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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Advanced Pain Centers of Alaska, Inc. (11/6/2009) sp-6430
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| MAT-SU VALLEY MEDICAL | ) |
| CENTER, LLC, an Alaska limited | ) Supreme Court No. S-13062 |
| liability company, d/b/a Mat-Su | ) |
| Regional Medical Center, | ) Superior Court No. 3AN-96-12646 CI |
| ) | |
| Appellant, | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| v. | ) No. 6430 November 6, 2009 |
| ) | |
| ADVANCED PAIN CENTERS OF | ) |
| ALASKA, INC., an Alaskan | ) |
| corporation, d/b/a Advanced | ) |
| Medical Centers of Alaska; STATE | ) |
| OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF | ) |
| HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, | ) |
| and KARLEEN JACKSON, in her | ) |
| capacity as Commissioner of the | ) |
| Department of Health and Social | ) |
| Services, State of Alaska, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Peter A. Michalski, Judge.
Appearances: John F. Sullivan, Inslee, Best,
Doezie & Ryder, P.S., Bellevue, Washington,
for Appellant. Stanley T. Lewis, Birch,
Horton, Bittner and Cherot, and Linda A.
Webb, Hagans, Ahearn & Webb, Anchorage, for
Advanced Pain Centers of Alaska, Inc. Kelly
E. Henriksen, Assistant Attorney General, and
Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau,
for State of Alaska, Department of Health and
Social Services and Karleen Jackson.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Carpeneti, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Alaska Department of Health and Social
Services decided no certificate of need (CON) was required for a
health care facility proposed by Advanced Pain Centers of Alaska,
Inc., Mat-Su Valley Medical Center sued Advanced Pain, the
department, and its commissioner. Mat-Sus lawsuit sought to
enjoin construction and operation of the facility and also sought
a judgment declaring that the states CON decision was contrary to
law and void. The superior court granted summary judgment
against Mat-Su. It held that because there was no violation of
an existing CON, Mat-Su lacked standing under AS 18.07.091(a) to
seek injunctive relief for the alleged violations. It also held
that Mat-Sus claim against the state defendants was an untimely
administrative appeal. Because Mat-Su did not lack standing
under the statute and because an appeal would not have been
untimely, we reverse and remand.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Advanced Pain Centers of Alaska, Inc. is a health care
provider specializing in interventional pain management. It
wished to convert office space in Wasilla into a single-suite
ambulatory surgery center. It therefore wrote the Alaska
Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) in February 2006,
asking the department to determine whether a certificate of need
(CON) was required for Advanced Pains proposed project. Advanced
Pains letter stated that the estimated total cost of the project
would be $966,035.54.
Alaska Statute 18.07.031 provides that a CON is
required whenever the intended cost of constructing a new health
care facility is over a certain statutory threshold. For the
year between July 1, 2005 and July 1, 2006, that statutory
threshold was $1,050,000.1 Because the estimated total cost of
Advanced Pains project was under the threshold, DHSS Commissioner
Karleen Jackson determined that a CON was not required.
DHSS published notice of the commissioners
determination on March 15, 2006. The notice invited person[s]
substantially affected by the CON determination to request
reconsideration. It stated that any request for reconsideration
must be postmarked no later than 4:30 P.M. April 14, 2006 and
must be made in accordance with 7 [Alaska Administrative Code]
AAC 07.033.
On April 26, 2006, twelve days after the deadline for
seeking reconsideration had expired, Mat-Su Valley Medical Center
sent the commissioner a letter requesting that she investigate
Advanced Pains project and make a determination as to whether the
requirements of AS 18.07 and the [CON] regulations are
applicable. By letter of May 3, Commissioner Jackson denied Mat-
Sus request because it had not been postmarked by April 14.
In October 2006 Mat-Su sued Advanced Pain, DHSS, and
Commissioner Jackson in her official capacity. Its complaint
alleged that Advanced Pain knowingly misrepresented material
facts in requesting and obtaining its CON determination. Mat-Su
sought to enjoin construction and operation of Advanced Pains
Wasilla surgery center under AS 18.07.091 and requested a
declaratory judgment that the commissioners CON determination was
contrary to law and therefore void.2
DHSS and the commissioner (collectively the state or
the state defendants) and Advanced Pain filed motions for summary
judgment. The superior court granted the states motion,
reasoning that Mat-Su lost the chance to obtain a judicial ruling
reversing the commissioners CON determination when timely appeal
of the decision was not taken. The court granted Advanced Pains
motion for summary judgment, reasoning that AS 18.07.091(a)
permitted Mat-Su to challenge only a violation of an existing
CON, not a violation of a CON statute or regulation. Mat-Su
unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration.
