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NOTICE
The text of this opinion can be corrected before the
opinion is published in the Pacific Reporter. Readers
are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts:
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Fax: (907) 264-0878
E-mail: corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| STEPHEN C. COLLIER, | ) | |
| ) Court of Appeals No. A-9404 | ||
| Appellant, | ) Trial Court No. 3AN-05-10882 MO | |
| ) | ||
| v. | ) | |
| ) O P I N I O N | ||
| MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, | ) | ) |
| Appellee. | ) No. 2054 July 14, 2006 | |
| ) | ||
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judi
cial District, Anchorage, Suzanne Cole,
Magistrate.
Appearances: Stephen C. Collier, pro se,
Anchorage. Rachel Plumlee, Assistant
Municipal Prosecutor, and Frederick H.
Boness, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for
the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
and Stewart, Judges.
STEWART, Judge.
Stephen C. Collier was convicted of speeding.1 On
appeal, he contends that the officer improperly obtained evidence
against him his drivers license and proof of registration and
insurance after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel. He also argues that he was denied
necessary discovery at trial. And, finally, he argues that
Alaska Criminal Rule 16(a) is unconstitutional. We affirm.
Facts and proceedings
On May 12, 2005, Anchorage Police Officer James Conley
stopped Collier on the Glenn Highway near the South Birchwood
exit for driving seventy-eight miles per hour in a sixty-five
mile-per-hour zone. Officer Conley cited Collier under Anchorage
Municipal Code 09.26.030(C) for speeding.
On June 1, 2005, Collier filed an eleven-page discovery
request, seeking information on the creation of the courts, the
chartering of Anchorage, the true name of the government accuser,
IRS documents, and police operating procedures. On July 26,
2005, the court granted the motion in part, noting that the city
is responsible for providing discovery materials to Collier,
e.g., officers notes of traffic stop.
At the trial on August 29, 2005, the Municipality
stated that it had provided Collier with the following discovery:
copies of the ticket, the certificate of
calibration for the radar instrument the
officer used, Officer Conleys certificate of
training for laser speed detection, and a
compact disk with the video recording of the
traffic stop ... . The only thing left that
we could find to be discovered to the
defendant is the recording of ... the police
dispatch calls. Sent defendant the notice
that that is available.
Collier said he did not request or want the dispatch
communications. The court then reviewed the remaining discovery
requests and found that none of the other items requested are
either relevant, within the agency and control of the prosecutors
office, nor required as obligatory discovery under Rule 16.
In its case in chief, the Municipality called Officer
Conley, who testified that on the morning of May 12, 2005, he was
parked on the Glenn Highway watching traffic. He saw a white
General Communication, Inc. van traveling at what appeared to be
eighty miles per hour. His laser indicated that the van was
actually going seventy-eight miles per hour. He pulled the van
over for speeding. Collier produced his drivers license and told
the officer that he thought he was going seventy to seventy-two
miles per hour. Collier apparently then asked if he was under
arrest and demanded an attorney. At trial, Collier argued
that he was denied discovery and that Officer Conley illegally
asked for his drivers license and proof of registration and
insurance after he had requested an attorney. The court held
that the Municipality had provided all relevant discovery and
that Collier did not have a right to counsel because he was
neither being interrogated, nor was he in custody. The court
found Collier guilty of violating AMC 09.26.030. This appeal
followed.
Discussion
Colliers claim that his right to counsel and
privilege against self-incrimination were violated
during the traffic stop
Collier claims that the traffic stop was a
constitutional seizure that entitled him to invoke his Fifth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel. He asserts that, after
he told the police he was invoking his right to counsel, the
police could not require him to produce his drivers license until
his counsel arrived on the scene.2
We find no merit to this claim. The right to counsel
under the Fifth Amendment only arises during custodial
interrogation, and Collier concedes he was not in custody for
purposes of Miranda v. Arizona.3 We agree that Collier was not
in Miranda custody. Routine traffic stops generally do not
constitute Miranda custody and thus do not trigger the right to
counsel.4 Here, Officer Conley stopped Collier, asked for his
license and proof of registration and insurance, and then cited
him for speeding. There is no evidence that this was anything
other than a routine traffic stop. Because Collier was not in
custody, Officer Conley did not violate Colliers Fifth Amendment
right to counsel when he asked for Colliers drivers license.5
To the extent that Collier may be asserting that his
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated, we
recognized in Thiel v. State6 that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only upon the commencement of adversary criminal
proceedings, not during purely investigative stages of a case.7
When Officer Conley stopped Collier for speeding, adversary
criminal proceedings had not commenced. Accordingly, Officer
Conley did not violate Colliers Sixth Amendment right to an
attorney.
Finally, Collier appears to claim that Officer Conley
violated his privilege against self-incrimination by demanding
his drivers license. The Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution
provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
proceeding to be a witness against himself.
Alaska law requires motorists to have in their
possession a valid drivers license and to present that license
for inspection upon demand by a peace officer.8 Collier argues
that requiring him to present his license violated his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination because it identified him
for the purpose of prosecution.
In Byers v. California,9 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the closely related issue of whether it violates
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to require
motorists to produce identification at the scene of an accident.10
The Court noted that [e]ven if we were to view the statutory
reporting requirement as incriminating in the traditional sense,
in our view it would be the extravagant extension of the
privilege Justice Holmes warned against to hold that it is
testimonial in the Fifth Amendment sense.11 The disclosure of the
drivers name and address is an essentially neutral act and
[w]hatever the collateral consequences ... the statutory purpose
is to implement the state police power to regulate use of motor
vehicles.12 Moreover, [a] name, linked with a motor vehicle, is
no more incriminating than the tax return, linked with the
disclosure of income ... . It identifies but does not by itself
implicate anyone in criminal conduct.13
We have also held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination does not extend to the
requirement that motorists produce a drivers license and thereby
identify themselves for purposes of prosecution.14 Officer
Conley, therefore, did not violate Colliers privilege against
self-incrimination when he demanded that Collier produce his
drivers license.
