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NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
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303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| JEFFREY GOTTLIEB, | ) |
| ) Court of Appeals No. A-8350 | |
| Appellant, | ) Trial Court No. 3AN-00-2954 CR |
| ) | |
| v. | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 2145 January 25, 2008 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the
Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Elaine M. Andrews, Judge.
Appearances: Gayle J. Brown, Anchorage, for
the Appellant. Kenneth M Rosenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage,
and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General,
Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
Jeffrey Gottlieb obtained a license to practice
medicine in Alaska by misrepresenting his credentials. After
practicing for several years, Gottlieb came to the attention of
the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Department of Law because
of concerns that Gottlieb was overbilling Medicaid.
After an investigation, the grand jury indicted
Gottlieb for perjury, forgery, eight counts of first-, second-,
and fourth-degree theft; and two hundred and twenty-four counts
of second- and third-degree misconduct involving a controlled
substance.1 The trial jury convicted Gottlieb on all counts.
Gottlieb raises several claims regarding his
convictions, ranging from a statute of limitations issue to an
attack on the jury instructions. For the reasons expressed
below, we vacate Gottliebs conviction for perjury, and reverse
his convictions for forgery, two counts of first-degree theft,
and one count of fourth-degree theft, and we affirm Gottliebs
remaining convictions.
Facts and proceedings
In an application endorsed under oath on June 3, 1992,
Jeffrey Gottlieb applied to the State Medical Board for a license
to practice medicine in Alaska. One of the questions on the
license application required Gottlieb to declare where he had
completed his post-graduate internship, also called a post-
graduate year one, which is required when applying for a medical
license. Gottlieb answered that he had completed post-graduate
year one at Monsour Medical Center in Pennsylvania.
The State Medical Board issued Gottlieb a license
based on his answer to the above question together with several
documents that Gottlieb supplied in support of his application.
In November 1993, Gottlieb began practicing medicine in Alaska.
In the fall of 1997, the Alaska Medicaid Fraud Control
Unit began investigating Gottlieb for overbilling Medicaid. As a
result of the investigation, a search warrant was executed on
Gottliebs apartment, which doubled as his office. The Fraud Unit
seized documents recording his treatment of patients. The Fraud
Units investigation revealed that, although Gottlieb had
participated in Monsour Medical Centers post-graduate medical
program, he had not satisfactorily completed the post-graduate
year one requirements. Ultimately, the case proceeded through
indictment and Gottlieb was convicted at trial.
Superior Court Judge Elaine M. Andrews sentenced
Gottlieb to concurrent terms of 10 years imprisonment with 3
years suspended on the perjury, forgery, first- and second-degree
theft counts, and second-degree misconduct involving controlled
substance counts. Gottlieb received lesser concurrent terms on
the remaining counts. Gottlieb appeals.
Discussion
Gottliebs claim that the statute of limitations bars
the perjury charge Gottlieb argues on appeal that the
statute of limitations barred the State from prosecuting him on
the perjury charge. The grand jury charged that Gottlieb
committed perjury by knowingly and falsely claiming to have
completed post-graduate year one on the notarized application for
a license that he submitted to the State Medical Board on June 3,
1992. The grand jury returned the indictment on April 27, 2000
almost eight years after the act for which he was indicted.
Gottlieb raises this claim for the first time on appeal.
In Padie v. State,2 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed
the question whether the statute of limitations was an
affirmative defense that must be asserted in the trial court or
lost, or alternatively, that compliance with the statute of
limitations was a jurisdictional issue that could be raised for
the first time on appeal.3 The court resolved this issue as
follows: In our view, the arbitrary jurisdictional-affirmative
defense distinction should be abandoned in favor of a
case-by-case analysis focusing on the language of the applicable
statute of limitations and the public policies behind its
enactment.4
The State had charged Padie with first-degree murder,
which was not time-barred, but reached an agreement that
permitted Padie to plead no contest to manslaughter even though
prosecution for manslaughter was otherwise time-barred.5 The
supreme court held that the statute of limitations could be
waived by a defendant if: the waiver was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered; the waiver was made for
the defendants benefit and after consultation with counsel; and
the waiver did not contravene the policy reasons underlying the
statute of limitations.6
The normal statute of limitations for prosecuting
crimes is five years.7 If the crime involves a material element
of fraud, AS 12.10.020(a) extends the general time limitation for
up to three additional years. However, if the State relies on
this statutory extension, the prosecution must commence within
one year after the discovery of the offense by an aggrieved
party[.]8 In this case, prosecution of the perjury charge
commenced when the indictment was returned on April 27, 2000.9
The State argues that perjury is a crime that involves
a material element of fraud and, furthermore, that the State
commenced prosecution of this crime within one year of
discovering that Gottliebs conduct constituted perjury.
