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Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass'n. v. City of Fairbanks (4/11/97), 934 P 2d 759
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal correction before publication in the Pacific Reporter.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K
Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
FAIRBANKS FIRE FIGHTERS )
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1324, ) Supreme Court No. S-7415
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION )
OF FIRE FIGHTERS, ) Superior Court No.
) 4FA-91-1451 CI
v. ) O P I N I O N
CITY OF FAIRBANKS, )
Appellee. ) [No. 4801 - April 11, 1997]
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth
Judicial District, Fairbanks,
Mary E. Greene, Judge.
Appearances: Brett M. Wood, Fairbanks, for Appellant. Paul J.
Ewers, Deputy City Attorney, Office of the City Attorney,
Fairbanks, for Appellee.
Before: Compton, Chief Justice, Rabinowitz, Matthews,
Eastaugh, and Fabe, Justices.
COMPTON, Chief Justice.
The Fairbanks Fire Fighters Association appeals from a
judgment of the superior court denying it full, reasonable
attorney's fees. We affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The Fairbanks Fire Fighters Association (FFFA) is a labor
organization which represents the fire fighters of Fairbanks. FFFA
entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City
of Fairbanks (City). In the event of a grievance, the CBA required
the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the
In August 1991 the City, citing "budgetary constraints,"
unilaterally limited the number of fire fighters who could be
called in on overtime. (EN1) This action reduced the minimum
staffing level of each twenty-four hour shift from eight fire
fighters to six. (EN2) The reduction was not accompanied by any
decrease in the services the fire fighters provided.
FFFA immediately filed a grievance under the CBA. FFFA
also sought an injunction to compel the City "to provide the
funding necessary"to maintain sufficient staffing levels pending
resolution of the grievance. The City opposed injunctive relief,
arguing that FFFA's claim could not be litigated until arbitration
required by the CBA was complete. In addition, the City Manager
testified that if the court ordered a return to eight-person
minimum shifts, "[the City] could not accomplish it . . . I'd have
to close down the department." The City conceded that the decline
in Fire Department funding had resulted in increased risks to the
The superior court granted a preliminary injunction,
finding that the City's action "poses the threat of grave and
serious harm to the public"and to the fire fighters. The court
also found that the shift reduction "is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining which may not be unilaterally imposed by the
[City]." Following that decision, the City rescinded its staffing
In October 1995 FFFA attempted to recover the actual
costs and attorney's fees it had incurred in seeking the
injunction. The superior court denied FFFA's request for actual
attorney's fees on the grounds that the City had not acted in bad
faith and that FFFA was not a public interest litigant. The court
did award FFFA, as the prevailing party, partial attorney's fees
pursuant to Civil Rule 82 as well as costs pursuant to Civil
Rule 79. This appeal followed.
A. The Superior Court's Ruling Regarding Bad Faith Conduct
Was Not Clearly Erroneous.
The superior court concluded that "there was no vexatious
conduct or bad faith by the City which would justify an award of
actual attorney's fees." This court will not disturb a lower
court's factual determinations unless they are "clearly erroneous."
State Farm Ins. Co. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 843 P.2d 1210,
1213 (Alaska 1992) (superior court's finding that there was no bad
faith conduct was not error). "We deem a factual finding to be
clearly erroneous when we are left with a definite and firm
conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made, even
though there may be evidence to support the finding." Brosnan v.
Brosnan, 817 P.2d 478, 480 (Alaska 1991) (citation omitted). While
the record reflects conduct which the superior court might conclude
was questionable, that conduct does not compel us to conclude that
the superior court was mistaken in finding that the City had not
acted in bad faith and had not engaged in vexatious conduct.
Case law does not delineate precisely between a losing
claim and a bad faith claim. Assertion of an unpersuasive defense
does not constitute bad faith conduct per se. We also have been
hesitant to allow excessive attorney's fee awards which might
discourage meritorious litigation. See Malvo v. J.C. Penney, 512
P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973) (awarding full costs in the absence of
bad faith was error, and would be a "serious detriment"to the
judicial system). However, when a claim lacks any legal basis, we
have not hesitated to reverse a trial court's failure to find bad
faith or frivolous conduct. See Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d
1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987) (superior court erred in not finding a
suit frivolous when that suit had no legal basis). A "design to
mislead or deceive another"also may constitute bad faith conduct.
The action for which FFFA seeks its actual attorney's
fees arose out of a wilful breach of the CBA by the City. (EN4) In
the course of that litigation, (EN5) the City Manager testified
that the City lacked the funds to restore overtime payments, and
would have to close down the Fire Department if FFFA prevailed.
The City's attorney carefully noted that the City was not "broke,"
but simply had not "budgeted"the necessary funds and therefore was
unable to fulfill its obligations. Several days later, the City,
with no apparent effort, managed to restore funding as required by
the preliminary injunction.
The superior court could have concluded that this conduct
constituted bad faith. It is clear that the City's representation
to the fire fighters, and to the court, that the City would have to
close down the Department if the superior court granted the
injunction was untrue. (EN6) Moreover, there is evidence that the
City had raised the same defense during similar labor disputes.
