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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Hartman v. State, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (01/26/2007) sp-6092

Hartman v. State, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (01/26/2007) sp-6092, 152 P3d 1118

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

MORGAN C. HARTMAN, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 11823
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-03-02754 CI
)
STATE OF ALASKA, ) O P I N I O N
DEPARTMENT OF )
ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION ) No. 6092 - January 26, 2007
OF MOTOR VEHICLES, )
)
Appellee. )
)

          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Fourth   Judicial   District,
          Fairbanks, Richard D. Savell, Judge.

          Appearances:   Robert  John,  Law  Office  of
          Robert   John,   Fairbanks,  for   Appellant.
          Richard  W.  Postma, Jr., Assistant  Attorney
          General,  Anchorage, and  David  W.  M rquez,
          Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.

          Before:   Bryner,  Chief  Justice,  Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          FABE, Justice.
          EASTAUGH, Justice, dissenting.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          This  is  an  administrative appeal of a Department  of
Motor  Vehicles  (DMV) decision revoking Morgan  Hartmans  Alaska
drivers license for driving while under the influence (DUI).   At
the license revocation hearing, the arresting officer relied on a
recording of the conversation he had had with Hartman before  the
arrest.  Hartman, a pro se litigant who had unsuccessfully sought
a  continuance to obtain further evidence, did not have a copy of
the  recording, and the hearing officer made no effort to  assist
Hartman  in  obtaining  the recording.   Based  in  part  on  the
officers  recollection  of  the recording,  the  hearing  officer
revoked  Hartmans license for ninety days and the superior  court
affirmed.
          Hartman raises four issues on appeal.  First, he claims
that  the  stop  leading  to  his  arrest  was  unconstitutional.
Second,  he  maintains  that  the  hearing  officer  abused   her
discretion by denying his request for a continuance.   His  third
claim   closely related to the second  is that he was denied  due
process  of  law by the States failure to furnish a copy  of  the
recording at his hearing.  Finally, he argues that DMV failed  to
provide  notice of the procedures that it would follow.   Because
the  hearing  officer erred by failing to inform Hartman  of  the
correct procedures for obtaining the central piece of evidence in
the  case,  even  though  he  was clearly  attempting  to  obtain
potentially exculpatory evidence, we reverse the judgment of  the
superior   court  and  remand  to  DMV  for  further  proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
     A.   Hartmans Arrest
          On   August  29,  2003,  State  Trooper  Tim   Tuckwood
responded  to  a  report  from  Tim Somerlot,  a  Delta  Junction
resident,  that a group of juveniles had abandoned  a  car  in  a
ditch  and  left  the  scene in a tan Ford  Taurus-type  vehicle.
According to Somerlot, the group consisted of two males  and  two
females.
          Tuckwood  investigated the abandoned  vehicle,  finding
that  it was a dented, white Honda Accord with fluid leaking from
the  radiator.  The windows were open, and Tuckwood noticed  that
the  interior had a strong odor of alcohol.  Although the car had
no  license plate, Tuckwood ran the vehicle identification number
and  determined  that  it  belonged to John  Hartman,  who  lived
nearby.   After  unsuccessfully attempting  to  contact  Hartman,
Tuckwood  called a towing company.  Before the tow truck arrived,
Tuckwood saw a small tan vehicle similar to a Ford Taurus [drive]
by,  and noticed that several people were in the car.  One of the
passengers was Morgan Hartman, the son of John Hartman.
          Tuckwood   stopped  the  car  and  questioned  Hartman.
According to Tuckwood, Hartman appeared to be intoxicated, due to
a  strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and  a
stagger[ing] step.  He failed three roadside sobriety tests,  and
refused  to take any others.  When asked about the Honda, Hartman
admitted to having driven it, and said that he had parked  it  in
the  ditch  when the radiator overheated.  According to Tuckwood,
Hartman claimed to have been alone when driving, but two  of  the
passengers from the Ford Taurus maintained that they had been  in
the  Honda  when  Hartman was driving.  One  of  the  passengers,
Mariah Morris, said that she knew Hartman was intoxicated.1
          Tuckwood  arrested Hartman for driving while under  the
influence.  A breath sample taken from Hartman showed an  alcohol
          concentration of .158g/210L, an amount substantially higher than
the  legal limit of .08.  Hartman declined to take a second test,
and  was  issued a citation for underage drinking.  Before  being
released  on bail, he was given notice that his license would  be
suspended, and informed that he could challenge the suspension at
an administrative hearing.
     B.   Administrative Hearing
          Hartman requested a hearing, and one was scheduled  for
October 21, 2003.  On October 15 he requested that the hearing be
postponed  due  to the fact that [he had] so far been  unable  to
gather  all  the evidence that [he] need[ed].  He also  requested
that Tuckwood be subpoenaed, and stated that his defense would be
based  on  AS  04.16.051(b)2 and Snyder v. State,  Department  of
Public  Safety,  Division  of Motor  Vehicles.3   On  October  21
Hartman  participated telephonically and pro se in  the  hearing.
At  the  beginning of the hearing, the request for a  continuance
was  denied4  on  the  ground that Hartman could  have  requested
discovery, but did not.
          The  hearing  officer  heard testimony  from  Tuckwood,
Hartman, Hartmans mother, and Crystal Mercer, the driver  of  the
Ford  Taurus.   Tuckwoods initial testimony mirrored  his  police
report.   Specifically,  he claimed that Hartman  tried  to  tell
[him] that he wasnt intoxicated because he doesnt drink.
          Hartman  testified that he was contesting  the  license
revocation because he did not become intoxicated until  after  he
left  the  Honda.  He claimed that he was driving the Honda  off-
road5  with  two  friends,  and  that  he  parked  it  when   the
transmission malfunctioned.  At that point, he asserted,  he  had
not yet had anything to drink.  After the car broke down, Hartman
and  his  friends began walking to Hartmans house, but  soon  saw
Mercer  pass by in a tan Ford Taurus.  Mercer gave them  a  ride,
and  Hartman invited all of them to have dinner with his  family.
Hartman had several beers during dinner.6  The four then left  in
the  Ford  Taurus,  with Mercer driving.  When they  were  pulled
over,  Hartman testified, he told Tuckwood that he  was  drinking
after [he] drove, a claim that Tuckwood must have misinterpreted.
          The hearing officer called Tuckwood again, and asked if
he  had  a  tape  recording of the contact and arrest.   Tuckwood
responded in the affirmative, and the hearing officer noted  that
she  did  not have a copy of it.  Tuckwood proceeded  to  testify
about  the tape, claiming that it supported his account  of  what
Hartman  had said.  Hartman did not have a copy of the  tape  and
was  thus unable to verify Tuckwoods recollection of its  content
or cross-examine Tuckwood about it.
          Hartmans mother corroborated her sons claim that he had
been  drinking  at  dinner but not earlier.  She  also  described
Hartmans  earlier  unsuccessful attempt in his criminal  case  to
procure  a  tape recording of the arrest and his public defenders
response that no tape existed:
          And  as  far  as the tapes, Maam,  supposedly
          Officer  Tuckwood said he  theres a  tape  in
          existence  that said [Hartman]  said  he  was
          drinking.  But then there is no tape.  Theres
          no  such  thing.  We tried to get  the  tape.
          [Hartman] tried to get a copy of it from  his
          public  defender.  The reason why he cant  is
          because there is none.  It doesnt exist.
          
