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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Inc., v. State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources and Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority (8/21/2020) sp-7478

Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Inc., v. State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources and Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority (8/21/2020) sp-7478

Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC  REPORTER.  Readers are  

requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,  

Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email corrections@akcourts.us.  



                                                                                                                         

                       THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ALASKA  



SOUTHEAST  ALASKA                                                      )  

CONSERVATION  COUNCIL,  INC.,                                          )     Supreme Court No. S-16793  

                                                                                                               

                                                                       )  

                                 Appellant,                            )     Superior  Court  No.  3AN-13-09162  CI  

                                                                       )  

           v.                                                          )                          

                                                                             O P I N I O N  

                                                                       )  

                                                                                                                    

                                        

STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT                                            )    No. 7478 - August 21, 2020  

                                                     

OF NATURAL RESOURCES and                                               )  

                                                       

ALASKA MENTAL HEALTH TRUST                                             )  

AUTHORITY,                                                             )  

                                                                       )
  

                                 Appellees.                            )
  

                                                                       )
  



                                                                                                                

                      Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
  

                                                                                                      

                      Judicial District, Anchorage, Frank A. Pfiffner, Judge.
  



                                                                                                                  

                      Appearances:                 Thomas   E.   Meacham,   Anchorage,   for
  

                                                                                                          

                      Appellant.           Colleen  J.  Moore,  Senior  Assistant  Attorney
  

                                                                                                           

                      General, and Jessica Alloway, Assistant Attorney General,
  

                                                                                                             

                      Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau,
  

                             

                      for Appellees.
  



                                                                                                             

                      Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, and Carney,
  

                                                                                      *   [Maassen, Justice,
  

                      Justices, and Eastaugh,  Senior Justice.                                               

                      not participating.]
  

                             



                      BOLGER, Chief Justice.
  

                                                    

                      WINFREE, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
  

                                                                                                                    



           *          Sitting by assignment made under article IV, section 11 of the Alaska                                   



Constitution and Alaska Administrative Rule 23(a).                          


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

                                                                                                                      

                                 STOWERS, Justice, dissenting in part.  



I.               INTRODUCTION  



                                 This appeal arises from a dispute over a parcel of land.                                                                               The State selected        



this parcel in 1989 under an Alaska Statehood Act provision allowing State selections                                          



of federal lands for community centers and recreational areas.                                                                                            In the 1990s, in order to                              



settle litigation about the State's management of lands granted to Alaska under the                                                                                                                          



Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act (Mental Health Act), the State agreed to create a                                                                                                                                



mental health trust.                                There were extensive negotiations over which lands would be                                                                                                



included in this trust. In the course of these negotiations, the State agreed that the parcel  

                                                                                                                                                                                                       



selected under the Statehood Act would not be conveyed to the mental health trust, but                                                                                                                        



rather would be classified and managed by the State as wildlife habitat.  For years after  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



this settlement, the State managed the parcel as wildlife habitat.  

                                                                                                                                                               



                                 By the mid-2000s there were still remaining State entitlements to federal  

                                          



lands;  the  State  and  the  federal  government  entered  negotiations  over  remaining  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



entitlements.   In 2009 the State and the federal government executed an agreement  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



finalizing the Mental Health Act selections.  One of the terms of the agreement was that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                             



the parcel selected under the Statehood Act would be converted to a Mental Health Act  

                                                                                                                                                                                                             



selection. The parcel was conveyed by the federal government to the State, and the State  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



subsequently conveyed the parcel to the mental health trust.  

                                                                                                                                                      



                                 A lawsuit was filed against the State to invalidate the transfer of the parcel  

                                                                                                                                                                                                       



to the mental health trust, based primarily on the arguments that the transaction violated  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



contractual and statutory terms of the earlier mental health trust settlement and violated  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



the constitutional public notice requirement for disposing of an interest in State land.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



The superior court ruled for the State, and the unsuccessful litigant appeals.  For the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



reasons that follow, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



                                                                                                       -2-                                                                                               7478
  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

with this opinion.              



II.        FACTS AND PROCEEDING                                   S 



           A.          Mental Health Trust Litigation And Settlemen                                         t 



                                                                                                                                                 

                       In 1956 the Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act authorized the Territory of  



Alaska to select and take title to one million acres of defined, available federal public  

                                                                                                                                         



                                                                                                                             1  

                                                                                                                                           

domain  in  Alaska  to  administer  in  trust  for  mental  health  programs.                                                     The  State  

legislature  in  1978  authorized the use of trust lands for  non-trust purposes;2   much  

                                                                                                                                          



                                                                                                 3  

                                                                                                                                     

existing trust land was then sold or otherwise encumbered.                                          Representatives of Alaskans  



with mental health needs brought a class action lawsuit in 1982, claiming that disposing  

                                                                                                                                    



                                                                                                                                      4  

                                                                                                                                         When  

of trust lands breached the State's fiduciary duties under the Mental Health Act. 



that litigation first reached us in  Weiss I, we invalidated the statute authorizing use of  

                                                                                                                                                 



                                                          5  

                                                                                                                                               

trust land for non-trust purposes,  and ordered that the trust corpus be reconstituted  



"to match as nearly as possible the holdings which comprised the trust when the  

                                                                                                                                               



                                                     6  

                                                                                                                                       

1978  law  became  effective."                          And  we  attempted  to  guide  the  superior  court  by  



noting that original trust lands still held by the State should be included in the trust  

                                                                                                                                                 



along with some form of  



           1           Alaska  Mental  Health  Enabling  Act,  Pub.  L.  No.  84-830,  §  202(a),  (e),  70  



Stat.  709,  711-12  (1956).  



           2           Ch.  181,  §  3(a),  SLA  1978;  see  Weiss  v.  State  (Weiss  II),  939  P.2d  380,  383  



(Alaska   1997).    



           3           Weiss II, 939 P.2d at 383.  

                                                                     



           4           State v. Weiss (Weiss I), 706 P.2d 681, 682 (Alaska 1985).  

                                                                                                                            



           5           Id. at 683.  

                                          



           6           Id. at 684.  

                                          



                                                                       -3-                                                                 7478
  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

reimbursement for original trust lands no longer held by the State.                                   7  



                                                                                                                                

                     In 1991 the legislature enacted a statute, commonly called "Chapter 66,"  



                                                                                                                               

authorizing a settlement to reconstitute the trust through substitution of other state lands  



                                                                                                                       

to be agreed upon by the class action plaintiffs and Department of Natural Resources  

            8    Chapter  66  established  the  Trust  Authority  to  serve  as  trustee  of  the  

(DNR).                                                                                                                           

reconstituted trust9  and provided that if the parties could not reach an agreement by  

                                                                                                                                  



December 1994, the trust could be reconstituted by lands to be identified by DNR in a  

                                                                                                                        

default list.10   A proposed settlement was drafted, winning the support of some, but not  

                                                                                                                                  

all, of the plaintiffs.11          A group that included Southeast Alaska Conservation Council,  

                                                                                                                         



Inc. (SEACC), referred  to  as the "ACE Intervenors" (ACE/SEACC), intervened to  

                                                                                                                                   

challenge  Chapter  66  and  the  proposed  settlement.12                                    ACE/SEACC  feared  that  

                                                                                                                                



Chapter 66 and the proposed reconstitution settlement would include valuable wildlife  

                                                                                                                           



habitat  and  recreational  land  without  adequate  planning  and  public  participation  

                                                                                                                  



safeguards, and that use of these lands would be narrowed for generating revenue.  In  

                                                                                                                                   



April 1993 the superior court granted ACE/SEACC summary judgment on 2 of its 11  

                                                                                                                              



claims, ruling that the legislature impermissibly had delegated its lawmaking authority  

                                                                                                                         



by approving DNR's prospective default lands list before seeing its contents, and that the  

                                                                                                                                  



          7         Id.  at  683-84.  



          8          Ch.  66,  §  55,  SLA   1991.  



          9         Id.  §  26.  



          10        Id.   §   56;  see   also  Alaska   Ctr.  for   the  Env't   v.  State,   940   P.2d   916, 918  



(Alaska   1997).  



          11        Alaska  Ctr. for  the Env't, 940 P.2d at 918.  

                                                                                



          12        Id .   The  organizations  were  referred  to  as  the  "ACE  Intervenors"  because  



Alaska  Center  for  the  Environment  (ACE)  was  the  first  listed  party  in  pleadings.  



                                                                 -4-                                                          7478
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                                                                                                                                             13  

conveyance of substitute lands to the trust was subject to the land use requirements.                                                             



                                                                                                                                  

ACE/SEACC, plaintiffs who supported the proposed settlement, and the State appealed  



                                                                               14  

                                                                 

various aspects of the superior court's decision. 



                                                                                                                                   

                      In December 1993, pending resolution of the issues appealed, the superior  



                                                                                                                                        

court denied preliminary approval of the proposed settlement because its terms were  

                         15  The superior court also voiced grave doubts about the viability of any  

unenforceable.                                                                                                                             



settlement based on Chapter 66, given that the court had (1) invalidated the default lands  

                                                                                                                                        



list that was supposed to provide security, and (2) ruled that any lands the parties agreed  

                                                                                                                                     

to convey to the trust would be subject to land use planning.16  The State then repudiated  

                                                                                                                               

the Chapter 66 settlement framework, and the parties renewed negotiations.17  

                                                                                                                                  



                      In 1994thelegislatureenacted another statute,commonly called "HB201,"  

                                                                                                                                        

                                                                         18   HB 201 incorporated a list of substitute  

authorizing a settlement on modified terms.                                                                                     

                                                               



lands for conveyance to the trust (Other Lands List) that had been negotiated by the  

                                                                                                                                           

            19  including ACE/SEACC.  Page 27 of the Other Lands List specified that three  

parties,                                                                                                                                



parcels - including one referred to as No Name Bay - would not be conveyed to the  

                                                                                                                                           



reconstituted trust, but instead would be designated as wildlife habitat and managed by  

                                                                                                                                            



DNR.  



           13         Id . at 919.     



           14         Id .  



           15  

                                 

                      Id . at 920.  



           16         Id.  



           17  

                                                                                                               

                       Weiss v. State (Weiss II), 939 P.2d 380, 385 (Alaska 1997).  



           18  

                                                

                      Ch. 5, FSSLA 1994.  



           19  

                                                      

                      See id. § 40(a)(2).  



