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Brianna Marie Peterson v. MOA (10/15/2021) ap-2710

Brianna Marie Peterson v. MOA (10/15/2021) ap-2710

                                                              NOTICE
  

           The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the  

          Pacific Reporter.  Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal  

           errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:  



                                         303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
  

                                                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
  

                                           E-mail:  corrections @ akcourts.gov
  



                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  



BRIANNA MARIE PETERSON,  

                                                                                Court of Appeals No. A-12891  

                                          Appellant,                         Trial Court No. 3AN-16-06203 CR  



                                v.  

                                                                                             O P I N I O N  

MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,  



                                          Appellee.                              No. 2710 - October 15, 2021  



                     Appeal   from   the   District   Court,   Third   Judicial   District,  

                                                                  

                     Anchorage, Douglas Kossler, Judge.  



                     Appearances:               Richard        K.     Payne,       Denali       Law       Group,  

                     Anchorage,  for  the  Appellant.    Sarah  E.  Stanley,  Assistant  

                     Municipal          Prosecutor,         and      Rebecca         A.    Windt        Pearson,  

                     Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for the Appellee.  



                     Before:   Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,  

                                                                     

                     Judges.  



                     Judge WOLLENBERG.  



                     Brianna Marie Peterson was involved in a traffic accident that severely                                 



injured another driver.  The Municipality of Anchorage charged her with one count of                           


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

driving with a revoked license, but did not bring any charges directly related to the                                                     

accident.1  



                                                                                                                                  

                      Peterson  pleaded  guilty  to  the  single  count  of  driving  with  a  revoked  



                                                                                                                                 

license. At the sentencing hearing, the Municipality did not present any formal evidence  



                                                                                                                                                 

or sworn testimony about the accident or the reasons for Peterson's revoked license.  



                                                                                                                                             

Nonetheless, the traffic accident figured prominently in the district court's decision to  



                                                                           

impose a term of imprisonment and to order restitution.  



                                                                                                                                     

                      On appeal, Peterson  challenges her  sentence and  the restitution  order,  



                                                                                                                                   

contesting the court's reliance on an accident for which she was not separately charged  



                                                                                                                                  

or convicted.  We conclude that - in the absence of a conviction related to the accident  



                                                                                                                                 

or  any  indication  in  the  record  that  the  losses  were  caused  by  Peterson's  criminal  



                                                                                                                                          

conduct, as opposed to her negligence - restitution was improperly imposed in this  



                                                                                                                                 

criminal case and must be pursued in a separate civil action. However, we also conclude  



                                                                                                                                 

that, given the broad goals of sentencing and the purposes underlying the statutory  



                                                                                                                                           

prohibition on driving with a revoked license, the court could reasonably rely on the  



                                                                                                                                            

circumstances  surrounding  Peterson's  criminal  conduct  in  formulating  her  term  of  



                                                                                                                                  

imprisonment, particularly since Peterson never contested that she was at least partially  



                                          

at fault for the accident.  



                                                                                                                                    

                      We  therefore  reverse  the  restitution  judgment,  but  otherwise  affirm  



                   

Peterson's sentence.  



                                 

           Background facts  



                                                                                                                                  

                      AccordingtotheMunicipality's chargingdocument, in June2016, Peterson  



                                                                                                                                          

was driving in the middle lane of the road when she allegedly turned in front of a bus that  



      1    Former Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 09.28.019(B)(1) (pre-July 2016).   



                                                                    - 2 -                                                               2710
  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

was   being   driven   in   the   left   lane.     The   driver   of   the   bus   swerved   to   avoid   hitting  



Peterson's car, causing the bus to collide with a light pole.                                                                                                The bus driver was badly                              



injured and hospitalized.                                         When the police checked the status of Peterson's Washington                                                                      



driver's license, they discovered that it was revoked.                                                                                      



                                   Although the Municipality charged Peterson with driving with a revoked                                                             



license, Peterson was not charged with any additional criminal offenses arising out of the                                                                                                                                 



accident.   Peterson ultimately pleaded guilty to a single count of driving with a revoked                                                                                                                  



license, with sentencing open to the district court.                                                               



                                   At sentencing, the court found an aggravating factor - that Peterson had                                                                                                              



                                                                                                                                                                                    2  

prior criminal convictions similar in nature to the current offense.                                                                                                                                                   

                                                                                                                                                                                           The court was  



                                                                                                                                                                                         3  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

therefore authorized to impose a term of imprisonment of up to 1 year. 



                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                   The prosecutor argued that Peterson should be considered a worst offender  



                                                                                                                                                                                                    

and subjected to the maximum penalty, given her history of driving-related convictions  



                                                                                                                                                                                                    

and the severity of the accident.  (Peterson had several prior driving-related convictions  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

from Washington state:  two prior convictions for driving while license suspended, one  



                                                                                                                                                                                                          

conviction for reckless driving, and one conviction for driving without a valid operating  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

license.)  The prosecutor also argued that the court should impose restitution for the  



                         

accident.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                   Neither party presented any sworn testimony or formal evidence regarding  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

the accident.   (The prosecutor apparently submitted photographs of the scene to the  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

court,  but these photographs are  not  part  of the appellate record.)                                                                                                                   The bus driver  



                                                                                                                                                                             

provided a statement in which he recounted the accident from his perspective:  he saw  



         2        Former AS 12.55.135(a)(1)(C) (2017).   This statute became effective on July 12,   



2016, and it applied to sentences imposed on or after the effective date for conduct occurring  

before, on, or after the effective date.  SLA 2016, ch. 36, §§ 91, 185(u)(4), 188.  