In an unreported case, Latchem v. State,10 we
addressed whether the crime of making a campaign contribution in
another persons name11 contained a material element of fraud for
purposes of triggering the one-year period for commencing
prosecution under AS 12.10.020(a). We suggested in Latchem that
the application of AS 12.10.020(a) depends on the material
elements of the crime, not on the defendants motivation for
committing the crime.12
There is no specific definition of fraud as that term
is used in AS 12.10.020(a). The State points out that, for
purposes of the property crimes chapter of Title 11, an intent to
defraud means an intent to use deception.13 Blacks Law
Dictionary defines fraud as a knowing misrepresentation of the
truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act
to his or her detriment.14
But even if we assume that the crime of perjury
requires the State to prove a material element of fraud, the
State must still show that Gottlieb was prosecuted within one
year of the discovery of the offense. The Fraud Unit first
learned of potential Medicaid billing problems associated with
Gottlieb on September 24, 1997, and began investigating shortly
thereafter. In September 1998, the State obtained and executed a
search warrant for Gottlieb and his residence. In March 1999,
the Fraud Unit asked its Pennsylvania counterpart for assistance
in obtaining evidence from Monsour Medical Center. Fraud Unit
Investigator Sharon Magier sent an affidavit, dated April 12,
1999, to Don Wojtowich, a special agent in the Pennsylvania
Attorney Generals Office. The affidavit was sent to support the
application for a search warrant in Pennsylvania. Wojtowich
obtained a search warrant based on Magiers affidavit on May 4,
1999, and executed the warrant the following day at the Monsour
Medical Center. Gottliebs complete personnel file was seized.
The documents reflected Gottliebs failure to complete his
internship.
The State argues that, for purposes of AS
12.10.020(a), a criminal offense is not discovered until the
State has probable cause to believe that the defendant committed
the offense. But even assuming this is correct, the perjury
prosecution against Gottlieb was time-barred.
The State maintains it did not have probable cause to
believe Gottlieb committed perjury until a search warrant for
Gottliebs records at the Monsour Medical Center was executed in
Pennsylvania on May 5, 1999. Gottlieb points out that the State
certainly knew by March 1999 that the Monsour Medical Center had
not issued Gottlieb an internship certificate (technically known
as a PGY-1). The State had received a letter from the hospitals
attorney in March 1999 confirming that Gottlieb had not received
a certificate for completing a year of postgraduate training and
had not completed his required rotations. The Fraud Unit
investigator then decided to obtain the hospitals original
records and contacted the Pennsylvania authorities for assistance
with obtaining a search warrant for the records. And earlier, in
September 1998, the State had seized documents from Gottliebs
residence that reflected Gottliebs failure to complete his
internship.
The search warrant for Gottliebs personnel file
executed in Pennsylvania on May 5, 1999, was supported by the
April 12, 1999, affidavit from the Fraud Unit investigator. The
search warrant sought the original records reflecting that
Gottlieb had not completed his internship. It follows that the
State had evidence demonstrating a fair probability or
substantial chance15 that Gottlieb committed perjury by the end
of March 1999, and no later than April 12, 1999. The indictment
was returned April 28, 2000, more than one year later.
Therefore, the perjury prosecution was not commenced within one
year of its discovery. Accordingly, we conclude that Gottliebs
perjury prosecution is time-barred and his perjury conviction
must be vacated.
Gottliebs attack on the forgery conviction
Next, we address Gottliebs attack on his forgery
conviction. Gottlieb argues that the State did not present
sufficient evidence of a forged instrument to sustain his
conviction. Gottlieb was convicted of second-degree forgery
under AS 11.46.505(a)(1). Alaska Statute 11.46.505(a) provides:
A person commits the crime of forgery
in the second degree if he violates 510 of
this chapter and the instrument is or
purports to be
(1) a deed, will, codicil, contract,
assignment, negotiable or other commercial
instrument, or other document which does or
may evidence, create, transfer, alter,
terminate, or otherwise affect a legal
right, interest, obligation, or status; or
(2) a public record.