                                                                      -5-                                                              7478
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                    In several related court filings ACE/SEACC asserted that it had played a  



                                                                                                                               

central role in negotiating the specific lands on the Other Lands List to be conveyed -  



                                                                                                         

and not to be conveyed - under the new settlement. ACE/SEACC, however, did not  



                                                                                                               

sign either the proposed or final written settlement agreement ending the litigation.  



                                                                                                                             

                    Shortly  before  the  superior  court  granted  preliminary  approval  of  the  



                                                                                                                      

HB 201 settlement agreement, ACE/SEACC moved to dismiss its separate pending  



                                                                   

appeal on its Chapter 66 claims, vacate the superior court's judgment on those claims,  



                                                                                                                              

and  dismiss  its  intervention  complaint  without  prejudice  on  the  ground  that  its  



                                                                                                                             

Chapter 66 claims were mooted by HB 201.   ACE/SEACC argued that vacatur and  



                                                                  

dismissal were proper because they would allow ACE/SEACC to bring similar claims  



                                                                                     

if the legislature enacted future laws similar to Chapter 66.  



                                                                                                                  

                    The State opposed vacatur and dismissal of ACE/SEACC's complaint,  



                                                                                                                   

arguing that even if HB 201 had mooted those causes of action, the HB 201 settlement  



                                                                                                                               

agreement granted ACE/SEACC a number of concessions in an effort to secure its  



                                                                                                                             

support and quiet its legal claims stemming from the mental health trust litigation.  The  



                                                                                                                              

 State argued it would be unfair to allow ACE/SEACC to challenge the settlement in the  



                                                                                                                                

future simply because it had not signed the settlement agreement.  The State pointed to  



                                                                                                                           

page 27 of the Other Lands List to illustrate its assertion that specific concessions were  



                                                                                                            

made to secure ACE/SEACC's support of the settlement.  We granted ACE/SEACC's  



                                                                                                                     

motion to dismiss its appeal, although we did not vacate the superior court's judgment  



                                                                                                                     

denying preliminary approval of the proposed settlement or its grant of partial summary  



                    

judgment to ACE/SEACC.  



                                                                                                                                 

                    The  original  plaintiffs  and  one  of  the  plaintiff-intervenors  in  Weiss  I  



                                                                                                                    

subsequently challenged HB 201, eventually leading to our Weiss II decision upholding  



                                                               -6-                                                        7478
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                                                                                                20  

the settlement and ending the litigation.                                                              Weiss II            did not concern any of the issues in                                              



the present case.            



                B.               Status Of No Name Bay                              



                                 Section 6(a) of the Alaska Statehood Act authorized the State to select                                                                                           



800,000 acres of unappropriated land from the federal public domain for community                                                                                                     



centers and recreational areas - up to 400,000 acres of which were to be vacant and                                                                                                                      



                                                                                                             21  

unappropriated lands within national forests.                                                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                     In 1989 DNR selected No Name Bay,  



                                                                                                                                                                                                    

located on Kuiu Island in the Tongass National Forest, under § 6(a) as a national forest  



                                                                                                                                                                                        

community grant (NFCG) selection. The selected No Name Bay parcel was designated  



NFCG-299.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                But in 1993 the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) classified the  



                                                                                                                                                                                                         

selection as a "top filing" under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act  



                             22  

                                                                                                                                                            

(ANILCA).                          This meant the parcel was not "available" within the meaning of § 6(a),  



                                                                                                                                                                                                              23  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

but its  selection  would  receive tentative approval automatically  upon  availability. 



                                                                                                                                                                                                          

ANILCA allowed the State to select 25% more land than it was entitled to under the  



                                                                                                                                                                                           

Statehood Act, with approval granted in order of priority decided by the State; ANILCA  



                20               Weiss II           , 939 P.2d at 402.              



                21              Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a), 72 Stat. 339, 340 (1958).                                                                           The § 6(a) grant was                     



in addition to the § 6(b) general purpose grant of about 102 million acres to be selected                                                                                                     

from the unappropriated public domain.  See id. § 6(b).  

                                                                                                                                        



                22              See Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 906(e), 94 Stat. 2371, 2439 (1980).  

                                                                                                                                                                     



                23              Id . ("Each such selection application, if otherwise valid, shall become an  

                                                                                                                                                                           

effective selection without further action by the State upon the date the lands included  

                                                                                                                                                                               

in such application become available within the meaning of [§ 6(a) of the Statehood  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

Act] . . .").  

                 



                                                                                                      -7-                                                                                             7478
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

also allowed the State to change selections and priorities pending tentative approval.                                                                                                               24  



                                                                                                                                                                      

                               Shortly  after  DNR selected  No  Name  Bay,  the  federal  Forest  Service  



                                                                                                                                                                                                   

proposed reserving several rights-of-way for road construction and timber harvest on the  



                                                                                                                                                                                       

parcel.  DNR's concurrence was required before encumbering lands already selected  

                                                          25  and DNR granted its concurrence.  In Southeastern Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                                                          

under the Statehood Act, 



Conservation Council, Inc. v. Pekovich, SEACC sued DNR, alleging that granting the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



concurrence for federal rights-of-way across No Name Bay without prior public notice  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



violated the Public Notice Clause, article VIII, section 10 of the Alaska Constitution, as  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

this concurrence disposed of interests in state lands.26                                                                         The superior court ruled in the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



case that, although the State did not own No Name Bay, "state lands, or interests therein"  

                                                                                                                                                                                        



included selections under § 6(a) of the Statehood Act within the meaning of the Public  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



Notice Clause. The court reasoned that the Public Notice Clause embraced future federal  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



land grants because when the Constitution was drafted territorial Alaska owned almost  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



no land and was relying on vast land grants from the federal public domain to secure a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                       



new government.  The superior court therefore invalidated DNR's concurrence.  DNR  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



did not appeal the decision.  The HB 201settlement followed about two months later.  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



                               After the HB 201 settlement was reached, DNR undertook a public process  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



regarding whether to renew its concurrence on the rights-of-way and timber harvest,  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



ultimately deciding to allow only a temporary road. DNR explained that although it had  

                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                24             Id.  § 906(f). The Alaska Land Transfer Acceleration Act, discussed below,                                                                                  



amended ANILCA to exclude top filings for purposes of calculating whether the State's                                                                                                      

selections exceeded its entitlement, meaning that the State's total selections -including                                                                                           

top filings - could exceed its entitlement by more than 25%.                                                                                         Pub. L. No. 108-452,            

 § 404(a)(4), 118 Stat. 3575, 3593-94 (2004).                                           



                25              § 906(k), 94 Stat. at 2441.  

                                                                               



                26             No. 1JU-93-00823 CI (Alaska Super., Feb. 11, 1994).  

                                                                                                                                                               



                                                                                                  -8-                                                                                         7478
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

not classified No Name Bay, which the State did not own, it had reviewed the proposed                                                                                                                                                                   



rights-of-way   "in   light   of   [DNR's]   commitment   to   classify   this   land   as   'Wildlife  



Habitat.' " DNR justified its decision to allow only a temporary road by invoking the                                                                                                                                                                                      



"need[] to honor [its] commitment" under HB 201 to manage No Name Bay as wildlife                                                                                                                                                                            



habitat.   Elsewhere it characterized this commitment as "a political trade off made by                                                                                                                                                                                      



DNR, intended to resolve the [mental health trust] issue."                                                                                                                                       And in a letter to a state                                           



representative   explaining   the   limited   concurrence,   the   DNR   commissioner   again  



referenced   the   prior  "commitment   to   classify   [No   Name   Bay]   as   'Wildlife   Habitat  



Land.' "   



                                           Later DNR documents also referenced the commitment to manage No                                                                                                                                                                



Name Bay as wildlife habitat as part of the HB 201 settlement. In a letter to the regional                                                                                                                                                                 



national forest supervisor, the DNR commissioner wrote that, as a result of negotiations                                                                                                                                                      



to settle the   Weiss litigation, "a decision was made to designate these lands as wildlife  



management land." DNR's 2000 land-use plan for southcentral and southeastern Alaska                                                                                                                                                                             



classified No Name Bay to be managed for its "high habitat values," noting that "[u]nder                                                                                                                                                                   



the   Mental   Health   Settlement,   this  land   is   to   be   designated   habitat   and   managed  



accordingly."  



                                           In 2004 Congress                                               enacted the Alaska Land Transfer Acceleration Act                                                                                                              

                                                              27       Section 103 of the Acceleration Act allowed the State to convert  

(Acceleration Act).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



general  purpose  selections  made  under  §  6(b)  of  the  Statehood  Act  to  community  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



development selections under § 6(a). Section 106(a) of the Acceleration Act authorized  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



the  Interior  Secretary  to  "enter  into  a  binding  written  agreement  with  the  State"  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



concerning  "land  remaining  to  be  conveyed  under  each  entitlement  established  or  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



confirmed by" the Alaska Statehood Act. Although neither the Acceleration Act nor the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



                      27                    118 Stat. 3575.  

                                                                         



                                                                                                                                      -9-                                                                                                                                          7478  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

                                                                                                                    

Statehood Act mentions the 1956 Mental Health Act, DNR and the Trust Authority  



                                                                                                                          

began negotiations with the Department of Interior to close out Alaska's mental health  



                                                                                     

trust entitlement under the auspices of the Acceleration Act.  



                                                                                                                    

                    DNR, the Trust Authority, and the BLM executed an agreement (Closeout  



                                                                                                                        

Agreement) in 2009 closing out the State's remaining entitlement under the Mental  



                                                                                                                              

Health Act.  Among other conveyances, the federal government agreed to convey No  



                                                                                                                            

Name Bay to the State as a Mental Health Act selection, not a Statehood Act § 6(a)  



                                                                                                                              

selected parcel.  In 2010 BLM issued a decision converting No Name Bay from a § 6(a)  



                                                                                                                                

national forest community grant selected parcel to a mental health selection pursuant to  



                                                                                                                              

the terms of the Closeout Agreement.  In 2012 the federal government conveyed No  



                                                                                    

Name Bay to DNR in partial satisfaction of the State's Mental Health Act entitlement,  



                                                                                                                         

and DNR then conveyed it to the Trust Authority.  The State did not publish any public  



                                                                                    

notice or announcement before executing the Closeout Agreement.  