          On  October  30 the hearing officer issued a  decision.
In  her  findings, she noted that Hartman was the driver  of  the
Honda,  and  that  Hartman was highly intoxicated  when  Tuckwood
arrested  him.  She also found that the contact tape  does  exist
and  that  Tuckwoods testimony about its contents  was  credible.
Based  on  these  findings,  the breath  alcohol  test,  and  her
negative assessment of Hartmans credibility, the hearing  officer
determined  that  Hartman  had  been  driving  while  under   the
influence.   She therefore affirmed the ninety-day revocation  of
his license.
          Hartman  appealed this decision to the superior  court.
The superior court held that Tuckwood had reasonable suspicion to
make  the  stop  and probable cause to arrest Hartman.   It  also
determined  that DMVs failure to furnish Hartman a  copy  of  the
recording  absent any request did not violate Hartmans  right  to
due  process.  Similarly, it ruled that Tuckwoods reliance  on  a
recording that had not been furnished to Hartman did not  violate
Hartmans  rights under the confrontation clause, because Tuckwood
merely  used  it  to  confirm his memory of Hartmans  statements.
Finally, the superior court held that the hearing officer did not
abuse   her  discretion  by  denying  Hartmans  request   for   a
continuance.  For these reasons, the superior court affirmed  the
hearing  officers  decision.  Hartmans  subsequent  petition  for
rehearing was denied, and this appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
     A.   Standard of Review
          When  reviewing license revocation hearings,  we  apply
the  standard of review set forth in Nevers v. State,  Department
of Administration:
          We  review license revocation hearings  under
          AS  28.15.166(m),  which  provides  that  the
          court    may    reverse    the    departments
          determination  if the court  finds  that  the
          department misinterpreted the law,  acted  in
          an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a
          determination unsupported by the evidence  in
          the record.  Where the superior court acts as
          an   intermediate  court   of   appeals,   we
          independently  review  the  hearing  officers
          decision.   For legal questions not involving
          agency  expertise, we apply the  substitution
          of   judgment   standard.   We  also   review
          constitutional  questions de novo,  and  will
          adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive
          in light of precedent, reason, and policy.[7]
          
