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Gray v. State (12/9/2011) ap-2339

Gray v. State (12/9/2011) ap-2339


        The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the 
        Pacific Reporter.   Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal 
        errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts. 

                               303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
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KIRA GRAY,                                      ) 
                                                )           Court of Appeals No. A-10305 
                            Appellant,          )         Trial Court No. 3PA-05-1307 CR 
             v.                                 ) 
                                                )                   O P I N I O N 
STATE OF ALASKA,                                ) 
                            Appellee.           ) 
                                                )            No. 2339 - December 9, 2011 

                Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 
                Palmer, Eric Smith, Judge. 

                Appearances:     David K. Allen, Attorney at Law, Sechelt, B.C., 
                Canada,     for  the  Appellant.     Eric   A.  Ringsmuth,     Assistant 
                Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, 
                Anchorage, and Richard A. Svobodny, Acting Attorney General, 
                Juneau, for the Appellee. 

                Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, 

                BOLGER, Judge. 

                Alaska Statute 47.12.030(a) provides that when a sixteen-year-old minor 

commits certain serious felonies, including murder, the minor "shall be charged, held, 

released   on   bail,   prosecuted,   sentenced,   and   incarcerated   in   the   same   manner   as   an 

adult."    Kira   Gray    argues    that  her   sentence    for  first-degree    murder    violates   the 

----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment and the constitutional 

guarantees of equal protection because she was a minor at the time of her offense. But 

we    conclude    that  this  combination     of  the  automatic    waiver   statute   and  the  adult 

sentencing   statute   is   consistent   with   "evolving   standards   of   decency"   and   that   this 

scheme bears a fair and substantial relationship to the legitimate purposes of punishment. 

                Gray also argues that her sentence of sixty-five years to serve is excessive 

for a murder and kidnapping she committed when she was sixteen years old. But we 

conclude that the sentencing judge gave her rehabilitative prospects "careful scrutiny and 

appropriate weight" and that the resulting sentence was not clearly mistaken. 


                Gray was sixteen years old and dating Mario Page, an Anchorage drug 

dealer. While Page was out of state, Gray stole nine ounces of cocaine from Page and 

gave it to her sister's boyfriend, Terrell Houngues. When Page returned and found out 

about the theft, he became angry. 

                Gray concocted a plan to pacify Page. She falsely told Houngues that she 

had had an argument with Page and that she knew where Page hid money and drugs. She 

suggested to Houngues that they should steal Page's money and drugs. This plan was 

simply a ruse to kidnap Houngues. 

                Gray picked up Houngues and drove him to a remote location in the Mat-Su 

Valley. Page and three other men then arrived in a separate car and forced Houngues into 

the trunk. They drove to   another spot and removed Houngues from the trunk. Page 

demanded to know what became of the nine ounces of stolen cocaine. When Houngues 

denied any knowledge of the drugs, Gray shot him in the knee. Houngues was then 

                                                   2                                             2339

----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

screaming in pain, so Page told Gray to "shut him up." Gray and another man, Tommie 

Patterson, then shot Houngues multiple times, killing him. 

                 Gray   was charged   and   prosecuted as an adult based   on   the statute   that 

automatically waives juvenile jurisdiction for certain serious crimes.  Prior to trial, Gray 

made a motion for the court to declare the automatic waiver statute unconstitutional, but 

Superior Court Judge Eric Smith denied the motion. Gray, Page, and Patterson were 
convicted of murder and kidnapping in separate trials.2 

                 At   the   sentencing   hearing,   Gray   presented   testimony   from   two   mental 

health    professionals.   Drs.   Marty     Beyer    and   Ronald    Roesch    provided     opinions    on 

developmental immaturity in general, along with specific opinions about Gray's mental 

state. Dr. Beyer testified that Gray "showed a variety of kinds of immature thinking ... 

that   led   to   irrational   behavior   and   poor   moral   reasoning,   especially   when   she   felt 

coerced." Dr. Beyer also testified that juvenile sentences should be less punitive than 

adult sentences and should generally provide more and earlier opportunities for parole 

or release because most juvenile offenders are very immature and have "a huge amount 

of developing still to do." 