                                   

          C.        Current Proceedings  



                                                                                                                              

                    SEACC sued DNR and the Trust Authority in 2013, seeking return of No  



                                                                                                                       

Name Bay to DNR with instructions to manage it as wildlife habitat. SEACC's relevant  



                                                                                                                

complaint included five claims.  First, SEACC claimed that by signing the Acceleration  



                                                                                                                               

Act Closeout Agreement, DNR breached an oral contract - memorialized on page 27  



                                                                                                                              

of the Other Lands List incorporated into HB 201 - obligating DNR to manage No  



                                                                                                                             

Name Bay as wildlife habitat instead of mental health trust land. Second, it claimed that  



                                                                                                                              

by signing the Closeout Agreement, DNR breached obligations of good faith and fair  



                                                                                            

dealing under the oral contract.  Third, it claimed that DNR violated the Public Notice  



                                                                                                                          

Clause by failing to provide public notice prior to relinquishing its interest in No Name  



                                                                                                                                    

Bay as a Statehood Act § 6(a) selected parcel by executing the Closeout Agreement.  



                                                                                                                           

Fourth, it claimed that by signing the Closeout Agreement, DNR had violated three  



                                                                                                                        

statutes: HB 201, specifying that DNR manage No Name Bay as wildlife habitat instead  



                                                              -10-                                                        7478
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                                                                                                                        

of mental health trust land; AS 38.05.035(e), requiring DNR to issue written findings  



                                                                                                                                  

before disposing of an interest in state land; and AS 38.05.945(a)(1), requiring DNR to  



                                                                                                                                

give notice before changing the classification of state land.  Fifth, it claimed that the  



                                                                                                                                   

superior court's Pekovich  decision precludes DNR from arguing that there was not a  



                                                                                                                                  

disposal of an interest in state lands within the meaning of the Public Notice Clause.  



                                                                                                                               

                     SEACC moved for judicial notice that:  (1) the selection of No Name Bay  



                                                                                                                                

as mental health trust land occurred long after the window closed for selections under the  



                                                                                                                                

Mental Health Act; (2) the parcel was not unreserved and therefore was ineligible for  



                                                                                                                      

selection  under  the  Mental  Health  Act;  (3)  the  Acceleration  Act  did  not  authorize  



                                                                                                                                

conversion of Statehood Act § 6(a) selections to Mental Health Act selections; and (4)  



                                                                                                                                   

No Name Bay had not been selected by the deadline set in the Acceleration Act for a  



                                                                    

parcel to be subject to a binding agreement.  



                                                                                                                         

                    The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims.  In October  



                                                                                                                      

2015 the superior court granted DNRand the Trust Authority partial summary judgment,  



                                                                                                                  

ruling that the statutory public notice and written-findings requirements for reclassifying  



                                                                                                                             

state land were not violated.  In July 2017 the superior court granted DNR and the Trust  



                                                                                                                 

Authority summaryjudgment on all remaining claims. Theorders werenotaccompanied  



                                                                                                                          

by explanations for the court's decisions.  The court partially granted SEACC's motion  



                                                                                                                          

for judicial notice, taking notice only of the "existence and language" of the Mental  



                                                                                                                               

Health Act and the Acceleration Act. In September 2017 the court designated DNR and  



                                                                                                            

the Trust Authority as prevailing parties and awarded them attorney's fees.  



                                                                                                                                

                     SEACC appeals the superior court's summary judgment orders, except the  



                                                                                                                                      

order granting summary judgment on the statutory notice and written-findings claims.  



                                                                                                                                

SEACC also appeals the superior court's order on  judicial notice and - based on  



                                                                                                                                

arguments that the superior court erred on the merits - its designation of DNR and the  



                                                                                          

Trust Authority as prevailing parties entitled to attorney's fees.  



                                                               -11-                                                         7478
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

 III.	        STANDARD OF REVIEW                    



                           "We review rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo, 'reading                                                                



the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and making all reasonable                                                                  



                                                   28  

 inferences in its favor.' "                            Questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation, res                                                     



                                                                                                                                                                  29  

                                                                                                                                                                        

judicata, and collateral estoppel are questions of law that we review de novo.                                                                                           "In  



                                                                                                                                                                       

 conducting de novo review, we will 'adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light  



                                                                        30  

                                                                             

 of precedent, reason, and policy.' " 



 IV.	         DISCUSSION  



                                                                                                                                                              

              A.	          The   State  Violated  The  Public   Notice   Clause   Of   The   Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                             

                           Constitution  By  Disposing  Of  An  Interest  In  State  Land  Without  

                                                                              

                           Providing Prior Public Notice.  



                                                                                                                                                             

                           The Alaska Constitution's Public Notice Clause provides, "No disposals  



                                                                                                                                                                         

 or leases of state lands, or interests therein, shall be made without prior public notice and  



                                                                                                                                               31  

                                                                                                                                                                         

 other safeguards of the public interest as may be prescribed by law."                                                                                Whether the  



                                                                                                                                                                    

Public Notice Clause applies in this case presents two questions:  (1) whether No Name  



                                                                                                                                                               

Bay, as a selected parcel under Statehood Act § 6(a), qualifies as "state lands, or interests  



                                                                                                                                                               

therein," and (2) whether the State's exchange of No Name Bay as a § 6(a) selected  



              28            ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.                                                                 , 322 P.3d     



 114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (quoting                                       Witt v. State, Dep't of Corr.                               , 75 P.3d 1030, 1033              

 (Alaska 2003)).   



              29           See, e.g., Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 178-79 (Alaska  

                                                                                                                                                                

 2009) (regarding statutory and constitutional interpretation); Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v.  

                                                                                                                                                                            

 Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 152 P.3d 460, 465 (Alaska 2007) (regarding res judicata and  

                                                                                                                                                                        

 collateral estoppel).  

                     



              30           State, Div. of Elections v. Green Party of Alaska, 118 P.3d 1054, 1059  

                                                                                                                                                                     

 (Alaska 2005) (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)).  

                                                                                                                                               



              31           Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 10.  

                                                                                



                                                                                    -12-	                                                                            7478
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

parcel for No Name Bay as a Mental Health Act selection qualifies as a "disposal."                                                                                                                                                                   



                                                                                                                                                                  32  

Neither party asserts that prior public notice was provided.                                                                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                                                                          The State argues that such  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

notice was not constitutionally required because there was not a "disposal" of "state  



                                                   

lands, or interests therein."  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                      1.	               The State is precluded from relitigating whether the Statehood  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                                        Act § 6(a) selected parcel at No Name Bay constitutes "state  

                                                                                                               

                                                        lands, or interests therein."  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

                                      SEACC cites Pekovich for authority that No Name Bay's selection under  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

 § 6(a) qualifies as an interest in state land within the meaning of the Public Notice  



                     33  

Clause.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

                              SEACC argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in this case  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

because the parties are the same, the same parcel of land is the subject of both cases, and  



                                                                                                                                                                       

identical facts about the interest in the land were at issue in Pekovich.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                      "Collateral estoppel is also known as issue preclusion because it requires  



                                                                                                                                                                                                        34  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

that a court has decisively adjudicated a particular factual or legal issue."                                                                                                                                  The doctrine  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

of collateral estoppel applies if:  (1) the party against whom the preclusion is employed  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

was a party to or in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue precluded from  



                   32                In response to questions about public notice, the State points to the public                                                                                                                



availability of the Closeout Agreement in the Department of Interior                                                                                                                         after  it was signed:                                   

"Making the Closeout Agreement available for public inspection at the appropriate                                                                                                                                

offices of the Department of the Interior was affirmatively making the existence of the                                                                                                                                                   

agreement known to the public. No other public notice or announcement was required."                                                                                                                                                                 

When public notice                                     is required, notifying the public                                                     after the Statehasalready committed                                     

to   an   agreement   is   insufficient.     As   we   explained  in  Baxley   v.   State,   "The   Alaska  

Constitution does not express a requirement of pre-negotiation notice, and instead can   

be read to require notice before the State commits to an agreement requiring it to dispose                                                                                                                                   

of or lease state lands or interests in state lands."                                                                                     958 P.2d 422, 432 (Alaska 1998).                                                                  



                   33                No. 1-JU-93-00823 CI (Alaska Super., Feb. 11, 1994).  

                                                                                                                                                                             



                   34                Angleton v. Cox , 238 P.3d 610, 614 (Alaska 2010).  

                                                                                                                                                                   



                                                                                                                   -13-	                                                                                                            7478
  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

relitigation is identical to the issue decided in the first action; (3) the issue was resolved                                                               



in the first action by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination of the issue                                                                       



                                                                       35  

was essential to the final judgment.                                         



                                                                                                                                                                 

                           Pekovich, in which DNR was a party, specifically addressed on the merits  



                                                                                                                                                                  

whether No Name Bay's selection under § 6(a) of the Statehood Act constituted "state  



                                                                                                                                                           

lands, or interests therein" within the meaning of the Public Notice Clause. In Pekovich  



                                                                                                                                                                     

the superior court concluded that the selection of No Name Bay was an interest in state  



                                                                                                                                                                   

land falling  within  the Public Notice Clause's  protection  after  examining  the plain  



                                                                                                                                                                       

meaning of the language of the Public Notice Clause, the purpose of the provision, and  



                                                                                                                                                                      

the intent of the framers.  The issue of whether there was an interest in state land was  



                                                                                                                                                                     

essential to the final judgment in Pekovich; the final judgment required the State to give  



                                                                                                                                                                    

public  notice  before  granting  the  Forest  Service's  requested  concurrence  for  road  



                                                                                                                                                           

reservations and timber harvest in No Name Bay.  We therefore conclude that collateral  



                                                                                                   

estoppel bars relitigation of this same issue here.  



                                                                                                                                                                           

                           2.	          The State is not precluded from litigating whether there was a  

                                                                  

                                        "disposal."  



                                                                                                                                                                  

                           SEACC  contends  that  collateral  estoppel  precludes  the  State  from  



                                                                                                                                                                       

relitigating whether there was a "disposal" and that we "should give no weight to the  



                                                                                                                                                              

inconsequentialfactual differences between thestatutes involved [or]thetypeofdisposal  



                                                                                                                                                                       

action" in Pekovich .  The State counters that it cannot be collaterally estopped by the  



                                                                                                                                                            

Pekovich decision on the issue of disposal because the Closeout Agreement occurred  



                                                                                                                                  

years after the Pekovich case was decided and presents different facts.  