         3        Former AS 12.55.135(a)(1) (2017); AMC 08.05.020(H)(1).  



                                                                                                           -  3 -                                                                                                      2710
  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

 the front tire of Peterson's van turn toward him, he "yanked" his steering wheel to try to                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



 avoid hitting her, and he then clipped Peterson's van and ran into the light pole.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    In her   



 allocution, Peterson apologized for what happened.                                                                                                                                            She said that she had consulted her                                                                                  



 GPS before pulling her car out and "was certain that there was a double-turn lane."                                                                                                                                                                                                                            She  



 nonetheless acknowledged "that does not excuse me being behind the wheel of a car."                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



                                                  Peterson's   attorney   argued   that   the   accident   was   not   a   foreseeable  



 consequence of driving with a revoked license, and that therefore the court should not   



 take it into consideration at sentencing.                                                                                                            The attorney also argued that any restitution                                                                                      



 should be pursued separately through a civil case, where fault could be apportioned                                                                                                                                                                                              



 between the parties.                                                         The attorney noted that the bus driver stated that when he saw                                                                                                                                                                    



 Peterson turn her wheel, he took some evasive action, and that it was unclear how a civil                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



jury would evaluate the relative responsibility of the parties.                                                                                                                                     



                                                  In its sentencing comments, the court found that "it was foreseeable that . . .                                                                                                                                                                                         



                                                                                                    4  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

 an accident would occur."                                                                                    In particular, the court found that Peterson's history of  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

 driving offenses suggested that she had not learned the rules of the road and that, as a  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

 result, she put people at risk when she drove.  Accordingly, the court found that there  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 was a nexus between Peterson's driving with a revoked license and the accident itself.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                                  Based on Peterson's criminal history and the harm to the bus driver, the  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

 court imposed a sentence of 365 days with 190 days suspended (175 days to serve). The  



 court also ordered Peterson to pay restitution for the accident, and, pursuant to Alaska  



             4            The court cited two cases in support of its ruling:                                                                                                                                Johnson v. State , 224 P.3d 105,  



  105-06 (Alaska 2010) (discussing the standard of foreseeability in criminal prosecutions                                                                                                                                              

 based on reckless conduct); Brown v. Anchorage, 764 P.2d 322, 323 (Alaska App. 1988)  

 ("Although causing injury to another person is not an element of the offense of driving while                                                                                                                                                                                   

 intoxicated, it is a foreseeable result of this conduct and aggravates the offense.").  



                                                                                                                                                        - 4 -                                                                                                                                                   2710
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

Criminal Rule 32.6(c)(2), the court gave the Municipality ninety days to file a proposed                                                                                                   



restitution amount.   



                                After the Municipality filed a proposed restitution judgment, the court                                                                                              



ordered restitution totaling $38,831.20 - $30,460 to the bus driver (for lost wages and                                                                                                                   



transportation costs) and$8,371.20 to theMunicipalityofAnchorage(for damagecaused                                                                                                                 



by the bus to the light pole).                         



                                Peterson   now   appeals   her   sentence,   arguing   that   the   court   erred   in  



considering the accident when formulating a term of imprisonment and in imposing                                                                                                           



restitution.  



                 Why we reverse the restitution order  

                                                                                            



                                We  first  address  the  restitution  order.                                                         Peterson  was  convicted,  under  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



AMC 09.28.019(B)(1), of driving with a revoked license.  This ordinance prohibits a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                



person, acting with criminal negligence as to the status of their driver's license, from  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      

driving a motor vehicle when that person's license has been revoked.5  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                                                                       To be liable under  



                                                                                                                                                                                                     

this ordinance - or the state counterpart, AS 28.15.291(a) - a person need not cause  



                                                                                                                                                      

an injury or accident while driving with the revoked license.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                Peterson argues that the restitution order is improper because the crime of  



                                                                                                                                                                                                      

driving with a revoked license is a regulatory offense without a direct victim.  She notes  



                                                                                                                                                                                                         

that the ordinance prohibiting driving with a revoked license does not contain any  



        5       Peterson was convicted under the pre-July 2016 version of this ordinance.                                                                                                    A month  



after Peterson committed her offense, the Anchorage Assembly amended this portion of the                                                                                                                    

ordinance, AMC 09.28.019(B)(1), to make it applicable only to those whose licenses were   

revoked based on the commission of certain prior offenses.                                                                                        See  infra footnote 15 for a  

further description of this amendment.  



                                                                                                   -  5 -                                                                                               2710
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

element   involving   injury   or   a   risk   of   injury,   and   contends   that   evidence   about  the  



accident would likely have been inadmissible had she proceeded to trial on the charge.                                                                    



                       Alaska's   restitution  statutes   provide   that,   unless   a   victim   declines  



restitution, a court shall order restitution for the actual damages or loss caused by the                                                          



                                                                                          6  

                                                                                                                                 

conduct   for   which   the   defendant   was   convicted.                                      In  particular,  AS  12.55.045(a)  



                                                                                                                                             

authorizes restitution, as a direct component of a sentence, "to the victim or other person  



                                               7  

                                                                                                                                                      

injured  by  the  offense[.]"                      And  AS  12.55.100(a)(2)(B)  authorizes  restitution,  as  a  



                                                                                                                                                   

condition of probation, "to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the  



                                                                                                                                               

crime for which conviction was had[.]"  We have previously held that restitution under  



                                                                                                                                                   

both statutes "should be assessed according to the damages or loss arising from the  



                                      8  

                       

defendant's crime[.]" 



      6     Welsh v. State, 314 P.3d 566, 567 (Alaska App. 2013) (discussing AS 12.55.045(a)  



(authorizing restitution as a direct component of   a   sentence) and AS 12.55.100(a)(2)(B)  

(authorizing restitution as a condition of probation)).  



      7     See  also  AS  12.55.045(a)(1)-(2)  (providing  that,  in   determining  the  amount  of  



restitution, the trial court shall consider the "public policy  that favors requiring criminals to  

compensate for damages and injury" and the "financial burden placed on the victim  and those  

who provide services to the victim  and other persons injured by  the offense as a result of  the  

criminal conduct of the defendant").  



