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Shay Hurd v Larry E. Henley (12/31/2020) sp-7497

          Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC  REPORTER.  

          Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

          303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email  

          corrections@akcourts.us.  



                      THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA                                   



SHAY  HURD,                                                        )  

                                                                   )    Supreme  Court  No.  S-17104  

                               Appellant,                          )  

                                                                                                                                 

                                                                   )    Superior Court No. 3KN-16-00584 CI  

          v.                                                       )  

                                                                                            

                                                                   )    O P I N I O N  

                   

LARRY E. HENLEY,                                                   )  

                                                                                                                  

                                                                   )    No. 7497 - December 31, 2020  

                               Appellee.                           )  

                                                                   )  



                                                                                                          

                                                

                     Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third  

                                                                                                       

                     Judicial  District,  Kenai,  Anna  Moran  and  Lance  Joanis,  

                     Judges.  



                                                                                                        

                     Appearances:             Andy  L.  Pevehouse  and  Noah  H.  Mery,  

                                                                                                      

                     Gilman &Pevehouse, Kenai, for Appellant. Larry E. Henley,  

                                                 

                     pro se, Soldotna, Appellee.  



                                                                                                           

                     Before:         Bolger,  Chief  Justice,  Winfree,  Maassen,  and  

                                                                                    

                     Carney, Justices.  [Stowers, Justice, not participating.]  



                                                 

                     BOLGER, Chief Justice.  



I.        INTRODUCTION  



                                                                                                                        

                     Shay Hurd appeals the superior court's determination that his adjoining  



                                                                                                                    

neighbor, Larry Henley, adversely possessed a portion of his land.  Hurd and Henley  



                                                                                                                                   

share a boundary line that Henley first encroached on by building a shed and then by  



                                                                                                                                

building a larger shop.  Hurd sued, and the superior court ultimately awarded the area  


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originally occupied by Henley's shed and the area surrounding it to Henley, but not the  



                               

larger area with the shop.  



                                                                                                                       

                    The superior court did not err when it found that Henley regularly graveled  



                                                                                                                      

and  parked  vehicles  in  the  area  granted  to  him  as  adversely  possessed.                                    Henley's  



                                                                                                                       

activities on that area were sufficient to constitute adverse possession.  The superior  



                                                                                                                             

court adequately defined the area adversely possessed by referencing landmarks with  



                                                                                                                              

locations  readily  ascertainable  from  the  record.                         We  interpret  the  "good  faith  but  



                                                                                                                             

mistaken belief" required for adverse possession by AS 09.45.052(a) to require only  



                                                                                                                 

subjective good faith; therefore, the superior court did not clearly err by determining  



                                                                                                                             

Henley occupied the former shed area due to a good-faith belief the land was his.  We  



                                                                                                                                     

thus affirm the superior court's decision awarding title to the former shed area to Henley.  



                                  

II.       FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  



          A.        Facts  



                                                                                                                                     

                    Henley and Hurd are neighbors who live on Skyline Road in Soldotna:  



                                                                                                                        

Henley on Lot 6-A to the north and Hurd on adjacent Lot 6-B to the south.   Henley  



                                                                                                                                

received his lot as a gift in 2001.  At that time, Henley's Lot 6-A was a treed lot with no  



                                                                                             

improvements, and Hurd had not yet purchased his Lot 6-B.  



                                                                                                                                 

                    Henley hired Hall Quality Builders to construct a home on the lot later in  



                                                                                                                             

2001.  As part of the project, Henley quitclaimed his interest in the property to Hall  



                                                                                                                                     

Quality Builders, who quitclaimed the property back to Henley after the home was built.  



                                                                                                                    

No as-built survey was provided to Henley. Improvements to the lot included excavating  



                                                                                                                            

an eastern portion of Henley's lot and removing trees.  When he took possession back,  



                                                                                                                               

Henley  assumed  Hall  Quality  Builders  knew  the  location  of  the  boundaries  of  his  



                                                                                                                        

property and had cleared and excavated within those boundaries.  Henley later testified  



                                                                                                                                

that he located three boundary markers in the ground after retaking possession of the lot  



                                                               -2-                                                         7497
  


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but provided inconsistent testimony whether he found a marker on the southeastern  



                                    

corner of his property.  



                                                                                                                                      

                    In 2003 Henley built a 12-by-16-foot shed on skids in the contested area.  



                                                                                      

The shed lay across the southern border from Henley's property, on the northern edge  



                                                                                                                                

of Lot 6-B.   In a deposition, Henley stated he had "eyeballed" the boundary of his  



                                                                                                                         

property before placing his shed, noting that "if there is a problem, I can move it because  



                                                                                                                                  

it's on skids."  At trial Henley testified to his state of mind when building the shed:  "I  



                                                                                                                               

thought I was on my land.  So if I was off, I figured it wasn't very much."  Henley said  



                                                                                                                        

he believed the shed was on his land because he assumed that Hall Quality Builders  



                                                                                                               

would not have excavated and cleared beyond the property boundaries.  



                                                                                                                

                    Henley also made use of the disputed area near the shed, storing items  



                                                                                                                        

inside and outside the shed, placing a picnic table alongside the structure, and building  



                                                                                                                       

a deep-pit barbeque.  Henley graveled, installed portable carports, and parked vehicles,  



                                                                                 

boats, and trailers in the area leading up to the shed.  



                                                                                                                                      

                    In 2009 Hurd purchased Lot 6-B directly to the south of Henley's Lot 6-A.  



                                                                                                                                

Henley's shed had already been built on Hurd's property.  Hurd walked his lot with the  



                                                                                                                                      

previous owner and was unsure where the northeast corner of his property precisely lay.  



                                                                                                                                

                    In  2011  Hurd  approached  Henley  to  tell  Henley  he  was  planning  on  



                                                                                                                          

building his own shed.  During the conversation, Henley suggested they build a privacy  



                                                                                                                             

fence and proposed surveying the property line in preparation for it. No fence was built,  



                                                                             

and no joint property line survey was conducted.  



                                                                                                                                

                    In 2012 Henley began constructing a detached shop, again relying on the  



                                                                                                                                

excavation work by Hall Quality Builders to estimate the property dividing line.  He  



                                                                                                                               

began excavating a foundation for a 36-by-64-foot shop. He installed a large gravel pad  



                                                                -3-                                                         7497
  


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extending from the shed area to the eastern boundary of his lot to serve as a foundation.  



                                                                                                                                     

The pad straddled the true south/north property line between his and Hurd's property.  



                                                                                                                              

                    Concerned  about  potential  encroachment,  Hurd  tried  to  locate  the  



                                                                                                                           

northeastern border between his and Henley's properties with the help of a visiting friend  



                                                                                                                       

who conducted surveys for the State of Minnesota. Even with the aid of a metal detector,  



                                                                                                       

Hurd and his friend could not find any rebar pin or stake marking the northeast/southeast  



                                                                                                                             

boundary between the two properties.  Using a hundred-foot tape and compass, they  



                                                                                                                   

assessed where the demarcation pin should have been and determined a significant  



                                                                                         

portion of Henley's gravel pad foundation encroached on Hurd's property.  However,  



                                                                                                                            

instead of contacting Henley, Hurd simply stuck a makeshift spruce stake with his name  



                                                                                                                                     

on it where he and his friend assessed the property boundary marker should have been.  



                                                                                                                            

Hurd testified that he thought Henley would see the stake and approach him to talk about  



                                                                                                                                

the issue.  Hurd also testified that once construction began again, he had doubts that he  



                                                                                                                                

was correct about the real property line and decided not to bring it up with Henley.  