                 Dr. Roesch testified that Gray was "amenable to rehabilitation and that she 

does have a high potential for change." Like Dr. Beyer, Dr. Roesch emphasized that, in 

crafting a juvenile sentence, the court must take developmental differences between 

juveniles and adults into consideration. 

    1   See AS 47.12.030(a). 

    2   See Patterson v. State, Mem. Op. & J. No. 5713, 2011 WL 2518952 (Alaska App. 

June 22, 2011); Page v. State, Mem. Op. & J. No. 5548, 2009 WL 6327506 (Alaska App. 
Dec. 2, 2009). 

                                                    3                                                 2339 

----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                 At   the   conclusion   of   the   sentencing   hearing,   Judge   Smith      imposed   a 

sentence of ninety-nine years' imprisonment with forty-four years suspended for Gray's 

murder      conviction     and   a   consecutive     sentence     of  ten   years'   imprisonment        for 

kidnapping. Gray now appeals. 


                 The automatic waiver statute does not constitute cruel and 
                 unusual punishment. 

                 As noted above, when a sixteen-year-old minor commits certain serious 

felonies, the minor is "prosecuted, sentenced, and incarcerated in the same manner as an 
adult."3 Under this statute, a minor convicted of first-degree murder is subject to the 

same   sentence   as   an   adult   -   generally   a   sentence   of   twenty   to   ninety-nine   years' 
imprisonment.4 Gray argues   that this statutory scheme violates the state and federal 

prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment  because the statutes do not recognize 

the   differences   in   culpability    between   juveniles   and   adults   by   providing   for   early 

eligibility for discretionary parole. 

                 Gray relies mainly on two recent decisions from the United States Supreme 
Court: Roper v. Simmons6                                       7 
                                 and   Graham v. Florida.  In Roper, the Court concluded that 

the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of individuals who were juveniles at the time 

    3   AS 47.12.030(a).

    4   See AS 12.55.125(a).

    5   U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Alaska Const. art. I, § 12.

    6   543 U.S. 551 (2005).

    7    130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).

                                                     4                                                2339

----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

they committed murder.  In Graham, the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment 
forbids a juvenile from being sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime.9 

                 In both cases, the Court applied a test that focuses on the characteristics of 

the offender, considering whether there is a "national consensus" against the imposition 
of the sentence in question and whether the sentence is categorically unconstitutional.10 

The Court concluded that 

                  juveniles (as a group) are "less deserving of the most severe 
                 punishments"   because,   compared   to   adults,   they   exhibit   a 
                 "lack     of   maturity     and    an    underdeveloped         sense    of 
                 responsibility,"      because     they    are   "more     vulnerable     or 
                 susceptible to negative influences and ... peer pressure," and 
                 because their characters are "not as well formed."11 

                 Under the Alaska Constitution, we have generally applied a different test 

when we have focused on the characteristics of the penalty imposed. We have asked 

whether the punishment is so disproportionate to the offense as to be completely arbitrary 
and shocking to a sense of justice.12 But in a case where the Alaska Supreme Court 

focused   on   the   characteristics   of   the   offender,   it   applied   a  test   similar   to   the   test 

employed in Roper and  Graham, asking whether the sentence violated "the evolving 

    8   543 U.S. at 574-75.

    9    130 S. Ct. at 2030.

    10   Id. at 2022 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008); Roper, 543

U.S. at 572). 

    11  Smith v. State, 258 P.3d 913, 920 (Alaska App. 2011) (quoting                Graham, 130 S. Ct. 

at 2026). 

    12  See, e.g., Green v. State, 390 P.2d 433, 435 (Alaska 1964); McNabb v. State, 860 P.2d 

1294, 1298 (Alaska App. 1993). 