Alaska Statute 11.46.510(a) defines forgery in the third degree
as follows:
A person commits the crime of forgery
in the third degree if, with intent to
defraud, the person
(1) falsely makes, completes, or alters a written
instrument;
(2) knowingly possesses a forged instrument; or
(3) knowingly utters a forged instrument.
In AS 11.46.580(b)(3), the code defines written instrument to
mean:
[A] paper, document, instrument, electronic
recording, or article containing written or
printed matter or the equivalent, whether
complete or incomplete, used for the purpose
of reciting, embodying, conveying, or
recording information or constituting a
symbol or evidence of value, right,
privilege, or identification, which is
capable of being used to the advantage or
disadvantage of some person.
The State charged Gottlieb with forgery based on the
assertion that he submitted an application for a license to
practice medicine that contained false statements. But such
conduct does not constitute forgery unless the false statements
are designed to misrepresent the true identity of the person who
prepared the application.
Forged instrument is defined in AS 11.46.580(b)(1) as
a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed, or
altered[.] Alaska Statute 11.46.580(a) defines what it means to
falsely make, complete, and alter, a written instrument. To
falsely alter a written instrument means to change it so that the
instrument so altered falsely appears or purports to be in all
respects an authentic creation of its ostensible maker[.]16 To
falsely complete a written instrument means to complete an
incomplete written instrument so that the complete written
instrument falsely appears or purports to be in all respects an
authentic creation of its ostensible maker[.]17 To falsely make
a written instrument means to create a complete or incomplete
written instrument that purports to be an authentic creation of
its ostensible maker, but which is not[.]18
In other words, an instrument or document is forged
only if it is altered, completed, or otherwise created so as to
falsely appear or purport to be an authentic creation of someone
other than its true maker. The State concedes that Gottlieb
prepared and submitted the medical license application, and that
none of the statements in the application suggests otherwise.
The State has never asserted that the document falsely appears to
be an authentic creation of Gottliebs. Thus, even though the
document contained false assertions of fact, those false
assertions did not misrepresent the identity of the person who
prepared the document. Instead, the forgery charge was based on
the States assertion that the document contained false assertions
of fact.
The State now argues that there was evidence in the
record that Gottlieb falsely altered a letter that was submitted
in support of his application. But at Gottliebs trial, the
prosecutor never claimed that this altered letter established the
forgery charge. Rather, the prosecutor argued that the
application itself constituted the forgery. The prosecutor
argued that Gottlieb committed forgery when he submitted the
application that answered the question where did you complete
your training? with the answer the Monsour Medical Center.
Prosecutor: [E]ven though [Gottlieb]
knew better [than to claim that he completed
his training at Monsour], he signed that
application under oath. That ladies and
gentlemen is perjury and forgery, counts one
and two. Perjury is the lying under oath,
count two forgery is submitting the false
document to the medical board.
Because there is no evidence in the record that Gottlieb falsely
altered, completed, or made the application he submitted for his
medical license, Gottliebs conviction for forgery must be
reversed.
Gottliebs attack on the fourth-degree theft
convictions
The grand jury indicted Gottlieb in counts 9 and 10 of
the indictment for two counts of fourth-degree theft. A person
commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or
to appropriate the property of another for himself, the person
unlawfully obtains the property of another.19 Fourth-degree
theft is defined as a theft valued at less than $50.20
In count 9, the grand jury charged Gottlieb with
taking sample medications from Urgent Care Medical Clinic in
Anchorage on June 14, 1998, when Gottlieb was filling in for the
regular doctor who was on vacation. Gottlieb asked Tonya
Dedomenici, a medical assistant at the clinic, if he could have
some sample medications. At trial, Dedomenici testified that
Gottlieb asked me if he could have um, some sample medications
and I told him uh, he could. At that point, Gottlieb took a
couple trash bags the white kitchen type trash bags from the
clinic; opened the boxes containing the sample medications; threw
away the warnings contained in the boxes; and placed the
medications in the trash bags.
Dedominici testified that she had thought that
Gottlieb was experiencing discomfort from a cold or a headache
and that he wanted to use a small dose of cold or headache
medicine to treat the symptoms he was personally experiencing.