      8     Welsh, 314 P.3d at 568.  In this case, the district court imposed restitution as a direct  

                                                      

component of Peterson's sentence. Neither party contests the application of AS 12.55.045(a)  

                                                                                                                              

- the state statute authorizing restitution as a direct component of a defendant's sentence  

                                                                                                                   

- to Anchorage municipal crimes, and we therefore assume for purposes of this appeal that  

                                                                                                                                

it does.  We have previously held that the Anchorage Municipal Code permits the imposition  

                                                

of restitution as a condition of probation.  See Lock v. Anchorage, 1982 WL 889390, at *2  

                                                                        

(Alaska App. Nov. 17, 1982) (unpublished) (noting that AMC 08.50.020(E), the sentencing  

provision of  the Anchorage Penal Code, incorporates by reference AS 12.55.100, which  

                                                                                                   

authorizes the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation).  



                                                                        - 6 -                                                                   2710
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                       The strict elements of the crime of conviction do not necessarily define the                                             



                                                                        9  

parameters of a potential restitution order.                                                                                       

                                                                            However, a court cannot award restitution  



                                                                                                                                                  10  

                                                                                                                               

for uncharged conduct that is distinct from the conduct that resulted in the conviction, 



                                                                                                                                   

unless the parties have agreed that the defendant will be subject to such a restitution  



          11  

                                                                                                                                               

order.          That is, the damages for which restitution is ordered must be caused by the  



                                                                                                                                  

criminal conduct  for  which  the defendant was convicted,  not additional uncharged  

conduct.12  



                                                                                                                                           

                       Peterson was not charged with reckless or careless driving, offenses which  



                                                                                                                                                  13  

                                                                                                                                                      

would require the Municipality to demonstrate the manner in which Peterson drove. 



      9    See Farmer v. State, 449 P.3d 1116, 1124-25 (Alaska App. 2019); Harris v. State, 678  



                                                                                                                                      

P.2d 397, 408 (Alaska App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds by Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d  

1156 (Alaska 1985); Fee v. State, 656 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Alaska App. 1982).  



      10  

                                                      

           See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 628 P.2d 884, 895-96 (Alaska 1981) (reversing restitution  

                                                                                  

order for items stolen in uncharged burglaries);  Schwing v. State, 633 P.2d 311, 313-14  

                                                                   

(Alaska App. 1981) (reversing award of restitution for three uncharged cocaine sales made  

to an informant).  



      11   Kimbrell v. State, 666 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska App. 1983) (holding that a court may  



impose restitution for a separate, dismissed charge only if, inter alia, "the defendant admits,  

                                                                                                

and there is no factual question as to whether, the defendant caused or was responsible for  

the aggrieved party's loss," and "the defendant consents, freely and voluntarily, to make full  

                                                                                                        

restitution").  



      12   See id. (holding that "restitution cannot be required in an amount greater than the loss  

                        

or damage caused by the offense for which a defendant is convicted");  Yannello v. State,  

                                                                                                                        

2014 WL 1691542, at *5 (Alaska App. Apr. 23, 2014) (unpublished) ("Under Alaska law,  

                  

the courts are limited to awarding restitution only for actual damages or losses arising from  

                                                                                  

a defendant's crime." (citing  Welsh, 314 P.3d at 568)).  



      13   See AMC 09.28.010 (reckless driving); AMC 09.28.015 (careless driving); see also  



AS  28.35.400  (state  statute  prohibiting  reckless  driving);  AS  28.35.410  (state  statute  

       

prohibiting negligent driving).  



                                                                      -  7 -                                                                 2710
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

Instead, the ordinance only required the Municipality to show that Peterson drove her                                                                                                                      



vehicle - and that she did so with a revoked license (and with criminal negligence as     



                                                                    14  

to the status of her license).                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                                           Moreover, there was no agreement that Peterson would  



                                                                                                                                                                                                               

pay restitution for the traffic accident, and the Municipality presented no evidence as to  



                                                                                                                      15  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

                                                                                                                            Given this background, the question  

the reasons why Peterson's license was revoked. 



                                                                                                                                                                                                           

is whether Peterson's role in the traffic accident can fairly be considered part of the  



                                                                                              

conduct for which she was convicted.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                 Alaska courts have not previously addressed the question of whether a  



                                                                                                                                                                                                            

defendant can be ordered to pay restitution for a traffic accident that occurred while the  



                                                                                                                                                                                                          

defendant was driving with a revoked license, where the sole charge and conviction was  



                                                                                                                                                                                                       

driving with a revoked license.  But several other state courts have held that the mere  



         14     Former AMC 09.28.019(B)(1) (pre-July 2016).  



         15     Peterson was charged under the pre-July 2016 version of AMC 09.28.019(B)(1) that                                                     



made it unlawful for a person, with criminal negligence as to the status of their driver's                                                                                          

license, to "[d]rive a motor vehicle at a time when that person's driver's license, privilege        

to drive, or privilege to obtain a license has been canceled, suspended[,] or revoked in this  

or another jurisdiction."  See former AMC 09.28.019(B)(1) (pre-July 2016).  The basis for  

the license revocation was not a specified element of the offense.                                                                                          The current ordinance,   

which was enacted in July 2016, makes it a misdemeanor for a person to drive with a revoked   

license only if their license was revoked for a specific reason -                                                                                     i.e., for previously driving   

under the influence or refusing to submit to a chemical test. AMC 09.28.019(B)(1) & (C)(1);                                              

see  also  Anchorage  Emergency   Ordinance  (EO)  No.  2016-1,  §§  3-4  (July   12,  2016);  

Anchorage Ordinance (AO) No. 2016-83(S), §§ 5-6 (July 26, 2016).                                                                                                     (Other instances of  

driving  with  a   revoked  license  are  now  classified  as  minor  offenses.)    The  amended  

definition of the crime did not apply to Peterson because she committed her offense in June     

2016.  