     B.   Legality of the Investigatory Stop
          Hartman first argues that the investigatory stop of the
tan Ford Taurus was unconstitutional because it was not justified
by  reasonable suspicion.8  As a result, he claims, this evidence
          should have been suppressed.
          The  exclusionary rule provides that evidence  obtained
from  an  unconstitutional search or seizure is inadmissible  and
must  be excluded.9  Although this rule generally does not  apply
to  license  revocation  proceedings,10  we  have  held  that  an
exception  applies in certain contexts, such as police misconduct
which shocks the conscience, or is of a nature that calls for the
judiciary,  as  a  matter of judicial integrity, to  disassociate
itself from benefits derivable therefrom.11  In addition, where a
Fourth  Amendment violation stems from a lack of  probable  cause
for a DUI arrest, exclusion may well be mandated because probable
cause  is  an  affirmative statutory element of  the  offense  of
refusal  and  is an affirmative element for proof in the  license
revocation proceeding.12  But we need not reach the applicability
of  exceptions  to  the  general rule in this  case  because  the
investigative stop was not an unreasonable search or seizure.
          In  Alaska,  a police officer may make an investigatory
stop  if  the  officer has a reasonable suspicion  that  imminent
public  danger exists or serious harm to persons or property  has
recently  occurred.13   Reasonable  suspicion  exists  where  the
totality  of  the  circumstances  indicates  that  there   is   a
substantial  possibility that conduct [giving rise  to  a  public
danger] has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.14  Thus,
where a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver  is
operating a vehicle while intoxicated,15 the officer may  conduct
an investigatory stop.16
          While  we have held that a person who is driving  while
under  the  influence poses an imminent public danger, warranting
an  investigatory stop,17 we have not considered whether a person
who  has recently been behind the wheel while intoxicated but  is
no  longer  driving continues to pose an imminent public  danger.
In  a series of three cases,18 the court of appeals has addressed
this  specific  issue.   In  Larson v. State,  a  police  officer
observed  a  car  stopped in the middle of  the  road,  and  then
watched as the driver of the car, Larson, drove on the wrong side
of the road, tried to pick up pedestrians, and almost hit a group
of  pedestrians.19  The officer then witnessed Larson pick up two
pedestrians, one of whom took over driving.20  The officer stopped
the car, immediately approached Larson, now a passenger, observed
that  he  appeared intoxicated, and arrested him for DUI.21   The
court  of  appeals  concluded that the  district  court  did  not
clearly  err  when it found that it was likely that Larson  would
have  resumed driving at some later point, and that [the officer]
was  not unreasonable in believing that the change of drivers did
not eliminate the need to make an investigatory stop.22
          In  Romo v. Municipality of Anchorage, a police officer
began  following the defendant after observing a known prostitute
in  the  cab of the truck that the defendant was driving.23   The
defendant, who was not driving erratically, pulled into a parking
lot,  exited  the  truck, and voluntarily approached  the  police
officer.24  When the police officer noticed that Romo had an odor
of  alcoholic beverage about his . . . person, he asked  Romo  to
perform  a field sobriety test.25  The court of appeals concluded
the  test  was  justified by reasonable suspicion.26   The  court
          explained that [t]he fact that Romo was driving just prior to his
encounter  with  [the officer] demonstrated Romos willingness  to
drive  in  his current [intoxicated] condition.27  The  court  of
appeals  went on to reason that because Romo retained  possession
of  his  car  and it remained immediately accessible for  him  to
drive,28 there was a sufficient risk of imminent public danger to
warrant an investigatory stop.29
          In  Shearer  v.  Municipality of  Anchorage,  a  police
officer  noticed  a jeep being driven erratically  on  the  Glenn
Highway and followed the vehicle until its owner pulled the  jeep
into  his driveway.30  The officer contacted the driver, Shearer,
as  he  was  heading into his house, and, noticing  that  Shearer
smelled  of alcohol, asked him to perform field sobriety tests.31
As  in  Romo, the court of appeals pointed to Shearers continuing
possession  of the vehicle as a factor increasing the  likelihood
that  he  would resume driving, but did not state that possession
was,  in all cases, a necessary condition for finding an imminent
public danger:
          [L]ike  the defendant in Romo, Shearer  still
          had  access  to his car at the  time  of  the
          encounter    with   [the   police   officer].
          Further,  Shearer  had just demonstrated  his
          willingness   to  drive  while   intoxicated.
          Thus,  [the officer] could reasonably believe
          that  there was a sufficient risk of imminent
          public  danger  to  justify an  investigatory
          stop.[32]
          
          In  this  case, although Hartman was no longer  driving
his  car,  the  investigatory  stop was  still  proper.  Somerlot
reported that the Honda whip[ped] into his yard and crashed  into
a  ditch  in front of his house.  Somerlot then saw the juveniles
exit  the  Honda  and get into a tan Ford Taurus[-]type  vehicle.
There  was  no  license  plate  on the  Honda,  but  the  vehicle
identification number indicated that it belonged to John Hartman,
whose  teenage son Tuckwood knew.  Tuckwood noted that the  Honda
smelled strongly of alcohol.  While waiting for the tow truck  to
arrive,  Tuckwood  saw  a  tan  Ford  Taurus-like  vehicle   with
juveniles in it drive by the abandoned Honda.  Tuckwood therefore
had  a  reasonable  suspicion that someone had been  driving  the
Honda  while under the influence and that the intoxicated  driver
of  the Honda was likely in the Ford Taurus when Tuckwood stopped
it.   Although  Hartman was now a passenger in the  Ford  Taurus,
this  is  not enough to show that he no longer posed an  imminent
public  danger.  Passenger status did not automatically establish
a non-driving intention on Hartmans part.33  Nor was Hartmans non-
ownership  of the Ford Taurus determinative absent evidence  that
the  owner  of the vehicle was unwilling to give him a chance  to
drive.    In  view of Hartmans continuing access to  the  Taurus,
Tuckwoods   belief  that Hartman posed an imminent public  danger
was   reasonable.   Therefore,  under  these  circumstances,  the
investigatory stop was legal.
     C.   Denial  of  a  Continuance and Failure To  Provide  the
          Recording
          Hartman  maintains  that the superior  court  erred  by
denying him a continuance to obtain additional evidence.  Because
this claim is closely related to his argument about the recording
that  the  State violated his right to due process by failing  to
furnish the central piece of evidence in the case  the two issues
will be treated together.
          A  driver  has  a constitutional right to a  meaningful
hearing before the state can suspend his [or her] license.34   In
defining a meaningful hearing, we are guided by considerations of
fundamental  fairness, 35 which require that the same  procedural
safeguards  apply in civil drivers license revocation proceedings
for  driving  while intoxicated as apply in criminal prosecutions
for  that offense.36  One such safeguard is the requirement  that
the  State  preserve  and make available to a criminal  defendant
material evidence gathered in a criminal investigation which  may
prove important in the preparation of the accuseds defense.37   A
meaningful  license revocation hearing, like a meaningful  trial,
should  therefore include the presence of the arresting  officer,
the  production  of the report of the arresting officer  and  any
tape  recordings,  videotapes, or transcripts  concerning  events
surrounding the arrest.38
          The State asserts that it is generally not required  to
furnish  such evidence in the absence of a request,39 and  points
out  that Hartman did not explicitly request a copy of the  tape.
But  Hartman,  a pro se litigant, had requested a continuance  on
the  ground  that  he had so far been unable to  gather  all  the
evidence  that [he] need[ed], and the court heard testimony  that
he had previously (but unsuccessfully) attempted to obtain a copy
of  the  recording.   We have stated that a  trial  judge  should
inform  a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the  action
he or she is obviously attempting to accomplish.40  Here, Hartman
was  obviously  attempting41  to obtain  potentially  exculpatory
evidence, and the central piece of evidence in this case was  the
recording.42  His failure to request a copy at the close  of  the
hearing  appears  to have been the product of a belief  that  the
tape  did  not  exist.43  In this situation, the hearing  officer
should have informed Hartman that he could request a copy of  the
tape  and, if the State failed to provide the requested evidence,
that she could impose an appropriate sanction.44  Her failure  to
inform  Hartman  of the procedure by which he could  procure  the
tape  that  he  had  previously sought, and  her  issuance  of  a
decision  that was based largely on a recording that neither  she
nor  the  accused  had  heard, violated  Hartmans  right  to  due
process.  We therefore remand for a new hearing.
     D.   Notice of DMVs Procedures
          Finally, Hartman claims that the hearing officer denied
him advance notice of [DMVs] method of proceeding by: (1) failing
to  inform him before the day of the hearing that his continuance
would  be  denied; (2) not giving him notice that  she  would  be
considering  testimony about the recording; and  (3)  failing  to
state  when  she  would  issue a judgment.   But  the  notice  of
administrative hearing stated that, in the absence of  an  answer
regarding a motion for postponement, the motion may be considered
denied.   The second and third elements of Hartmans notice  claim
          are moot.  Because we hold that the hearing officers conduct
regarding the recording was unconstitutional, we need not address
the  question  whether  Hartman received  notice  that  testimony
regarding the recording would be considered.  Similarly,  because
we are remanding for a new hearing, we need not determine whether
the hearing officer provided sufficient notice of the date of her
decision.
IV.  CONCLUSION
          For  the  reasons  set  forth  above,  we  REVERSE  the
judgment  of  the  superior court and REMAND to DMV  for  further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
EASTAUGH, Justice, dissenting.
     A.   Introduction
          I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that Trooper
Tuckwoods  investigatory  stop was  lawful.   When  he  contacted
Morgan  Hartman, Trooper Tuckwood could not have had a reasonable
suspicion  that Hartman posed an imminent public danger  because:
(1) he knew the family car Hartman had been driving was no longer
in  Hartmans  possession and was no longer available  to  Hartman
because it was disabled and being towed; (2) he knew Hartman  was
only  a  passenger in someone elses car; and (3) he expressed  no
belief,  reasonable  or otherwise, that Hartman  might  begin  to
drive  that  car.   The  result the court  reaches  is  therefore
contrary to Coleman v. State.1  It is also contrary to the  three
pertinent  court  of  appeals decisions on which  todays  opinion
relies.          I   first   discuss  the   lawfulness   of   the
investigatory  stop because the courts opinion  focuses  on  that
issue.   Because  I  conclude  that the  investigatory  stop  was
unlawful, it is also necessary to decide whether the unlawfulness
of  the  stop  affects  the license revocation.   The  applicable
statutes,  AS 28.35.031(a) and AS 28.15.166(g), do not  authorize
the state to suspend a motorists license on the basis of a search
that  is  itself the product of an unlawful arrest.   The  arrest
here  was  unlawful because it directly resulted from an unlawful
stop.  The license revocation should therefore be reversed.
     B.   The Investigatory Stop Was Unlawful.
     