Colliers request for additional discovery
On June 1, 2005, Collier filed an eleven-page discovery
request, seeking information on the creation of the courts, the
chartering of Anchorage, the true name of the government accuser,
IRS documents, and police operating procedures. The Municipality
provided Collier with a copy of the ticket, the certification of
the laser used in this case, Officer Conleys training certificate
for operating the laser, and the video recording of the traffic
stop. The prosecutor also offered to provide Collier with the
recording of the radio traffic between the officer and dispatch,
but Collier said he did not want the dispatch communications.
Magistrate Cole found that none of the other items requested are
either relevant, within the agency and control of the prosecutors
office, nor required as obligatory discovery under Rule 16.
Collier argues that all the information he requested
should have been disclosed because it would have had a direct
bearing on the trial. We overturn discovery orders only for
abuse of discretion.15
Several sections of Criminal Rule 16 are relevant to
this appeal. Criminal Rule 16(a) mandates that discovery prior
to trial shall be as full and free as possible consistent with
protection of persons, effective law enforcement, and the
adversary system. Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(A) requires the
prosecuting attorney to disclose the names, addresses, and
statements of persons known by the government to have knowledge
of relevant facts, written or recorded statements made by the
accused or a co-defendant, documents or objects obtained from the
accused or intended to be used at trial, and records of prior
convictions of the defendant and any witnesses the prosecutor
intends to call. Criminal Rule 16(b)(3) requires the prosecution
to disclose material or information within its possession or
control that tends to negate the guilt or reduce the punishment
of the accused. Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) allows the court in its
discretion to require disclosure of other relevant material and
information. And, finally, Criminal Rule 16(b)(8) states that
the prosecution is not required to disclose legal research or
attorney work product. None of these sections requires the
prosecution to disclose information on the creation of the
courts, the chartering of Anchorage, or any of the other
documents Collier requested.
Magistrate Cole had discretion under Criminal Rule
16(b)(7) to order the disclosure of other relevant material and
information. But she correctly found that none of the other
items requested are either relevant, within the agency and
control of the prosecutors office, nor required as obligatory
discovery under Rule 16. The only relevant information within
the Municipalitys control (the ticket, the laser certification,
Officer Conleys training certificate for operating the laser, the
video recording of the traffic stop, and the dispatch
communications) was provided or made available to Collier. The
rest was either nonexistent, irrelevant, or publicly available.
None had a tendency to negate his guilt.16 Magistrate Cole
therefore did not abuse her discretion in refusing to order
additional discovery.17
Colliers claim that Criminal Rule 16 is
unconstitutional
In passing, Collier argues that Criminal Rule 16 is
unconstitutional. His entire argument, raised only in his
conclusion, is as follows:
[T]his court should hold that Criminal Rule
16(a) is unconstitutional, as the withholding
of any inculpatory or exculpatory evidence
material from the Accused must be disclosed
and under no circumstance can evidence be
withheld to protect persons (the State of
Alaska), protect effective law enforcement
(Alaska State Troopers, Anchorage Police
Department and other Police Departments and
Police) and the adversary system (Judges,
Attorneys, Prosecutors and other court
personnel) or any other entity.
Collier appears to be arguing that Criminal Rule 16(a)
unconstitutionally limits discovery by providing that discovery
should be as full and free as possible consistent with protection
of persons, effective law enforcement, and the adversary system.
But he does not cite any legal authority for this position. He
also does not show how he was prejudiced. As noted above,
Collier received all relevant discovery.18
Conclusion
Colliers conviction is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 09.26.030(C).
2 Collier also claims that his rights to counsel and his
privilege against self-incrimination were violated when the
officers demanded his registration and proof of insurance. We
have not addressed this claim because we do not see how proof of
registration or insurance could be used against Collier as
evidence of speeding.
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602,
1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 439-43, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150-52, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317
(1984); Clark v. Anchorage, 112 P.3d 676, 678-79 & n.4 (Alaska
App. 2005).
4 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-43, 104 S. Ct. at 3150-52; Blake
v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 515 (Alaska App. 1988).
5 See id.
6 762 P.2d 478 (Alaska App. 1988).
7 Id. at 481 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429-30,
106 S. Ct. 1135, 1145-46, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986); Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481
(1985); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S. Ct. 1877,
1881, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972)).
8 AS 28.15.011(b); AS 28.15.131.
9 402 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 1535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1971).
10 Id. at 427, 91 S. Ct. at 1537.
11 Id. at 431, 91 S. Ct. at 1539.
12 Id. at 432, 91 S. Ct. at 1540.
13 Id. at 433-34, 91 S. Ct. at 1540.
14 Winterrowd v. State, ____ P.2d ____, Alaska App. Opinion
No. 2050 (June 23, 2006).
15 See R.E. v. State, 878 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Alaska 1994);
Linne v. State, 674 P.2d 1345, 1354-55 (Alaska App. 1983).
16 See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1974).
17 See R.E., 878 P.2d at 1345; Linne, 674 P.2d at 1354-55.
18 See Adamson v. Univ. of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 n.3
(Alaska 1991).
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