Mat-Su appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review grants of summary judgment de novo, drawing
all factual inferences in favor of, and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to, the non-prevailing party.3 We affirm
grants of summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the prevailing party was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.4
Questions regarding the interpretation and application
of a statute are questions of law to which we apply our
independent judgment.5 When construing the meaning of a statute
under this standard, we look to the meaning of the language, the
legislative history, and the purpose of the statute and adopt the
rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent,
reason, and policy.6
We review for abuse of discretion a superior courts
decision to strictly enforce the thirty-day deadline for filing
an administrative appeal under Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2).7
B. Whether It Was Error To Grant Summary Judgment in Favor
of Advanced Pain
Mat-Su argues that it had standing under AS
18.07.091(a) to seek injunctive relief, and that it was therefore
error to grant summary judgment to Advanced Pain.
Alaska Statute 18.07.091(a) describes three categories
of complainants eligible to obtain injunctive relief for
violations of Alaskas CON statutes or regulations. Subsection
.091(a) provides, with bracketed numbers inserted to demark the
categories:
[i]njunctive relief against violations of
this chapter or regulations adopted under
this chapter may be obtained from a court of
competent jurisdiction at the instance of
[(1)] the commissioner, [(2)] a holder of a
certificate of need who is adversely affected
in the exercise of the activities conducted
in violation of the certificate, or [(3)] any
member of the public substantially and
adversely affected by the violation.[8]
Thus, the three categories are: (1) the commissioner, (2) CON
holders, and (3) member[s] of the public.9 The statute
prescribes additional requirements for two of the categories.
For the second, the statute requires the CON holder to be
adversely affected in the exercise of the activities conducted in
violation of the certificate.10 For the third, the statute
requires the member of the public to be substantially and
adversely affected by the violation.11
The superior court concluded that Mat-Su did not fall
within any of the three categories of persons capable of
obtaining injunctive relief under AS 18.07.091(a). It determined
that the first category did not apply because Mat-Su was not the
commissioner and that the second did not apply because Mat-Su was
not alleging the violation of an existing CON. Mat-Su does not
challenge those conclusions.12 The superior court also held that
because Mat-Su could not show that it was adversely affected by
the violation of a certificate, it did not fall within the third
category.
The superior courts conclusion as to the third category
turned on the courts interpretation of the text of subsection
.091(a). The court read the last word in the third category,
violation, to refer back to the words violation of the
certificate that end the second category, and not to the words
violations of this chapter or regulations that open the
subsection and precede all three categories.13
The court gave two reasons for its reading. First, it
concluded that common sense English usage requires that the
statute be interpreted to refer in the last use of the word
violation to the immediately precedent violation of the
certificate, not to the first use in the phrase violations of
this chapter or regulations.
Second, it relied on its reading of the rights of
certificate holders, given that it saw no reasonable argument
that a member of the publics right to remedy should exceed that
of an adversely affected certificate holder.
On these bases, the court granted Advanced Pains
summary judgment motion.
1. Whether Mat-Su had standing under AS 18.07.091
Mat-Su argues that, as a direct competitor of Advanced
Pain, it has standing to seek injunctive relief under AS
18.07.091(a) for what it calls Advanced Pains fraudulent
activity. Mat-Su argues that as a member of the public
substantially and adversely affected, it is within the statutes
third category of complainants. It contends that it was error to
conclude that because Mat-Su was not alleging a violation of an
existing CON, it did not have standing to obtain injunctive
relief under subsection .091(a). It argues that the superior
courts conclusion was contrary to South Central Health Planning &
Development, Inc. v. Commissioner of Department of
Administration,14 and would insulate those violators who
completely disregard the CON laws.