          In   Coleman,   we   articulated   the   standard   for
investigatory  stops  in Alaska: a police  officer  may  make  an
investigatory  stop  only if he has a reasonable  suspicion  that
imminent  public  danger exists or serious  harm  to  persons  or
property  has  recently  occurred.2  We recently  reaffirmed  our
adherence  to the Coleman standard in Saltz v. State,  Department
of   Administration,  Division  of  Motor  Vehicles.3    We  also
explained  that a reasonable suspicion must be based on  specific
and articulable facts and a totality of the circumstances.4
          We  have held that a sufficient imminent public  danger
exists for which an officer may make an investigatory stop if the
officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person is driving while
intoxicated.5  But we have never considered whether a person  who
has  ceased  driving  while  intoxicated  continues  to  pose  an
imminent  public  danger under Coleman.  That  case  requires  an
officer  to  have  a  reasonable suspicion that  imminent  public
danger  exists, not that imminent public danger existed  at  some
point in the past.6
          In  a  series  of  cases  Larson  v.  State,7  Romo  v.
Municipality  of  Anchorage,8  and  Shearer  v.  Municipality  of
Anchorage9   the  court of appeals addressed whether,  and  under
what  circumstances,  a  person who was  formerly  driving  while
intoxicated  but  is  no longer doing so  continues  to  pose  an
imminent public danger under Coleman.
          In  Larson, a police officer observed a car stopped  in
the middle of the road, and then watched as the driver of the car
(Larson)  drove on the wrong side of the road, tried to  pick  up
pedestrians, and almost hit a second group of pedestrians.10  The
          officer then witnessed Larson pick up two pedestrians, one of
whom  took  over driving the vehicle Larson had been operating.11
The  officer  stopped the car, immediately contacted Larson  (who
was then a passenger), observed that he appeared intoxicated, and
arrested him for DWI.12  Larson argued that the stop was unlawful
and  that  therefore  evidence  of  his  intoxication  should  be
suppressed.13   The court of appeals rejected his argument.   The
court first reasoned that the officers suspicion that Larson  had
been  driving  while  intoxicated was  reasonable  given  Larsons
erratic   driving.14   The  court  then  addressed  whether   the
requisite  element  of  imminent danger  terminated  when  Larson
allowed  an  apparent stranger to drive the car in  his  place.15
The court concluded that the district court had not clearly erred
when  it  found that it was likely that Larson would have resumed
driving  at  some  later point, and that [the  officer]  was  not
unreasonable  in  believing that the change of  drivers  did  not
eliminate the need to make an investigatory stop.16
          In  Romo,  a police officer followed a truck  after  he
recognized  a  known  prostitute in the  trucks  front  passenger
seat.17   The  truck  pulled into a parking lot  and  the  driver
(Romo) voluntarily exited the truck and approached the officer.18
The  officer  noticed  that  Romo smelled  of  alcohol  and  Romo
admitted to the officer that he had been drinking.19  The officer
then asked Romo to perform field sobriety tests; Romo failed  the
tests.20   The  court of appeals concluded that the investigatory
stop  commenced when the officer asked Romo to perform the  field
sobriety  tests  and  that the officer had sufficient  reasonable
suspicion at that point to warrant that request.21  As the  court
explained:
          The fact that Romo was driving just prior  to
          his encounter with [the officer] demonstrated
          Romos  willingness to drive  in  his  current
          [intoxicated] condition.  At the time of  the
          encounter,  Romo retained possession  of  his
          car  and  it  remained immediately accessible
          for  him to drive.  Under these circumstances
          there  was  a  sufficient  risk  of  imminent
          public  danger  to  warrant an  investigatory
          stop.[22]
          