                                                      5                                                2339

----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."13 The present case 

focuses on Gray's status as a juvenile. We will therefore focus on national standards and 

categorical considerations to decide whether a juvenile can be sentenced to an adult 
sentence for first-degree murder.14 

                 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently considered a similar question in 
State v. Ninham.15 Omer Ninham was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 

of   parole    for  first-degree    intentional   homicide.16     On   appeal,    Ninham      argued    that 

sentencing a fourteen-year-old to life imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment.17 

                 The Wisconsin court considered whether sentencing a fourteen-year-old to 
life without parole is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency.18 They noted that 

Graham only prohibited life without parole for nonhomicide offenses and that Roper 
prohibited capital punishment of juveniles.19 But neither case directly addressed the 

    13   Abraham v. State , 585 P.2d 526, 531, 533 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Rust v. State, 582 

P.2d 134, 142 (Alaska 1978)) (holding that a traditional Alaska Native who did not speak 
much English could be sentenced to imprisonment outside his local area). 

    14   See generally Hosier v. State, 976 P.2d 869, 870-71 (Alaska App. 1999) (holding that 

the "excessive bail" clause of the Alaska Constitution should be interpreted similarly to its 
federal counterpart). 

    15   797 N.W.2d 451 (Wis. 2011), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. Sept. 16, 2011) (No. 11- 


    16   Id . at 460. 

    17   Id . at 462. 

    18   Id . at 466. 

    19   Id. at 467. 

                                                     6                                                2339

----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

constitutionality of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for an intentional 

                  The   Wisconsin   court   evaluated   whether   there   is   a   national   consensus 
against sentencing minors to life without parole for intentional homicides.21 They found 

that forty-four states allow life imprisonment without parole for homicide offenses for 
juveniles.22 Moreover, although few juveniles age fourteen or younger have ever been 

sentenced to life without a possibility of parole, the court concluded that the statistic did 
not necessarily show there was a consensus against such a penalty.23                          In summary, the 

court     concluded       that   there    is  no   national     consensus      against     a  sentence      of   life 
imprisonment without parole for an intentional homicide committed by a minor.24 

                  In   addition   to   our   review      of   any   national   consensus,   we   also   have   a 

responsibility to exercise our independent judgment regarding whether an adult sentence 
for a minor convicted of murder serves legitimate penological goals.25  The research that 

Gray relies on suggests that some minors may have a greater potential for rehabilitation 
and that there is a lesser need to isolate them to protect the public.26 This is consistent 

with our previous recognition that rehabilitation and individual deterrence should be 

     20   Id .

     21   Id . 

     22   Id . at 468.

     23   Id .

     24   Id . at 468-69.

     25   Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.

     26   Id. at 2029.

                                                          7                                                   2339

----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

accorded "careful scrutiny and appropriate weight"   in   cases involving youthful first 
offenders convicted of first-degree murder.27 

                But a lengthy sentence for the crime of murder promotes other goals. A 

lengthy sentence affirms the important community norms that protect the value of a 
human life.28    And a lengthy sentence can serve as an important deterrent to potential 

homicide offenders, even when the offenders are juveniles.29 

                Several other courts considering the question have distinguished Graham 

and held that a life sentence can be imposed on a juvenile convicted of murder without 
violating the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.30 We conclude that sentencing a 

minor to an adult sentence for first-degree murder is not categorically unconstitutional. 

                Gray did not receive a life sentence; she received a sentence of only sixty- 

five   years'   imprisonment.   She   will   be   eligible   for   discretionary   parole   after   serving 
twenty-five years of her sentence.31 But Gray argues that this sentencing scheme involves 

    27   Riley v. State, 720 P.2d 951, 953 (Alaska App. 1986). 

    28  See Martin v. State, 664 P.2d 612, 620 (Alaska App. 1983); Weston v. State, 656 P.2d 

1186, 1191-92 (Alaska App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 682 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1984). 