Although the state concedes that Mat-Su may have
standing to challenge the commissioners decision or [Advanced
Pains] alleged violations of the CON laws, Advanced Pain
disagrees. It argues that the superior courts common sense and
well-reasoned interpretation of AS 18.07.091(a) is consistent
with the plain language of the statute. Advanced Pain asserts
that the superior courts interpretation is not inconsistent with
our holding in South Central because the plaintiff in that case
was challenging the violation of an existing CON, whereas
Advanced Pain had no CON.
We conclude that there are two main reasons why summary
judgment should not have been entered against Mat-Su on the
standing issue. First, South Central is inconsistent with
requiring third-category complainants to show that an existing
CON was violated. Second, we independently read the statute to
contain no such requirement.
We read South Central as foreclosing a conclusion that
a member of the public cannot obtain injunctive relief unless a
CON was violated. A state agency there failed to submit for CON
review the proposed construction of an addition to the Anchorage
Pioneers Home.15 In other words, the case concerned the failure
to seek a certificate, not the violation of an existing
certificate. We held that South Central, as a member of the
public substantially and adversely affected, had standing under
AS 18.07.091(a) to obtain a preliminary injunction.16 The opinion
established that a substantially and adversely affected member of
the public may seek injunctive relief under AS 18.07.091(a) if a
health care facility fails to obtain a required CON. South
Central was within the statutes third category of eligible
complainants, even though it did not allege violation of an
existing certificate.
Advanced Pain reads South Central as involving the
equivalent of an existing CON; it refers to our recognition that
the facility would be constructed without conforming to South
Centrals plan, and our statement that this could disrupt the
plan.17 Advanced Pain refers to the plan as essentially [South
Centrals] federally-mandated CON. We think Advanced Pain
misreads our opinion. As Mat-Su argues in reply, we described
the violation claimed by South Central as the states fail[ure] to
submit the proposed addition to [CON] review as required by state
law . . . .18
Our independent review of the statute and the superior
courts analysis confirms that South Central did not misapply AS
18.07.091(a).
We interpret the statute as allowing substantially and
adversely affected members of the public to challenge any
violation of Alaskas CON statutes or associated regulations, not
just violations of an existing CON. We read the statute to
provide that [i]njunctive relief against violations of this
chapter or regulations adopted under this chapter may be obtained
from a court . . . at the instance of . . . any member of the
public substantially and adversely affected by the violation.19
Two main reasons grammar and the effect on enforcement compel
this reading.
First, it is grammatically most correct to link the two
nouns, violations in the opening clause and violation in the last
clause, because it permits the three categories to be read
independently. The first category is clearly independent, and
the word or precedes the third category. This implies that each
category is independent, and that each can be read and applied
without referring to any other. Advanced Pains reading would
effectively make the third category dependent on the second,
requiring it to borrow an element from the second, a result that
seems grammatically unlikely.
Likewise, one would expect that if the drafters had
intended the first and second categories to be independent but
the third to depend in some way on the second, they would have
more clearly treated the third as related to the second. In that
event, one would not expect three ostensibly independent
categories. And given the way the subsection is constructed, we
assume the drafters would have recognized that if the third
category could be rationally read to borrow an element from the
second, it would create inherent ambiguity about whether the
final violation refers to violations in the subsections opening
words or to violation in the second category. Consequently, if
the legislature had intended both the second and third categories
to require the violation of a certificate, we would expect the
third category to refer more explicitly to a certificate
violation, and to parallel more explicitly the second category in
construction. At the least, one would have expected the
legislature to have added of the certificate after violation in
the third category to unambiguously indicate that both the second
and third categories require the violation of an existing CON.
Similarly, if the third category had been intended to
carry forward the second categorys requirement of activities
conducted in violation of the certificate, ambiguity would have
been avoided if the third category used activity or activities,
rather than violation. It is improbable that the legislature
would have used an ambiguous, indirect, and ungrammatical
shortcut to refer to a restriction explicitly required only for
the second category of prospective complainants.
The two clauses constructional divergence also renders
the superior courts reading less plausible. The initial clause
of the subsection and the third category directly use violations
and violation as nouns. But the second category uses violation
only as part of the clause in the exercise of the activities
conducted in violation of the certificate.20 As used there,
violation is a buried verb21 that modifies activities conducted;
translated, the second category really requires activities
violating the holders certificate. It is unlikely the
legislature used an unadorned noun in the third category to adopt
an entire clause in the second category simply by repeating one
word that is used as a modifier in the second.