          In  Shearer, an off-duty police officer observed a Jeep
speeding on the Glenn Highway and swerving between lanes  without
signaling.23  The officer telephoned Anchorage Police  Department
dispatch  for  a  check on the Jeeps license  plates,  determined
where  the  owner  lived, and followed the  Jeep  to  the  owners
residence.24  The driver (Shearer) opened his garage door, parked
the  Jeep  in  his driveway, and exited the Jeep.25   As  Shearer
headed  into his house through the garage, the officer  contacted
him.26   The officer noticed that Shearer smelled of alcohol  and
arrested  him  for  DWI after he had difficulty performing  field
sobriety  tests.27  On appeal, Shearer conceded that he  arguably
posed  an  imminent public danger while he was driving home,  but
claimed that because he parked his Jeep in his driveway,   exited
the  vehicle  and was headed towards his home when [the  officer]
          contacted him,  [the officer] had no basis to reasonably suspect
that Shearer continued to pose an imminent danger to the motoring
public.28   The  court  of  appeals  rejected  Shearers  argument
because,  as  the court explained, at the time of  his  encounter
with the officer, Shearer retained possession of the vehicle  and
it remained immediately accessible for him to drive.29
          Thus,  under Larson, Romo, and Shearer, an officer  may
conduct  an  investigatory stop of a  person  who  is  no  longer
driving  but is suspected of driving while intoxicated  when  (a)
the  driver  just  demonstrated his willingness  to  drive  while
intoxicated, and (b) the driver retains possession of his vehicle
and  it  remains immediately accessible for him to drive.30   The
second prong of that analysis provides assurance that the officer
has  a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger continues
to  exist  even  though  the intoxicated  driver  was  no  longer
driving.31
          The  courts  opinion  correctly  reasons  that  Trooper
Tuckwood had a reasonable suspicion for thinking that Hartman had
been  driving  while intoxicated.  But there is no  justification
for  concluding that Hartman posed an imminent public  danger  at
the  moment  he  was  contacted  by  Trooper  Tuckwood.   Trooper
Tuckwood  could not then have reasonably suspected  that  Hartman
would  again  operate a vehicle that day.   The  Honda  owned  by
Hartmans  father was disabled and Trooper Tuckwood was having  it
towed.   And there was no evidence Hartman might operate the  tan
Taurus  in which he was now a passenger.  Trooper Tuckwood  never
testified  that  he thought Hartman might drive the  Taurus.   As
Hartman  argues,  the Taurus did not belong to  him  and  he  had
manifested a non-driving intention as a passenger in the  Taurus.
Moreover, there was no indication the Taurus driver was  impaired
or might ask or permit Hartman to drive.  Because Hartman was not
in  possession  of  a  vehicle  and no  vehicle  was  immediately
accessible  for  him to drive, Trooper Tuckwood  could  not  have
reasonably suspected that imminent public danger existed when  he
stopped  the Taurus, contacted Hartman, and saw that Hartman  was
merely a passenger in someone elses car.32
          The   courts  opinion  discusses  Larson,   Romo,   and
Shearer.33  But in my view, the opinion recognizes but ultimately
misapplies the factual justification that permitted the court  of
appeals to uphold the stops in those cases:  the availability  of
a  vehicle the defendant might drive and some likelihood he might
actually  drive it.34  To uphold the stop here given the complete
absence of any evidence and any administrative finding that there
was  any likelihood Hartman might drive the Taurus misapplies the
court  of appealss decisions.  And, given the circumstances here,
it would mean police could find imminent public danger justifying
an  investigatory stop whenever a vehicle driver gives a ride  to
an  intoxicated  passenger,  on  a  theory,  unsupported  by  any
evidence  supporting  a  reasonable  belief,  the  driver   might
relinquish  the wheel to the visibly intoxicated  passenger.   No
doubt  such  a relinquishment of control can occur.   But  absent
evidence justifying some reason to think it is likely to occur, a
DUI investigatory stop would not be sustainable in that case, nor
is it in this case.
          It  is  not  just  that those three  court  of  appeals
decisions  uphold stops for reasons absent here.  Our  own  case,
Coleman,  requires us to hold that the absence  of  any  evidence
that the trooper actually thought Hartman might drive the Taurus,
and  the  absence  of any evidence that would have  made  such  a
notion  reasonable, is fatal to this stop.  Coleman requires  the
officer to suspect that imminent public danger exists, not simply
that it existed in the past.35
          The   state   also   argues  that   Trooper   Tuckwoods
investigatory  stop  was lawful because Trooper  Tuckwood  had  a
reasonable  suspicion that serious harm to  persons  or  property
ha[d]  recently  occurred.36   The state  suggests  that  Trooper
Tuckwood  may  have stopped the Taurus to investigate  whether  a
theft  had  been  committed.  But the Honda  was  never  reported
stolen, and Trooper Tuckwood never expressed any concern  in  his
police  report  or his testimony that he thought the  Taurus  was
stolen.   And  the  only damage to the car that Trooper  Tuckwood
reported  was  that  the Honda was dented and  leaking  water  or
antifreeze.
          The state cites Gutierres v. State37 and argues that an
officer  may  investigate a crime before he or she  has  specific
knowledge  that a crime has been committed.  But an officer  must
still have specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion  that serious harm to property has recently occurred.38
In Gutierres, an officer was patrolling a residential area in the
middle  of  the  night when he saw a man jump into the  passenger
side  of  a  car  in a back alley as the officer approached;  the
driver  then  swiftly backed the vehicle down the  alley.39   The
court  of  appeals  held that these were sufficiently  suspicious
circumstances to warrant an investigatory stop on the theory that
there  had  been  a  potential  burglary.40   But  here,  Trooper
Tuckwood  did  not testify that he had witnessed  any  suspicious
circumstances suggesting a car theft.  Instead, he  reported  and
testified  that he knew the Honda belonged to John  Hartman;  his
report  and  testimony  implied that he  thought  Morgan  Hartman
(Johns son) had been driving the car because Morgans friend lived
nearby.
          Because  Trooper  Tuckwood did not  have  a  reasonable
suspicion  that  imminent public danger existed or  that  serious
harm  to  property had recently occurred, the investigatory  stop
was unlawful under Coleman.41
     C.   Hartmans Drivers License Revocation Should Be Reversed.