    29  See Riley, 720 P.2d at 952-53; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 

    30  See, e.g., Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1220-26 (11th Cir. 2011); Jackson v. 

Norris,   ___   S.W.3d   ___,   No.   09-145,   2011   WL   478600,   at   *4-5   (Ark.   Feb.   9,   2011); 
Gonzalez v. State, 50 So.3d 633, 635-36 (Fla. Dist. App. 2010); Evans v. State, ___ So.3d 
___, No. 2009-KA-00854-COA, 2011 WL 2323016, at *10 (Miss. App. June 14, 2011); State 
v. Andrews , 329 S.W.3d 369, 376-77 (Mo. 2010); State v. Golka, 796 N.W.2d 198, 215-16 
(Neb. 2011). The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in two cases to 
determine the constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole in murder cases. See Jackson v. Hobbs, ___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 1060941 (Nov. 7, 
2011); Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 1086007 (Nov. 7, 2011). 

    31  See AS 12.55.125(a)-(b); AS 33.16.090(b)(7)(A). 

                                                    8                                               2339

----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

cruel    and   unusual    punishment      because     it  does  not   allow   for  early   eligibility  for 

discretionary parole. 

                As noted above, the combination of the automatic waiver statute and the 

adult sentencing statutes promotes various penological goals, especially the goals of 

general     deterrence    and   affirmation    of  societal   norms.    In  view    of  these   legitimate 

legislative   considerations,   we   conclude   that   the   difficulty   in   applying   the   goals   of 

rehabilitation     and    isolation   to  a  juvenile    offender    does    not   render   this   scheme 

unconstitutionally cruel. The legislature could reasonably determine that, when a minor 

is   convicted     of  first-degree    murder,    general    sentencing     considerations      require    a 

substantial delay before the minor becomes eligible for discretionary parole. This aspect 

of the operation of the automatic waiver statute does not constitute cruel and unusual 


                 The automatic waiver statute does not violate Gray's right to 
                 equal protection. 

                 Gray also argues that the automatic waiver statute violates her right to equal 
protection of the law.32 We apply a three-part "sliding scale" test to analyze this claim 

under   the   Alaska   Constitution:   we   first   determine   the   importance   of   the   individual 

interest impaired by the statute; we next examine the importance of the state's purposes 

underlying the statute; and, finally, we evaluate the relationship between the state's 
purposes and the means employed in the statute.33 

    32  U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1; Alaska Const. art. I, § 1. 

    33  See Williams v. State, 151 P.3d 460, 464 (Alaska App. 2006). 

                                                     9                                                 2339 

----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

                 Applying step one of this test, Gray has "no constitutional right to be tried 
in   a   juvenile   court."34  Her   interest   in   avoiding   adult   penalties   implicates   only   "the 

relatively narrow interest of a convicted offender in minimizing the punishment for an 
offense."35 This narrow interest requires only "legitimate" state purposes to justify the 


                 The second step of the test requires us to identify the purposes for this 

legislation. The waiver statute provides that certain minors are subject to prosecution and 

punishment as adults. We therefore refer to the purposes of criminal administration that 

apply to all offenders: "the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of 

the   offender,   the   rights   of   victims   of   crimes,   restitution   from   the   offender,   and   the 
principle of reformation."37 These constitutional requirements encompass a number of 

legitimate sentencing goals: 

                 Within the ambit of this constitutional phraseology are found 
                 the    objectives     of   rehabilitation     of  the   offender     into   a 
                 noncriminal member of society, isolation of the offender from 
                 society   to   prevent   criminal   conduct   during   the   period   of 
                 confinement,   deterrence   of   the   offender   himself   after   his 
                 release from confinement or other penological treatment, as 
                 well as deterrence of other members of the community who 
                 might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct similar to 
                 that   of   the   offender,   and   community   condemnation   of   the 
                 individual      offender,    or  in   other   words,    reaffirmation      of 

    34   W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska App. 1986).

    35   State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Alaska App. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. State ,

904 P.2d 433, 436 (Alaska App. 1995)). 

    36   See Williams, 151 P.3d at 464. 

    37   Alaska Const. art. I, § 12. 

                                                      10                                                 2339

----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                 societal norms for the purpose of maintaining respect for the 
                 norms themselves.38 

These   goals   give   the   State   "a   strong   and   direct   interest   in   establishing   penalties   for 

criminal offenders and in determining how those penalties should be applied to various 
classes of convicted felons."39 