                                                                                                    -  8 -                                                                                              2710
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

occurrence of an accident while the defendant is driving with a revoked license                                                                is  



                                                                                                            16  

insufficient to justify an order of restitution against the defendant.                                                                     

                                                                                                                For instance, at least  



                                                                                                                                               

two courts have held that restitution for injuries sustained as a result of an accident in  



                                                                                                                        

which the defendant was driving with a revoked or suspended license is inappropriate  



                                                                                                                                             

in a criminal case, and should instead be resolved through a separate, civil action.  



                                                                                                                                              

                       In State v. McDonough, McDonough was involved in an accident when the  



                                                                                       17  

                                                                                                                                                

vehicle he was operating  collided with a taxicab.                                           McDonough was driving on a  



                                                                                                                                            

suspended license, and he later pleaded no contest to this charge. At sentencing, the trial  



                                                                                                                                      

court  ordered  McDonough  to  pay  restitution  to  compensate  the  taxi  driver  for  his  



                                                         18  

                                                 

financial losses and medical bills. 



                                                                                                                                        19  

                                                                                                                                             

                       The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the restitution judgment.                                                  The  



                                                                                                                                              

court explained that while it was possible that McDonough was negligent in causing the  



                                                                                                                                 

accident, "negligent operation is not an element of the crime of [driving with a suspended  



                                                                                                                                   

license], and therefore, the conviction [did] not establish that McDonough was negligent  



                                                                                                                     20  

                                                                                                                                            

or that his negligence was the cause of the damages" to the taxi driver.                                                 The court held  



                                                                                                                                 

that, absent an agreement between the parties that the defendant would pay restitution,  



                                                                                               

"there [was] no nexus between the act of driving while one's license is suspended and  



      16   See People v. Taylor, 179 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 12, 225 Cal.Rptr. 430, 436 (Cal. App.  



1986); Schuette v. State, 822 So.2d 1275, 1283 (Fla. 2002); State v. McDonough, 968 A.2d  

549, 551 (Me. 2009); State v. LaFlam, 965 A.2d 519, 521 (Vt. 2008).  



      17   McDonough , 968 A.2d at 550.  



      18   Id. at 550.  



      19   Id. at 551.  



      20   Id.  



                                                                     -  9 -                                                                2710
  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

driving negligently so as to cause an accident" - and that McDonough's liability for the                                                                         

accident could instead be pursued in a separate civil action.                                                     21  



                                                                                                                                                           

                          In State v. LaFlam, the defendant drove his van through the front of a store,  



                                                             22  

                                                                                                                                                       

                                                                   At the time of the accident, the defendant's driver's  

causing damage to the building. 



                                                                                                                                                                

license was suspended  for  driving  under  the influence.                                                        Following  a jury  trial,  the  



                                                                                                                                                                

defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license, and he was ordered to pay  



                                                                                23  

                                                               

restitution for the damage to the building. 



                                                                                                                                            24  

                                                                                                                                                            

                          The Vermont Supreme Court vacated the restitution order.                                                                The court  



                                                                                                                                                        

acknowledged that LaFlam had caused the damage to the store by driving his vehicle  



                                                                                                                                                                    

through the front door.  But the court also noted that LaFlam was never charged with a  



                                                                                                                                                                    

crime directly connected to that act, and was instead only convicted of driving with a  



                                                                                                                                                       

suspended license.  Like the Maine court, the Vermont court explained that the damage  



                                                                                                                                                                

for  which  restitution  is  ordered  must  be  caused  by  the  criminal  act  for  which  the  



                                                                                                                                                          

defendant was convicted - and that the defendant's criminal act must be both a cause- 



                                                                                            25  

                                                                                                                                                    

in-fact and the proximate cause of the damage.                                                   The court concluded that LaFlam's  



                                                                                                                                                      

failure to have a license was simply a condition and not a proper cause of the damage:  



                                       

                          While [the] defendant should not have been driving in light  

                                                                                                                               

                          of his  license suspension,  we  do not see how the license  

                                                                                                                                       

                          suspension alone can be deemed a proximate cause of the  

                                                                                                                          

                          victim's injuries.  Driving without a license, [the] defendant  



      21     Id.  ("If McDonough's driving was negligent, as well as illegal, his liability for the                                                       



accident can be established through a separate, civil action.").  



      22     State v. LaFlam, 965 A.2d 519, 520 (Vt. 2008).  



      23     Id.  



      24     Id. at 524.  



      25     Id. at 521-22.  



                                                                             -  10 -                                                                         2710
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                        could have driven negligently or safely.                                 An accident could       

                        have been caused by another driver's negligence or by forces                                    

                        outside [the] defendant's control.                         [26]  



                                                                                                                                              

                        Two  other  courts  have  vacated  restitution  orders  issued  under  similar  



                                                                                                                                               

circumstances, but left open the possibility that restitution could be ordered under certain  



                                                                                                                                               

narrow circumstances where the government has shown that the accident was the natural  



                                                                                                                                         27  

                                                                                                                                                   

and proximate consequence of the criminal act of driving on a revoked license.                                                               In each  



                                                                                                                                                    

instance, however, the courts determined that the government had failed to meet that  

burden.28  



                                                                                                                                         29  

                                                                                                                                              

                        Like the majority of states that have addressed this question,                                                       Alaska  



                                                                                              

employs a test of proximate causation in evaluating claims for restitution in a criminal  



         30  

case.                                                                                                                                              

              Thus, in order to obtain a restitution order in this case, the Municipality was  



                                                                                                                                                         

required to show both that Peterson's criminal conduct - i.e., her act of driving with a  



                                                                                                                                                    

revoked license - was a cause in fact (a "but for" cause) of the losses incurred, and also  



      26    Id. at 523.  



      27    Schuette v. State, 822 So.2d 1275, 1283-84 & n.9 (Fla. 2002); People v. Taylor,   179  



Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 12-13, 225 Cal.Rptr. 430, 436-37 (Cal. App. 1986).  



