Made available by Touch N' Go Systems, Inc. and
Law Offices of James B. Gottstein.
406 G Street, Suite 210, Anchorage, AK 99501
(907) 274-7686 fax 333-5869

You can of the Alaska Court of Appeals opinions.

Touch N' Go®, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother. Visit Touch N' Go's Website to see how.

State v. Gottschalk (7/7/2006) ap-2052

State v. Gottschalk (7/7/2006) ap-2052

     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878


) Court of Appeals No. A-8798
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 4BE-03-854 CR
v. ) O P I N I O N
Appellee. ) No. 2052 - July 7, 2006
Appeal    from     the
          Superior  Court,  Fourth  Judicial  District,
          Bethel, Leonard R. Devaney, Judge.

          Appearances:    Kenneth J. Diemer,  Assistant
          Attorney  General,  and Diane  L.  Wendlandt,
          Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special
          Prosecutions  and  Appeals,  Anchorage,   and
          David  W. M rquez, Attorney General,  Juneau,
          for  the  Appellant.  Margi  Mock,  Assistant
          Public  Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public
          Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and  Mannheimer
          and Stewart, Judges.

          COATS,  Chief Judge.
          MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.

          Criminal  Rule  45(c)(1) provides  that  the  time  for
bringing  a  defendant to trial is calculated from the  date  the
charging document is served upon the defendant.  This case raises
the  question of whether, when the defendant is in court  on  one
charge and is given a copy of a new indictment in a separate case
by  the  prosecutor at the direction of the judge, the  defendant
has  been served with this indictment for purposes of the  speedy
trial  rule.   We conclude that this does not constitute  service
for purposes of the rule.

          Factual and procedural background
          Gottschalk  was  convicted in 1998  of  felony  driving
while intoxicated and other related offenses. In 2003, Gottschalk
was  on  probation  from  these earlier convictions.  Gottschalks
probation   officer  filed  a  petition  to  revoke   Gottschalks
probation based upon information that Gottschalk had violated his
probation  by consuming alcohol and driving under the  influence.
Gottschalk was arrested in Bethel on the probation violations and
brought to Anchorage.
          Gottschalk was brought to court on a petition to revoke
his  probation.  While at the courthouse, the assistant  district
attorney informed the court, and Gottschalk, that Gottschalk  had
been  indicted in Bethel on a recent felony DUI which had been  a
basis  for the petition to revoke.  Superior Court Judge  Michael
L.  Wolverton  instructed the prosecutor  to  obtain  information
about  the  Bethel case for Gottschalk and his attorney.    In  a
court  proceeding on the petition to revoke on July 9,  2003,  at
the  direction  of the court, the prosecutor gave Gottschalk  and
his  attorney  a  copy of the indictment for felony  DUI  in  the
Bethel case.
          On  October  8,  2003,  Gottschalk  was  served  in  an
Anchorage jail with the warrant issued by the superior court  for
the felony DUI indictment.  On October 9, the Anchorage court set
bail  on  this  charge  for Gottschalk and appointed  the  Public
Defender  Agency  to  represent him.  Gottschalk  was  ultimately
transported to Bethel and arraigned on the indictment on November
10,  2003.   Superior  Court Judge Dale O. Curda  concluded  that
Criminal  Rule 45 had started on October 8, 2003, when Gottschalk
was  served  with  the  warrant.  Gottschalks  counsel  objected,
arguing that he was served for Criminal Rule 45 purposes when  he
received  the  copy of the indictment in open court  on  July  9.
Gottschalk filed a motion to dismiss based upon Criminal Rule 45.
          Following  an  evidentiary hearing,  Judge  Leonard  R.
Devaney  granted  Gottschalks motion to dismiss.   Judge  Devaney
concluded  that Gottschalk was served with the charges  when,  at
the   direction  of  Judge  Wolverton,  Gottschalk  received  the
charging documents in open court from the prosecution. The  State
filed  a  petition  for  review challenging  this  decision.   We
granted  review.  We now reverse Judge Devaneys decision granting
Gottschalks motion to dismiss.