                                                                                                                                                                   

                           In Pekovich the superior court addressed whether the concurrences given  



             35            Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, Inc.                                                        , 152 P.3d 460, 468              



(Alaska 2007) (citing                       Universal Motors, Inc. v. Neary                                 , 984 P.2d 515, 518 n.11 (Alaska                  

 1999)).    



                                                                                   -14-	                                                                           7478
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                                                                                                                                

by DNR to the Forest Service for its proposed road reservations and timber harvest on  



                                                                                                                                 

No Name Bay, a parcel selected under § 6(a) of the Statehood Act, were "disposals."  In  



                                                                                                                               

the matter before us, No Name Bay remained a selected parcel under § 6(a) while the  



                                                                                                                                 

State negotiated the Closeout Agreement, requesting that No Name Bay be conveyed to  



                                                                                                                                

fulfill a portion of Alaska's remaining entitlements under the Mental Health Act.  In  



                                                                                                                          

2009 the State signed the Closeout Agreement, in which the federal government agreed  



                                                                                             

to convey No Name Bay, among other parcels, to satisfy the State's remaining Mental  



                                                                                                                              

Health Act entitlement.  In December 2010 a BLM decision converted No Name Bay  



                                                                                                                           

from a § 6(a) selected parcel to a Mental Health Act selection.   In May 2012 BLM  



                                                                                                                               

granted the State patent to No Name Bay as mental health trust land pursuant to the  



                                                                                                                                 

Closeout Agreement.  At issue in this case is whether the State disposes of an interest in  



                                                                                                                          

land when, having selected a parcel of land under one federal entitlement, it then agrees  



                                                                                                            

to accept title to that same parcel under a different federal entitlement.  



                                                                                                                       

                    Giventhatthequestion is whether a"disposal"occurred within themeaning  



                                                                                                                              

of the Public Notice Clause, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to this  



                                                                               

issue due to the differences in the alleged disposal.  



                                                                                                                          

                    3.	       The State's exchange of its Statehood Act § 6(a) selected parcel  

                                                                                                                   

                              for a Mental Health Act selection was a "disposal."  



                                                                                                                     

                    SEACC asserts that the State relinquishing No Name Bay as a Statehood  



                                                                                                                               

Act § 6(a) selected parcel by converting it to a Mental Health Act selection via the  



                                                                                                                               

Closeout Agreement was a "disposal" of an interest in state land. SEACC argues that the  



                                                                                                                    

exchange amounted to a "disposal" because the language of § 6(a), although containing  



                                                                                                                               

a precatory clause directing that grants be used for community development, did not  



                                                                                                                          

impose limits on actual uses. By contrast, the federal Mental Health Act created a public  



                                                                                                                           

trust requiring the State to manage lands for the sole purpose of supporting mental health  



                                                                                                                               

programs. SEACC thus argues that the State disposed of an interest by relinquishing the  



                                                              -15-	                                                        7478
  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

 ability to use No Name Bay for a wide range of purposes, including as wildlife habitat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



                                                      The State responds it acquired, rather than disposed of, an interest in state                                                                                                                                                                                                       



 land by agreeing to take title to No Name Bay under the Mental Health Act.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         The State   



 further asserts it did not reduce its total entitlement under § 6(a) because it may substitute                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



 another land selection for No Name Bay.                                                                                                                                      According to the State, the Public Notice                                                                                                          



 Clause was therefore not implicated.                                                                                                                  



                                                      The State additionally argues that SEACC's challenge of the State's action                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 is misplaced. Instead,                                                                SEACCshould                                                    havechallenged                                                  thefederal                                  government's decision  



to convey the land to the State to fulfill remaining entitlements under the Mental Health                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



Act. The                             State's argument conflates questions of the legality of thefederal                                                                                                                                                                                             government's  



 grant of No Name Bay to the State under the Acceleration Act with the distinct question                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

whether the State disposed of an interest in state land under the Alaska Constitution.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               36  



                                                      We review this question of constitutional interpretation de novo.37                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Our  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



previous cases indicate that the Public Notice Clause should be construed liberally to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 give effect to the framers' intent of protecting the public's paramount interest in Alaska's  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



                           36                         We have previously addressed similar arguments.                                                                                                                                                                In  Laverty v. Alaska                                      



Railroad Corp.                                                , we considered whether a contract for extraction of gravel on land owned                                                                                                                                                                                           

by Alaska Railroad Corporation (ARRC) constituted a "disposal" of                                                                                                                                                                                                                          "state lands, or                                        

 interests therein" within the meaning of the Public Notice Clause.                                                                                                                                                                                                              13 P.3d 725, 731                                           

 (Alaska 2000).                                               ARRC argued that because of how the federal government granted the                                                                                                                                                                                                                

 land under the Alaska Railroad Transfer Act, the land at issue did not fall within the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

 auspices   of   the   Public   Notice   Clause.     Id.   at   734.     We   disagreed,   noting   that   "the  

transaction was a federal-to-state grant:                                                                                                                        the federal government gave Alaska all of the                                                                                                                                  

 federal railroad's lands, allowing the state to designate the form of the state entity that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

would receive them."  Id. at 734-35.  We further noted, "The way the state chose to take  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

title, hold, and manage those lands is immaterial to whether they are governed by the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

Alaska Constitution's mandate."  Id. at 735.  The same logic applies here.  



                           37                         See Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 178-79 (Alaska 2009).  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                                                                                                                                                                       -16-                                                                                                                                                              7478
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                                            38  

land and its resources.                          And we reiterate that the framers drafted article VIII conscious                                         



of both mismanagement by the federal government and short-sighted exploitation of                                                                                        

                                                                                               39    The discussion at the constitutional  

natural resources by outside business interests.                                                                                                  



convention emphasized that to avoid mismanagement of the natural resources so crucial  

                                                                                                                                                                



to Alaska's future as a state, the process for making natural resource allocation decisions  

                                                                                                                                                           

among competing users was to occur in full public view.40                                                                      And the constitutional  

                                                                                                                                                  



commentary on section 10 states, "Certain safeguards of the public interest are essential  

                                                                                                                                                             



in public lands transactions.  Such transactions may vary in importance from routine  

                                                                                                                                                               

matters to those of substantial value."41  

                                                                                



                           In analyzing whether there was a "disposal" of an interest in state land  

                                                                                                                                                                     



under the Public Notice Clause, we have applied the test of whether the interest is  

                                                                                                                                                                          



             38            See  Moore  v.  State,  553  P.2d  8,  25  (Alaska  1976)  ("[W]e must  keep  in  mind  



the   constitutional   mandate,   expressed   in   [a]rticle   VIII,   s[ection]   10,   to   safeguard   the  

public's interest in the disposition of state natural  resources."),  superseded by statute,  Ch.  

257,   §   3,   SLA   1976,   as   recognized   in   Sullivan   v.   Resisting   Envtl.   Destruction   on  

Indigenous  Lands,  311  P.3d  625  (Alaska  2013);  Alyeska  Ski  Corp.  v.  Holdsworth,  426  

P.2d   1006,   1011  (Alaska   1967)  ("[Article  VIII]  reflects  the  framers'  recognition  of  the  

importance  of  our  land  resources  and  of  the  concomitant  necessity  for  observance  of  

legal  safeguards  in  the  disposal  or  leasing  of  state  lands.").   



             39            See, e.g., VICTOR  FISCHER,  ALASKA 'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 130- 

                                              

32  (1975).   



              40           See,  e.g.,  GERALD  A.  MCBEATH,  THE  ALASKA   STATE   CONSTITUTION:   A  



REFERENCE  GUIDE   157-59  (2011).   



              41           Alaska   Constitutional   Convention  Files,  Article  VIII  Natural  Resources  



(C/P   8a),   Commentary   on  Article   on   State  Lands   and Natural  Resources,   5   (Jan.   16,  

 1956).   



                                                                                   -17-                                                                            7478
  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

functionally irrevocable.42  The premise of the functionally irrevocable analysis is that          



                                                                                                    43  

the   substance   of   an   interest,   not   its   form,   should   control.                                                             

                                                                                                          While  conducting  the  



                                                                                                                                   

functionally irrevocableanalysis, welook beyond howtheStatecharacterizesan interest,  



                                                                            

and instead consider what, in practice, is the long-term effect on the State's interest in  



              44  

                   

the land. 



                      We begin our analysis with the State's interest in No Name Bay, a selected  

                                                                                                                                  



parcel under § 6(a) of the Statehood Act.   Section 6(a) provides that lands "shall be  

                                                                                                                                           



adjacent to established communities or suitable for prospective community centers and  

                                                                                                                                          



recreational areas," and "shall be selected by the State of Alaska with the approval of the  

                                                                                                                                           

Secretary of Agriculture as to national forest lands."45  

                                                                                           



                      We next examine the terms of the Closeout Agreement to determine how  

                                                                                                                                        



the agreement impacted the State's interest in No Name Bay.  The Closeout Agreement  

                                                                                                                             



identifies No Name Bay as fulfilling a portion of the State's remaining entitlement under  

                                                                                                                                      



           42         Nunamta Aulukestai v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res.                                , 351 P.3d 1041, 1057-58         



(Alaska 2015).             



           43         Id. at 1058.  

                                           



           44         Id. (concluding granting license that would result in "large-scale and long- 

                                                                                                                                       

lasting changes to the land which cannot be removed without significant damage to it"  

                                                                                                                                           

constituted a "disposal" under the Public Notice Clause); see also SOP, Inc. v. State,  

                                                                                                                                      

Dep't of Nat. Res., Div. of Parks & Outdoor Recreation, 310 P.3d 962, 968-69 (Alaska  

                                                                                                                                   

2013)  (concluding  terms  of  seasonal  permits  granted  rights  of  use  analogous  to  

                                                                                                                                           

easements, notlicenses,and therefore were unconstitutional without prior public notice),  

                                                                                                                                   

as amended on reh'g (Oct. 11, 2013); N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res.,  

                                                                                                                                        

2  P.3d  629,  639  (Alaska  2000)  (concluding  "[i]n  light  of  the  potential  long-term  

                                                                                                                              

environmental damage, the sheer magnitude of the project and concomitant investment  

                                                                                                                             

of resources, and the asserted critical public importance," right-of-way permit was not  

                                                                                                                                   

functionally revocable and was thus subject to statutory best interest finding).  

                                                                                                                                  



           45         Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a), 72 Stat. 339, 340 (1958).  