                 To apply the third step of the equal protection test, we must assess the 

relationship between these legitimate legislative goals and the methods employed in the 

statute. Because Gray's interest is relatively narrow, the constitution requires only a 

"substantial      relationship"    between     the   legislative   goals   and   the   automatic     waiver 

statute.    "In deciding which minors should receive juvenile delinquency dispositions for 

criminal acts, the legislature can draw distinctions between different groups so long as 
those distinctions are not arbitrary or based on a discriminatory classification."41 

                 The waiver statute makes a distinction between minors who are charged 

with a class A or an unclassified   felony offense (who are prosecuted as adults) and 

minors      charged    with    less  serious    crimes    (who    are   presumptively      prosecuted      as 
juveniles).42 This distinction is based in turn on the classification system itself - class 

A felonies "characteristically involve conduct resulting in serious physical injury or a 

    38   State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).

    39  Anderson v. State , 904 P.2d 433, 436 (Alaska App. 1995) (citing Dancer v. State, 715

P.2d 1174, 1180-81 (Alaska App. 1986)). 

    40   See Williams, 151 P.3d at 464. 

    41  Ladd , 951 P.2d at 1225. 

    42   AS 47.12.030(a)(1)-(2), (4). Some juveniles convicted of class B felonies are also 

subject to automatic waiver based on their prior convictions. AS 47.12.030(a)(3). 

                                                     11                                                2339

----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

substantial     risk   of   serious    physical    injury    to  a  person."43    Other     felonies    and 

misdemeanors generally involve less serious misconduct.44 

                 This classification of penalties, based on the gravity of the offense, bears 

a substantial relationship to the purposes of punishment that are constitutionally required. 

"A sentencing system that specifies progressively harsher penalties for progressively 

more serious classes of offenses is neither novel nor impermissible. This is a form of 
classification that has traditionally been recognized and upheld as rational."45 

                 In particular, we have recognized the rationality of the sentencing range for 

first-degree murder: "Legislatures have traditionally reserved the highest penalties for 

intentional homicide. Our legislature could reasonably label it an unclassified offense and 

conclude      that  a  minimum      twenty-year      sentence    was   necessary     for  affirmation     of 
community norms and deterrence of others."46 Thus, we conclude that the sentencing 

range for murder is substantially related to legitimate sentencing goals that emphasize 

the uniquely serious nature of this crime. 

                 Likewise,      there   is  a  reasonably     close   fit  between     the   purposes     of 

punishment and the automatic waiver statute. The legislature could reasonably conclude 

that the more lenient provisions of the juvenile system should not be available for those 

who commit the most serious crimes: "This indication of dangerousness is reasonably 

related   to   the   criteria   for   deciding   whether   a   minor   should   be   dealt   with   under   the 

    43  AS 11.81.250(a)(1).

    44  AS 11.81.250(a)(2)-(6).

    45  Brown v. State, 926 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Alaska App. 1996).

    46  Martin v. State, 664 P.2d 612, 620 (Alaska App. 1983).

                                                     12                                               2339

----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

juvenile system or the adult system."47 We thus conclude that the automatic waiver 

statute    bears   a  substantial   relationship    to  the  legitimate   purposes     of  punishment, 

consistent with the equal rights clause of the Alaska Constitution. 

                The test for equal protection claims under the federal Constitution is less 

stringent than the three-part test for claims under the Alaska Constitution. Since the 

automatic      waiver   statute  complies     with  the   equal   protection   clause   of   the  Alaska 

Constitution,      it  also  complies    with    the  Equal    Protection    Clause    of   the  federal 

                Gray's sixty-five year sentence is not excessive. 