                                                                                                                   

                    In 2015 Henley finished erecting his shop.  In April and May 2016 Hurd  



                                                                                                                 

had the property professionally surveyed and discovered Henley's shop significantly  



                                                                                  

encroached on his property.  He filed suit soon after.  



          B.        Proceedings  



                                                                                                                      

                    Hurd  filed  an  action  against  Henley  in  August  2016  for  trespass,  



                                                                                                                                 

negligence, slander of title, and to quiet title to his property.  Henley counterclaimed to  



                                                                                                                              

quiet  title  to  the  contested  property,  asserting  that  he  had  adversely  possessed  the  



                       

disputed area.  



                                                                                                                     

                    Following a bench trial the superior court concluded Henley had adversely  



                                                                                                                          

possessed a portion of Hurd's land and defined that portion as the "area from where  



                                                                                                                              

[Henley's] well is located to where [Henley's] shed used to stand." The court noted that  



                                                               -4-                                                         7497
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                                                                                                                           

although Henley had moved his shed prior to the suit, Henley had provided many photos  



                                                                                                                            

to  the  court  to  "aid  in  determining  the  location  of  the  shed."                             The  superior  court  



                                                                                                                         

mentioned that it had a survey of the encroachment only as of 2016, making it difficult  



                                                                                                                               

to  accurately  map  out  the  then-current  state  of  the adversely  possessed  area.                                       The  



                                                                                                                                

superior court added that the adversely possessed area "includes a small portion of the  



                                                                                                                                 

land north of the shed where the picnic table was located" and ordered the land be  



                                                                                                                         

surveyed in order to correctly define the space.  The superior court attached a drawing  



                                                                                                                             

to aid the parties in locating the adversely possessed portion, with its eastern edge  



                                                                                   

anchored on the southeast corner of Henley's garage.  



                                                                                                                               

                    The superior court also found that Henley had believed in good faith that  



                                                                                                                       

the contested area was his property.  In the court's view, Henley's "good faith mistake"  



                                                                                                                        

was relying on Hall Quality Builder's excavation of the area to demarcate his property  



                                                                                                                             

boundaries when he built his shed.  The superior court noted that this finding of good  



                                                                                                                              

faith  on  Henley's  part  was  supported  by  Hurd's  own  testimony  that  even  he  was  



                                                                                                                                 

uncertain where the property line lay, and he therefore did not approach Henley to  



                                                                                                                                  

express concern about the location of the shed or the shop during their construction.  



                                                                                                                            

                    The  superior  court  also  determined  Henley  had  met  all  the  other  



                                                                                                                               

requirements of adverse possession for this portion of the property. He had "openly and  



                                                                                                                               

continuously used" the area "bordered on the south from Henley's well to a few feet past  



                                                                                                                                 

where [Henley's] shed was located" for at least ten years beginning in 2003 when he  



                                                                                                                               

built the shed.  The superior court described a number of Henley's activities in this area  



                                                                                                                            

that, when taken together, constituted open and continuous use:   building the shed,  



                                                                                                                            

storing items inside and outside the shed, placing a picnic table alongside the shed,  



                                                                                                                     

"repeatedly park[ing] his cars, boats and trailers," installing a carport, and "regularly  



                                                                                                                            

put[ting] down new gravel."  All of these facts together, according to the superior court,  



                                                                -5-                                                         7497
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                                                                                               

were "synonymous with open and notorious conduct that was exclusive and hostile to  



                                                                          

Hurd and his predecessor's interest in the land."  



                                                                                                                             

                    In  contrast,  the  superior  court  determined  Henley  did  not  satisfy  the  



                                                                                                                    

requirements of adverse possession for the entire area where his 2,300-foot shop was  



                                                                                                                            

located. The superior court determined that Henley's "occasional use of this area to park  



                                                                                                                 

vehicles" was not "sufficiently visible, open and hostile to put Hurd or his predecessor  



                                                                                                                                    

in title on notice that Henley was asserting a continuous adverse possessory interest."  



                                                                                                 

The superior court noted that the majority of the photo exhibits demonstrated "Henley  



                                                                                                                              

mainly  parked  his  vehicles  and  boat  in  the  area  near  the  shed,"  rather  than  in  the  



                                                                                                                             

southeastern corner of his property where the shop would eventually be located.  The  



                                                                                                                              

court noted that although Henley claimed he used part of this area for a garden, a fire pit,  



                                                                                                                         

and a barbeque pit, no photographs documented the location of these activities.  



                                                                                                                           

                    The superior court awarded Henley the area where his shed used to stand  



                                                                                                                      

as "roughly depicted" in a drawing by the court which was to be followed by a property  



                                                                                                                              

survey.  The court simultaneously found that Henley had not adversely possessed the  



                                                                                                                  

larger area occupied by the shop and quieted title in favor of Hurd. The court determined  



                                                                                                                             

Henley "was negligent in not having the land surveyed before he built his shop" and that  



                                                                                                                                    

the shop trespassed on Hurd's property, but awarded  Hurd  only nominal damages.  



                                                                                                                           

Noting that Hurd had taken four years to notify Henley of the encroachment, the court  



                                                                  

gave Henley three years to move his shop.  



III.	     DISCUSSION  



                                                                                                                       

          A.	       The  Superior  Court  Did  Not  Clearly  Err  By  Determining  Henley  

                                                                                                                             

                    Regularly Put Down Gravel And Repeatedly Parked Vehicles In The  

                                    

                    Disputed Area.  



                                                                                                                       

                    When concluding that Henley continuously and openly used the original  



                                                                                                                             

shed area, the superior court noted that Henley "repeatedly parked his cars, boats and  



                                                               -6-	                                                       7497
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

trailers" and "regularly put down new gravel" in the area Henley adversely possessed.                                                                                                                       



Hurd argues that, according to the record, these factual findings are plainly erroneous.                                                                                                                    



                               We review the superior court's factual findings for clear error.                                                                                     "It is the  



trial court's function, and not                                           that  of a reviewing court, to judge the credibility of                                                                   

                                                                                                              1    Therefore, we will not disturb these  

witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence."                                                                                                                                                

findings of fact unless they were clearly erroneous.2  

                                                                                               



                               Hurd argues that from 2003 when Henley built the shed until 2012 when  

                                                                                     



Henley built a gravel pad to serve as a foundation for his shop, the record demonstrated  

                                                                                                                                                                           



that Henley regularly graveled and parked only on "his own driveway," north of the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



southern property boundary, rather than in any part of the contested area.  In support of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



his argument, Hurd points to testimony from Henley's longtime girlfriend, who said that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



Henley graveled the contested area only sometime after 2007.  But at a different point,  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



Henley's girlfriend testified that he brought in gravel to an area including the shed and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                 



south of the well during or before 2007.  Hurd also highlights testimony from Henley  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



that when he graveled the area in 2008 he was "still concentrating on the driveway in the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



front of [his] house."  However, the superior court may have reasonably interpreted this  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



to mean that while he concentrated on graveling his own driveway, he spread gravel to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



the area around the shed as well.  

                                                                              



                               Regardless, the superior court had other testimony on which to rely for its  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



findings of repeated graveling and parking in the contested area.  Henley testified that,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                



                1              Penn v. Ivey                 , 615 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980).                         



                2              Reeves v. Godspeed Props., LLC                                              , 426 P.3d 845, 849 (Alaska 2018),                                                reh'g  



                                                                                                                                                                                                 

denied in part (July 13, 2018) (quoting HP Ltd. P'ship v. Kenai River Airpark, LLC, 270  

                                                      

P.3d 719, 726 (Alaska 2012)).  