Furthermore, treating the usage of violation in the
second category as the same as the usage of violations and
violation in the opening words and in the third category would
inherently lead to ambiguity. Any such ambiguity is avoided by
giving independent effect to each of the categories and reading
the statute carefully. The superior court relied on one
grammatical tool, proximity, to decide which of the two choices
it perceived was correct. We conclude that the subsections text
strongly favors the reading we give the statute.
The second main reason for our reading of the statute
derives from the effect Advanced Pains reading would have on
enforcing Alaskas CON laws. At least two different sorts of
claims are possible with respect to the CON statutes and
regulations: first, claims that someone has acted without
obtaining a required CON; and second, claims that someone has
violated an existing CON. Limiting third-category complainants
to this second sort of claim would mean that the first sort of
claim could only be pursued by the commissioner, as the sole
first-category complainant. That reading would leave a
significant hole in enforcement if the state, contrary to law,
erred in failing to require someone to apply for or obtain a CON,
because no one other than the commissioner who erred could seek
relief under subsection .091(a). That result would effectively
render the legislatures chosen enforcement mechanism injunctive
relief a nullity, as either unavailable or unneeded.22 We doubt
that the legislature intended to limit enforcement of Alaskas CON
laws so narrowly or improbably.
The superior court also thought that there was no
reasonable argument that a member of the publics right to remedy
should exceed that of an adversely affected certificate holder.
The courts reading of the subsection seemed to assume that, like
certificate holders, members of the public only had to show that
they were adversely affected. The court therefore concluded
that, because a certificate holder could not obtain relief unless
a certificate was violated, a member of the public could not,
either. The courts underlying assumption appears to be
incorrect. Although the statute requires that a certificate
holder be adversely affected, it requires that a member of the
public be substantially and adversely affected.23 This difference
suggests that the statute does not impose identical requirements
on the two categories of complainants, undermining one of the two
bases for the superior courts reading of the statute.
The statute neither states nor implies that members of
the public may challenge only violations of existing CONs. We
see no reasonable basis for inferring such a limitation. Because
such a reading would also be contrary to the states common law
precedent on standing,24 we assume the legislature would have used
unambiguous language to adopt such a limitation, if that had been
its intention. We are consequently unwilling to read into the
subsection a limitation that is neither explicitly nor implicitly
stated.
It was therefore error to conclude that a member of the
public may only obtain injunctive relief for an alleged violation
of an existing CON. Mat-Su may seek injunctive relief for the
alleged violation of the statutes and regulations if it is a
member of the public substantially and adversely affected by the
violation.
It appears to be undisputed that Mat-Su is indeed a
member of the public. Neither Advanced Pain nor the state argues
otherwise. Nothing in AS 18.07.091(a) implies that the second
and third categories of complainants were intended to be mutually
exclusive. Neither Advanced Pain nor the state appears to argue
that an entity that holds a CON is ineligible to seek relief as a
member of the public. Such a reading would be illogical in this
case because it would mean that a would-be competitor who had not
yet been issued a CON could obtain injunctive relief under
subsection .091(a) even though Mat-Su could not. We therefore
assume without deciding that Mat-Su is a member of the public
even though it may have held its own certificate.
The closer question is whether Mat-Su was indeed
substantially and adversely affected by Advanced Pains alleged
violation of the CON laws and regulations. The superior court
assumed without deciding that Mat-Su, as a competitor of Advanced
Pain, would be adversely affected by the construction of Advanced
Pains Wasilla facility. Mat-Su argues that it is substantially
and adversely affected in part because Advanced Pains project
will compete directly with Mat-Su. It also argues that because
Advanced Pains ambulatory surgery center will be included as part
of the existing supply of surgery suites in any need analysis for
new surgery suites, Advanced Pains facility will limit Mat-Sus
ability to expand.
Advanced Pain contended at oral argument before us that
Mat-Su was not substantially and adversely affected. Advanced
Pain conceded that its Wasilla facility was in the same service
area as Mat-Sus medical facility. But it also argued that its
facility had only one procedure room, which was intended to be
used only for pain-management procedures in which drugs are
injected into the spine, nerve root, or joint to reduce pain.