                                                                                                               



                                                                    -18-                                                              7478
  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

the Mental Health Act.                             The Mental Health Act § 202(e) provides, "All lands granted to                                                                        



[the State] under this section, together with the income therefrom and the proceeds from                                                                                           



any dispositions thereof, shall be administered by [the State] as a public trust and such                                                                                          



proceeds and income shall first be applied to meet the necessary expenses of the mental                                                                                        

                                     46    The Mental Health Act thus obligates the State to manage the land  

health program."                                                      



in public trust to benefit the mental health program, while the Statehood Act does not  

                                                                                                                                                                                      



impose this obligation.  

                                                    



                             The language of the Closeout Agreement indicates that the agreement  

                                                                                                                                                                      



between the State and the federal government is final.  The State would not have the  

                                                                                                                                                                                      



opportunity  to  amend  its  selections  under  the  Mental  Health  Act.                                                                                      Of  particular  

                                                                                                                                                                       



relevance, the Closeout Agreement provides:  

                                                                                                     



                                            Upon execution of this Agreement and conveyance of  

                                                                                                                                                            

                             the lands by BLM to the State of Alaska as provided above,  

                                                                                                                                                  

                             the  federal  obligation  to  convey  Alaska  Mental  Health  

                                                                                                                                                

                             Enabling Act land entitlement shall be deemed satisfied and  

                                                                                                                                                        

                             considered complete.  

                                                                              



                                            The State of Alaska shall receive any gain or bear any  

                                                                                                                                                        

                             loss  resulting  from  errors  in  prior  surveys,  protraction  

                                                                                                                                       

                             diagrams, or computation of the ownership of third parties on  

                                                                                                                                                           

                             any land conveyed.  

                                                                          



                                            The BLM shall not make any further adjustments to  

                                                                                                                                                            

                             calculations relating to Mental Health acreage entitlement,  

                                                                                                                                      

                             nor shall the State be entitled to any further conveyances  

                                                                                                                                    

                             under the Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act.  

                                                                                                                          



In signing this agreement, the State committed to receiving No Name Bay as a portion  

                                                                                                                                                         



of its Mental Health Act entitlement.  Based on the terms of the agreement, there was a  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



               46            Pub. L. No. 84-830, § 202(e), 70 Stat. 709, 712 (1956).                                                                           For a general     



overview of the Mental Health Act trust obligations, see                                                                    Weiss I  , 706 P.2d 681, 681-82                   

(Alaska 1985).                     



                                                                                          -19-                                                                                    7478
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

"negligible likelihood" that the State would decline to receive No Name Bay under the                                                              



Mental Health Act, as it would result in permanently forgoing a portion of its mental                                                       

                                47   Upon executing the Closeout Agreement the State therefore made  

health entitlement.                                                                                                                            



a functionally irrevocable change to its interest in No Name Bay from a § 6(a) selected  

                                                                                                                                          



parcel to a Mental Health Act selection.  

                                                      



                       Although the State claims that it only received an interest in No Name Bay  

                                                                                                                                                 

via the Closeout Agreement,48  the Closeout Agreement had the effect of taking two  

                                                                                                                                    



actions of legal significance here:                              first,  the State relinquished No  Name Bay  as a  

                                                                                                                                                      



Statehood Act selected parcel, and second, it acquired a new interest in No Name Bay  

                                                                                                                                      



to fulfill a portion of its remaining entitlement under the Mental Health Act. Regardless  

                                                                                                                                     



of the gloss the State applies to this exchange, the simple fact remains that the State  

                                                                                                                                               



cannot accept title to No Name Bay under two different federal entitlements.  

                                                                                                                                        



                       And         these       two        federal        entitlements             have        different          management  

                                                                                                                               



requirements. The terms of the Closeout Agreement itself are designed to accommodate  

                                                                                                                                



the State's new management requirements of No Name Bay under the Mental Health  

                                                                                                                                            



Act.  Section 6 of the Closeout Agreement, titled "DNR AND TRUST AUTHORITY  

                                                                                                                               



AGREEMENT," begins by noting "[t]he terms of this section apply only to DNR and  

                                                                                                                                                  



the Trust Authority."  Section 6 details a series of conveyances to occur between DNR  

                                                                                                                                               



            47         See   Nunamta   Aulukestai,   351   P.3d   at   1061   (concluding  there   was   a  



"negligible   likelihood"   that   permit   would   be   revoked,   satisfying   first   version   of  

functionally irrevocable test).                       



            48         The  State  appears  to  suggest  that  because  there  was  not  an  interest  

                                                                                                                                          

conveyed  to  any  entity  outside  of  the  State  there  could  not  possibly  have  been  a  

                                                                                                                                           

"disposal" of an interest in state land.  This is an unduly narrow reading of the term  

                                                                                                                                                

"disposal."  Although this case addresses a question of constitutional interpretation, we  

                                                                                                                                                   

note that even the Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) defines a "disposal" of land as an  

                                                                                                                                                    

"exchange of land or interests in land to another . . . government agency."  11 AAC  

                                                                                                                                               

55.280(7) (1994).  

                                   



                                                                        -20-                                                                   7478
  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                                                                                                          

and the Trust Authority "upon the signing of this Agreement."  One such conveyance  



                                                                                                                            

from DNR to the Trust Authority includes "Exhibit B, Priority 1," which is the No Name  



                                                                                                                          

Bay parcel, providing:  "DNR and the Trust Authority also agree that upon the signing  



                                                                                                                              

of  this  Agreement[,]  DNR  will  expeditiously  convey  to  the  Trust  Authority  any  



                                                                                                                                      

remaining, unconveyed lands listed in . . . Exhibit B, Priority 1, to the Trust Authority."  



                                                                                                              

 Section 6 of the Closeout Agreement indicates that there was not just a federal-to-state  



                                                                                                                           

transfer of an interest, as the State insists, but rather there was also a change in the State's  



                                                                                                                            

interest in the land that necessitated transferring the parcel from DNR to the Trust  



                   

Authority.  



                                                                                                                          

                    The State cannot circumvent the requirements of the Public Notice Clause  



                                                                                                                                  

by incorporating a disposal of an interest in state land, and an inter-agency transfer to  



                                                                                                                          

accommodate the new management requirements, within an agreement with the federal  



                                                                                                                               

government.            As  a  federal  Regional  Deputy  Solicitor  noted  about  a  draft  of  the  



                                                                                                                         

agreement, "The provisions are quite awkward in the context of the Agreement because  



                                                                                                                             

they only involve the internal relationships of two state agencies, [DNR] and the Trust  



                                                                                                                            

Authority."   And in a letter replying to SEACC's concerns about the DNR to Trust  



                                                                                                                                

Authority transfer, Alaska's Attorney General clarified that the transfer from DNR to the  



                                                                                                                           

Trust Authority was solely for administrative ease because the State had already bound  



                                                                                                                               

itself to manage No Name Bay as mental health trust land: "Because No Name Bay was  



                                                                                                                         

conveyed by BLM as mental health trust land, it must be managed as trust land whether  



                                                                                                                                   

it is held by DNR or by [the Trust Authority].  Accordingly, DNR intends to convey it  



                                                                                                                          

to [the Trust Authority], for convenience in managing it along with all other mental  



                             

health trust land."  



                                                                                                                               

                    In sum, the State's exchange of No Name Bay as a Statehood Act § 6(a)  



                                                                                                                                   

selected parcel for a mental health trust selection via the Closeout Agreement was a  



                                                                                                                                      

"disposal" of an interest in state lands within the meaning of the Public Notice Clause.  



                                                               -21-                                                         7478
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

The State was constitutionally required to provide public notice prior to this disposal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



We therefore conclude that it was error for the superior court to rule that the State did not                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



violate the Public Notice Clause.                                                                                                                                              



                                                                      B.	                                 The   State's   Exchange   Of   Interests   In   No   Name   Bay   Was  

                                                                                                          Inconsistent With HB 201.                                                                                                   



                                                                       SEACC   argues   that   the   State's   conversion   of   No   Name   Bay   from   a  



 Statehood Act § 6(a) selected parcel to a mental health selection conflicted with HB 201.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 SEACC asserts that HB 201 incorporated the entire Other Lands List, including page 27,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



 creating a statutory mandate that No Name Bay be managed as wildlife habitat. SEACC                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



points to legislative history confirming that the Other Lands List "was the product of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



parcel-by-parcel    negotiations    conducted    with    the    knowledge    of    the    legislative  



 committees," and the settlement embodied in the lands lists enabled HB 201 to move                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 forward   to   passage.     SEACC   additionally   argues   this   negotiation   process,   and   the  



incorporation of the resulting lists of lands, satisfied the constitutional concerns raised   



by Chapter 66.                                                                  



                                                                       The State responds that § 40(a)(2) of HB 201 referred to the Other Lands                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



List only to designate the parcels identified as lands to be conveyed to the mental health                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



trust.   The State argues that because No Name Bay was identified as a parcel                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         not  to be  



 conveyed to the trust on page 27, § 40(a)(2) does not incorporate it.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          It further notes that                                                              



the text of § 40(a)(2) does not mention page 27 or No Name Bay.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            SEACC replies that                                                                      



the legislature adopted by incorporation the Other Lands List in its entirety, and there is                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



no indication it "mysteriously failed to adopt or incorporate one single page."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



                                                                       SEACC raises a question of statutory interpretation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             We interpret statutes                                                  

                                             49  by "look[ing] to three factors:   the language of the statute, the legislative  

 de novo                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



                                   49                                  City  of   Valdez  v.  State,  372  P.3d  240,  248  (Alaska  2016).   



                                                                                                                                                                                                                         -22-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         7478  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

                                                                                                   50  

history,   and   the   legislative   purpose   behind   the   statute."                                  We   decide   questions   of  



statutory interpretation on a sliding scale:  the clearer the statutory language, the more                          



convincing any contrary legislative history must be to overcome the statute's plain                                                        

meaning.51  



                       HB201 is self-described as an Act "[r]elating to the mental health land trust  

                                                                                                                                             

and the mental health land trust litigation, Weiss v. State."52                                        The settlement agreement  

                                                                                                                                  



resolving  Weiss includes two lists of land in Attachment A:  the "Other State Land To  

                             



Be Designated As Trust Land, April 28, 1994," referred to as the Other Lands List, and  

                                                                                                                                              



the "Original Mental Health Land To Be Designated As Trust Land, April 28, 1994."  