          According  to  Criminal  Rule 45(c)(1),  the  time  for
bringing  a  defendant to trial begins running when the  charging
document  is  served.  However, the rule does not define  when  a
defendant is served.
          Prior to 1993, the 120-day period began on the date the
defendant is arrested, initially arraigned, or from the date  the
charge (complaint, indictment, or information) is served upon the
defendant, whichever is first.1  In 1993, the rule was amended at
the  request of the State.  The State pointed out that under  the
former rule a police officer, by making an arrest, would initiate
the speedy trial rule.  The State contended that the decision  to
initiate  a  criminal  prosecution should  be  made  by  a  State
prosecutor,  not the police.  And the speedy trial period  should
start only after the prosecutor had initiated charges.2
          Gottschalk  argues that he was served for  purposes  of
Criminal Rule 45 when, on July 9, the prosecutor gave him a  copy
of  the  Bethel indictment in open court at the direction of  the
judge.  He argues that all of the parties were aware that he  had
received  a  copy  of the indictment in a court  proceeding.   He
argues that this constitutes service.  Judge Devaney agreed  with
Gottschalks argument.
          The State argues that all it did was provide Gottschalk
with  an  informational  copy  of  the  indictment  because   the
indictment  was  relevant to the petition to  revoke  Gottschalks
probation.   The State points out that Gottschalks  attorney  had
been  appointed to represent him only in the probation revocation
proceeding,  not  on  the  Bethel  DUI  indictment.   And   Judge
Wolverton  took no action on the indictment.  He did not  arraign
Gottschalk, set bail, or appoint an attorney to represent him  on
the new charge.  The State argues that, under the criminal rules,
the court had to assert personal jurisdiction over Gottschalk  on
the Bethel indictment in order to start the prosecution and start
Criminal  Rule 45.  The State argues that to start Criminal  Rule
45,  Gottschalk  needed to be formally served  with  the  charges
under  Criminal Rule 4 or Criminal Rule 9, or formally  arraigned
under  Criminal Rule 10.  The State argues that, just  because  a
prosecutor,  police  officer,  or  other  agent  of   the   state
informally provides a copy of charges to a defendant,  the  State
has  not  formally  commenced a prosecution as  required  by  the
criminal rules.
          Gottschalks  case highlights a defect in Criminal  Rule
45.   Under the rule, as long as the State did not serve him with
the  Bethel indictment,  the State could hold Gottschalk  for  an
indeterminate period of time on the probation revocation petition
without  ever starting Criminal Rule 45.  The superior court  had
issued  a  warrant for Gottschalks arrest based upon  the  Bethel
indictment.   The  State  informed us at oral  argument  that  if
Gottschalk  were  to  be  released  on  the  petition  to  revoke
probation,  the  Department of Corrections would have  asked  the
superior court to schedule a hearing at which Gottschalk could be
served with the Bethel warrant.
          Professor  LaFave points out that Alaska  is  the  only
state  to  have  a  speedy trial rule which is dependent  on  the
service  of  the charging document.  Other states initiate  their
speedy  trial time periods from arrest (Arizona), entry  of  plea
(Colorado),   indictment  or  information  (Idaho),   arraignment
(Kansas),  or first appearance (Maryland) (for example).3   Thus,
other  states  have  not had to address the  issue  of  when  the
charging document is served for purposes of a speedy trial rule.
          The  purpose  of  Criminal Rule  45  is  to  protect  a
defendants  right to have  the criminal charges which  the  State
has  brought against him resolved within a reasonable  period  of
          time.  Although the particular time period is to some degree
arbitrary, the purpose of the rule is to set an exact  time  when
the  rule  starts and an exact time when it ends.  Unfortunately,
the  rule does not establish when a charging document is  served.
This  flaw  in the rule creates uncertainty about when  the  time
period begins.
          Gottschalk  has a strong argument that  he  was  served
when  the State gave him a copy of the charging document in court
at  the  direction of the judge.  There is an argument  that  the
Bethel  District  Attorneys Office had constructive  notice  that
Gottschalk  would  be  given a copy of the indictment.   But  the
logic   of  Gottschalks  argument  would  extend  to  many  other
situations.   Under the argument he advances, if a police officer
or  correctional officer, who was dealing with Gottschalk  on  an
unrelated  matter,  gave  him  an  informational  copy   of   the
indictment,  Gottschalk would have been served  for  purposes  of
starting  Criminal Rule 45.  Or, in a civil case involving  child
custody, an assistant attorney general might introduce a copy  of
Gottschalks   indictment,  starting  the  rule.   And   yet   the
prosecuting  authorities in Bethel, where  the  case  originated,
would  probably not have notice that the Criminal Rule  45  clock
had started.
          We conclude that Criminal Rule 45 must have a clear and
exact  starting date.  In order to eliminate any confusion as  to
when  the  Criminal  Rule 45 clock starts, we  believe  that  the
defendant must be formally served under Criminal Rules 4 or 9  or
formally arraigned on the charges under Criminal Rule 10.  We  do
not  believe  that the criminal rules authorize informal  service
such  as  occurred  in Gottschalks case when  he  was  handed  an
informational copy of the indictment.
          Gottschalk  has  not  made  any  showing  that  he  was
prejudiced by the States failure to formally serve him  with  the
Bethel felony DUI charge.  He had an attorney to represent him on
the  petition  to  revoke  and to assist  him  in  preparing  his
defense.  Gottschalk was already aware of the possibility of  the
felony DUI charge because of the petition to revoke probation and
the discovery that he had received because of the petition.
          We  accordingly conclude that for purposes of  Criminal
Rule  45,  Gottschalk was not served in this case when the  State
gave  him  a  copy of the indictment in court on the petition  to
revoke  his  probation.  Rather, he was served, for  purposes  of
Criminal Rule 45, when he was formally served with the charge  on
October  8, 2003.  Therefore, the State did not violate  Criminal
Rule  45.   We  reverse the superior courts order dismissing  the
          REVERSED and REMANDED.
MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.