Advanced Pain also appeared to concede at argument that the same
kind of pain-management procedures were performed at Mat-Sus
facility. And Mat-Sus chief financial officer stated in an
affidavit that from 2005 to 2007, Mat-Su performed over 127 pain-
related, outpatient procedures, including nerve blocks, trigger
point injections, and joint injections.
Based on these facts, we agree with Mat-Sus contention
that it would be substantially and adversely affected if Advanced
Pain were to open and operate even a single pain-management
procedure room in the same service area without complying with
the CON laws and regulations. For purposes of determining
whether the alleged violation gives Mat-Su standing, we assume
that Advanced Pain will be able to perform procedures that might
otherwise have been performed at Mat-Su. Mat-Su has arguably
invested resources in complying with the CON laws and regulations
with the expectation that DHSS would control the market by
enforcing those same rules against potential competitors.
We accordingly hold that Mat-Su has standing as a
substantially and adversely affected member of the public to seek
injunctive relief for Advanced Pains alleged violations under AS
18.07.091(a).
2. Whether Mat-Sus claim against Advanced Pain was
untimely
Advanced Pain argues that because Mat-Su failed to seek
judicial review in a timely manner the superior court was correct
to dismiss Mat-Sus claims. Advanced Pain contends that Mat-Sus
claim against it for injunctive relief was an administrative
appeal because it necessarily require[d] the superior court to
second-guess an agency decision. Advanced Pain argues that under
both AS 44.62.560(a) and Alaska Appellate Rule 602, Mat-Su had
just thirty days following the final agency decision in which to
seek judicial review.25 Because Mat-Su did not file its claim
within thirty days of DHSSs final decision, Advanced Pain argues
that Mat-Sus claim was untimely.
The superior court did not hold that Mat-Sus claim
against Advanced Pain was an untimely appeal of an administrative
decision. Advanced Pain appears to argue untimeliness as an
alternative basis for affirming the superior courts decision.26
To affirm on this ground, we would have to conclude both that:
(1) Mat-Sus request for injunctive relief was an administrative
appeal subject to the thirty-day appeal deadline in AS
44.62.560(a) and Appellate Rule 602, and (2) Mat-Su failed to
file its complaint within the thirty-day deadline prescribed for
administrative appeals.
We have held that [a] claim is functionally an
administrative appeal if it requires the court to consider the
propriety of an agency determination. A review on the record, as
distinct from the de novo reception of evidence, is a
characteristic of appeals.27 Mat-Sus claim for injunctive relief
against Advanced Pain required only that the superior court
consider whether Advanced Pain had violated the CON laws and
regulations by omitting costs from its project estimate a
question that would have involved the reception of new evidence
not the propriety of DHSSs CON determination. Therefore, Mat-Sus
claim for injunctive relief against Advanced Pain was not an
administrative appeal.
But even if it had been, that appeal would not have
been untimely. Under Appellate Rule 602, the thirty-day period
in which an administrative appeal must be filed does not begin to
run until the agency has issued a decision that clearly states
that it is a final decision and that the claimant has thirty days
to appeal.28 We have held that [w]here an administrative agencys
decision is communicated in a letter that fails to do either of
these things, it is an abuse of discretion not to relax Rule
602(a)(2)s thirty-day appeal deadline.29 In such cases, we have
held that the thirty-day period for filing an administrative
appeal never began to run.30
The state appears to argue that DHSSs May 3, 2006
letter denying Mat-Sus request for reconsideration was the final
agency action.31 But that letter did not clearly state either
that it was the final agency decision or that Mat-Su had thirty
days to appeal. We accordingly conclude that the thirty-day
period for filing an administrative appeal never began to run.
Even if it had been an administrative appeal, Mat-Sus claim for
injunctive relief would not have been untimely.
3. Whether Mat-Su was required to exhaust
administrative remedies before suing for
injunctive relief under AS 18.07.091(a)
As a second alternative basis for affirming, Advanced
Pain argues that Mat-Su failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Advanced
Pain appears to be renewing an argument it made in the superior
court that, because Mat-Su failed to make a timely request for
reconsideration by the commissioner, it allow[ed] its
administrative remedies to lapse.