(EN7) This evidence could support a finding that the City wilfully
asserted a defense it knew to be false. Such an act of deliberate
deception would constitute bad faith conduct.
Again, however, the evidence does not compel us to
conclude that the superior court's finding that the City did not
act in bad faith was clearly erroneous. It is not clear from the
record what steps the City took to comply with the injunction.
Arguably, City authorities allocated the funds necessary to comply
with the injunction, and in the absence of that action, the
Department might have been closed. If so, the City Manager's claim
would have been true when made. As noted, the City's attorney
stated that the City was not "broke,"and argued that compliance
with an injunction would be burdensome, rather than impossible.
(EN8) While the City's "crisis by designation"may have been a
bargaining tool as FFFA argues, the record does not point only to
that conclusion. Since this action never proceeded beyond the
preliminary injunction stage, there is little of record to
determine whose version regarding the cuts and the City's
compliance with the injunction preponderates. The City Manager's
statement might be viewed as less than candid. However, neither
that statement, nor other evidence in the record, compels us to
hold as clearly erroneous the finding that the City had not acted
in bad faith. Trial courts possess substantial discretion
regarding attorney's fee awards, and should exercise particular
caution in granting full reasonable attorney's fees. See Malvo,
512 P.2d at 587. A finding that FFFA had not proven bad faith
conduct was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we will not
disturb the superior court's determination that FFFA is not
entitled to full, reasonable attorney's fees under the bad faith
exception to Civil Rule 82. (EN9)
B. FFFA Does Not Qualify as a Public Interest Litigant.
"A prevailing public interest plaintiff is normally
entitled to full reasonable attorney's fees." Hickel v. Southeast
Conference, 868 P.2d 919, 923 (Alaska 1994)(citations omitted). To
qualify as a public interest litigant, a party must satisfy four
(1) Is the case designed to effectuate strong
(2) If the plaintiff succeeds will numerous
people receive benefits from the lawsuit?
(3) Can only a private party have been
expected to bring the suit?
(4) Would the purported public interest
litigant have sufficient economic incentive to
file suit even if the action involved only
narrow issues lacking general importance?
Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404
The superior court denied FFFA public interest litigant
status on the ground that FFFA did not satisfy the fourth
criterion, lack of economic incentive. (EN10) We review the
superior court's denial of public interest status for an abuse of
discretion. Stein v. Kelso, 846 P.2d 123, 127 (Alaska 1993)
(miners who claimed they were deprived of a property interest
without just compensation were not public interest litigants).
A public interest litigant may have some minimal or
indirect personal interest in the outcome of an action, so long as
that party's interest is insufficient to provide an incentive to
litigate in the absence of public interest concerns. Anchorage
Daily News, 803 P.2d at 404 (newspaper which brought an action to
force disclosure of information required to be public by law was a
public interest litigant despite its minor commercial interest in
the disclosure of newsworthy information). In Municipality of
Anchorage v. Citizens For Representative Governance, 880 P.2d 1058
(Alaska 1994), officials challenging a petition to recall them were
public interest litigants despite the fact that their offices
carried monthly stipends. Id. at 1062 (while salary is usually
sufficient incentive to prompt suit, normal compensation of
elective office does not bar public interest status, due to "strong
public interest in fair and honest elections"). Similarly, in
Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State, 900 P.2d 1191 (Alaska
1995), a party challenging a permit allowing "exploratory"scallop
fishing in an area closed to commercial fishing was a public
interest litigant because it sought only injunctive relief, its
members stood to collect nothing if they prevailed in the action,
and the litigation would have no impact on that party's ability to
fish in the closed area. Id. at 1199. Conversely, if a party has
an economic interest which would be sufficient in and of itself to
inspire litigation, that party cannot qualify as a public interest
litigant. In Abbott v. Kodiak Island Borough Assembly, 899 P.2d
922 (Alaska 1995), homeowners who argued that a rezoning scheme
would "amount to a tak 'had sufficient economic incentives to
proceed with the litigation without the issues that were also
shared by others'"and thus were not public interest litigants.
Id. at 924. Similarly, in Acevedo v. City of North Pole, 672 P.2d
130, 137 (Alaska 1983), a police officer seeking reinstatement had
sufficient economic incentive in regaining his job to disqualify
him as a public interest litigant.