          I  agree with my colleagues that Criminal Rule  45  was
not  violated  in this case.  I further agree that the  facts  of
this  case demonstrate that there is a problem with the way  that
Rule  45(c)(1)  defines the starting date for  the  speedy  trial

     Background of the provision at issue in this case
               Criminal Rule 45 specifies the time limit for
     bringing  a  defendant to trial.  Prior  to  1993,  the
     starting date for calculating Rule 45 was the date  [on
     which]  the  defendant  [was] arrested  [or]  initially
     arraigned,  or  ... the date [on which]  the  charg[ing
     document  was]  served  upon the  defendant,  whichever
     [was]   first.   But,  as  explained  in  the  majority
     opinion,  the  rule was amended in 1993  to  address  a
     concern voiced by the Department of Law.
               The   Departments  concern  was  that  police
     agencies might trigger Rule 45 by making an arrest,  or
     even by filing a complaint, in circumstances where  the
     Department had not yet determined that the case  should
     be   prosecuted,  or  that  it  could   be   prosecuted
     successfully.  The Department suggested that  the  Rule
     45  starting date should hinge on the formal initiation
     of the charge  under the assumption that this would not
     happen unless and until the Department had screened and
     approved the charging decision.
               The Criminal Rules Committee recommended this
     change  to  the Alaska Supreme Court, and  the  supreme
     court  approved the change in April 1993.  See  Supreme
     Court  Order No. 1127, which took effect July 15, 1993.
     As  a result of this 1993 amendment, Rule 45(c)(1)  now
     states  that, in most instances, the starting date  for
     calculating  Rule 45 is the date on which the  charging
     document is served upon the defendant.
The  legal  distinction between receiving a copy  of  a
document and being served with that document