      28    Schuette v. State, 822 So.2d at 1284; People v. Taylor, 179 Cal. App.3d Supp. at 12.  



      29    See, e.g., Taylor, 179 Cal.App.3d Supp. at 12; Schuette, 822 So.2d at 1283; State v.  



McDonough , 968  A.2d   549, 551 (Me. 2009); LaFlam , 965 A.2d at 521 (all applying a  

proximate causation test for the imposition of  restitution).  The Washington Court of  Appeals  

has upheld an award of  restitution   for   an accident that occurred while the defendant was  

driving with a suspended license (and was convicted  of  that charge), but the court applied  

solely  a "but for" theory  of  causation.  State v. Harris, 327 P.3d 1276, 1279-80 (Wash. App.  

2014).  



      30    See Ned v. State, 119 P.3d 438, 446 (Alaska App. 2005) (rejecting   a   standard of  



causation limited to "but for" causation because that would extend the scope of  restitution  

beyond the amount that could lawfully be awarded in a civil case).   



                                                                        - 11 -                                                                    2710
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

that the losses were a natural and proximate result of Peterson's criminal conduct to                                                                                    



                                                         31  

which liability should attach.                                                                                                                                     

                                                              Stated differently, the Municipality was required to show  



                                                                                                                                                              

that Peterson's criminal conduct was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the ensuing  



                 32  

                                                                                                                                                        

damage.                 It was not enough  for  the Municipality  to show that  but-for  Peterson's  



                                                                           

driving, the accident would not have occurred.  



                                                                                                                                                                  

                           As cases from other states demonstrate, establishing a proximate cause  



                                                                                                                                                                           

connection under these circumstances is exceedingly difficult.  The act of obtaining a  



                                                                                                                                                                           

license does not guarantee that the driver will not cause accidents, and the fact that a  



                                                                                                                                                                  

defendant's license was suspended or revoked does not necessarily make it more likely  



                                                                                                                              33  

                                                                                                                                    

that the person will be responsible for an accident in the future. 



       31    See  id.;  see  also  Paroline  v.  United   States,  572  U.S.  434,  446,  449-50  (2014)  



(recognizing that "[p]roximate cause is a standard aspect of causation in criminal law and the   

law of torts," and discussing the need to establish both causation in fact and proximate       

causation with respect to a federal restitution statute); Howarth v. State, Pub. Def. Agency,  

925 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Alaska 1996) (explaining that "legal cause encompasses two concepts"  

                                                                                                                      

-  actual  (or  "but-for")  causation  and  causation  grounded  in  legal  policy,  which  asks  

"whether the conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the defendant should  

                     

be legally responsible" (internal quotations and citations omitted)).  



       32    See State v. Malone, 819 P.2d 34, 36 (Alaska App. 1991) ("A criminal defendant can  



be held responsible only for injuries that 'result from' or are 'caused by' his conduct.  But  

                                                                                                                                                                       

the defendant's conduct need not be the sole factor in producing the injury.  Rather, the test  

                                                                                                                                                 

is whether the defendant's conduct was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the result.").  



       33    See LaFlam, 965 A.2d at 523; see also State v. Bakka, 826 A.2d 604, 611 (N.J. 2003)  



("Unlike driving while intoxicated, speeding, or some other conduct from which a reckless  

                                                                                                                                                              

state of mind may be inferred circumstantially, the mere fact that a defendant is an unlicensed  

                                   

driver does not by itself suggest an awareness of risk."); cf. Brown v. Anchorage, 764 P.2d  

                                                                                              

322, 323 (Alaska App. 1988) ("Although causing injury to another person is not an element  

                                                                                                            

of the offense of driving while intoxicated, it is a foreseeable result of this conduct and  

                                                                                                                                                                      

aggravates the offense.").  



                                                                                 -  12 -                                                                            2710
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

                             Indeed,   in   the   tort   context,   driving   without   a   valid   license   does  not  



 generally constitute evidence of negligence.                                                    In that context -                         i.e., in a civil lawsuit          



 arising from a traffic accident - the majority of jurisdictions have held that evidence                                                                             



that one of the parties drove in violation of a driver's license restriction is not admissible                                                                    



 on the question of negligence in the absence of a causal connection between the violation                                                                            



                                34  

 and the injury.                                                                                                                                                 

                                       This is because the defendant's "status as a licensed or unlicensed  



                                                                                                                                                                  

 driver" does not tend to prove or disprove "whether the manner in which [the defendant]  



                                                                                                                                                          35  

                                                                                                                                     

 operated [their] vehicle was a substantial factor in causing the accident." 



                                                                                                                                                                                    

                             Moreover, as we previously noted, negligent operation is not an element of  



                                                                                                                                                                                 

the crime of driving with a revoked license.   Accordingly, awarding restitution for  



                                                                                                                                                                                  

 driving with a revoked license requires a trial court not only to make findings about the  



                                                                                                                                                                                 

 amount of loss and damages (findings that are standard in the restitution context), but  



        34     See Schuette, 822 So.2d at 1283-84 (discussing Brackin v. Boles, 452 So.2d 540, 545  



 (Fla.  1984));  see  also  Taylor,  179  Cal.App.3d  Supp.  at  6  ("In  California,  as  in  most  

                                                 

jurisdictions, it has long been the rule in both civil and criminal cases that evidence that a  

                                                                                                                                                                             

 driver  is  unlicensed  is  not  admissible  on  the  issue  of  negligence  as  the  cause  of  an  

                                                                                                                                                                                  

 accident.");  Rentschler  v.  Lewis,  33  S.W.3d  518,  519  (Ky.  2000)  (holding  that  the  

                                                                                                                                    

 defendant's status as a licensed or unlicensed driver was irrelevant in a tort case because it  

would not tend to prove or disprove whether the manner of his driving caused the accident);  

                                                                                                                        

LaFlam , 965 A.2d at 522-23 (discussing Dervin v. Frenier, 100 A. 760, 761 (Vt. 1917),  

                                                              

which held that the trial court erred in admitting, in a tort case, evidence that the defendant  

- who ran over a pedestrian - did not have a driver's license, finding that this illegality  

                                                                                                   

was "a mere condition and not a cause of the plaintiff's injury").  