                                                                                                  -7-                                                                                         7497
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

                                                                                                                               

between 2003 and 2012, he graveled five times and parked vehicles including cars and  



                                                                                 

a boat in the area immediately adjacent to the shed.  



                                                                                                                                

                    Hurd points to a number of photo exhibits he believes demonstrate the  



                                                                                                              

gravel was not present and cars were not parked in the contested area throughout the  



                                                                                                                     

statutory period.  However, Henley testified that he had to gravel the area repeatedly  



                                                                                                                                      

because the gravel kept sinking down into the clay and being covered over by grass.  



                                                                                                                        

And as cars are mobile by nature, photos showing vehicles parked north of the property  



                                                                                                                           

line do not preclude their being parked south of the property line at other points during  



                                                                                                                               

the same time frame.  Moreover some of these photos do show Henley graveled and  



                                                                               

parked his boat on areas that appear to be south of the true property line.  Others were  



                                                                                                                           

taken after the shop foundation gravel pad was laid in 2012, and show the same extent  



                                                                                                                                      

of graveling in the area between the well and the shed that appears in earlier pictures.  



                                                                                                                          

                     Several  photos  Henley  introduced  at  trial  support  the  superior  court's  



                                                                                                                            

findings of fact.   Photos taken before Henley installed the gravel pad in 2012 show  



                                                                                                                                  

gravel in areas south of the true boundary between Henley's and Hurd's properties:  to  



                                                                                                                                      

the east of the shed, up to the door of the shed, and considerably south of Henley's well.  



                                                                                                                                

Another photo, taken in 2003 or 2004, may show indications of graveling right up to the  



                                                                                                                             

door of the shed. Other photos identified as taken before the gravel pad installation show  



                                                                                                                                 

a boat parked considerably south of Henley's well, by a distance estimated at over 15  



                                                                                                                          

feet.  The boat appears parked approximately as far south in that picture before Henley  



                                                                                                                               

laid the gravel pad as in a picture taken afterwards, casting doubt on Hurd's claim that  



                                                                                                                           

the parking moved south across the property line only after Henley installed the gravel  



                                                                                                                               

pad.  While the photo exhibits alone do not clearly establish that Henley graveled and  



                                                                                                                          

parked in the entirety of the adversely possessed area throughout the statutory period,  



                                                                                             

they do support a finding that he did so in part of that area.  



                                                                -8-                                                         7497
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                                                                Hurd arguesthat sincethecourt never determinedpreciselywhereHenley's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



 shed was originally located, Henley could not have conclusively established that he                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



graveled and parked in the area bordered by the shed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 But many photo exhibits from                                                                                                  



numerous angles show where the shed stood in reference to key landmarks including                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



Henley's well, Henley's shop and the gravel pad underneath it, and the southeast corner                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



of Henley's garage, as well as where parking and graveling took place in relation to those                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



landmarks.     Multiple   witnesses   testified   to   and   diagramed   the   original   location   of  



Henley's shed.                                                             The court had sufficient evidence from which to make a reasonable                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



conclusion about where the shed originally stood and where the activities of parking and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



graveling took place in relation to that location.                                                                                                                                                                                   



                                                                At times, the testimony and pictures of the property provided admittedly                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



conflicting and confusing evidence for the court to assess.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  However, faced with this                                                                                     



difficult  determination,   the   superior   court   reasonably   judged   the   credibility   of   the  



witnesses and weighed conflicting evidence, appropriately determining the facts under                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



thecircumstances. Becausetestimony                                                                                                                                                 andphotographs                                                                  admittedintoevidencesupported                                                                              



the superior court's determination that Henley regularly graveled and repeatedly parked                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



vehicles in the contested area, that factual finding was not clearly erroneous.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



                                B.	                             Henley's   Activities   On   The   Land   Were   Sufficient   To   Constitute  

                                                                Adverse Possession.   



                                                                Whether Henley's activities on disputed land were sufficient to constitute                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         3        We disturb a superior court's  

adverse possession presents issues of both law and fact.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     4   However,  

 findings of fact underlying its conclusion only if they are clearly erroneous.    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



                                3                               See   id.,  (applying    analogous    standard    of    review    for    easements    by  



prescription).  



                                4	                             Id.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                        -9-	                                                                                                                                                                                          7497
  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

the application of law to these facts is a question of law we review de novo, using our     

independent judgment.                      5  



                         To acquire title by adverse possession under AS 09.45.052(a), the claimant  

                                                                                                                                                 



must prove possession of the land that was continuous for the statutory period, open and  

                                                                                                                                                           

notorious, and exclusive and hostile to the true owner.6                                                       The statutory period for a  

                                                                                                                                                              



claimant acting on the basis of a good-faith mistake that the disputed land lies within the  

                                                                                                                                                            

boundaries of the claimant's own property is ten years.7  An adverse possessor must meet  

                                                                                                                                                        

each of these requirements by clear and convincing evidence.8   "Continuity, notoriety,  

                                                                                                                      



and exclusivity of use . . . are 'not susceptible to fixed standards,' but rather 'depend on  

                                                                                                                                                            

the character of the land in question.' "9                                      Exclusivity is not destroyed by occasional  

                                                                                                                                             

permissive use by the claimant's guests or even trespassers.10   Hostility is not destroyed  

                                                                                                                                               



by a claimant's mistaken belief of holding title to the land, so long as the claimant's use  

                                                                                                                                                           

of the land is without the record owner's consent.11                                               The underlying purpose of these  

                                                                                                                                                       



             5                                                                    P.3d 387, 391 (Alaska 2004) (discussing                   

                         See id.; Glover v. Glover, 92  

hostility).  



             6           Prax  v.  Zalewski,  400  P.3d   116,   120  (Alaska  2017).  



             7           AS  09.45.052(a).  



             8           Curran  v.  Mount,  657  P.2d  389,  391-92  (Alaska   1982).  



             9           Vezey   v.   Green,   35   P.3d   14,   20   (Alaska   2001) (quoting  Nome   2000   v.  



Fagerstrom,  799  P.2d  304,  309  (Alaska   1990)).  



             10          See  Peters  v.  Juneau-Douglas  Girl Scout  Council,  519  P.2d  826,  831  

                                                                                                                                                         

(Alaska  1974) ("[A] claimant's 'possession need not be absolutely exclusive; it need  

                                                                                                                                                        

only be  a type  of possession  which  would  characterize  an owner's use.'  "  (quoting  

                                                                                                                                                 

Norgard v. Busher, 349 P.2d 490, 496 (Or. 1960))).  

                                                                                  



             11          See id. at 832 ("Peters believed his right to possession derived from his  

                                                                                                                                                           

uncles, not from any acquiescence, consent or permission of the [record owners]." ).  

                                                                                                                                                          



                                                                             -10-                                                                      7497
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

requirements  is  "to   put   the   record   owner   on   notice   of   the   existence   of   an   adverse  



                12  

claimant."          



                     Evenifindividual actions maybeinsufficientto constitutepossession when  

                                                                                                                               



considered separately, in combination those actions may "demonstrate continuous and  

                                                                                                                                 

uninterrupted possession."13  For instance, in Alaska National Bank v. Linck , we affirmed  

                                                                                                                          



the  trial  court's  determination  that  "clear[ing]  part  of  the  land,  buil[ding]  and  

                                                                                                                                



maintain[ing] barricades, and ke[eping] the property clean" were sufficient to constitute  

                                                                                                                        

continuous, hostile, and notorious possession.14  

                                                       



                     In  finding  that  Henley  continuously  and  openly  used  the  adversely  

                                                                                                                       



possessed area between a few feet south of Henley's well to where the shed stood, the  

                                                                                                                                  



superior court noted Henley built and frequently used the interior and exterior of the  

                                                                                                                                  



shed,  had  a  picnic  table  alongside  the  shed,  erected  a  carport  near  the  shed,  and  

                                                                                                                                



"repeatedly parked his cars, boats and trailers" and "regularly put down new gravel" in  

                                                                                                                                    



that contested area.  Hurd argues these activities are insufficient to constitute adverse  

                                                                                                                           



possession.  