          When  we  speak  of serving a  document  that
initiates  a lawsuit, we mean something different  from
simply handing or mailing a copy of the document to the
person affected (acts that normally would be sufficient
to  constitute  service of a later pleading,  once  the
lawsuit  has  begun).   The law imposes  special  rules
governing the service of the initial complaint  because
that  act  of  service  must  accomplish  two  distinct
things:   not only (1) notifying the defendant  of  the
allegations against them, but also (2) establishing the
courts  jurisdiction over the person of  the  defendant
so  that the court can lawfully direct the defendant to
respond  to  the allegations in the complaint  and,  if
those  allegations are ultimately proved, so  that  the
court  can  issue  a  judgement  that  will  bind   the
defendant.           In  civil cases, unless  there  is
proper  service  of  a  summons  and  a  complaint   as
specified  in  Alaska Civil Rule  4,  the  court  lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.1  And if  the
court  lacks  personal jurisdiction, any judgement  the
court enters against the defendant is void.2
          Personal  jurisdiction over the defendant  is
also crucial in criminal cases.  As in civil cases, the
requisite personal jurisdiction can be obtained by  the
service  of a summons and a complaint.  The manner  for
doing this is prescribed in Alaska Criminal Rule 4  and
Alaska  Civil  Rule 4(d).3  But in many (if  not  most)
criminal cases, the court obtains jurisdiction over the
defendants  person by literally seizing  the  defendant
either  pursuant to a warrant as provided  in  Criminal
Rule   4,4  or  by  taking  custody  of  the  defendant
following  the defendants arrest without a warrant  (in
those  instances where a police officer  or  a  private
person  is  authorized to arrest a  suspect  without  a
          When personal jurisdiction over the defendant
is  obtained  by service of a summons and a  complaint,
the  defendant  receives the charging document  at  the
same  time  that personal jurisdiction is  established.
But  when  personal jurisdiction over the defendant  is
obtained  by arrest, the charging document is  normally
not served at the same time.
          When an arrest is made without a warrant, the
charging  document  will, of  necessity,  be  drawn  up
later.  Criminal Rule 5(a)(5) acknowledges this fact by
expressly directing the government to promptly  file  a
written complaint:  When[] a person arrested without  a
warrant  is  brought before a judge or magistrate  [for
their  initial appearance], a complaint shall be  filed
          But  even  when a complaint has already  been
filed,  and  the  arrest  is conducted  pursuant  to  a
warrant  issued  on that complaint (see  Criminal  Rule
4(a)(1)),  the arrest will generally take place  before
the  defendant receives a copy of the complaint.  Under
Rule  4(c)(3),  the officers making an  arrest  upon  a
warrant  need  not possess a copy of the warrant,  much
less  a  copy of the complaint.  Criminal Rule  4(c)(3)
requires  only  that the officers inform the  defendant
that  a  warrant has indeed been issued, and upon  what
charge.   If  the defendant asks to see a copy  of  the
warrant,  and the arresting officers do not  have  one,
Rule  4(c)(3)  states that the police  shall  show  the
warrant to the defendant as soon as possible.
          In  these  cases, defendants  will  sometimes
receive a copy of the complaint before they go to court
for   their  initial  appearance.   But  Criminal  Rule
5(c)(2) declares that the defendant must receive a copy
of the complaint at their initial appearance if no copy
          has previously been delivered to them.
          As  a  result of these various provisions  of
the  Criminal Rules, a person who is arrested (with  or
without a warrant) and who remains in custody may  wait
as  long  as  24  hours before seeing  a  copy  of  the
complaint.  (Criminal Rule 5(a)(1) establishes 24 hours
as  the  outer time limit for conducting the defendants
initial  appearance  before a judicial  officer.)   But
with  the service of that complaint, the court  obtains
full  authority  to  entertain the criminal  proceeding
against the defendant.6
          Thus,  there are two crucial aspects  to  the
initiation of a criminal prosecution:  the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and  the  act
of  providing the defendant with a copy of the charging
document.   When  the prosecution is initiated  by  the
service  of  a summons and complaint, the assertion  of
personal  jurisdiction  (i.e.,  the  service   of   the
summons)  occurs contemporaneously with the  defendants
receipt   of  a  copy  of  the  complaint.   When   the
prosecution is initiated by an arrest, the assertion of
personal  jurisdiction (i.e., the physical  seizure  of
the  defendants person) precedes the defendants receipt
of a copy of the complaint by as much as 24 hours.  But
in  either  instance, it is the assertion  of  personal
jurisdiction that makes the defendants receipt  of  the
charging document a service of that document.

The  problem  in  this case:  the  superior  court  had
physical   custody  of  the  defendant,  and   personal
jurisdiction over him, but on a different matter