        35    Rentschler, 33 S.W.3d at 519; see also Ardinger v. Hummell, 982 P.2d 727, 735 n.29  

                                                                                                                                          

 (Alaska 1999) (recognizing that a plaintiff is not precluded from recovering civil damages  

 arising out of an accident simply because the plaintiff was operating their vehicle without a  

                                                                                                              

 license, at least "absent a causal connection between the lack of a license and the resulting  

 injuries").  



                                                                                      -  13 -                                                                                 2710
  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

also to make additional findings about a defendant's                                           conduct  - findings beyond those                     



                                                                                         36  

that are inherent in the criminal conviction itself.                                          



                                                                                                                                          

                        Under our restitution statute, this is not permitted.  We have previously  



                                                                                                                                                           

stated that "consideration of the precise crime for which [a defendant] was convicted is  



                                                                                                                                                        

of paramount importance" in determining whether a person is an "aggrieved party" for  



                                         37  

                                                                                                                                     

purposes of restitution.                      In Pena v. State, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter  



                                                                                                                                                   

after he drove under the influence and collided with another vehicle, injuring the driver  



                                                                                    38  

                                                                                                                                                        

of the other vehicle and killing the passenger.                                          We upheld an order of restitution for  



                                                                                                                                                 

property  damages  and  injuries  sustained  by  the  driver  since  those  losses  "were  



                                                                                                                                                       

unquestionably the consequence of precisely the same conduct and intent on Pena's part  



                                                                                                                                                           

as the conduct and intent that caused the death with which Pena was charged and . . .  



                        39  

convict[ed]."                



                                                                                                                                                        

                        Similarly, in a pair of cases - Nelson v. State and Schwing v. State - the  



                                                                                                                                               

Alaska Supreme Court and  this Court  held  that only losses caused  by  the conduct  



                                                                                                                                            

underlying  the  conviction  are  compensable  in  restitution.                                                   These  courts  therefore  



                                                                                                                                           

reversed the award of restitution for items stolen in uncharged burglaries and uncharged  



      36    See State v. Baker, 177 A.3d 1093, 1100 (Vt. 2017) ("[B]ecause restitution is triggered     



by   a  conviction,  the  harm   for  which  a  defendant  pays   restitution   must  be  a  directly  

foreseeable result of the criminal act that leads to a conviction.").  



      37    Pena v. State, 664 P.2d 169, 178 (Alaska App. 1983) (citing AS 12.55.100(a)(2)),  

                                                                                                            

rev'd on other grounds, 684 P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984).  



      38    Id. at 171.  



      39    Id.  at 178; see also Farmer v. State, 449 P.3d 1116, 1124-26 (Alaska App. 2019)  

                                 

(holding that, where the defendant did not contest her criminal responsibility for causing the  

                                                                                                                                     

victim's damages and losses, restitution was not limited by the statutory maximum damages  

                                                                                                                                               

threshold that defined the degree of offense).  



                                                                         -  14 -                                                                     2710
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                                                     40  

drug sales, respectively.                                  The United States Supreme Court - interpreting a federal                                                           



restitution statute - has likewise held that a defendant who pleaded guilty to a single                                                                                          



count of use of an unauthorized credit card could not be ordered to pay restitution for                                                                                                 



losses occasioned by additional stolen credit cards, notwithstanding the fact that the                                                                                                  



                                                                                                                                                                                           41  

government proffered evidence that the defendant had stolen these additional cards.                                                                                                              



                                                                                                                                                                                       

In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the position taken by several circuit courts that  



                                                                                                                                                                                        

a defendant could be ordered to pay restitution for additional conduct for which the  



                                                                42  

                                          

defendant was not convicted. 



                                                                                                                                                                        

                             Here, the prosecutor did not present any evidence about why Peterson's  



                                                                                                                                                                                

license was revoked. The court stated that it "believe[d]" Peterson never got her license  



                                                                                                                                                                                     

and therefore never learned the rules of the road, but acknowledged that it had "not  



                                      43  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                            This information was critical to the court's determination that there  

looked into this." 



       40      See Nelson v. State                    , 628 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1981) (reversing restitution order for items  



stolen  in  uncharged  burglaries);   Schwing  v.  State,  633  P.2d  311  (Alaska  App.  1981)  

(reversing award of restitution for three uncharged cocaine sales made to an informant).  



       41     Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 & n.1, 414-16 (1990) (interpreting former  

                                                                                                               

 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1987), which authorizes federal courts to order "a defendant convicted of  

an offense" to "make restitution to any victim of such offense"; now codified at 18 U.S.C.  

                                                                                                        

§ 3663); see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 445 (2014) (interpreting a different  

federal restitution statute as "intended to compensate victims for losses caused by the offense  

                                                                                                                                                                         

of conviction").  



       42      See Hughey, 495 U.S. at 415 n.2 (citing United States v. Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 32 (2d  



Cir. 1989) and United States v. Duncan, 870 F.2d 1532, 1537 (10th Cir. 1989)).  



       43      We note that the judgments for Peterson's prior convictions for driving with a revoked  

                        

license suggest that she was otherwise eligible for reinstatement of her license.  