                    



                     In the most analogous case of ours cited by Hurd, Tenala, Ltd. v. Fowler,  

                                                                                                                           



we  concluded  claimants'  activities  of  building  a  shed  and  an  addition  to  a  cabin  

                                                                                                                              



straddling thepropertyboundary weresufficientto establish adversepossession for those  

                                                                                                                               



          12        Id.  at  830.  



          13  

                    Alaska  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Linck,  559  P.2d   1049,   1052  (Alaska   1977).  



          14  

                                                                                                                                 

                    Id.  at  1052-53  (footnotes  omitted);  see  also  Peters,  519  P.2d  at  828-29, 832  

                                                                                                                                 

(claimant's activities of living  on  contested land during seal hunting season, scrapingseal  

                                                                                                                                  

hides,  repairing  boats  there,  digging  clams,  and  planting  garden  sufficed  to  establish the  

                                 

elements of adverse possession).  



                                                                -11-                                                          7497
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                       15  

areas where the structures slightly extended over the boundary.                                                                                                                              But in the areas where                         



the  Tenala  claimants' activities consisted only of using the adjoining portion of disputed                                                                                                                                         



land as an unimproved driveway to access the cabin and shed, park cars, and store                                                                                                                                                             



garbage cans, these activities were insufficient to "give[] notice to the true owners that                                                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                                                                                                 16   We explained that  

 [they] were claiming a possessory interest" in that portion of land.                                                                                                                                                                              



the Tenala claimants "never placed any permanent improvements on [that section] and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

never fenced or posted the area as their own."17  

                                                                                                                     



                                       In contrast to the Tenala claimants, Henley used the land from south of his  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



well to where his shed stood as if he owned it, rather than to pass through to gain access  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



to  another  part  of  his  property.                                                                     His  activities  included  making  and  maintaining  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



improvements to the land.  In addition to demarcating the land as his own by repeatedly  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



laying down gravel, Henley built and conspicuously used a 12-by-16-foot shed that -  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



in contrast to the merely slightly encroaching buildings in Tenala - stood entirely on  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                                                                           18      These activities were at least as extensive as the  

Hurd's side of the true property line.                                                                                                                                                                                                               

                                                                                              



                    15                 921 P.2d 1114, 1118-19 (Alaska 1996). Hurd cites two other cases of ours                                                                                                                                  



which   are   not   analogous.     The   first   relates   to   extinguishment   of   easements   by  

prescription, rather than adverse possession.                                                                                      See Reeves v. Godspeed Props., LLC                                                                          , 426   

P.3d   845,   854   (Alaska   2018),   reh'g   denied   in   part   (July   13,   2018).     The   second  

establishes that a claimant, by merely excavating a foundation that straddled a property                                                                                                                                           

line and then vacating the property for years without maintaining that foundation, did not                                                                                                                                                           

demonstratesufficiently continuous possession of the land excavated.                                                                                                                                      Walshv.Emerick                                    ,  

611 P.2d 28, 30-31 (Alaska 1980).                                                  



                    16                  Tenala, Ltd., 921 P.2d at 1118-20.  

                                                                                                                  



                    17                 Id. at 1119.  

                                                        



                    18                 Id. at 1118-19.  

                                                        



                                                                                                                         -12-                                                                                                                  7497
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

Alaska National Bank                claimants', which sufficed to demonstratecontinuous, hostile, and                                 



                                   19  

notorious possession.                  



                      Cases from other jurisdictions provide support for our determination that  

                                                                        



Henley's actions, which included building and using his shed as well as laying down and  

                                                                                                                                      



maintaining his gravel driveway, were sufficient to notify Hurd of the hostile nature of  

                                                                                                                                        



Henley's possession.  Connecticut claimants, by building and using a metal shed for  

                                                                                                                                       



storage on the true owner's property, demonstrated sufficiently exclusive use of that land  

                                                                                                                                     

to  establish  adverse  possession.20                     Missouri  claimants,  through  adverse  possession,  

                                                                                                                         



obtained an area where they put down gravel, mowed and raked the grass, and near  

                                                                                                                                    



which they built a garage only reachable through that gravel driveway; these activities  

                                                                                                                             



sufficed  to  show  actual,  hostile,  open  and  notorious,  exclusive,  and  continuous  

                                                                                                                         



possession even though the claimants allowed others, including therecordowners, to use  

                                                                                                                                       

the driveway when necessary.21  

                                                      



                      Henley's activities on the land under and near the shed were sufficient to  

                                                                                                                        



establish the requirements of adverse possession for the statutory period.  Henley built  

                                                                                                                                    



and used his shed himself, and nothing in the record indicates that Hurd ever had access  

                                                                                                                                  



to the shed, let alone used the contested portion of land in any way. Henley's shed, even  

                                                                                                                                    



if built on skids, was a sufficiently permanent structure to meet the requirements of  

                                                                                                                                        



           19         See  Alaska  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Linck,   559  P.2d   1049,   1052-53  (Alaska   1977)  



(noting  claimants  had  "cleared  part  of  the  land,  built  and  maintained  barricades,  and  kept  

the  property  clean");  see  also  White  v.  Lambert,  332  S.E.2d  266,  268-69  (W.  Va.  1985)  

(determining  as  sufficient  to  constitute  adverse  possession  claimants'  activities  of  using  

the  property  as  their  lawn,  planting  shrubs  and  trees,  burying  a  waterline,  and  building  

a  shed).    



           20         Woycik v. Woycik, 537 A.2d 541, 544 (Conn. App.  1988).  

                                                                                                                    



           21         Trokey v. R.D.P. Dev.  Grp., L.L.C., 401 S.W.3d 516, 526-28 (Mo. App.  

                                                                                                                                   

2013).  



                                                                  -13-                                                             7497
  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

adverse possession because the presence of a shed is sufficient to provide notice to a                                                                                                        



                                                                                                             22  

landowner of exclusive and hostile possession.                                                                                                                                    

                                                                                                                    Henley built and used his gravel  



                                                                                                                                                                                       

driveway extending over the property line near the shed in a similar manner, to park cars,  



                                                                                                                                                                               

boats, and trailers in the area he used as his own over a long stretch of time.  By erecting  



                                                                                                                                                                                           

and using a shed as well as graveling and using a driveway on the contested area for ten  



                                                                                                                                                                                 

years, Henley engaged inactivitiessufficiently openandnotorious, exclusiveand hostile,  



                                                                                                                                                                                 23  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

and continuous and uninterrupted to satisfy the elements of adverse possession. 



               C.	            The    Superior    Court    Adequately    Defined    The    Area    Adversely  

                              Possessed By Henley.            



                              Hurd argues both that the superior court erred by not describing the area it                                                                                    



granted to Henley with sufficient precision and that Henley failed to meet his burden of                                                                                                     



providing   a   description   of   the   land  he   claimed   to   have   adversely   possessed   with  



sufficient particularity. However,                                         Henley originally claimedto                                    haveadverselypossessed            



a   larger   area   (the   entire   area   occupied   by   his   shop)  than   the   parcel   the   trial   court  



                                                                                                                                                                                   

eventually awarded him (the smaller area where his shed used to stand). For this reason  



                                                                                                                                                                                            

we focus on the sufficiency of the superior court's description of the area granted to  



Henley.  