          In my discussion of instances where the court
obtains   personal  jurisdiction  over  the   defendant
through an arrest, the implicit assumption was that the
defendants  arrest  was conducted for  the  purpose  of
holding  the  defendant to answer one or more  criminal
charges  arising  from the incident that  provided  the
basis for the arrest.
          AS  12.25.160 defines arrest as the taking of
a  person into custody in order that the person may  be
held  to  answer for the commission of a crime.   Thus,
not all acts of taking a person into custody constitute
an  arrest   for there are times when people are  taken
into  custody  for reasons other than holding  them  to
answer for a crime.  And in such instances, this  Court
has  repeatedly  held that the act of taking  a  person
into custody does not constitute the commencement of  a
criminal proceeding.
          For  example, in Lindsay v. State,  698  P.2d
659  (Alaska  App.  1985), the police  interviewed  the
defendant  concerning his potential  involvement  in  a
robbery.   The police did not formally arrest  Lindsay,
and he was allowed to return home after the interview.7
However, this Court ruled that, given the circumstances
          of the interview, Lindsay had been in custody for
Miranda purposes.8  The next question was whether  this
custodial  interview  should be deemed  an  arrest  for
purposes of triggering Criminal Rule 45.  Based on  the
definition  of  arrest codified  in  AS  12.25.160,  we
concluded  that  the answer was no   because  when  the
police  took Lindsay into custody, they did not  do  so
for  the purpose of holding him to answer for a  crime.
Id., 698 P.2d at 663.
          We reached a similar conclusion in Cannizzaro
v.  State,  765  P.2d  110  (Alaska  App.  1988).   The
defendant  in  Cannizzaro  failed  to  appear   for   a
scheduled  court hearing on his motion  to  modify  his
sentence, and the judge issued a bench warrant for  the
defendants arrest.9  Cannizzaro was picked up on  other
charges  and, while he was in jail, he was served  with
this bench warrant.10
          A  little  over three months later,  a  grand
jury  indicted  Cannizzaro on a charge  of  failure  to
appear,  based  on  his  failure  to  appear   at   the
sentencing hearing.  Cannizzaro was arraigned  on  this
charge, and his trial was scheduled for three months in
the  future.11  But a week before his scheduled  trial,
Cannizzaro  moved  to dismiss the  charge  on  Rule  45
grounds.   He contended that the service of  the  bench
warrant  had  constituted  the  commencement   of   the
criminal  proceeding for failure to  appear,  and  that
therefore the State had exceeded the allowed  time  for
bringing him to trial.12
          We rejected Cannizzaros argument:
          [The]   bench  warrant  did  not  charge
     Cannizzaro with a crime or command his arrest
     for  the  commission of a crime.   Cannizzaro
     was not held to answer for a new charge [when
     he  was]  arrest[ed] on the warrant.  Rather,
     his   arrest  [served]  only  to  secure  his
     presence for [the] sentencing proceedings  he
     had  previously  missed.  Because  Cannizzaro
     was  not  arrested for purposes  of  Criminal
     Rule  45  when he was served with  the  bench
     warrant  ...  ,  his ... arraignment  on  the
     indictment  was the event that triggered  the
     120-day speedy trial period.
     Cannizzaro, 765 P.2d at 112.
          The problem in the present case  is
that even though Gottschalk was arrested, and
even though his arrest was based, in part, on
his  act  of  driving  under  the  influence,
Gottschalk was not arrested so that he  could
be  held to answer a charge of driving  under
the   influence  (or  any  criminal  charge).
Rather, Gottschalk was arrested for violating
his probation.
          Gottschalk was on probation from an
Anchorage criminal case (File No. 3AN-98-4387
Cr).  In March 2003, Gottschalk violated  his
probation  by  (1)  leaving  his  region   of
residence  without  his  probation   officers
permission,   (2)  consuming   alcohol,   and
(3)   driving  a  motor  vehicle  under   the
influence.  Gottschalk was arrested for these
probation  violations, and he was brought  to
Anchorage     for    probation     revocation
          In  this  way, Gottschalks case  is
similar  to Cannizzaro.  As was the  case  in
Cannizzaro,   some   of   Gottschalks   post-
sentencing  conduct constituted a new  crime,
and  it  was  foreseeable that  he  might  be
charged  with  that crime.   But  Gottschalks
arrest  in  March 2003 was not done  for  the
purpose  of  holding  him  to  answer  a  new
criminal  charge.   Rather,  Gottschalk   was
arrested because there was probable cause  to
believe that he had violated the terms of his
probation in the 1998 Anchorage case.
          Three  and a half months later,  in
early July 2003, while Gottschalk was in jail
in  Anchorage,  a Bethel grand jury  indicted
him   for  his  act  of  driving  under   the
influence, and the superior court  issued  an
arrest  warrant based on this indictment.   A
member  of  the Anchorage District  Attorneys
office  faxed a copy of the Bethel indictment
to   Gottschalks  attorney,  and   Gottschalk
personally  received a copy  of  this  Bethel
indictment on July 9, 2003, when the  parties
were   in   court  in  connection  with   the
Anchorage  probation  revocation  proceeding.
But Gottschalk was not arrested on the Bethel
indictment until October 8, 2003 (when he was
served with the superior courts warrant), and
Gottschalks initial appearance on the  Bethel
indictment did not occur until the  following
day.  (This initial appearance took place  in
the  Anchorage  superior court.)   Thus,  not
until   October   did  the   superior   court
establish    personal    jurisdiction    over
Gottschalk  to try him for the crime  charged
in the indictment.
          Criminal  Rule  45(c)(1)  does  not
expressly  speak  of  personal  jurisdiction.
Rather,  the  rule  says that  the  time  for
bringing the defendant to trial is calculated
from  the date on which the charging document
is  served on the defendant.  But, as I  have
explained here, service of a criminal  charge
requires not only delivery of a copy  of  the
charging  document but also the establishment
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
          Just as a potential defendant in  a
civil lawsuit might learn of the lawsuit  and
might  even  obtain a copy of  the  complaint
without ever being properly served, so too  a
defendant  in  a  criminal  proceeding  might
obtain  a copy of the complaint or indictment
without ever being summoned or arrested.   In
both the civil and the criminal context, even
though the defendant might possess a copy  of
the  complaint, the court would be  powerless
to   proceed  against  the  defendant  until,
through  the  act of summons or  arrest,  the
court   established  jurisdiction  over   the
defendants person.
          That    was   the   situation    in
Gottschalks case when he received a  copy  of
the    Bethel   indictment   on   July   9th.
Gottschalk  now  had a copy of  the  charging
document,  but  he  was  not  served  in  any
meaningful  sense because the superior  court
had  yet  to  establish personal jurisdiction
over  Gottschalk in the Bethel criminal  case
jurisdiction  that was necessary  before  the
court  could call upon Gottschalk  to  answer
the Bethel indictment.
          For these reasons, I concur with my
colleagues  that Rule 45 was not violated  in
Gottschalks  case.   This  is  not  to   say,
however, that I think this result is  a  good
one.   Gottschalks case highlights a  problem
with   the   present  formulation   of   Rule
          Normally, there is no problem  with
having the Rule 45 starting date hinge on the
service of the charging document  because, in
a  typical  case,  the State  will  not  have
physical  custody of the defendant  when  the
State decides to file a criminal charge,  and
thus  the State will be motivated to promptly
establish  personal  jurisdiction  over   the
defendant  through either the  service  of  a
summons or an arrest.
          But  when, as in Gottschalks  case,
the  defendant  is  already  in  custody   in
connection  with another criminal proceeding,
and the State files new charges, there is  no
pressure on the State to summon or arrest the
defendant on the new charges, or to have  the
defendant  arraigned  on  the  new   charges.
Unless  the  defendant  learns  of  the   new
charges and affirmatively demands arraignment
on those charges, the Rule 45 clock might not
be  triggered for months or even  years   if,
for  instance,  the defendants  new  criminal
conduct  constitutes  a  violation   of   the
defendants probation in an earlier case,  and
the defendant is sentenced to serve a lengthy
term  of  imprisonment as a  result  of  this
probation violation.
          For  this reason, I think that  the
supreme  court  should  direct  the  Criminal
Rules Committee to consider how Criminal Rule
45(c)(1)  might  be  amended  to  cure   this