Mat-Su replies that Advanced Pains interpretation
seek[s] to impose a new condition upon the applicability of AS
18.07.091(a) that simply does not exist in the statute. Mat-Su
argues that subsection .091(a) does not condition the right to
seek injunctive relief upon first filing an administrative appeal
or exhausting administrative remedies. It also contends that it
would be nonsensical to impose such a prerequisite, because one
of the parties that may seek relief under the statute is the
commissioner.
We have noted that the basic purpose of the exhaustion
doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform
functions within its special competence to make a factual
record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so
as to moot judicial controversies.32 The United States Supreme
Court has held that [p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with
an agencys deadlines and other critical procedural rules because
no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing
some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.33 But
the case in which the Court so held involved a lawsuit brought
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which explicitly
provided that the action could not be brought until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.34
Nothing in AS 18.07.091 or in Alaskas CON laws for
that matter explicitly required Mat-Su to exhaust available
administrative remedies before suing for injunctive relief in the
superior court. Furthermore, as discussed above, Mat-sus claim
for injunctive relief against Advanced Pain was not an
administrative appeal because the dispute focused far more on the
validity of Advanced Pains cost estimate than on what the
commissioner did. A failure to exhaust therefore is not an
alternative ground for affirming.
C. Whether It Was Error To Grant Summary Judgment in Favor
of the State Defendants
Mat-Su asked the superior court to declare that the
states CON determination was contrary to the CON statutes and
regulations. Mat-Su argued that the state defendants adopted a
laissez faire attitude and blindly accepted [Advanced Pains]
representations with no independent analysis or investigation.
Mat-Su contended that their head-in-the-sand-approach permitted
Advanced Pain to violate the CON laws.
Mat-Su appears to renew on appeal the contentions it
made below. It argues that DHSS blindly accepted Advanced Pains
representations with no independent analysis or investigation and
was, as a result, at least partially complicit in Advanced Pains
deception. Mat-Su contends that even a cursory review of
Advanced Pains CON determination request would have revealed that
it was inadequate because it did not contain certified estimates
or other supporting information for the claimed project costs.
Mat-Su argues that this information was required by 7 AAC 07.031
and that the state defendants might have been able to discover
Advanced Pains duplicity if they had properly administered the
CON laws and regulations.
The state responds that Mat-Su has either waived or
abandoned any claims it may have had against the state
defendants. Even if Mat-Sus claim was not abandoned, the state
argues that we should affirm the grant of summary judgment
because Mat-Sus complaint was an untimely administrative appeal
and because the commissioners consideration of Advanced Pains
request for determination was proper as a matter of law.
The superior court granted summary judgment to the
state defendants on the sole ground that [t]he opportunity to
obtain a judicial ruling reversing the commissioners
administrative decision was lost when timely appeal of the
decision was not taken. But we noted above that the thirty-day
period in which to seek judicial review never began to run
against Mat-Su because DHSS did not clearly state in its May 3,
2006 letter either that the letter was the final agency decision
or that Mat-Su had thirty days to appeal.35 We therefore hold
that it was error to grant summary judgment to the state
defendants on the ground Mat-Sus action was untimely, and remand
for further proceedings.36
D. Whether the Attorneys Fees Awards to Advanced Pain and
the State Were Manifestly Unreasonable
The superior court awarded the state $3,336.58 in
attorneys fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82; it also awarded
Advanced Pain $76,899.38 in attorneys fees under Alaska Civil
Rule 68. Mat-Su argues that these awards were manifestly
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.
We do not need to reach the merits of Mat-Sus attorneys
fees arguments. Because Advanced Pain and the state are no
longer prevailing parties, we vacate their fees awards.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the grants of summary
judgment in favor of Advanced Pain and the state, and REMAND for
further proceedings. Because Advanced Pain and the state are no
longer prevailing parties, we VACATE their attorneys fees awards.
_______________________________
1 AS 18.07.031(d).
2 Advanced Pain contended in the superior court that it
had begun construction on the new facility in early 2006, and
that the facility was completed in September 2006.
3 Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 2005)
(citing Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d 700, 702 (Alaska
1984)).
4 Id. at 1219 (citing Witt v. State, Dept of Corr., 75
P.3d 1030, 1033 (Alaska 2003)).