               22             See Woycik               , 537 A.2d at 544.             



               23             See   Alaska   Nat'l   Bank,   559   P.2d   at   1052-53   (adverse   possessors   had  



                                                                                                                                                                                

"cleared part of the land, built and maintained barricades, and kept the property clean");  

                                                                       

see also Trokey, 401 S.W.3d at 526-28.  



                                                                                            -14-	                                                                                     7497
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                               Whether   a   trial   court's   description   of   adversely   possessed   land   is  



 sufficiently precise and definite is a question of law.  Although we have not addressed                                                                                           



what standard of review we apply to this issue in the adverse possession context, we                                                                                                               

                                                                                                                                                              24    Accordingly we  

 generally review the sufficiency of superior court findings de novo.                                                                                                                              



 apply our independent legal judgment and review de novo the adequacy of the superior  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

 court's description of the land awarded to Henley.25  

                                                                                                                            



                                The superior court described the area it awarded to Henley as the "portion  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



 of Hurd's property . . . bordered on the south from Henley's well to a few feet past where  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



 [Henley's] shed was located."  This included "a small portion of the land north of the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



 shed where the picnic table was located." The court provided the parties with a drawing  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



 to help themunderstand where the area adversely possessed by Henley was, "based upon  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



 the location of [the] southeast corner of Henley's garage." The superior court noted that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 although it had a survey of the encroachment as of 2016, it did not have a survey of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 Henley's property current as of the time of trial. Therefore, the court determined the land  

                                                                                                                                                                                                 



 must be surveyed before a final determination was made.  

                                                                                                                                       



                                Hurd argues that the superior court erred by describing the area adversely  

                                                                                                                                                                                    



possessed  by  Henley  with  insufficient  precision.                                                                      In  particular,  Hurd  contends  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 superior court's description is inadequate because it defines the area's boundaries using  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



                24             See Horne v. Touhakis                                , 356 P.3d 280, 282 (Alaska 2015) ("Whether there                                                          



 are sufficient findings for informed appellate review is a question of law." (quoting                                                                                                

Hooper v. Hooper                            , 188 P.3d 681, 685 (Alaska 2008)));                                                  Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway  

Borough, 28 P.3d 935, 938 (Alaska 2001) ("Whether . . . findings are sufficient to permit                                                                                                  

 appellate   review   is   a   legal   question   that   we   decide   by   exercising   our   independent  

judgment.").  



                25             See Inserra v. Violi, 679 N.W.2d 230, 235 (Neb. 2004) (applying de novo  

                                                                                                                                                                                              

review  to  the  entirety  of  an  adverse  possession  action,  including  sufficiency  of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                    

 description).  

                                



                                                                                                -15-                                                                                          7497
  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

anow-invisible                landmark: the              original location ofHenley's                          shed, whichhad                been moved  



prior to trial.           



                         Our only case considering how precisely a court need define an adversely                                                 



possessed area is               Vezey v. Green              , in which we upheld a superior court's use of landmarks                             

                                             26   In Vezey the superior court described the adversely possessed  

to delineate boundaries.                                                                                                                         



area as a "rectangular" parcel defined by "a telephone line to the north, Shaw Creek to  

                                                                                                                                                                



the east, Old Richardson Highway to the south, and a line 300 feet from the house to the  

                                                                                                                                                              

west."27           On  appeal  the original landowner argued the superior court's reliance on  

                                                                                                                                                              

"natural boundaries" to define the property was without legal precedent.28                                                                   We rejected  

                                                                                                                                                     



this argument, determining the superior court's description of the adversely possessed  

                                                                                            



area with reference to landmarks posed no "legal problem" because "[n]atural barriers  

                                                                                                                                                     



                                                                                                              29  

. . . may serve as boundaries in adverse possession cases."     

                                                                                                 



                          Vezey thus confirms the superior court may use landmarks, rather than  

                                                                                                                                                           



metes and bounds, to describe the boundaries of adversely possessed parcels. But Vezey  

                                                                                                                                                         



leaves open whether the superior court may use the previous locations of landmarks later  

                                                                                                                                                            



moved  to  delineate  those  boundaries.                                      We  therefore  turn  to  other  jurisdictions  for  

                                                                                                                                                              



guidance on this point.  

                                 



                         The  Wisconsin  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  a  trial  court's  property  

                                                                                                                                                  



description, based on the location of a fence no longer standing, was insufficiently  

                                                                                                                                          



definite to support an adverse possession judgment; the court thus recommended a  

                                                                                                                                                                 



             26          35  P.3d   14,  24  (Alaska  2001).  



             27          Id.  



             28          Id.  



             29          Id.  



                                                                              -16-                                                                        7497
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                                                                    30  

description by metes and bounds.                                         However there is no indication the trial court in                                               



                                                                                                                                                              31  

question had reference to photo exhibits showing the fence's previous location.                                                                                    



                           Indiana courts find descriptions sufficient for quiet title actions when the  

                                                                                                                                                                       



complainant describes the premises such that a "sheriff, with the aid of a surveyor, can  

                                                                                                                                                                      

find  the  real  estate  and  determine  its  boundaries."32                                                      The  Indiana  Supreme  Court  

                                                                                                                                                                



determined one complainant's property description sufficient despite its reliance on a  

                                                                                                                                                                          



fence's previous location:  "[W]e think [the parcel described] could be found with the  

                                                                                                                                                                       



assistance of a competent surveyor, aided by  one having  knowledge of the former  

                                                                                                                                                              

location of the fence referred to."33  

                                                            



                           In Illinois an adverse possession claimant must "establish with reasonable  

                                                                                                                                                        

certainty the location of the boundaries of the tract" claimed under adverse possession.34  

                                                                                                                                                                               



Under this standard the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a decision granting title to  

                                                                                                                                                                        



claimants where the proposed boundary was defined by a fence long since removed and  

                                                                                                                                                                      



             30            Brockman v. Brandenburg                              , 221 N.W. 397, 398 (Wis. 1928) ("It seems to                                            



us that the strip should be described by metes and bounds, if there is to be a permanent                                                               

settlement of the controversy.").       



             31            See id.  

                                    



             32           Morgan v. White, 56 N.E.3d 109, 117 (Ind. App. 2016) (quoting Gilbert v.  

                                                                                                                                                                          

Lusk, 106 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ind. App. 1952) (en banc)).  

                                                                                                  



             33            Brown v. Anderson, 90 Ind. 93, 95 (Ind. 1883) (considering sufficiency of  

                                                                                                                                                                         

claimant's property description rather than trial court's property description).  

                                                                                                                                  



             34            Schwartz v. Piper, 122 N.E.2d 535, 538 (Ill. 1954); see also Brosie v.  

                                                                                                                                                                         

Borrowman,  332  N.E.2d  129,  130  (Ill.  App.  1975)  ("The boundaries of the parcel  

                                                                                                                                                                

awarded to plaintiff are susceptible of specific and definite location with reasonable  

                                                                                                                                                       

certainty . . . [which] is sufficient.").  