          Hartmans  drivers license revocation should be reversed
because the statutory provisions underlying administration  of  a
breath test, the revocation of a drivers license, and the drivers
license  revocation appeal process are contingent upon  a  lawful
arrest.42   Alaska Statute 28.15.165(a) requires  an  officer  to
notify  a person who has failed or refused to take a chemical  or
breath   test  administered  under  AS  28.35.031(a)   that   the
department intends to revoke his drivers license and that he  has
a  right  to  administrative review.  Alaska Statute 28.35.031(a)
part of the implied consent statute  provides:
          A  person  who  operates or  drives  a  motor
          vehicle  in  this  state  .  .  .  shall   be
          considered  to  have  given  consent   to   a
          chemical test or tests of the persons  breath
          for  the purpose of determining the alcoholic
          content  of  the persons blood or  breath  if
          lawfully arrested for an offense arising  out
          of  acts alleged to have been committed while
          the  person was operating or driving a  motor
          vehicle . . . while under the influence of an
          alcoholic  beverage, inhalant, or  controlled
          substance. . . . The test or tests  shall  be
          administered  at  the  direction  of  a   law
          enforcement officer who has probable cause to
          believe  that  the  person was  operating  or
          driving a  motor vehicle . . . in this  state
          while  under  the influence of  an  alcoholic
          beverage. . . .
          
(Emphasis  added.)   And  AS 28.15.166(g)  provides  that  a  DMV
hearing  officer may consider two issues when reviewing  the  DMV
drivers  license  revocation decision:  first,  whether  the  law
enforcement officer had probable cause to believe . . . that  the
person  was  operating a motor vehicle .  .  .  while  under  the
influence  of  an  alcoholic beverage,  inhalant,  or  controlled
substance,  and second, whether the person refused to  submit  to
the  chemical  test  or  the  chemical  test  produced  a  result
indicating the person had a blood alcohol content at or above .08
percent. (Emphasis added.)  Under AS 28.15.166(j),  if one of the
subsection  .166(g) issues is determined in the negative  by  the
hearing officer, the departments action shall be rescinded.
          Alaska Statute 28.35.031(a) and AS 28.16.166(g) require
a  drivers  license revocation to be based upon a lawful  arrest.
Under  AS 28.35.031(a), the state may not use breath test results
that  are  obtained following an unlawful arrest.  And  under  AS
28.15.166(j), the drivers license revocation must be rescinded if
the  officer  did  not have probable cause to  believe  that  the
person was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
          For  reasons  I  explained in Part B, the investigatory
stop  was unlawful.  The ensuing arrest was also unlawful because
Trooper  Tuckwood  established probable cause to  arrest  Hartman
with  information gathered during the unlawful stop.  [A]n arrest
is  invalid  if it follows as a consequence of and  depends  upon
[an]  unlawful  stop. . . . [A]n unlawful stop may invalidate  an
ensuing  arrest . . . through the exclusion of evidence  garnered
from   the  stop.43   Without  the  investigatory  stop,  Trooper
Tuckwood would not have had probable cause to arrest Hartman  for
driving  while  intoxicated.  It was only  after  the  stop  that
Trooper  Tuckwood  confirmed the identity of the  driver  of  the
Honda or had any evidence (aside from the smell of alcohol in the
Honda)  of  Hartmans  intoxication.  Because  a  drivers  license
revocation  is  premised on a lawful arrest, and because  Trooper
Tuckwoods  arrest of Hartman was unlawful, we should reverse  his
drivers license revocation.44
     D.   Conclusion
          Because  the  statutory  provisions  governing  drivers
license  revocation proceedings  do not authorize  the  state  to
revoke a motorists drivers license on the basis of a search  that
itself  is  the  product of an unlawful arrest, and  because  the
arrest  here  was  unlawful, we should reverse  Hartmans  drivers
license revocation.
_______________________________
     1     It  is  unclear whether Morris meant that Hartman  was
intoxicated at the time Tuckwood asked or when he was driving the
Honda.

     2     AS  04.16.051(a)  forbids the  delivery  of  alcoholic
beverages to those under twenty-one, but AS 04.16.051(b)(1) makes
an exception for alcohol given by a parent to the parents child.