Dedominici explained that, when clinic employees had a cold or a
headache, they regularly treated their cold symptoms or headache
with sample medication from the clinic, and that clinic employees
were welcome to do so. But Dedominici testified that Gottlieb
appropriated from the medicine cabinet a large volume (two
kitchen trash bags full) of a variety of medications.
Dedominici also testified that when Gottlieb had
finished taking samples, there wasnt very much left in the
medicine cabinet, and that she was a little surprised by how many
sample medications Gottlieb had taken. Gottlieb told her that he
was taking the samples because he treated patients out of his
house and drug company representatives did not give him samples
like they did for the clinic.
When asked why she had not stopped Gottlieb from
taking so many sample medications, Dedominici testified that she
was not a confrontational person. Dedominici thought that
Gottlieb was asking only to swallow[] a pill or something, on the
spot, to treat a cold or a headache. And she explained that,
although she didnt think it was right for Gottlieb to take so
many sample medications, she did not want to stop Gottlieb
because she was six months pregnant at the time.
Gottlieb argues that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of theft for taking the samples. He points out
that he was given permission to take the samples. The State
counters that Gottlieb took more than Dedominici expected he
would. But Dedominici did not express or communicate any of the
reservations she had about the number of samples Gottlieb took.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we
conclude that Gottliebs conduct in taking the drug samples, with
the express permission of a regular member of the clinic staff,
did not constitute theft. Accordingly, a judgment of acquittal
must enter on that count.
We reach a contrary result on count 10, a charge of
fourth-degree theft for taking drug samples from the Chugach
Family Medical Clinic between August 7 and August 16, 1996. At
the time, Gottlieb was filling in for a staff doctor who was on
vacation.
Gottlieb argues that insufficient evidence supported
his conviction on this charge because the State failed to present
testimony from a witness who observed Gottlieb take sample
medications. But the State presented circumstantial evidence of
theft.
Rosalie Stofflet, the laboratory supervisor at the
clinic during the time of the offense, testified that the clinic
stored a great deal of sample medications in a small store room.
Based on the quantity of samples that were missing after Gottlieb
stopped working at the clinic, she believed that Gottlieb had
taken a significant amount of samples from the clinic. Stofflet
testified that it was very obvious that samples were missing from
the shelves because drug company representatives kept the clinic
well-supplied with samples, and the shelves were full of sample
medications from floor to ceiling along one side of the store
room. Finally, Stofflet testified that she had not given
Gottlieb permission to take any samples from the clinic.
Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the
conviction, we conclude that this quantum of circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain this conviction for fourth-
degree theft.
The attack on the jury instructions for controlled
substances misconduct
Gottlieb argues that the superior court erred in the
jury instructions that related to the counts charging him with
misconduct involving a controlled substance. The State charged
Gottlieb with more than two hundred counts of misconduct
involving a controlled substance for issuing prescriptions from
1996 through 1999.
The jury instructions provided that the State had to
prove that Gottlieb knowingly and unlawfully delivered controlled
substances as specified in each count. The court instructed the
jury that for each count of misconduct involving a controlled
substance, the prescriptions for controlled substances issued by
Gottlieb were unlawful if there did not exist a legitimate
medical purpose for them.
The court defined legitimate medical purpose as
follows:
A legitimate medical purpose in this context
existed if each of the following was
present: (1) the defendants sole purpose in
issuing the prescription(s) was medical as
opposed to any other purpose, (2) the
prescription(s) was reasonably necessary for
treatment of a persons illness or injury,
and, (3) the prescription(s) was issued by
the defendant while acting within the usual
course of professional medical practice and
in accordance with a standard of medical
care generally recognized and accepted
within the medical community.
Gottlieb argues that this instruction was erroneous.
Specifically, Gottlieb argues that the instruction improperly
allowed the jury to convict him of incompetently prescribing
drugs because the instruction allowed the jury to convict him if
he prescribed drugs while not acting within the usual course of
professional medical practice and in accordance with a standard
of medical care generally recognized and accepted within the
medical community.