                                                



                                                                                  -17-                                                                            7497
  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

the only evidence of the fence's prior location was testimony that was "vague, indefinite                                                                                 

and conflicting."                    35  



                              The superior court here relied on 6 days of testimony and 125 exhibits -  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



mostly of photographs of the land - to establish the original location of Henley's shed  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



and the other boundaries.  Many photo exhibits from numerous angles show where the  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



shed stood in reference to key landmarks including Henley's well, Henley's shop and the  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



gravel pad underneath it, as well as the southeast corner of Henley's garage, which  

                                                                                                                                                                                 



served as the basis for the court's drawing and all of which still stood at the time of trial.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                 



The superior court drew its guiding diagram on a survey of the encroachment on which  

                                                                                                                                                                                  



the surveyors had clearly marked the location of Henley's well, and multiple witnesses  

                                                                                                                                                                          



had drawn the original location of Henley's shed on that same survey.   The original  

                                                                                                                                                                              



location of the shed was therefore ascertainable with reasonable certainty from evidence  

                                                                                                                                                                            

in the record.36  

              



                              The  superior  court's  task  in  an  adverse  possession  case  is  to  clarify  

                                                                                                                                                                                



boundaries, not create further confusion.  Yet adverse possession claims resulting from  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



a good-faith but mistaken belief are often confusing by their very nature. And a statutory  

                                                                                                                                                                           



period of ten years means the trial court will often be charged with mapping activities  

                                                                                                                                                                           



long since completed and structures that may have changed over time.  Hurd asserts the  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



superior court here had no adequate means to determine the location of the area Henley  

                                                                                                                                                                               



adversely  possessed.                                But  Henley  provided  significant  supporting  documentation,  

                                                                                                                                                            



including many photographs of the relevant landmarks.   Given the challenging task  

                                                                                                                                                                                      



               35            Schwartz, 122 N.E.2d at 539-40 ("[W]here the location of a boundary is                                                                                        



marked by a monument at the inception . . . of the period of adverse possession, but such                                                                                            

monument is lost or destroyed, the location of such boundary or the monument marking                                                                                         

the same must be susceptible of definite proof in any action . . . of adverse possession.").                                                                                                     



               36            See id.; Brosie, 332 N.E.2d at 130.  

                                                                                                 



                                                                                           -18-                                                                                     7497
  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

before it, the superior court did not err by describing the area adversely possessed with                                                                                                                                                                                                  



reference to landmarks which are still standing and a landmark whose location is readily                                                                                                                                                                                           



 ascertainable with reasonable certainty from the record.                                                                                                               



                        D.	                    The Superior Court Could Reasonably Conclude That Henley Acted                                                                                                                                                                        

                                               In Good Faith.                  



                                              Alaska   Statute   09.45.052(a)  requires   that   to   gain   title   under   adverse  



possession, a claimant must have engaged in possessory activities "because of a good                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 faith but mistaken belief that the real property lies within the boundaries of adjacent real                                                                                                                                                                                                 



property owned by the adverse claimant."                                                                                                             Hurd contends the superior court erred by                                                                                                    



 determining Henley had acted with a good-faith belief that the contested property was   



his.   



                                              Whether Henley acted in "good faith" under the meaning of AS 09.45.052                                                                                                                                                    



 involves questions of both law and fact.                                                                                                 "[T]he interpretation of . . . controlling statutes                                                                                    



                                                                                                                                                                                      37  

 . . . is a legal question which we review de novo."                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                                                                                                                 However, the superior court's  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 determination that Henley acted in "good faith" is a finding of fact which we review for  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

 clear error because we interpret AS 09.45.052 to require only subjective good faith,  



                                                                                                                                                                    38  

                                                                                                                                                                           

without a showing of objective reasonableness. 



                       37	                    Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge                                                                        , 339 P.3d 636, 638 (Alaska 2014).                                                                 



                       38                     SeeEnders v. Parker, 125 P.3d 1027, 1029-31 (Alaska2005) (stating "[t]he  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

 good faith inquiry requires a factual determination of intent that we review for clear                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 error" when analyzing "good faith" in the context of will contests); Air Logistics of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

Alaska, Inc. v. Throop                                                       , 181 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.57 (Alaska 2008) ("[T]he determination                                                                                                                

regarding subjective good faith is generally factual and reviewed for clear error [while]                                                                                                                                                                                         

 the determination regarding objective reasonableness 'involves applying the proper  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

 interpretation of the [federal statute] and supporting regulations to uncontested facts, a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

primarilylegal determination,' which should be reviewed de novo." (quoting Bratt v. Cty  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

 of L.A., 912 F.2d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 1990))).  

                                                                                                                                                                    



                                                                                                                                               -19-	                                                                                                                                      7497
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

                            1.            Alaska Statute 09.45.052(a) requires only subjective good faith.                                                               



                            Adverse possession in Alaska is primarily governed by AS 09.45.052,                                                               



which sets forth the substantive elements a claimant must prove to acquire title by                                                                                            



adverse possession, while AS 09.10.030 limits when a person may bring related actions                                                                                 



                                                  39  

to recover real property.                                                                                                                                     

                                                       As amended in 2003, AS 09.45.052(a) limits the availability  



                                                                                                                                                                 

of gaining title through adverse possession to two types of claimants: adverse claimants  



                                                                                                                                                                                 

who acted "under color and claim of title" and adverse claimants who acted "because of  



                                                                                                                                                                                

a good faith but mistaken belief that the real property lies within the boundaries of  



                                                                                                                   40  

                                                                                                                        

adjacent real property owned by the adverse claimant." 



                            Our previous cases do not address whether AS 09.45.052(a)'s prescription  

                                                                                                                                                            



of a "good faith but mistaken belief" requires that this belief be objectively reasonable.  

                                                                                                                                                                                      



This case thus presents a question of first impression: whether AS 09.45.052(a)'s good- 

                                                                                                                                                                         



faith provision requires that the claimant's beliefof ownership be reasonably held as well  

                                                                                                                                                                            



as sincerely held.  We conclude that it does not.  

                                                                                            



                            Thelegislature's2003amendmentstoAlaska's statutory schemeofadverse  

                                                                                                                                                                     



possession - previously contained in both AS 09.45.052 and AS 09.10.030 - were  

                                                                                                                                                                          

intended  "to  eliminate  bad  faith  adverse  possession  claims."41                                                                            Specifically,  the  

                                                                                                                                                                             



legislature "modified AS 09.10.030 with the intent of abolishing adverse possession in  

                                                                                                                                                                                 

cases  where  the  claimant  does  not  have  color  of  title."42                                                                 But  instead  of  entirely  

                                                                                                                                                                    



eliminating  adverse  possession  claims  by  individuals  without  color  of  title,  "the  

                                                                                                                                                               



              39            See  Cowan  v.  Yeisley,  255  P.3d  966,  972  (Alaska  2011).  



              40            Id.  at  972-73  (quoting  AS  09.45.052(a),  as  amended  by  ch.  147,  §  3,  SLA  



2003).  



              41            Prax  v.  Zalewski,  400  P.3d   116,   119  (Alaska  2017).  



              42            Cowan,  255  P.3d  at  973  (footnote  omitted).  



                                                                                      -20-                                                                                       7497  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                43  

legislature relocated the doctrine (with some alterations) to AS 09.45.052."                                                                                                                                                           These  



alterations permitted adverse possession claims for claimants without color of title only                                                                                                                                                     



when   the   claimant   engages   in   "uninterrupted   adverse   notorious   possession   of   real  



property for 10 years or more because of                                                                                a good faith but mistaken belief                                                               that the real   



property lies within the boundaries of adjacent real property owned by the adverse                                                                                                                                                  

                              44      Together, these modifications "limit Alaskans' adverse possession claims  

claimant."                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



to cases where the claimant had either color of title or a good faith but mistaken belief  

                                                                                                                                                                                                    

that the claimant owned the land in question."45  

                                                                                                        



                                       Legislativehistorydemonstratesclearlegislativeintent toeliminateadverse  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

possession claims by trespassers in "bad faith," or "squatters."46                                                                                                                           But the bill's drafters  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



                    43                 Prax, 400 P.3d at 120.                              



                    44                 Cowan, 255 P.3d at 972-73 (emphasis added) (quoting AS 09.45.052(a),  



                                                                                                   

as amended by ch. 147, § 3, SLA 2003).  