     3     43  P.3d  157  (Alaska 2002).  In Snyder,  the  driver
claimed that he had not become intoxicated until after he crashed
his vehicle.  Id. at 158.

     4     Although the hearing officer did not inform Hartman of
her  decision  until  the  day  of the  hearing,  the  notice  of
administrative hearing states that, in the absence of  an  answer
regarding a motion for postponement, the motion may be considered
denied.

     5     Hartman described it as a field car, as opposed  to  a
highway car, and denied that he had driven it on the road.

     6     Mercer  testified that Hartman appeared  to  be  sober
before dinner, but that he had consumed beer during dinner.

     7      123  P.3d  958,  961  (Alaska  2005)  (citations  and
quotation marks omitted).

     8     The  State points out that Hartman did not raise  this
issue before the hearing officer.  Cf. Snyder, 43 P.3d at 161 n.9
(holding  that  a driver waived his Miranda claim by  failing  to
argue  it  at the initial . . . hearing).  But, in its brief  and
arguments before the superior court, the State did not raise  the
waiver  issue.   The State, therefore, has waived  the  right  to
argue that Hartman waived the search issue.

     9     Nevers,  123 P.3d at 962.  This rule is applicable  in
both  state and federal courts.  See Ellison v. State,  383  P.2d
716, 718 (Alaska 1963) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55
(1961) for the proposition that the exclusionary rule operates as
a constitutional mandate upon the state courts).

     10    Nevers, 123 P.3d at 964.

     11    Id. (quoting State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska
1976)).

     12    Nevers, 123 P.3d at 963 n.21.

     13    Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976).

     14    Saltz v. State, Dept of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles,
126 P.3d 133, 136 (Alaska 2005) (citing State v. Morgan, 667 P.2d
734, 735-36 (Alaska App. 1983)).

     15    Saltz, 126 P.3d at 136.

     16    Id.; see also State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 456 (Alaska
App. 1989) (noting that police officers may conduct investigatory
stops in cases where a prompt investigation is required . . .  as
a matter of practical necessity) (citation omitted).

     17    Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 701 (Alaska 1978).

     18    Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage, 4 P.3d 336, 338-
40  (Alaska  App. 2000); Romo v. Municipality of  Anchorage,  697
P.2d  1065, 1069-70 (Alaska App. 1985); Larson v. State, 669 P.2d
1334, 1337 (Alaska App. 1983).

     19    669 P.2d at 1335.

     20    Id.

     21    Id. at 1335-36.

     22    Id. at 1337.

     23    697 P.2d at 1067.

     24    Id.

     25    Id.

     26    Id. at 1068-69.

     27    Id. at 1069.

     28    Id.

     29    Id. at 1069-70.

     30    4 P.3d at 337-38.

     31    Id. at 338.

     32    Id. at 340 (citation omitted).

     33    See Larson, 669 P.2d at 1335-37 (affirming the validity
of  an  investigatory  stop after a third  party  had  taken  the
defendants  place  at the wheel and the defendant  had  become  a
passenger).

     34     Champion  v. Dept of Pub. Safety, 721 P.2d  131,  133
(Alaska 1986); see also Whitesides v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety,
Div.  of  Motor  Vehicles, 20 P.3d 1130,  1135-36  (Alaska  2001)
(noting that a drivers license is an important property interest,
and  that  our  cases underscore the importance of the  right  to
drive).

     35     Thorne  v. Dept of Pub. Safety, State of Alaska,  774
P.2d 1326, 1329 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Whisenhunt v. Dept of Pub.
Safety, 746 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska 1987)).

     36     Barcott v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety, Div. of  Motor
Vehicles,  741 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska 1987) (citing Champion,  721
P.2d  at  133); see also Whitesides, 20 P.3d at 1135-36,  1138-39
(noting  that DMV must permit the accused to test the reliability
of  evidence and may not consider evidence obtained in  violation
of  the  right to counsel, and holding that an in-person  hearing
must  be provided on request where the credibility of a party  is
at issue).

     37     Thorne,  774  P.2d at 1330 (holding that  the  States
failure to preserve a videotape of field sobriety tests taken  an
hour after a DWI arrest violated the drivers right to due process
in  a  license  revocation hearing); see  also  Snyder  v.  State
(Snyder  I),  930 P.2d 1274, 1282 (Alaska 1996) (noting,  in  the
context  of a criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated,
that  [i]t  is a fundamental tenet of due process of law  that  a
person  accused  of  a  crime has a right to  attempt  to  obtain
exculpatory  evidence.   And  it is  well  established  that  law
enforcement  has  a  duty  to  preserve  and  disclose   material
evidence, the dereliction of which can deprive the accused of due
process.).  This is particularly true where the evidence is of  a
type that the State can easily preserve.  See Thorne, 774 P.2d at
1330   (explaining,   in  the  context  of  a   videotape,   that
considerations  of fundamental fairness dictate  that  where  the
burden  of  preservation is so slight, evidence being potentially
relevant  to  an  issue of central importance at  the  revocation
proceeding should be preserved).

     38    Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211, 216 n.12 (Alaska 1981).

     39     But see Snyder I, 930 P.2d at 1278 (holding that  the
State  was  required  to help a suspect obtain  evidence  in  the
unique  evidentiary circumstance of a request for an  independent
blood test in connection with a DWI arrest).

     40    Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987); see also
Genaro  v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 846-47 (Alaska
2003) (holding that the superior court erred by failing to inform
a  pro  se  litigant who was obviously attempting to use  a  Rule
36(b)  motion  to preclude summary judgment of the procedure  for
doing  so); Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska
1998) (holding that the superior court erred by failing to inform
a pro se litigant of the specific defects in his notice of appeal
and give him an opportunity to remedy those defects).