We recently addressed these same claims in Grandstaff
v. State.21 In Grandstaff, the defendant was also convicted of
numerous counts of unlawfully distributing controlled substances
by writing prescriptions that served no medical purpose. Like
Gottlieb, Grandstaff argued that the superior courts instructions
to the jury erroneously allowed the jury to convict him of those
offenses if the State proved that his decision to write the
prescriptions fell below the standard of practice generally
recognized and adopted within the medical community, even if he
honestly believed there was a medical purpose for writing the
prescriptions.22 In other words, Grandstaff argued that the
instructions allowed the jury to convict him for medical
malpractice. He also argued that the instructions allowed the
jury to convict him if he had some non-medical purpose for
prescribing the drugs, even if he also had a proper medical
purpose.23
In Grandstaff, we acknowledged that the instruction
defining legitimate medical purpose in terms of the standard of
practice generally accepted in the medical community, considered
in isolation, potentially violated due process by allowing the
jury to convict the defendant of a criminal offense for providing
negligent medical care.24 We also acknowledged that a jury
instruction that allowed the jury to convict the defendant if he
had any non-medical purpose for writing a prescription even if
he also had a medical purpose might also violate due process.25
We noted, for instance, that it would be unconscionable to
convict a doctor for prescribing a medication for valid medical
reasons just because the doctor also hoped that the success of
his treatment decisions would improve his reputation and allow
his practice to grow.26
But we found no error in Grandstaffs case because the
instruction defining the elements of the charged offenses of
misconduct involving a controlled substance required the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Grandstaff recklessly
disregarded the fact that the prescriptions he wrote served no
legitimate medical purpose. As we explained, the elements
instruction required the State to prove that there was no valid
medical purpose for writing the prescriptions and that
Grandstaff knew of, or was at least reckless concerning, this
circumstance.27
Unlike the jury in Grandstaff, the jury in this case
was not instructed that the State had to prove that Gottlieb
recklessly disregarded the fact that the prescriptions he issued
served no medical purpose. The jury was instructed that a
prescription did not serve a legitimate medical purpose unless
the defendants sole purpose in issuing the prescription(s) was
medical as opposed to any other purpose. Theoretically, a jury
receiving this instruction might convict a prescribing physician
if the physician was negligent in issuing prescriptions or if the
physician had both medical and non-medical reasons for writing
the prescriptions.
But the State did not argue that Gottlieb was merely
negligent in writing the prescriptions, or that Gottlieb should
be convicted because he had some other purpose in addition to a
medical purpose when he issued the prescriptions. Instead, the
prosecutor announced in opening statement that the case against
Gottlieb for the controlled substances counts relied on evidence
that the prescriptions those counts were based on were issued in
the absence of any medical necessity, and that Gottlieb was
running a pill mill, a scheme to provide drug seeking individuals
with drugs for their own use or for resale on the street. In
final argument, the prosecutor repeatedly argued that Gottlieb
issued all the prescriptions relevant to this case without any
medical necessity, and thereafter summarized the evidence
supporting that theory of prosecution.
This issue is presented to us as one of plain error
because Gottlieb did not object to the pertinent jury
instructions. To constitute plain error, an erroneous
instruction must create a high likelihood that the jury followed
an erroneous theory[,] resulting in a miscarriage of justice.28
The States theory of prosecution for the counts of
misconduct involving a controlled substance was that Gottlieb
issued prescriptions to drug-dependent individuals not to treat
their medical conditions, but to supply them with drugs they were
seeking. The evidence presented by the State supported that
theory. Our review of the record convinces us that the jury did
not follow an erroneous theory leading to a miscarriage of
justice.
The States attack on the validity of Gottliebs medical
license
The States theory of the case for two first-degree
theft counts was that the State Medical Board should not have
issued a medical license to Gottlieb. Besides charging Gottlieb
with perjury and forgery in the application process, the State
premised its prosecution on the first-degree theft charges in
counts 5 and 6 on its assertion that the license issued by the
State Medical Board was invalid. The State argued that, because
Gottlieb was paid for medical services that he performed under
authority of the invalid license, Gottliebs conduct was theft.
Under the Alaska Statutes, the State Medical Board has
the exclusive authority to issue medical licenses.29 The
statutory scheme creating the Medical Board also specifies the
grounds for imposing disciplinary sanctions and includes the
specific ground of obtaining a license by deceit, fraud, or
intentional misrepresentation.30 If the Board finds that a
licensee has committed one (or more) of the grounds for
imposition of a sanction, the Board is authorized to impose a
wide range of disciplinary sanctions including permanently
revoking a license.31
In the superior court, Gottlieb argued that, under
Taylor v. Johnston,32 the State could not contest the validity of
Gottliebs license in the criminal case. The superior court
denied Gottlieb relief on this theory. Gottlieb raises this
issue on appeal, again relying on Taylor. The State does not
discuss Taylor in its brief.