                                                                                         -  15 -                                                                                     2710
  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

was a causal link between Peterson's criminal conduct and the damages arising from the                                                                   

accident, since a license can be revoked for reasons unrelated to a person's driving.                                                                   44  



                                                                                                                                                        

                        In addition, the district court justified its restitution order by finding that  



                                                                                                                                                

Peterson violated the rules of the road when she "turned into another lane" and "caused  



                                                                                                                                            

the accident." But this is essentially a finding of negligence untethered from Peterson's  



                                                                                       

criminal conviction - a finding regarding her underlying conduct for which Peterson  



                                                                                                                                             

was not charged or tried. Indeed, if Peterson had originally been charged with recklessly  



                                                                                                                                                       

causing physical injury to the bus driver, and the charge dismissed as part of her plea  



                                                                                                                                                         

agreement with the Municipality with no agreement to pay restitution for his injuries, our  



                                                                                                     45  

                                                                                                          

case law would not permit the imposition of restitution. 



                                                                                                                                                  

                        We acknowledge that the state's licensing requirements, and the related  



                                                                                                                                                   

driving with a revoked license statute, serve important purposes.  The state has a strong  



                                                                                                                                                           46  

                                                                                                                                                                

interest in ensuring that its drivers are properly trained and know the rules of the road. 



                                                                                                                                            

And we have previously recognized that the restitution statutes should be construed  



      44    See, e.g., AS 28.15.187 (providing for revocation of a driver's license or privilege to   



drive when a person has used a driver's license as a false or fraudulent identification).  



      45    See Kimbrell v. State, 666 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska App. 1983).  

                    



      46    Cf. Smith v. State, 756 P.2d 913, 915-16 (Alaska App. 1988) (holding that reasonable  



suspicion that a person is driving with a suspended license is a legitimate basis for a traffic  

stop on the ground that the person may pose an imminent public danger to other motorists);  

                                                                     

State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 752 (Alaska App. 1995) (recognizing that license revocation  

is  "akin  to  a  restraining  order  or  injunction,  protecting  the  public  from  future  harm by  

                                                                                                                                                          

depriving an unsafe or irresponsible driver of his or her authority to continue to operate  

                                                                                                                       

motor vehicles").  



                                                                          -  16 -                                                                     2710
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

broadly to effectuate the legislature's purpose of compensating victims and other people                                                        



                                                                                                           47  

fully for losses caused by the defendant's criminal conduct.                                                    



                                                                                                                                                     

                        But without a link between the losses for which restitution was ordered and  



                                                    48  

                                                                                                                                                

                                                        awarding restitution under these circumstances would  

Peterson's criminal conduct, 



                                                                                                                                                        

penalize Peterson for conduct for which she was not convicted nor afforded the right to  



                                                                        49  

                                                                                                                                                  

a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.                                       The risk is too great that a restitution order  



                                                                                                                                                       

under these circumstances will "require[] payment for damage which was caused by  



                                        50  

                                             

noncriminal conduct." 



                                                                                                       

                        This does not mean that a victim is without recourse when an unlicensed  



                                                                                                                                                        

driver negligently causes an accident.  Rather, the victim is free to sue the defendant in  



                                                                                                                                                     

a tort action for negligence.  Such an action ensures that the victim can recover for any  



                                                                                                                                                        

damages caused by the defendant's negligence.   It also ensures that the defendant is  



                                                                                                                                                             

entitled to the substantive protections (e.g., the ability to argue comparative fault) and  



      47    See AS 12.55.045(a)(1) & (2); see also Maillelle v. State, 276 P.3d 476, 479 (Alaska  



App.  2012)  (noting  the  Alaska  Legislature  has  made  it  plain  that  it  intends  Alaska's  

restitution statute to be construed broadly).  



      48    See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420-21 (1990) (rejecting the notion that  



                                                  

the expansive declaration of purpose behind the restitution statute should be read to require  

restitution for acts outside the offense of conviction).  



      49    U.S. Const. amend. VI & Alaska Const. art. I, § 11 (providing for the right to a jury  



trial in criminal prosecutions); see also Hester v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 509, 509-11 (2019)  

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (noting that, to the extent restitution is  

                                                                         

beyond the purview of the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions,  

                                                                                                                                     

then  the  Seventh  Amendment's  right  to  a  jury  trial  in  civil  cases  would  seemingly  be  

                                                                                                                                                       

implicated).  



      50    People v. O'Rourke, 105 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4, 165 Cal.Rptr. 92 (Cal. App. 1980).  



                                                                        -  17 -                                                                    2710
  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

procedural protections (                             e.g., a jury trial) that are not generally available in a criminal                                                      



restitution hearing.   



                              Accordingly, for the reasons discussed, we reverse the restitution order.                                                                          



                Why we affirm Peterson's term of imprisonment                                                                



                              Peterson also argues that, because causing an injury or accident is not an                                                  



element of the offense for which she was convicted, the court erred when it considered                                                                                   



the   accident   and   injuries   to   the   bus  driver   when   imposing   her   sentence.     But   the  



                                                                                                                                                                                      51  

information germane to sentencing is not so restricted, either by statute or case law.                                                                                                     In  



                                                                                                                                                                                          

formulating a sentence of imprisonment, a court "may consider any facts relevant to the  



                                                                                                                                                                                            

defendant's reformation or the need to protect the community from the defendant or  



                                                                                                                                52  

                                                                                                               

those similarly situated, which are verified in the record." 



                                                                                                                                                                                    

                              The goals of sentencing, as set out in AS 12.55.005, are broad, and under  



                                                                                                                                                                                    

this statute, judges are required to consider "the circumstances of the offense" when  



        51     See AS 12.55.005(4) (requiring the sentencing court to consider "the circumstances  



of the offense and the extent to which the offense harmed the victim or endangered the public  

                                                                                                                                              

safety or order").  