                                                                                                                                                      



Section 40(a)(2) of HB 201 "designate[s] as mental health trust land" the state lands  

                                                                                                                                           



listed in the Other Lands List. Page 27 of the Other Lands List, titled "List of Other State  

                                                                                                                                            



Lands," specifies that No Name Bay, along with a few other parcels, "are not to be  

                                                                                                                                                



designated  as  Mental  Health  Trust  Land.                                  These  parcels  will  be  managed  by  the  

                                                                                                                                              



Department of Natural Resources for wildlife habitat purposes and are hereby classified  

                                                                                                                                    



as Wildlife Habitat as that term is defined in 11 AAC 55.230."  

                                                                                                              



                       The State argues that we should look no further than the text of § 40(a)(2)  

                                                                                                                                      



and should disregard the language on page 27. However, externally referenced land lists  

                                                                                                                                              



are integral in defining which parcels reconstitute the mental health trust and which  

                                                                                                                                          

original mental health parcels are converted to general grant land by HB 201.53                                                        In fact,  

                                                                                                                                             



           50          Pederson  v.  Barnes,   139  P.3d   552,   559   (Alaska  2006)   (quoting   W.  Star  



Trucks,  Inc.  v.  Big  Iron  Equip.  Serv.,  Inc.,   101  P.3d   1047,   1050  (Alaska  2004)).  



           51          City  of   Valdez,  372  P.3d  at  248.   



           52          Ch. 5, FSSLA 1994.  

                                                            



           53          Id.    §§   40-41;   see    also    id.    §   45    (providing   replacement    land    for  



municipalities  with  land  on  certain  lists).   



                                                                      -23-                                                                 7478
  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

                                                                                                                      

the State itself asserts that we should privilege the language in a footnote of an externally  



                                                                                                          

referenced list over the plain text of the statute in neighboring § 41.  



                                                                                

                     Section 41 references external lists of land to confirm the "ratification of  



                                                                                                                         

conversion of certain original mental health land to general grant land." Section 41(a)(2)  



                                          

provides "land patented to or approved for patent to the state under the Alaska Mental  



                                                                                                                             

Health Enabling Act after July 1, 1978, and not listed in 'Original Mental Health Land  



                                                                                                                                  

To Be Designated as Mental Health Trust Land, April 28, 1994,' . . . is redesignated as  



                                                                                                                                

general grant land."  Based on this plain text, any land patented to the State under the  



                                                                                                                                 

Mental Health Act after July 1, 1978, and not included in the referenced list would be  



                                                        

redesignated as general grant land.  



                                                                                                                               

                    But, as the State notes, page 48 of the Original Mental Health Land List  



                                                                                                                          

provides in footnote one that "[a]ny additional land conveyed pursuant to the Mental  



                                                                                                                                 

Health Enabling Act after the effective date of [this Act] . . . automatically will be  



                                                                                                                   

considered as Designated Trust Land."   The text of § 41(a)(2) does not specifically  



                                                                                                                                

reference page 48 or footnote one, or for that matter, any other page of the list, and yet  



                                                                                                                             

the State acknowledges its significance in the larger statutory scheme. And, as the State  



                                                                                                                              

notes, given the Weiss litigation's focus on resolving the State's previous breach of trust  



                                                                                                                             

when it redesignated trust land as general grant land, it would be inconsistent with  



                                                                                                                         

legislative purpose to read the statute to automatically redesignate all future Mental  



                                                                                                          

Health Act land conveyances as general grant land.  Thus § 41(a)(2) should be read to  



                                                                                                                        

incorporate the Other  Mental Health Land  List in  its entirety.                                    Reading §  40(a)(2)  



                                                                                                                     

alongside § 41(a)(2) suggests that the legislature intended to incorporate the referenced  



                                                               

Other Lands List in its entirety as well.  



                                                                                                                                 

                    The legislative history does not indicate that the legislature intended to  



                                                                                                                               

exclude  particular  pages  or  provisions  in  the  referenced  lands  lists.                                   Instead,  the  



                                                                                                                               

legislative        history       includes        statements         made       during        committee          hearings        by  



                                                               -24-                                                         7478
  


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

representativesofthepartiesto                                  the  Weiss  litigation regarding theprogress                                        ofnegotiations   

on lands to be included in and excluded from the reconstituted trust.                                                                       54  After receiving  



                                                                                                                                                                         

updates on the negotiations, House Committee Co-Chairman Ron Larson stated, "we  



                                                                                                                                                                           

would like to say we have put [the] mental health [litigation] behind us here, that we  



                                                                                                                                                                   

have a settlement or a resolution and whatever is necessary."  In response to further  



                                                                                                                                                                           

questions indicating concern from legislators about the time frame and the costs of the  



                                                                                                                                                                          

matter remaining unresolved, DNR Commissioner Harry Noah explained his belief that  



                                                                                                                                                                                

a "settlement is the best way to go," and the bill they were working towards would be a  

                                                                                                                     55   A later draft letter of intent  

                                                                                                                                                                      

settlement as a result of negotiations between the parties. 



from Committee Co-Chairman Larson explained that HB 201 aimed to address "varied  

                                                                                                                                                                   



and seemingly incompatible goals" in order to reconstitute the trust while avoiding  

                                                                                                                                                               



"backlash against the mental health community."  This letter emphasized that HB 201  

                                                                                                                                                                          



sought to ensure that "other public interests in the land are taken into consideration and  

                                                                                                                                                                          



accommodated," and reconstituting the trust would not remove land from parks and  

                                                                                                                                                                          



wildlife  refuges  or  from  the  control  of  the  state  agencies  to  which  they  had  been  

                                                                                                                                                                       



assigned. The legislative history indicates that the legislature intended to finally resolve  

                                                                                                                                                                   



the  Weiss litigation in HB 201, and understood compromises were required to reach a  

                                                                                                                                                                               



settlement that would satisfy the public and the mental health trust beneficiaries.  This  

                                                                                                                                          



legislative history is consistent with HB 201 incorporating the referenced lands lists in  

                                                                                                                                                                              



              54           Attorney Tom Waldo spoke on behalf of the public interest intervenors                                                          



before the House Finance Committee, and emphasized that the lands in the lists were                                                                                     

identified during an extended process including a wide coalition of affected groups, and                                                                                  

that they would be providing the legislature a "package . . . negotiated land list."                                                                        



              55           Although negotiations were not completely finalized at the time of this  

                                                                                                                                                                          

committee hearing, Commissioner Noah noted some "significant parcels" that "received  

                                                                                                                                                               

a lot of comment" were removed from the list of substitute lands to be added to the  

                                                                                                                                                                           

mental health trust.  

                              



                                                                                    -25-                                                                               7478
  


----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

their entirety.                     



                                In considering the legislative purposes behind HB 201, we note § 1(b)                                                                                               



indicates that the purposes include "reconstitut[ing] the mental health trust with some                                                                                                           



original mental health land and some other state land"; "ratify[ing] and confirm[ing] the                                                                                                               



removal from trust status of some original mental health land"; and "ratify[ing] and                                                                                                                  



confirm[ing] the validity of the dispositions and uses of the original mental health land                                                                                                            

                                                                 56   HB 201's stated purposes thus contemplate reconstituting  

removed from trust status."                                                                                                                                                   



the trust by including some lands and excluding other lands from the trust.  Ultimately  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



HB 201 was concerned with "resolv[ing] the  Weiss litigation on terms that are fair to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          

both the public and the beneficiaries of the mental health trust."57  

                                                                                                                                                              



                                Viewing HB 201 in light of its language, legislative history, and legislative  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



purposes leads us to conclude that the legislature intended to incorporate the entire Other  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



Lands List.  And page 27 of the Other Lands List states No Name Bay is "not to be  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         



designated as Mental Health Trust Land," legislatively  classifies  No  Name Bay as  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         



"Wildlife Habitat," and directs DNR to manage No Name Bay "for wildlife habitat  

                                                                                                                                                                                              



purposes."  The State's exchange of No Name Bay as a Statehood Act § 6(a) selected  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



parcel for No Name Bay as a Mental Health Act selection was therefore inconsistent with  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

HB 201.58                  We reverse the superior court's summary judgment ruling on this claim.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



                56              Ch.  5,  §   1(b)(1)-(3),  FSSLA   1994.    



                57              Id.  §   1(a)(15).   



                58              Justice  Winfree's  dissent  invites  us  to  address  various  scenarios  that  are  not  



presented in the   case  before   us.    But   we   need   go   no   further   to   conclude   that   it   was  

incorrect  to  grant  the  State  summary  judgment  on  this  issue.   The  dissent  also  questions  

whether  our  holding  addresses  future  legislatures.   It  does  not.   As  we  explained  in  Weiss  

II,  no  agreement  could  bind  future  legislatures s   o  as  to  prevent a   mendment of  the  HB  

201  settlement  statutes.   939  P.2d  380,  397  (Alaska   1997).    



                                                                                                   -26-                                                                                            7478
  


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

                   C.	                The Superior Court Did Not Err By Granting Summary Judgment To                                                                                                                                        

                                      The State On SEACC's Contract Claims.                                                                



                                      1.	                The   doctrine   of  quasi-estoppel   does   not   bar   the   State   from  

                                                        taking the position that it did not form a contract with SEACC.                                                                                                                               

                                      SEACC argues that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel                                                                                                59  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                                                                                                                                                             bars the State from  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

taking the position that the State and SEACC did not have an agreement.  SEACC notes  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

that during the earlier litigation of its Chapter 66 claims, the State took the position on  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

appeal that ACE/SEACC was bound by the settlement agreement.  We have stated that  



                                           

quasi-estoppel seeks:  



                                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                      to prevent injustice by precluding a party from asserting a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  

                                      right inconsistent with a position previously taken . . . . The  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                      essence of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is the existence of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                      facts   and   circumstances   making   the   assertion   of   an  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

                                      inconsistent position unconscionable. . . .  Among the many  

                                                                                                                                                                          

                                      considerations  which  may  indicate  that  an  inconsistent  

                                                                                                                                                                      

                                      position is unconscionable and the doctrine of quasi-estoppel  

                                                                                                                                                                      

                                      should  be  applied  are  whether  the  party  asserting  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                      inconsistent position has gained an advantage or produced  

                                                                                                                                                                     [60]   

                                                                                                                                            

                                      some disadvantage through the first position. 