     1 Former Alaska Criminal Rule 45(c)(1) (1992).

     2  See  Supreme  Court Order No. 1127 (eff. July  15,  1993)
(amending Rule 45); Cynthia Hora, Memorandum on Criminal Rule  45
Revisions (April 6, 1992) (suggesting that 120-day period  should
not  begin  until  defendant is held to answer  for  charge,  and
noting  concern  that former Rule allowed period  to  begin  upon
actions of police as opposed to prosecutors).

     3  4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure  18.3(c)  at
698 n.65 (2d ed. 1999).

1 Department of Corrections v. Kila, Inc., 884 P.2d 661, 662
(Alaska 1994); Valentine v. Roberts, 1 Alaska 536, 539, 546-
49, 552 (D. Alaska 1902).

2 Kila, 884 P.2d at 662; Valentine, 1 Alaska at 546-49, 552.

3  Civil Rule 4(d) applies to the service of a summons in  a
criminal case because Criminal Rule 4(c)(3) declares that  a
criminal  summons may be served in any ...  manner  provided
for service of process in civil actions.

4  See  In re Hern ndez, 5 Alaska 421, 433 (D. Alaska  Terr.
1915):  [T]he record shows that [the judge] got jurisdiction
of  the  [defendants] person by having him arrested  on  [a]
warrant and brought before him.

5 See AS 12.25.010  040.

6 See Drahosh v. State, 442 P.2d 44, 45-46 (Alaska 1968).

7 Lindsay, 698 P.2d at 660.

8 Id. at 661.

9 Cannizzaro, 765 P.2d at 110.

10   Id.

11   Id.

12   Id. at 110-11.

Case Law
Statutes, Regs & Rules

IT Advice, Support, Data Recovery & Computer Forensics.
(907) 338-8188

Please help us support these and other worthy organizations:
Law Project for Psychiatraic Rights