        52     Huckaby v. State, 632 P.2d 975, 976 n.2 (Alaska App. 1981); see also Nukapigak v.  

                                                      

State, 562 P.2d 697, 701 n.2 (Alaska 1977), aff'd on rehearing, 576 P.2d 982 (Alaska 1978)  

              

(noting allegations of misconduct must be "corroborated or substantiated by supporting data  

                                                                                                                                                                 

or information" in order to be considered at sentencing); Grandstaff v. State, 171 P.3d 1176,  

 1211  (Alaska  App.  2007)  ("A  trial  judge  may  consider  evidence  of  prior  uncharged  

                                                                                                                                                             

misconduct at a defendant's sentencing if the misconduct is verified."); Brakes v. State, 796  

                                                                                                                                                        

P.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Alaska App. 1990) (holding that a sentencing judge may rely on any  

                                                                                                                                                                                   

information  that  is  verified  in  the  record,  even  conduct  for  which  the  defendant  was  

                                                                                                            

acquitted, given the differing burdens of proof); Willard v. State, 662 P.2d 971, 975 (Alaska  

                                                                                       

App. 1983) (discussing the court's reliance on uncharged allegations of sexual assault at  

                                                                                                                                                             

sentencing).  



                                                                                          -  18 -                                                                                      2710
  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

                                 53  

imposing a sentence.                 Judges  also  maintain  considerable  discretion in formulating an  

appropriate  sentence.54  



                     Here,  the  district  court  evaluated  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  and  the  



Chaney  criteria  (as  codified  in  AS  12.55.005),  identifying  deterrence  and  isolation  as  the  



                                                                                                 55  

                                                                                                                                 

primary  reasons  for  a  more  substantial term  of  imprisonment.                                   The court found that  



                                                                                                                                   

Peterson's potential  for rehabilitation was  "extremely guarded" given her  history  of  



                                                                                                                                   

driving offenses.  And ultimately, although the court considered the extent to which the  



                                                                                                                          

offense harmed the bus driver, the court focused "in particular" on Peterson's criminal  



                                                                                               

history and the need for personal deterrence in imposing the sentence.  



                                                                                                                           

                     One of the primary purposes of the prohibition on driving with a revoked  



                                                                                                                           

license is to protect the public.  And the prohibition on driving with a revoked license,  



                                                                                                                               

together with the attendant penalties for violating the statute, is designed in part to deter  



                                                                                                       56  

                                                                                        

persons with suspended licenses from driving on public highways.                                                       

                                                                                                           Given Peterson's  



                                                                                                                             

history of driving-related convictions, and the totality of the circumstances, we cannot  



                                                                             57  

                                                               

say that the sentence imposed is clearly mistaken. 



     53   AS 12.55.005(4).  



     54   Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997).  



     55   See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).  



     56    Cf.  State  v.  Fearick,  350  A.2d  227,  229-30  (N.J.  1976)    (upholding,  against  



constitutional challenge, mandatory minimum jail term for defendant involved in accident       

while driving with a suspended license, notwithstanding defendant's undisputed lack of fault   

for the accident, in part because the mandatory jail term "provides additional deterrence for     

those who drive while their licenses are revoked").  



     57   McClain v. State , 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).  Peterson also argues that she  

                                                                                              

was prejudiced when the Municipality initially sought to rely on a second aggravating factor  

                                                                                                  

- former AS 12.55.135(a)(1)(B) (2017) (most serious conduct included in the definition of  

                                                                                                                  (continued...)  



                                                               -  19 -                                                         2710
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

                                       Weacknowledgethatitmayappearatleast facially inconsistent toconclude                                                                                                                          



that a court cannot rely on uncharged conduct as the basis for a restitution order, while                                                                                                                                                      



at the same time endorsing the court's reliance on that same conduct in crafting a term                                                                                                                                                         



of imprisonment. But under the restitution statute, a defendant's liability is limited to the                                                                                                                                                          



proximate effects of the offense of conviction, since restitution is intended to allow crime                                                                                                                                                   



victims and others who have suffered losses as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct                                                                                                                                                



to recover monetary damages that would otherwise be subject to recovery only in a civil                                                                                                                                                         



             58  

suit.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                    Without such a limitation - and in the absence of an agreement to pay restitution  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

for uncharged conduct - defendants would lack notice of the permissible scope of their  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                        59  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

financial liability, and their liability would be without any apparent limit. 



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                        In contrast, the permissible term of imprisonment for a given criminal  



                                                                                                                                                                      

conviction is subject to a statutory maximum - a limit that the court may not exceed,  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

regardless of the defendant's uncharged conduct.  So long as a defendant has notice and  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

an opportunity to contest the conduct on which the court relies, and the court makes  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

appropriate findings regarding the defendant's conduct and how that conduct relates to  



          57        (...continued)  



                                                                                                               

the offense).  But having reviewed the record, we see no discernible prejudice to Peterson  

                                                                                                            

since the Municipality withdrew this aggravating factor prior to sentencing and Peterson  

conceded that her prior convictions established the aggravator on which the court ultimately  

relied.  



          58        See Ned v. State, 119 P.3d 438, 446 (Alaska App. 2005).  



          59        See State v. Baker, 177 A.3d 1093, 1100 (Vt. 2017) ("[B]ecause restitution is triggered   



                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

by  a  conviction,  the  harm  for  which  a  defendant  pays  restitution  must  be  a  directly  

foreseeable result of the criminal act that leads to a conviction.").  



                                                                                                                       - 20 -                                                                                                                      2710
  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

 the  Chaney  criteria, we have held that a court may rely even on conduct for which the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 defendant was acquitted in formulating an appropriate sentence.                                                                                                                                                                                  60  



                          Conclusion  



                                                   For these reasons, we REVERSE the order of restitution.  We otherwise  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



 AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  

                                                                                                                                              



             60           See Brakes v. State, 796 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Alaska App. 1990) (permitting sentencing   



judges to rely on conduct for which a defendant was acquitted in enhancing a defendant's   

 term of imprisonment - if the judge concludes, based on substantial evidence, that the                 

 defendant actually committed the crime for which he was acquitted).  



                                                                                                                                                         - 21 -                                                                                                                                                       2710
  

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