                    45                 Id. at 973 (emphasis added); see also Hansen v. Davis, 220 P.3d 911, 916  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

n.7 (Alaska 2009) ("To prevail under the amended adverse possession law, claimants  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

must now show that they believed in good faith that the disputed land lies within the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

boundaries of their property. . . .").  

                                                                                         



                    46                 Jennie  Morawetz,  Note,  No  Room  for  Squatters:                                                                                                            Alaska's  Adverse  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

Possession Law, 28 ALASKA L.R                                                                 EV.341, 359-69 (2011); Minutes, H.                                                                     Judiciary Standing   

                                                          

Comm. Hearing on S.B. 93, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. (May 18, 2003) (testimony of Senator                                                                                                                                                  

Wagoner) (stating that the proposed bill "would not . . . abolish all aspects of adverse                                                                                                                                            

possession; instead, its purpose is to eliminate the possibility that a landowner will lose                                                                                                                                                    

property to a squatter who has no claim to the property"); Senator Thomas Wagoner,                                                                                                                                            

 S.   Judiciary   Comm.,   S.B.   93   Sponsor   Statement,   23rd   Leg.,   1st   Sess.   (2003),  

http://www.akrepublicans.org/wagoner/23/spst/wago_sb093.php ("[The amendments]   

would repeal the Doctrine of Adverse Possession in the case of 'bad faith' trespassers,                                                                                                                                   

giving private property owner's [sic] security in knowing their property cannot be taken                                                                                                                                                   

by squatters.").   



                                                                                                                        -21-                                                                                                                 7497
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

made no statements explicitly characterizing the "good faith" requirement as either                                                           

objectively reasonable or subjectively held.                                47  



                       Legislative  committee  minutes  suggest  an  intent  to  preserve  adverse  

                                                                                                                                          



possession claims by individuals whobelievethey knowtheir properties' boundaries and  

                                                                                                                                                  



inadvertently encroach upon their neighbors' properties. In committee,thebill's sponsor  

                                                                                                                                           



deferred questions about the proposed bill's effect to Jon Tillinghast, legal counsel to the  

                                                                                                                                                   

corporation that had drafted the bill.48  Tillinghast told legislators that adverse possession  

                                                                                                                                      



in "bad faith" occurs when one "moves onto a piece of property and builds a squatter's  

                                                                                                                                       



cabin," whereas adverse possession in "good faith" occurs when one "with a deed for a  

                                                                                                                                                      



piece of property [who] thinks he knows the boundaries . . . ends up inadvertently using  

                                                                                                                                               

the adjacent property."49                      As an example of a simple good-faith  boundary  dispute,  

                                                                                                   



Tillinghast offered a hypothetical landowner with "a fence that was one foot on his  

                                                                                                                                                   



neighbor's property" for 11 years; he explained that the landowner could successfully  

                                                                                      



                                                                                                                                  50  

gain title over the strip of land, but only if the trespass were unintentional.                                                       

                                                                                                          



                       The drafter's word choices provide no  explicit guidance, as the terms  

                                                                                                                                              



"inadvertently"   and   "unintentional"   are   legally   imprecise   with   respect   to   the  

                                                                                                                                                 



            47         S e e          g e n e r a l l y             S . B .          9 3         L e g i s l a t i v e              H i s t o r y ,  



http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Detail/23?Root=SB%20%2093.  



            48         See  Minutes,  S.  Judiciary  Standing  Comm.  Hearing  on  S.B.  93,  23rd  Leg.,  



 1st   Sess.   at   9   (Apr.   16,   2003)   (testimony   of   Senator   Wagoner)   (stating   "Sealaska  

Corporation   asked   him   to   introduce   this   bill");   see   also   id.   at   10   (testimony   of   Jon  

Tillinghast)  (stating  that  Sealaska  drafted  the  proposed  bill).   



            49         Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (testimony of Jon Tillinghast).  

                                                                                                        



            50         Minutes, S. Judiciary Standing Comm. Hearing on S.B. 93, 23rd Leg., 1st  

                                                                                                                                                   

Sess. at 13 (Apr. 30, 2003) (emphasis added) (testimony of Jon Tillinghast).  

                                                                                                                 



                                                                        -22-                                                                   7497
  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

                                                         51  

reasonableness of a belief.                                   And the bill's legislative history demonstrates the drafters                                                 



and legislators did not answer all of the complex legal questions that were likely to                                                                                                  



            52  

                                                                                                                                                                                  

arise.            Even so, the drafter's language describing the good-faith neighbor - one who  



                                                                                                                                                                                 

made an unintentional, inadvertent trespass because he believes the land is his, even  



                                             53 

                                                                                                                                                             

without color of title                           - supports an interpretation that "good-faith" in this context is  



subjective.  



                                                                                                                                                                            

                             Our previous cases interpreting similar statutory requirements also support  



                                                                                                                                                                            

reading AS 09.45.052(a)'s requirement of "a good-faith but mistaken belief" to require  



                                                                                                                                                                              

a  subjectively  held,  rather  than  an  objectively  reasonable,  belief.                                                                             We  have  never  



                                                                                                                                                                                     

explicitly characterized this formulation as objective or subjective, but our reasoning has  



                                                                                                                                                                        

previously equated the phrase with a subjective belief, as has reasoning from the court  



       

of appeals.  



                                                                                                                                                                                         

                             In Sheldon v. City of Ambler we equated a "good faith mistake" with a  



                                                                                                                       54  

                                                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                            We explained that "[b]ecause  

subjective standard in the context of qualified immunity. 



               51            See, e.g.         ,  Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.                                           , 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed.                   



Cir. 1995) ("The boundary between unintentional and culpable acts is not always bright,                                                                                      

for the facts often include subjective as well as objective elements." (citations omitted)).                                                                          



               52            Infact, even themisplaced fencehypothetical scenariodescribedabovewas  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

subject to some confusion.  See Minutes, S. Judiciary Standing Comm. Hearing on S.B.  

                                                                                                                                                                                  

93, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. at 13 (Apr. 30, 2003) (testimony of Jon Tillinghast) (explaining  

                                                                                                                                                                   

he  had  initially  "misadvised"  the  committee  that  the  fence  example  was  adverse  

                                                                                                                                                                          

possession under color of title when the example would actually qualify as good faith).  

                                                                                                                                                                              



               53            Thepre-2003 statutory scheme already benefitted thoseadversepossessors  

                                                                                                                                                                     

with a certain type of objective good faith; those who possess the land under "color of  

                                                                                              

title" were permitted to file a claim after possessing the land for only seven years.  See  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

Prax v. Zalewski, 400 P.3d 116, 119 (Alaska 2017).  

                                                                                                   



               54             178 P.3d 459, 465 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Samaniego v. City of Kodiak,  

                                                                                                                                                                          

                                                                                                                                                              (continued...)  



                                                                                         -23-                                                                                   7497
  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

objective reasonableness is required, officers do not enjoy immunity on account of their                                            



                                               55  

subjective  good faith alone."                                                                                                            

                                                   And we clarified that "[a] police officer might make a  



                                

good faith mistake in believing that his action is legal; this does not, however, prevent  

                                                                                                                56    Our analysis  

                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                       

that same belief from being  unreasonable  for that officer to hold." 



therefore reflected an understanding that a "good faith mistake" refers to a subjective  

                                                                                                                           



belief, which in turn can be either objectively reasonable or objectively unreasonable.  