5 State v. Jeffrey, 170 P.3d 226, 229 (Alaska 2007).
6 Enders v. Parker, 66 P.3d 11, 13-14 (Alaska 2003)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Fancyboy v. Alaska Vill. Elec. Coop., Inc., 984 P.2d 1128, 1132
(Alaska 1999); citing Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska
1979)).
7 Carlson v. Renkes, 113 P.3d 638, 641 (Alaska 2005)
(citing Manning v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 853 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Alaska
1993)).
8 AS 18.07.091(a).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Mat-Su does not contend here that it is eligible to sue
as a member of the second category, or that it has standing as an
adversely affected CON holder, or that the defendants violated
any CON of Mat-Sus.
13 AS 18.07.091(a).
14 South Cent. Health Planning & Dev., Inc. v. Commr of
Dept of Admin., 628 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1981).
15 Id. at 552.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 AS 18.07.091(a) (emphasis added).
20 AS 18.07.091(a).
21 See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage
122-23 (2d ed. 1995).
22 Injunctive relief would be unavailable because a
commissioner unwilling to require a facility to obtain a CON
would be unlikely to sue either to enjoin the facilitys
construction or to compel herself to require the facility to
apply for a CON. It would be unneeded because a commissioner
willing to require a facility to obtain a CON would require the
facility to apply. In that event an injunction would be unneeded
unless the facility declined to comply.
23 AS 18.07.091(a).
24 We broadly interpret the concept of standing to favor
increased accessibility to judicial forums. Moore v. State, 553
P.2d 8, 23 (Alaska 1976). To establish general interest-injury
standing, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that he or she has a
sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and
an interest which is adversely affected by the complained-of
conduct. Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299, 304 (Alaska 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Ruckle
v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 85 P.3d 1030, 1040 (Alaska 2004);
Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906, 915 (Alaska
2000)).
Applying the general standing test, we have held that a
hospital had standing to obtain review of a decision by DHSS that
a competitors project had been substantially implemented.
Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc. v. Dept of Health &
Soc. Servs., 648 P.2d 970, 975 (Alaska 1982) (noting that
hospital had demonstrated a sufficient personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy to assure that the proceedings will be
adversarial in nature); see also Fuhs v. Gilbertson, 186 P.3d
551, 556 (Alaska 2008) (noting that because AS 18.07.091(a) is a
permissive statute[] that expressly grant[s] standing and only
impliedly den[ies] it, subsection .091(a) does not necessarily
foreclose the possibility that litigants may have standing under
the general standing requirements).
25 AS 44.62.560(a) provides that [j]udicial review by the
superior court of a final administrative order may be had by
filing a notice of appeal . . . within 30 days after the last day
on which reconsideration can be ordered. Alaska Appellate Rule
602 similarly states that [a]n appeal may be taken to the
superior court from an administrative agency within 30 days from
the date that the decision appealed from is mailed or otherwise
distributed to the appellant.
26 See Snyder v. Am. Legion Spenard Post No. 28, 119 P.3d
996, 1001 (Alaska 2005) (We may affirm a judgment on any grounds
that the record supports, even if not relied on by the superior
court. (citing Marshall v. First Natl Bank of Alaska, 97 P.3d
830, 835 (Alaska 2004); Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282, 285
(Alaska 1961))).
27 Carlson v. Renkes, 113 P.3d 638, 641 (Alaska 2005)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Haynes
v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commn, 746 P.2d 892, 893
(Alaska 1987); Dept of Corr. v. Kraus, 759 P.2d 539, 540 (Alaska
1988)).
28 Alaska R. App. P. 602(a)(2).
29 Carlson, 113 P.3d at 642 (quoting Skudrzyk v. Reynolds,
856 P.2d 462, 463 (Alaska 1993)).
30 Id.
31 Advanced Pain treats Commissioner Jacksons March 15,
2006 letter as the final administrative decision that a CON was
not required for [its] facility.
32 State, Dept of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. Fairbanks
N. Star Borough, 936 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Alaska 1997) (quoting Ben
Lomond, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 761 P.2d 119, 121-22
(Alaska 1988)).
33 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006).
34 Id. at 87-88 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (2000)).
35 See Alaska R. App. P. 602(a)(2); see also Part III.B.2.
36 The state argues that we can still affirm the superior
courts decision on the alternative ground that the states CON
determination was proper as a matter of law. We decline to so
hold.
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