You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Hutka v. Sisters of Providence in Washington (12/10/2004) sp-5851
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA ELIZABETH HUTKA, ) ) Supreme Court Nos. S- 10706/10735 Appellant/ ) Cross-Appellee, ) Superior Court No. ) 3AN-95-06452 CI v. ) ) O P I N I O N SISTERS OF PROVIDENCE IN ) WASHINGTON, ) [No. 5851 - December 10, 2004] ) Appellee/ ) Cross-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, John Reese, Judge. Appearances: Kenneth W. Legacki, Anchorage, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee. John A. Treptow and Jahna M. Lindemuth, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Anchorage, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices. FABE, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION In this appeal, we address questions arising from the state and federal law overtime claims of a home health care supervisor. Appellant Elizabeth Hutka is a nurse who worked as a supervisor for Providence Hospital and was classified by Providence as exempt from receiving overtime payments after she received a promotion. Hutkas employment responsibilities included supervising nurses who provided personal care to patients in their homes, reviewing time sheets and task sheets, reviewing payroll records, and visiting patients at home to manage their care. The superior court granted summary judgment to Providence on Hutkas Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) claim on the ground that Hutka was exempt under AS 23.10.060(d)(12) because her position included the provision of medical services. The superior court found that Hutka could, however, recover overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). After a bench trial, the superior court found that Hutka had worked an average of 2.71 overtime hours per week from July 1992 to May 1995. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial courts decision. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In October 1990 Providence Hospital hired Elizabeth Hutka as a staff registered nurse. From November 1991 to August 1995, Hutka worked as a supervisor for the Home Health Care unit, headquartered on hospital grounds in Providences former convent. In July 1992 Providence promoted Hutka from a team leader assistant paid on an hourly basis to a home health aide supervisor paid by salary. After giving her this promotion, Providence classified Hutkas new position as exempt from earning overtime wages and stopped compensating her for time worked in excess of forty hours a week. In March 1994 Hutka filed a complaint with the Alaska Department of Labor to ask for an official determination as to whether Providence could classify her as exempt from receiving overtime. Providence initially responded to the Department of Labor that, as a supervisor, Hutka was exempt from the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA); it later also contested the Alaska regulation defining nurses as nonexempt under the AWHA. Hutka filed a complaint in superior court on July 26, 1995 to recover overtime compensation under the AWHA. The trial court denied both Providences summary judgment motion that alleged Hutka was exempt as a supervisor and Providences request for a ruling that nurses should not be entitled to bring overtime claims under the AWHA. The trial court did, however, grant Providence partial summary judgment on January 13, 2000, holding that Hutka could not bring an AWHA claim because AS 23.10.060(d)(12) exempts employees whose employment includes the provision of medical services.1 Providence had already acknowledged that Hutka did not provide medical care as her primary responsibility. In an affidavit submitted on behalf of Providence by Kathy Lum, a co- director of Home Health Care, Lum testified that the primary function of the home health aides that Ms. Hutka supervised was to provide personal care, time sheet and task sheet review and verification, as opposed to medical care, for patients in their homes . . . . The important thing to note is that Ms. Hutka, and the other supervisor of home health aides, Joan Hamilton, both were responsible for reviewing time sheets, task sheets, and giving their approval for payroll purposes. The superior court found, however, that there is no maximum or minimum quantification in the statute. Therefore, based on Ms. Hutkas statements [that she provided patient care], she is exempt. Hutka then moved on February 7, 2000 to amend her complaint to add a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim for overtime compensation. Providence filed a motion to dismiss the FLSA claim, arguing that it did not relate back to the original complaint and that it unfairly prejudiced Providence. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss but allowed Providence to bring a motion to sanction Hutka for her failure to timely allege the federal law claim. The court ultimately assessed attorneys fees in the amount of $7,134.50 against Hutka as a sanction for the untimely amendment. A nonjury trial commenced on June 5, 2000 to determine the number of overtime hours worked by Hutka, and her entitlement to overtime compensation under the FLSA. Providence had required Hutka and other exempt staff to fill out time cards but several witnesses testified that Providence directed that the actual hours worked by exempt employees should not be recorded. Michelle Lorenzen Iverslie, who hired Hutka in July 1992 and supervised her until August 1994, testified that there were times when [Hutka] put down more than 80 [hours] and I would scratch it out and write exempt employee and write 80. Iverslie also stated that there were times that [Hutka] wrote down actual hours but ultimately . . . it had to be 80 hours every two weeks . . . that was the bottom line. Iverslie further testified that while she may not have crossed out the daily number of hours when Hutka put more than eight, she would tell Hutka dont do this again, youre an exempt employee. Joan Hamilton, who held the same position as Hutka and shared responsibilities with her from January 1993 to August 1994, testified that the time cards that were submitted to Providence did not reflect the number of hours she and Hutka worked. Hamilton also testified regarding the number of hours worked by Hutka. [Hutka and I] worked . . . pretty consistently 10 hours a day but more heavily on the payroll weeks. According to Hamilton, payroll was done every two weeks, and she and Hutka were responsible for collecting . . . forms on Fridays before payroll and also going . . . to Providence on the weekends to collect [forms] . . . then [they] would come home . . . [each] with a stack of forms that [they] had to go through minutely detailed exercises tallying up . . . many . . . hours were spent . . . to get those papers submitted to payroll by their deadline Monday morning . . . life on payroll weekends was pretty much work. Hutka herself testified with regard to the time cards that she had made an effort to keep track of extra hours worked but was reprimanded by [her] supervisors that [she] was messing up the whole payroll system by doing that. Hutka also testified that [the time card] had to say eight on Monday through Friday whether [she] came to work or not or whether [she] was there 10 hours. Hutka alleged that she worked an average of 11.16 hours of overtime a week for the period from July 1992 to May 1995. The superior court found that there were inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence presented: Ms. Hutka told the Department of Labor that time cards were accurately kept, at least after a certain point and then testified differently at trial. Ms. Hutka put time on the time cards when she was taking annual leave and also when she was on sick leave. After considering this conflicting evidence, the court found that it was more likely than not that Hutka worked an average of 2.71 hours of overtime per week, the estimate given by Providence. The court granted a directed verdict to Providence as to Hutkas claims that shift differential and on-call pay rates should be included in the computation of overtime rates, finding that the shift differential part of the salary . . . is a contract provision and its not a contract to which Ms. Hutka was a party . . . . Her contract with Providence was as a supervisory employee that didnt include that and what she has available to her are the FLSA remedies. She has no contract remedies in that sense so shift differential is not applicable . . . . As to the on-call pay, the standard there is the extent to which it burdens her life and the testimony from Ms. Hutka as well as . . . Ms. Hamilton, was that it seemed to be an insignificant burden on her life . . . . The superior court ultimately awarded Hutka $14,574.18 in unpaid wages, $10,584.96 in prejudgment interest (10.5% per annum), $14,574.18 in liquidated damages, and $5,678.63 in attorneys fees. On the issue of liquidated damages, the court found that [a]lthough this is a close question, it does appear more likely than not that the employer was testing the line and had reason to believe that there was no exemption applicable to Ms. Hutka . . . . Certainly there was not clear and convincing evidence of good faith. Hutka appeals the following trial court decisions: (1) the determination that she is exempt under AWHA as a provider of medical services; (2) the finding in favor of Providences estimate that Hutka worked an average of 2.71 hours of overtime a week; (3) the decision not to include shift differential and on- call rates in the computation of overtime; and (4) the assessment of attorneys fees against her for the untimely amendment of her complaint. Providence cross-appeals on two points, arguing that the superior court erred in its decision to award both prejudgment interest and liquidated damages under an FLSA claim for overtime and that the court erred in allowing Hutka to claim and receive damages for three years of overtime under the two- year statute of limitations. III. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review We review grants of summary judgment de novo.2 We must determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and