                                                                                                                    



                      Similarly, in Mount Juneau Enterprises, Inc. v. City &Borough of Juneau,  

                                                                                                                               

we used the phrase "good-faith but mistaken belief" to mean a subjective belief.57                                                  The  

                                                                                                                                     



case involved an "inverse condemnation," defined as "when a governmental entity takes  

                                                                                                                                    



private property for public purposes under the good-faith but mistaken belief that the  

                                                                                                                                      

taking does not require the exercise of eminent domain."58                                     A simple title search would  

                                                                                                                                  



have revealed the City's reliance on an easement was mistaken by showing that the entity  

                                                                                                                                   



that granted the City an easement lacked authority to do so.  But we held "the City's  

                                                                                                                                  



reliance on [the] easement" was nevertheless consistent "with a good-faith but mistaken  

                                                                                                                             

belief that there was no need to exercise eminent domain powers."59  

                                                                                             



           54         (...continued)  



2  P.3d  78,  84  (Alaska  2000)).  



           55        Id.  (alteration  in  original)  (emphasis  added).  



           56        Id.  (emphases  added).  



           57         923  P.2d  768,  773  (Alaska   1996).  



           58        Id.  (emphasis  added)  (citing  State  of  Alaska,  Dep't  of  Highways  v.  Crosby,  



4 10  P.2d  724,  728-29  (Alaska   1966)).  



           59        Id .     Although  we   could   have   emphasized   that   the   City's   belief   was  



objectively reasonable, in  addition  to  being  subjectively  held,  we did  not.  We  instead  

simply  rejected  the  appellant's  argument  that  the  City  was  required to  conduct  a  title  

                                                                                                                     (continued...)  



                                                                  -24-                                                             7497
  


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

                         In   Wahl v. State                the court of appeals implicitly equated "a defendant's                            



subjective  belief in the existence of a                           sentencing agreement" with "a defendant's reliance                                



on  a mistaken but good faith belief                              that a sentencing agreement has been made . . . even                                    

if the mistaken belief is unilateral."                             60  



                         In each of these cases, we or the court of appeals used terminology similar  

                                                                                                                                                       



to the language at issue from AS 09.45.052(a) - "a good faith but mistaken belief" -  

                                                                                                                                                               



and  implicitly  characterized  it  as  a  subjective  standard.                                                   Furthermore,  neither  the  

                                                                                                                                                             



statutory text nor the legislative history indicates that the phrase specifically requires an  

                                                                                                                                                                



objective standard of good faith.   Therefore we construe "a good faith but mistaken  

                                                                                                                                                  



belief" in AS 09.45.052(a) to require only subjective good faith.  

                                                                                                                           



                         2.	          The superior court did not err in determining Henley acted in  

                                                                                                                                                                

                                      subjective good faith.  

                                                                       



                         An adverse possessor must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence  

                                                                                                                                                   



that statutory requirements are met, including the requirement that the possessor act  

                                                                                                                                                              



under a good-faith belief that the disputed land was within the possessor's property  

                                                                                                                                                   

boundaries.61  

                           



                         The superior court found that Henley did possess a good-faith belief that  

                                                                                                                            



the contested area was part of his property.  The superior court reasoned that Henley's  

                                                                                                                                                   



reliance on Hall Quality Builders' excavation led him to this belief, noting Henley's  

                                                                                                                                                   



testimony that he relied on the excavation performed by Hall Quality Builders when  

                                                                                                                                                         



determining what he thought his property boundaries were.   The superior court also  

                                                                                                                                                            



             59          (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                           

search  to  verify  that the entity  granting the easement held  the land  rights  the  City  

                                                                   

sincerely believed the entity held.  Id.  



             60          691 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Alaska App. 1984).  

                                                                                                           



             61          Curran v. Mount, 657 P.2d 389, 391-92 (Alaska 1982).  

                                                                                                                      



                                                                              -25-	                                                                       7497
  


----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

                                                                                                                         

pointed  to  Hurd's  testimony  admitting  he  had  been  unsure  enough  of  the  precise  



                                                                                                                              

boundary to not bring his concern up to Henley, even after Hurd attempted his own  



                                                                                                                            

informal survey with the aid of a compass, hundred-foot tape, metal detector, and friend  



                                                             

who conducted surveys professionally.  



                                                                                                                     

                    Hurd argues the superior court erred in concluding Henley had a good-faith  



                                                                                                                 

belief that the contested property belonged to him.  Hurd first points to a conversation  



                                                                                                                  

during which, after Henley had built his shed, Henley told Hurd that they should get a  



                                                                                    

survey done so that they could build a privacy fence.  



                                                                                                                                   

                    When Henley suggested performing a property survey before building a  



                                                                                                           

fence that would precisely demarcate the boundary between his and Hurd's property,  



                                                                                                                               

Henley did reveal he was uncertain exactly where the boundary lay between the two  



                                                                                                                                

properties.  However, his admission of uncertainty as to the precise boundary does not  



                                                                                                                               

negate the sincerity of his belief that the area on which he had already built his shed was  



                                              

on his side of that boundary.  



                                                                                                                            

                    Hurd next suggests Henley's inconsistent testimony on whether and where  



                                                                                                                                

he found property markers contradicts the superior court's finding that Henley built his  



                                                                                                                                  

shed on Hurd's land because of a good-faith belief the land was his.  Henley testified at  



                                                                                                                                   

trial that when he received the property in 2001, before he built his shed, he found a  



                                                                                                                  

white stake near the southeast corner of his property; this testimony clearly contradicted  



                                                                                                                        

what Henley had said in the deposition, as the superior court pointed out in its findings  



              

of fact.  



                                                                                                                        

                    Hurd's argument finally relies on Henley's own testimony, which indicates  



                                                                                                                                 

Henley knew there was a possibility he was encroaching on his neighbor's property by  



                                                                                                                                      

building the shed.  Henley testified about his state of mind when constructing the shed:  



                                                                                                                                      

"I thought I was on my land.   So if I was off, I figured it wasn't [by] very much."  



                                                               -26-                                                         7497
  


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

 Henley explained:                         "[I]f there is a problem, I can move [the shed] because it's on skids                                                                       



 . . . I could have just put a strap around it and just tugged it forward a couple feet."                                                                                                   



                              But "[i]t is the trial court's function, and not that of a reviewing court, to               



judge   the   credibility  of   the   witnesses   and   to   weigh   conflicting   evidence.     This   is  



                                                                                                                                                                                               62  

 especially true where the trial court's decision depends largely upon oral testimony."                                                                                                              



 The  superior  court  acknowledged  that  Henley's  testimony  about  the  stakes  was  

                                                                                                                                                                                        



 inconsistentbut still determined,in reliance on other portions ofHenley's oraltestimony,  

                                                                                                                                                                            



that Henley believed when he built his shed that the land underneath was his in reliance  

                                                                                                                                                                                 



 on Hall Quality Builders' excavation of that area.  

                                                                                                                 



                              We conclude that AS 09.45.052(a)'s requirement of good faith requires  

                                                                                                                                                                                



 only subjective good faith; the adverse claimant's belief of possessing land need only be  

                                                                                                                                                                                              



 sincerely rather than reasonably held. As a result, the record contains sufficient evidence  

                                                                                                                                                                               



to support the trial court's determination that Henley hada good-faith but mistaken belief  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



that the "contested area" was part of his property.  

                                                                                                                   



 IV.            CONCLUSION  



                              We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's judgment.  

                                                                                                                                 



               62  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

                              Kessler v. Kessler, 827 P.2d 1119, 1119 (Alaska 1992) (quoting Penn v.  

                                                               

Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980)).  



                                                                                             -27-                                                                                              7497  

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