FFFA's litigation was motivated at least in part by
safety concerns. The City conceded that the staffing cuts
adversely affected fire safety in Fairbanks. The superior court
also noted that the fire fighters themselves faced increased risk
as a result of the staff reduction. Moreover, restored overtime
funding, the relief which FFFA sought, would address both problems
However, FFFA's solution to those safety problems would
result in increased overtime payments from the City directly to
members of FFFA. (EN11) Indeed, FFFA argued that if the City truly
lacked sufficient funding to make such payments, the suit would be
meaningless. If the usefulness of the suit was contingent on the
ability of the City to make payments to FFFA's members, then FFFA
was not economically "disinterested"in the litigation. Here, as
in Abbott, the would-be public interest litigant's attempt to serve
a public purpose directly furthered that party's financial
interests. In the same way that the plaintiff in Acevedo had an
economic incentive to regain his job, FFFA's members had an
economic incentive to regain overtime payments. While FFFA can
argue that such payments were required to address the safety
concerns which prompted the action, the members of FFFA clearly had
a direct economic stake in the action which exceeded the indirect
interests of the litigants in Kodiak Seafood Processors and
Anchorage Daily News. (EN12)
Since the relief FFFA seeks is direct payment of
substantial funds to its members, FFFA would have "sufficient
economic incentive to file suit even if the action involved only
narrow issues lacking general importance." Anchorage Daily News,
803 P.2d at 404. Accordingly, there is ample evidence to support
the superior court's finding that FFFA does not qualify as a public
interest litigant even though its financial interest in this case
is closely intertwined with safety concerns. We will overturn the
superior court's determination only if the court abused its
discretion. Stein, 846 P.2d at 127. We are unpersuaded that it
The decision of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
1. FFFA claimed that the fire fighters brought the suit "to assert and protect not only their
private rights and interests in the preservation of their lives, health and safety, but also the
preservation of the lives, health, safety and property of the public."
2. The City operates under a "tax cap,"which both limits property tax revenue and requires
the City to maintain an unencumbered reserve fund equal to its 1988 reserve.
3. Black's Law Dictionary includes "a design to mislead or deceive another,"as well as a
refusal to fulfill a contractual obligation "not prompted by an honest mistake"as to rights or
duties, "but by some interested or sinister motive,"within the definition of bad faith. Black's
Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990).
4. The City was aware that its staffing cuts would trigger a grievance, as indeed they did.
Moreover, the City never denied that the CBA required maintenance of the status quo pending
grievance resolution. Under the CBA, "[w]hen any matter in dispute has been referred to the
grievance procedure . . . the conditions and provisions prevailing prior to the time the dispute
arose shall, insofar as it is possible and consistent with normal operations, not be changed until
the decision is rendered." Thus, under the CBA, whenever arbitration was triggered, the parties
were required to maintain the status quo during the proceedings. Nevertheless, the City
unilaterally imposed the cuts.
5. FFFA initially sought to recover attorney's fees as damages for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The court properly rejected that claim on the ground that
attorney's fees are unrecoverable as damages. Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft, 705 P.2d 446,
452 n.8 (Alaska 1985) (attorney's fees are not an item of damages).
6. It is less clear how a senior City official, who professed detailed knowledge of the City's
financial status, could be unaware that his declaration was false.
7. In 1989 the City claimed that it lacked the appropriated funds to pay a three percent raise
agreed upon, and that FFFA would either have to abandon the raise or seven fire fighters would
be laid off. FFFA refused to abandon the increase, and seven fire fighters were laid off. After
arbitration on the issue began, the City "found"the funds to reinstate the laid-off workers.
8. A generous interpretation of the events would be that the City faced a crisis "by
designation"in that it earmarked funds in such a way as to place it in a difficult situation.
9. Had we concluded that there was bad faith conduct on the part of the City, FFFA would
be entitled to receive full or substantially full fees under Civil Rule 82. Alaska N. Dev., Inc.
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33, 42 n.9 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041
(1984). The superior court held that FFFA was precluded from recovering its costs and
attorney's fees as an element of damages for the alleged breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. FFFA's contention that Alaska should adopt an additional "bad faith"
exception to the common law bar against fee recovery lacks merit, since Alaska already
possesses a mechanism for recovery of full reasonable attorney's fees in the event of bad faith
on the part of the non-prevailing party. FFFA has presented no compelling reason to create a
second mechanism for recovery of attorney's fees, nor does reason suggest any benefits to be
gained from doing so. See Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936, 949 (Alaska
10. FFFA's claim satisfies the other three criteria. The City concedes that the cuts adversely
affected public safety. FFFA's action is designed to "effectuate strong public policies"by
redressing that danger. Moreover, numerous people threatened by increased fire danger in
Fairbanks stand to benefit from FFFA's action. The City concedes that the third requirement
is also satisfied.
11. A substantial amount of money was at stake. The City Manager testified that the City's
actions had cut average overtime expenditures by $4000 per week. In addition, the superior
court required FFFA to post a bond of $32,000 before granting the preliminary injunction.
12. FFFA argues that its pursuit of injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages, indicates
that its interest in this case was safety rather than financial gain. Indeed, in Kodiak Seafood
Processors, the plaintiffs' request for solely injunctive relief cut in favor of public interest status.
Kodiak Seafood Processors, 900 P.2d at 1199. However, as noted, the relief FFFA requested
consists entirely of renewed payments directly to its members, in marked contrast to the
plaintiffs in Kodiak Seafood Processors, who received nothing. As a result, the distinction
between injunctive relief and damages has little meaning in this context, and this argument lacks