 authorize the
Department to register and issue licenses to contractors and specialty contractors. The
21 A
Department has adopted regulations defining 37 categories of specialty contractor.
contractor who installs steel towers or pylons is considered a steel erection contractor.22
The superior court concluded that the 49-foot tower for the wind turbine qualifies as a
steel tower or pylon under this statutory framework and that AWI was therefore required
to be registered as a steel erection contractor.
The Daggetts do not contest that the wind turbine tower falls within this
category or that an installer of steel towers generally is required to register as a steel
erection contractor. Instead they argue that AWI was exempt from registration under
20 "A person may not submit a bid or work as a contractor until that person
has been issued a certificate of registration as a contractor by the department."
AS 08.18.011(a). "Department" is defined as "the Department of Commerce,
Community, and Economic Development, unless the context indicates otherwise."
AS 08.18.171(5).
21 See 12 AAC 21.200 (2010).
22 12 AAC 21.510. See 12 AAC 21.200 (31) (listing "Steel Erection
Contractor" as a type of specialty contractor).
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AS08.18.161(5),which provides that thechapter governing contractor registration"does
not apply to . . . the sale or installation of finished products, materials, or articles of
merchandise that are not actually fabricated into and do not become a permanent, fixed
part of a structure." The Daggetts argue that the wind turbine kit was a finished product
and AWI "would simply have been putting the pieces together and installing [the
turbine] on Feeney's property."
We have discussed this exemption only once before, in Industrial Power
23 Western Modular supplied pre-fabricated
&Lighting Corp. v. Western Modular Corp.
homes that Industrial Power assembled on-site.24 We decided that AS 08.18.161(5) did
not apply to Western Modular because the section was "aimed at a supplier who actually
installs his [or her] products," whereas "Western Modular had no installation
25 Instead we
responsibilities" because the homes were installed by Industrial Power.
concluded that Western Modular was exempt under a different section of AS 08.18.161
that covered suppliers who "only furnished materials" without installing them.26
The Daggetts read Industrial Power to support their contention that AWI's
wind turbine installation falls under the finished products exemption. But the Daggetts'
focus on this language is misplaced. In Industrial Power we inquired whether the
supplier installed the product in order to distinguish between two exemptions with
otherwise similar language.27 We did not suggest that any supplier who installed a
23 623 P.2d 291, 294-95 (Alaska 1981).
24 Id. at 292-93.
25 Id. at 295.
26 Id. at 294; see AS 08.18.161(7).
27 Indus. Power , 623 P.2d at 295.
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----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
product would be exempt under AS 08.18.161(5); to do so would let the exception
swallow the rule.
Instead, asFeeneysuggests, wemustevaluatetheprovision'sfull language,
which exempts "the sale or installation of finished products . . . that are not actually
28 Thus the
fabricated into and do not become a permanent, fixed part of a structure."
question is not only whether the turbine was to be installed but whether a turbine kit is
a "finished product[]" that "become[s] a permanent, fixed part of a structure." This
language and related elements of the statutory structure indicate that a turbine becomes
a permanent, fixed structure within the meaning of this provision.
Alaska Statute 08.18.171(4) defines "contractor" to include someone who
constructs or alters "any type of fixed structure, including . . . erection of scaffolding."
A wind turbine affixed to a 49-foot tower is clearly a fixed structure in the plain sense
of the phrase, and towers have been recognized as "structures" in other statutory contexts
29 Moreover, when scaffolding, which is inherently temporary, is
such as zoning codes.
considered a fixed structure under AS 08.18.171(4), a more permanent structure such as
a wind turbine must also be considered a fixed structure. As a fixed structure, the pole
and turbine would not fall under AS 08.18.161(5)'s exemption for finished products that
are not part of a fixed structure when installed.
TheDaggettspoint outthat theturbinesystemis "afree[-]standing,finished
product that [is] not 'fabricated' into another structure," perhaps implying that a fixed
structure product like a wind turbine is exempt because it is not made part of another
28 AS 08.18.161(5).
29 See Pruitt v. City of Seward , 152 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Alaska 2007) (citing
Seward City Code § 15.10.140, which defines "structure" as "[a]nything constructed or
erected on the ground or attached to something having location on the ground, including,
but not limited to, buildings, towers, and sheds," but excluding short walls).
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----------------------- Page 15-----------------------
30
structure. But this interpretation is unsustainable. The provision must be read as
exempting the installation of finished products that do not become a permanent, fixed
part of a structure or do not become permanent, fixed structures themselves. Feeney
notes that the construction of an entire house would be exempted from all contractor
regulations under the Daggetts' interpretation because the house does not become part
of another fixed structure. Such a result would be nonsensical and would undermine
much of the chapter governing contractors, which was clearly intended to apply to the
construction of new houses and other structures in addition to modification of existing
31 Alaska Statute 08.18.161(5)'s finished products exemption does not apply
structures.
to the Daggetts because we have already determined that the turbine becomes a fixed
structure.
Our decision in Industrial Power confirmsthisinterpretation ofthefinished
products exemption. There we held that Industrial Power, the contractor that assembled
32
and installed the prefabricated houses on-site, was required to register as a contractor.
The wind turbine kit that would have been assembled and installed by AWI to become
30 At oral argument James Daggett argued that among steel professionals,
"fabricate" has a specialized meaning: "to construct from raw materials" by cutting,
welding, and drilling them to build a structure. He considered AWI's work to be simple
"assembly," using hand tools, of components fabricated by the manufacturer. But
AS 08.18.161(5) applies to all kinds of finished products, so a specialized meaning, even
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