Although we did not vacate the superior court's judgment or dismiss ACE/SEACC's                                                                                                                         



complaint in the earlier appeal of its Chapter 66 claims, as it requested, ACE/SEACC                                                                                                                         



ultimately was designated a prevailing party and awarded $456,225 in attorney's fees for                                                                                                                                                    



its intervention.                             We conclude that the State did not gain an advantage from its position                                                                                                         



                   59                 SEACCalso suggests that judicial estoppel precludes the State from taking                                                                                                                    



an inconsistent position from that taken in 1995 during the                                                                                                             Weiss  litigation.  Although  

there is a form of judicial estoppel we have embraced that precludes a party from arguing                                                                                                                                      

a new position on appeal contrary to a position taken in the trial court, here the State's                                                                                                                            

change of position was not made in the same case.                                                                                              See Bruce L. v. W.E.                                       , 247 P.3d 966,               

967 (Alaska 2011).                                       



                   60                Jamison v. Consol. Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978).  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                                                                    -27-	                                                                                                             7478
  


----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

                                                                                          

in the earlier appeal.  Even assuming that denial of vacatur and dismissal constituted a  



                                                                                                                        

gain by the State, we do not believe that gain was so great as to make the State's current  



                                                                                                                       

position unconscionable.  Quasi-estoppel therefore does not bar the State from arguing  



                                                                                                                                    

that ACE/SEACC and the State did not form an oral contract regarding No Name Bay.  



                                                                                                                               

                              2.        SEACC's oral contract claims fail as a matter of law.  



                                                                                                                           

                    SEACC asserts that it formed an oral or implied contract with the State  



                                                                                                                              

regarding No Name Bay because there is no single document setting out the terms of the  



                                                                                                                   

agreement and containing the signatures of both parties.   SEACC makes seemingly  



                                                                                                                   

contradictory assertions that the State both fully performed the terms of their agreement  



and that the State has ongoing obligations under their agreement.  SEACC has argued  



                                                                                                                            

- before us and before the superior court - that both parties fully performed their  



                                                                                                                            

obligations  under  the  oral  contract  in  1994:  ACE/SEACC  supported  the  HB  201  



                                                                                                                       

settlement before the legislature and in court to settle  Weiss, and conceded another  



                                                                                                                             

parcel, Leask Lakes, could be included in the mental health trust replacement lands, and,  



                                                                                                                            

in exchange, the State agreed not to include the No Name Bay land selection in the trust  



                                                                                        

and that it would instead be managed by DNR as wildlife habitat.  



                                                                                                                              

                    SEACC  argues  that  the  HB  201  settlement  agreement's  provision  on  



                                                                                                                       

page 27 of the Other Lands List, regarding management of No Name Bay as wildlife  



                                                                                                                   

habitat and not mental health trust land, memorialized the State's side of the agreement  



                                                                                                              

with  ACE/SEACC.                 SEACC contends  that  the  State  had  an  ongoing  obligation  to  



                                                                                                                           

manage  No  Name  Bay  as  wildlife  habitat  under  the  agreement  it  reached  with  



                                                                                                                             

ACE/SEACC as embodied on page 27.   SEACC asserts that the State breached this  



                                                                                                                              

agreement by including No Name Bay in the Closeout Agreement to fulfill part of the  



                                                                 

State's remaining mental health trust land entitlement.  



                                                                                                                           

                    At times SEACC implies that it formed an oral contract with the State  



                                                                                                                                

outside of the Weiss settlement agreement that creates an ongoing State commitment to  



                                                              -28-                                                        7478
  


----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

manage No Name Bay as wildlife habitat, and at times SEACC suggests page 27 itself                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



is supposed to reflect this ongoing commitment.  The substance of the latter argument                                                                                                                                                                              



is not an                           oral contract claim,                                                           but  rather   boils down to                                                                    a repackaging of SEACC's                                            



argument that page 27 creates a legislative commitment to manage No Name Bay as                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



wildlife habitat.                                           We addressed this claim above.                                                                                          



                                                 SEACC's contract claims raise a number of issues, including whether the                                                                                                                                                                                        



DNR commissioner's later-signed letters to third parties describing a commitment to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



manage No Name Bay as wildlife habitat constitute confirming memoranda needed to  

                                                                                                                                               61          But we affirm the superior court's grant of  

overcome a Statute of Frauds defense.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



summary  judgment  without  reaching  these  issues  because  SEACC's  oral  contract  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



theories fail as a matter of law.  If, as SEACC has asserted numerous times, both parties  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



fully performed their obligations under the oral contract, then the State could not have  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



breached that contract.  

                                                                                     



                                                 Consequently, thesuperior courtdidnoterr bygrantingsummary judgment  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



to the State on SEACC's contract claims.  

                                                                                                                                                          



                         61                      Alaska's Statute of Frauds, codified as AS 09.25.010, bars enforcement of                                                                                                                                                                                          



certain contracts not in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

sought.   Contracts covered by the Statute of Frauds include those that "by [their] terms                                                                                                                                                                                                              

 [are] not to be performed within a year from [their] making" and those that "charge or   

encumber real property."                                                                        AS 09.25.010(a)(1), (a)(6).                                                                                The alleged oral contract that                                                                    

 SEACC seeks to enforce would fall in both categories.                                                                                                          



                                                 But a "note or memorandum . . . in writing and subscribed by the party                                                                                                                                                                                 

charged" may satisfy the writing requirement. AS 09.25.010(a).                                                                                                                                                                           A "memorandum may                                                  

consist of an entry in a diary or in the minutes of a meeting, of a communication to or                                                      

from an agent of the party, of a public record,                                                                                                                     or of an informal letter to a third person                                                                                                        ."   

RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  CONTRACTS  § 133 cmt. b (A                                                                                                                                                        M. L            AW  INST . 1981) (emphasis                               

added).  



                                                                                                                                                       -29-                                                                                                                                               7478
  


----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

                              D.	                          The Superior Court Did Not Err By Partially Granting                                                                                                                                                                                                                           SEACC's  

                                                           Motion For Judicial Notice.                                                                   



                                                           SEACC moved for judicial notice that specific provisions of the Mental                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 Health Act and the Acceleration Act barred the State and the federal government from                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



 signing an agreement closing out the State's entitlement under the Mental Health Act                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



 through conveyance of No Name Bay and other parcels of federal land. SEACC sought                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



judicial notice that the No Name Bay conveyance occurred long after the deadline had                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 passed for selections under the Mental Health Act; that because No Name Bay was                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 national forest land it was not unreserved and therefore was ineligible for selection under                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 the Mental Health Act; that the Acceleration Act, invoked as authority for the Closeout                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



 Agreement, did not authorize the conversion of selections under § 6(a) of the Statehood                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



 Act to selections under the Mental Health Act; and that the selection of No Name Bay                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



 occurred after the deadline for selections eligible for conveyance under the Acceleration                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 Act.  



                                                          Alaska Evidence Rule 201 authorizes courts to take notice of facts that                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 otherwise   would   be   decided   by   the   trier   of   fact   if   those   facts   are   "not   subject   to  



 reasonable dispute" and are "generally known within this state" or are "capable of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                                                                                       62  Notice may be taken sua sponte, but must be taken  

 accurate and ready determination."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

 upon the request of a party.63  Rule 202 requires courts to take notice of the common law,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 statutes,  constitutions,  rules  of  court,  and  regulations  of  the  Alaska  and  federal  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



                                                            64  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 governments.                                                          Notice of other laws and regulations may be taken sua sponte, but must  



                              62                          Alaska R. Evid. 201(a)-(b).                                            



                              63                          Alaska R. Evid. 201(c)-(d).                                            



                              64                          Alaska R. Evid. 202(b).                                                



                                                                                                                                                                                   -30-	                                                                                                                                                                         7478
  


----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

be taken upon the request of a party.                          65  Neither Rule authorizes a party to demand that  



a court interpret or apply the law in a particular way; that is the province of the courts.                                                       66  



                       SEACC's motion for judicial notice essentially asked the superior court to  

                                                                                                                                                  



rule on the legal validity of the Closeout Agreement between the State and the federal  

                                                                                                                                   



government for the conveyances under the Mental Health Act, although SEACC focuses  

                                                                                                                                         



on the conveyance of No Name Bay.  SEACC concedes as much in its briefing, stating  

                                                                                                                                          



that the agreement could have been challenged directly on the four grounds on which it  

                                                                                                                                                   



now seeks judicial notice, had public notice of the agreement been given.   In short,  

                                                                                                                                           



 SEACCis attemptingto collaterallyattack theagreementthroughjudicial notice, without  

                                                                                                                                         



joining the federal government as a party.  Because SEACC's motion for judicial notice  

                                                                                                                                           



actually asked the superior court to interpret and apply federal laws in a particular way  

                                                                                                                                              



-  against the non-party federal government - its motion fell outside the scope of  

                                                                                                                                                 



judicial notice, and the superior court therefore did not err by denying the motion except  

                                                                                                                                          



to  take  notice  of  the  "existence  and  language"  of  the  Mental  Health  Act  and  the  

                                                                                                                                               



Acceleration Act. Whether the federal government legally could enter into the Closeout  

                                                                                                                                      



Agreement and convey No Name Bay to Alaska was not before the superior court, and  

                                                                                                                                               



it is not before us in this appeal.  

                                            



V.          CONCLUSION  



                       The orders of the superior court are AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED  

                                                                                                                               



in part.  The case is REMANDED so the superior court can fashion a remedy consistent  

                                                                                                                                    



            65         Alaska R. Evid. 202(c)-(d).       



            66  

                                                                                                                                               

                       See Alaska R. Evid. 201(a) cmt. ("[I]f the fact involved tends to show that  

                                                                                                                                               

general  conduct  X  is  or  is  not,  or  should  or  should  not,  be  against  the  law  (or  

                                                                                                           

unconstitutional), it is for the court to consider freely . . . ."); Huntington v. State, 151  

                                                                                                                                          

P.3d 523, 528 (Alaska App. 2007) (stating that whether to grant mistrial is "a mixed  

                                                                                                             

question of fact and law addressed to the discretion of the trial judge" and not covered  

                

by Rule 201).  