     41    Breck, 745 P.2d at 75.  This is distinguishable from a
situation  where the court has reason to believe  that  discovery
issues  have been resolved.  Cf. Rollins v. State, Dept of  Rev.,
Alcoholic  Beverage Control Bd., 991 P.2d 202, 212 (Alaska  1999)
(holding  that  the  due process rights of  an  applicant  for  a
beverage  dispensary  license were not violated  by  the  hearing
officers failure to inquire into alleged discovery violations  by
the  State because correspondence between [the applicant] and the
Board,  copied to the hearing officer, reasonably indicated  that
the discovery issues were resolved).

     42     In many DUI cases, the most important evidence is the
alcohol  test  result.  See, e.g., Barcott, 741  P.2d  at  228-30
(discussing  whether  due process requires consideration  of  the
inherent  inaccuracy of a breath alcohol test when the result  is
within  the  margin of error).  But Hartman did not claim  during
the hearing that he was not intoxicated.  Rather, his defense was
that  he  did not start drinking until after he stopped  driving.
The  hearing officers negative credibility assessment was largely
based on Tuckwoods claims that Hartman had denied having consumed
any  alcohol  at  the time of arrest.  By proving  or  disproving
this, the tape could have had a decisive effect on the result.

     43     According  to  the testimony of Hartmans  mother,  he
instructed  his public defender to obtain a copy in the  criminal
case,  but  no copy was provided.  Even after Tuckwood  told  the
hearing  officer about the contents of the tape, Hartmans  mother
testified that there is no tape, and that the reason why  Hartman
was  unable to obtain it from his public defender was because  it
did not exist.

     44     Sanctions would be based on [t]he states good or  bad
faith in failing to preserve the []tape, as well as the degree of
culpability  on  the  part of the state, the  importance  of  the
evidence  lost,  the prejudice suffered by the accused,  and  the
evidence  of guilt adduced at the trial or hearing.  Thorne,  774
P.2d  at  1331.   In Thorne, we determined that  the  appropriate
sanction was a presumption that the contents of the videotape  at
issue would have favored the accused.  Id.

1    Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).

     2    Id. at 46.

     3    Saltz v. State, Dept of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles,
126 P.3d 133, 136 (Alaska 2005).

     4    Id.

     5    Id.; Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 701 (Alaska 1978).

     6    See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

     7    Larson v. State, 669 P.2d 1334 (Alaska App. 1983).

     8     Romo  v.  Municipality  of Anchorage,  697  P.2d  1065
(Alaska App. 1985).

     9     Shearer  v.  Municipality of  Anchorage,  4  P.3d  336
(Alaska App. 2000).

     10   Larson, 669 P.2d at 1335.

11   Id.

     12   Id. at 133536.

     13   Id. at 1336.

     14   Id. at 1337.

     15   Id.

     16   Id.

     17   Romo, 697 P.2d at 1067.

     18   Id.

     19   Id.

     20   Id.

     21   Id. at 106869.

     22   Id. at 106970.

     23   Shearer, 4 P.3d at 337.

     24   Id. at 33738.

     25   Id. at 338.

     26   Id.

     27   Id.

     28   Id.

     29   Id. at 340 (internal quotation marks omitted).

     30    Id.;  Romo, 697 P.2d at 106970; Larson,  669  P.2d  at
1337.

     31   See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

     32    See  Shearer, 4 P.3d at 340; Romo, 697 P.2d at 106970;
Larson, 669 P.2d at 1337.

     33   Slip Op. at 912.

     34    Shearer,  4  P.3d at 340; Romo, 697  P.2d  at  106970;
Larson, 669 P.2d at 1337.

35   Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

     36   See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

     37   Gutierres v. State, 793 P.2d 1078 (Alaska App. 1990).

     38    See  Saltz  v. State, Dept of Admin.,  Div.  of  Motor
Vehicles, 126 P.3d 133, 136 (Alaska 2005).

     39   Gutierres, 793 P.2d at 1079.

     40   Id. at 1080.

     41   See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

     42    Thorne  v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d  1326,
1331  (Alaska 1989) (stating that whether arresting  officer  had
reasonable  grounds  to  believe  defendant  was  driving   while
intoxicated  is  issue of central importance in  drivers  license
revocation  proceeding); Miller v. State, Dept  of  Pub.  Safety,
Div.  of  Motor  Vehicles,  761 P.2d  117,  11819  (Alaska  1988)
(considering  lawfulness of investigatory  stop  under  Coleman);
State  v.  Grier, 791 P.2d 627, 63031 (Alaska App. 1990)  (noting
that  because former AS 28.35.031(a) required probable  cause  to
arrest,  if  arresting  officer did not have  probable  cause  to
arrest  defendant  for  driving while  intoxicated,  trial  court
properly suppressed defendants blood and breath test results).

     43    Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Div., 755 P.2d 701, 703  (Or.
1988).

     44   Because the statutes prohibit the state from revoking a
motorists  drivers  license  on the basis of  a  search  that  is
itself the product of an unlawful arrest, it is not necessary  to
consider  whether the exclusionary rule should  also  operate  in
this  context  to suppress the breath test result obtained  after
the  unlawful investigatory stop.  See Nevers v. State,  Dept  of
Admin.,  Div.  of Motor Vehicles, 123 P.3d 958, 963 n.21  (Alaska
2005) (holding that although exclusionary rule does not apply  to
search  and seizure violations in administrative drivers  license
revocation  proceedings,  there may be potential  exceptions,  as
when  a  Fourth Amendment violation stems from a lack of probable
cause for a DWI arrest).

          This  courts opinion remands for a new hearing  because
it  concludes that the procedure followed by the hearing  officer
at  the  hearing violated Hartmans due process.  Slip Op. at  16.
The  result  I  believe  to  be  required  here  also  makes   it
unnecessary to decide that procedural issue.

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