In Taylor, the plaintiff attempted to amend his
medical malpractice complaint before trial to allege a claim of
medical battery.33 Taylor argued that a medical battery claim
was possible because the treating physician whom he was suing had
fraudulently obtained his medical license by misrepresenting his
credentials.34 But the supreme court recognized the Boards
exclusive authority to regulate medical licenses and the wisdom
of that delegation: Such a delegation makes sense because
[m]edicine is a complex subject and ... [t]he Board is a
competent body equipped with the necessary medical knowledge to
determine whether a doctors license to practice should be
revoked.35 Because the Board had the exclusive authority to
regulate the physicians license, the supreme court reasoned that
the proper forum in which to attack the validity of the
physicians license, in the first instance, was the Medical Board,
not the superior court.36
We conclude that this same analysis applies here. The
proper forum to attack the validity of Gottliebs license was in
the State Medical Board. Accordingly, we reverse counts 5 and 6.
Gottliebs remaining claims
Gottlieb argues that there is insufficient evidence in
the record to support his convictions for first-degree theft in
counts 3 and 4, and second-degree theft in counts 7 and 8. Count
3 charged that Gottlieb overbilled Medicaid by more than $75,000
by upcoding the procedures for which he billed. (Upcoding means
assigning a billing code that reflects a more intensive or
complicated procedure calling for higher payment than the
procedure performed.) Count 4 charged that Gottlieb stole more
than $30,000 by billing for services not performed or documented.
Count 7 charged that Gottlieb stole more than $5,000 for other
upcoding. Count 8 charged theft of more than $14,000 based on
the payment for Gottliebs unwarranted prescriptions.
Viewing the evidence in the record, together with the
reasonable inferences from that evidence, in the light most
favorable to upholding those convictions, we conclude that there
was sufficient evidence presented for a reasonable juror to
conclude that the State had proven those counts beyond a
reasonable doubt.37
Conclusion
We VACATE Gottliebs conviction on count 1. We REVERSE
Gottliebs convictions on counts 2, 5, 6, and 9. We AFFIRM
Gottliebs convictions on counts 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10, and on the
counts of misconduct involving a controlled substance.
_______________________________
1 AS 11.56.200(a), AS 11.46.505(a)(1), AS 11.46.120, AS
11.46.130, AS 11.46.150, and AS 11.71.030(a)(2), respectively.
2 594 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1979).
3 Id. at 55-57.
4 Id. at 57.
5 Id. at 54.
6 Id. at 57.
7 AS 12.10.010.
8 AS 12.10.020(a).
9 AS 12.10.030(b).
10 Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 4084
(August 4, 1999), 1999 WL 587238.
11 See former AS 15.13.070(d), recodified as AS
15.13.074(b).
12 Latchem, Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 4084 at 6,
1999 WL 587238 at *3.
13 See AS 11.46.990(11)(A).
14 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th ed. 2004).
15 State v. Joubert, 20 P.3d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 2001)
(quoting Van Sandt v. Brown, 944 P.2d 449, 452 (Alaska 1997)).
16 AS 11.46.580(a)(1).
17 AS 11.56.580(a)(2).
18 AS 11.56.580(a)(3).
19 AS 11.46.100(1).
20 AS 11.46.150.
21 171 P.3d 1176 (Alaska App. 2007).
22 Grandstaff, 171 P.3d at 1208.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 E.g., Matter of Estate of McCoy, 844 P.2d 1131, 1134
(Alaska 1993); Heaps v. State, 30 P.3d 109, 114 (Alaska App.
2001).
29 AS 08.64.101 (requiring the Board to admit, license,
and discipline physicians); AS 08.64.170 (mandating that all
Alaska physicians be licensed by the Board).
30 AS 08.64.326(a)(1).
31 AS 08.64.331.
32 985 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1999).
33 Id. at 461.
34 Id. at 463-464.
35 Id. at 465 (quoting Storrs v. State Med. Bd., 664 P.2d
547, 554 (Alaska 1983)).
36 Id.
37 See Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).
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