                Gray     also   argues    that  her   composite     sentence    of   sixty-five   years' 

imprisonment is excessive. When imposing this sentence, the judge was required to 
consider the same sentencing objectives we referenced in the previous section.49 The 

weight and priority of these criteria are up to the discretion of the sentencing judge.50 We 

will reverse the sentence after an independent review of the record, only if the judge's 
sentencing decision was clearly mistaken.51  In making this determination, we examine 

the   facts  of  this  case   "in  light  of  the  total  range   of  sentences    authorized    by   the 

    47  Ladd , 951 P.2d at 1225.

    48  See Stanek v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 81 P.3d 268, 272 (Alaska 2003).

    49  AS 12.55.005; see Chaney, 477 P.2d at 444.

    50  State v. Wentz, 805 P.2d 962, 964 (Alaska 1991).

    51  McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1974).

    52   Wentz, 805 P.2d at 965 (emphasis omitted).

                                                   13                                              2339

----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                In this case, the sentencing judge made extensive findings concerning the 

sentencing      goals   and   their  application.    He   found    that  Gray   had    used   her  close 

relationship with Houngues to trick him into getting into her car, and then executed him 

at Page's request. The judge concluded that this "particularly heinous crime" would have 

justified a composite sentence of 109 years to serve for a typical adult offender. 

                The judge found that Gray was well aware that her boyfriend was involved 

with a lifestyle involving drugs and violence. She actively participated because of her 

immaturity - she thought this lifestyle was romantic and exciting. The judge found that 

Gray was probably not as passive as she seemed to the mental health experts; he noted 

that she lied to the troopers and to her sister to cast her behavior in a favorable light. Her 

participation in Houngues's execution was particularly serious because she shot him 

repeatedly until her gun was empty. 

                On the other hand, the judge found that Gray was actually scared that Page 

would   retaliate   if   she   did   not   rectify  her  theft   of   his   cocaine.   She   participated   in 

rehabilitative programs while she was held in jail pending trial and sentencing. And 

although she did not make a formal apology, she did express genuine remorse to the 

mental health evaluators. The judge decided that her immaturity and her rehabilitative 

potential required him to substantially reduce the 109-year sentence that would otherwise 

be warranted by her conduct. He suspended forty-four years of the sentence, leaving 

Gray with sixty-five years to serve. 

                This sentence is less serious than many sentences we have approved for 

juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder. In  Perotti v. State, we affirmed a 

ninety-nine-year sentence for a sixteen-year-old defendant who committed an execution­ 

                                                   14                                              2339

----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

style murder.53 In Hightower v. State, we affirmed   a ninety-nine-year sentence for a 

sixteen-year-old defendant who committed first-degree murder during the robbery of a 
cabdriver.54 In Riley v. State, we affirmed a ninety-nine-year sentence for an eighteen­ 

year-old defendant, with no prior criminal record, who set up the murder of her husband 
in order to pursue an affair with another man.55 And in Ridgely v. State, we affirmed 

ninety-nine-year sentences for a sixteen-year-old defendant convicted of first-degree 

murder,    first-degree  burglary,   and  second-degree     theft,  and  a  seventeen-year-old 
defendant convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree theft.56 

               Gray argues that the testimony of her mental health evaluators and the 

recent research on brain development require a more lenient sentence. But we conclude 

that   Judge   Smith   gave   Gray's   prospects   for  rehabilitation  "careful  scrutiny  and 
appropriate weight," as we have previously required.57 An execution-style murder is a 

particularly   serious   offense,  and  the  sentencing    goals  of  general  deterrence   and 
affirmation of societal norms are especially important for this offense.58  Based on our 

independent review of the record, we conclude that the sentencing decision was not 

clearly mistaken. 

   53  843 P.2d 649, 651 & n.2 (Alaska App. 1992) (collecting cases involving youthful 

offenders convicted of first-degree murder). 

   54  842 P.2d 159, 160-61 (Alaska App. 1992). 

   55  720 P.2d 951 (Alaska App. 1986). 

   56  739 P.2d 1299 (Alaska App. 1987). 

   57  Riley, 720 P.2d at 953. 

   58  See Perotti, 843 P.2d at 651. 

                                               15                                          2339

----------------------- Page 16-----------------------


      We AFFIRM the superior court's judgment and sentence. 

                                   16                                    2339
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