                                                                       -31-                                                                 7478
  


----------------------- Page 32-----------------------

with this opinion and reconsider the prevailing party designation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          -32-                                                                                                                                                                                             7478
  


----------------------- Page 33-----------------------

WINFREE, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



                                                                             My primary disagreement with the court's decision lies in the reversal of   



the   superior   court's   summary   judgment   ruling   that  Southeast   Alaska   Conservation  



 Council, Inc. (SEACC) had no viable statutory claim under the mental health trust                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 settlement   enacted   as   House   Bill   (H.B.)   201.     Although  I  agree   with   the   court's  



 affirmance of the superior court's summary judgment ruling that SEACC had no viable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 oral contract claim, I write separately to explain more fully why I believe that ruling                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 should be affirmed.                                                                                              I reluctantly agree with the court's decision that collateral estoppel                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



bars the State from arguing that its Statehood Act § 6(a) land grant selection of the No                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



Name Bay parcel is not "state land" covered by the Public Notice Clause of the Alaska                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 Constitution; but I wish to make clear that, in my view, the collateral estoppel bar relates                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



 only to this particular land grant selection and not to land grant selections in general.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                I  



 agree with the court's decision that the State violated the Public Notice Clause when,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



without public notice, it disposed of state land in an exchange of land interests with the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 federal government; but I wish to make clear that, in my view, the disposal was the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 exchange of land interests, not the mere relinquishment of a grant land selection. Finally,    



 I agree with the court's decision that the superior court did not err in its application of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



the judicial notice doctrine, without need for further comment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



                                       Relevant Land Management Concepts                                                                                                                                                 



                                                                             The   legislature   has   established   policies,   consistent   with   the   Alaska  

 Constitution, that state land use should be maximized according to the public interest,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       1  



                                       1                                     AS   38.05.910   (stating   Alaska   Land  Act   policy   mirroring   article   VIII,  



 section 1 of Alaska Constitution);                                                                                                                                                               Alaska Survival v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res.                                                                                                                                                                                                            , 723 P.2d                    

  1281, 1285 (Alaska 1986) ("Alaska's Constitution and the Alaska Land Act, AS 38.05,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

 express a policy of                                                                                      encouraging settlement of the state's lands 'by making themavailable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 for maximum use consistent with the public interest.' " (quoting Alaska Const. art. VIII,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (continued...)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              -33-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     7478
  


----------------------- Page 34-----------------------

that state lands should be managed to establish a balanced combination of both public     



                                  2  

and private purposes,                                                                                                    

                                    and that the public or private land use choice shall be determined  



                                                                                                                         

through inventory, planning, and classification processes established in AS 38.04.060- 

        3  The legislature has delegated to the commissioner of the Department of Natural  

.070.                                                                                                                          



Resources (DNR) the duties to inventory state lands and regularly review that inventory  

                                                                                                                           

to determine the uses best providing for the public interest.4                                      The legislature also has  

                                                                                                                                     



delegated to DNR the duty to work with local governments and the public to adopt,  

                                                                                                                            

maintain, and revise regional land use plans5 and, in connection with that duty, to classify  

                                                                                                                               

state lands for various uses.6  

                                                



                     The legislature left state land use classifications to DNR's discretionary  

                                                                                                                      



           1         (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                       

§ 1; AS 38.05.910)), superseded by statute, ch. 257, § 3, SLA 1976, as recognized in  

                                                                                                                                   

Sullivan   v.   Resisting   Envtl.   Destruction   on   Indigenous   Lands,   311   P.3d   625  

              

(Alaska 2013).  



           2         AS  38.04.005-.015  (stating  general  land  classification  and  use  policy,  

                                                                                                                               

public interest in making land available for private use, and public interest in retaining  

                                                                                                                            

state land in public ownership).  

                                



           3         AS 38.04.005(a) (stating general state lands classification and use policy).  

                                                                                                                                            



           4         AS 38.04.060(a)-(b) (outlining commissioner's duties); AS 38.04.910(1)  

                                                                                                                      

(identifying "commissioner" as commissioner of natural resources).  

                                                                                            



           5         AS 38.04.065(a), (d), (e); see also Denali Citizens Council v. State, Dep't  

                                                                                                                                  

of Nat. Res., 318 P.3d 380, 389 (Alaska 2014)  (noting statutory duty to engage in  

                                                                                                                                       

regional land use planning does not indicate that plan provisions are legally enforceable  

                                                                                                                        

against DNR); State, Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Nondalton Tribal Council, 268 P.3d 293, 304  

                                                                                                                                     

n.93  (Alaska 2012) (stating that although regional land use plan guides future DNR  

                                                                                                                                  

policy, it likely is not enforceable by public against DNR).  

                                                                                                



           6         AS 38.04.065(e) (referring to AS 38.05.300 classification requirements);  

                                                                                                                   

see also State v. Wiedner, 684 P.2d 103, 107 (Alaska 1984) (stating that AS 38.04.065  

                                                                                                                           

generally requires land use plans prior to land classifications).  

                                                                           



                                                                  -34-                                                            7478
  


----------------------- Page 35-----------------------

                                                                                           7  

determination   of   what   is   "necessary   and   proper."     And   the   legislature   expressly  



authorized    DNR    to    reclassify    state    land    when    "the    public    interest    warrants   



                             8  

                                                                                                                                              

reclassification."               But the legislature set limitations on DNR's classification of state  



                                                                                                                                             

lands containing more than 640 contiguous acres:  Only the legislature may act to close  



                                                                                                                                        

that land to multiple-purpose use, and DNR may not, except on an interim basis pending  



                                                                                                                                            

legislative approval, classify that land to preclude mineral exploration and mining unless  



                                                                                                                                        9  

                                                                                                                                           

necessary for a land disposal, land exchange, or certain infrastructure projects. 



                                                                                                                                                

                       DNR is the legislatively designated entity for the "selection of grant, lieu  



                                                                                                                                          

and indemnity land" and DNR's land grant selections must conform with the Alaska  



                                                                                                 10  

                                                                                                                                             

Land Act and DNR's "policy, orders and regulations."                                                  DNR must give land grant  



                                                                                                                 11  

                                                                                                                                                   

selection preference to lands providing maximum public benefits.                                                     At the other end of  



                                                                                                                                       

the spectrum, land "owned in fee by the state or to which the state may become entitled,"  



                                                                                                                                               

with certain exceptions, "may be sold" under statutes specifically relating to selling land  



                           12  

                                                                                                                                        

                                But these restrictions do not limit dispositions under other statutes,  

for private use. 



            7          AS 38.05.300(a);               see also      AS 38.05.020(b)(1) (providing that DNR's land                              



classification ordersarenot required to be adopted under AdministrativeProcedureAct).                                                         



            8          AS 38.05.300(a).  

                               



            9          AS 38.05.300(a)(1)-(2), (c).  We have previously discussed Alaska's land  

                                                                                                                                               

use management procedures. See generally Nondalton Tribal Council, 268 P.3d at 294- 

                                                                                                                                               

96; Alaska Survival v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res. , 723 P.2d 1281, 1289-91 (Alaska 1986),  

                                                                                                                                           

superseded by statute, ch. 257, § 3, SLA 1976, as recognized in Sullivan v. Resisting  

                                                                                                                                      

Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands, 311 P.3d 625 (Alaska 2013).  

                                                                                                               



            10         AS 38.05.290(a).  

                                                        



            11         Id.  



            12         AS       38.05.045            (referencing             land      disposal          for      private        use       under  

                                                                                                                                          

AS 38.05.045-.069 and land disposal for homesteads under AS 38.08).  

                                                                                                               



                                                                       -35-                                                                  7478
  


----------------------- Page 36-----------------------

including AS 38.05.810(a), which authorizes the "lease, sale, or other disposal of state                                                                                    



land or resources" to "a state or federal agency" when DNR determines such disposals                                                                              



                                                                                                                  13  

"serve a public purpose and are in the public interest."                                                                



                                                                                                                                                       

                            When the legislature authorized DNR in the various ways just described,  



                                                                                                                       

it delegated to DNR the responsibility to exercise the Legislature's  constitutionally  

                                                                       14     As we have noted in another context, when the  

                                                                                                                                                                               

vested authority over state lands. 



legislature delegates its authority to an executive agency, the agency in effect acts as the  

                                                                                                                                                                               

legislature.15   Although it is axiomatic of our government's constitutional structure that  

                                                                                                                                                                              

the legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws,16  it equally is fundamental that  

                                                                                                                                                                              



the legislature may vest its authority - such as authority to manage state lands - in an  

                                                                                                                                                                                 

executive agency such as DNR.17                                          So long as the agency does not exceed its statutory  

                                                                                                                                                                   



authority, an agency's discretionary action - in effect, acting as the legislature -  

                                                                                                                                                                                

should be upheld.18  

                      



              H.B. 201 Issue  

                                   



                            I disagree with the court's vagueanalysis that, because the State's Closeout  

                                                                                                                                                                   



              13            Id.  



              14            See, e.g.        , Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 2 ("The legislature shall provide for the                                                            



utilization, development,and                                 conservation ofall natural                            resources belonging to the State,                      

including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of the public.").                                                        



              15            See Mallott v. Stand for Salmon, 431 P.3d 159, 164 n.17 (Alaska 2018).  

                                                                                                                                                                      



              16            See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).  

                                                                                                                                                               



              17            See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944), cited in State  

                                                                                                                                                                           

v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Alaska 1987).  

                                                                                                                                



              18            See Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 431-32 (Alaska 1998) (noting DNR  

                                                                                                                                                                          

commissioner's "broad statutory powers" and declining to find commissioner's act  

                                                                                                                                                                               

exceeded authority).  

                     



                                                                                      -36-                                                                                 7478
  


----------------------- Page 37-----------------------

Agreement with the federal government is "inconsistent" with H.B. 201, the superior                                                                                                       



court erred by granting summary judgment dismissing SEACC's statutory claim.  The                                                                                                  



court begs the question: What is the lasting statutory import of (1) placing the No Name                                                                                                        



Bay land grant selection on the list of state lands not conveyed to reconstitute the mental                                                                                                   



health trust, and (2) stating that, as of the settlement, the parcel would be classified and                                                                                                         



managed as wildlife habitat?                      



                                Section 40(a)(2) of H.B. 201 "designate[s] as mental health trust land" the                                                                                           

                                                             19     But the Other Lands List specifies at page 27 that the No  

Other Lands List parcels.                                                                                                                                                                             



Name Bay land grant selection is "not to be designated" as mental health trust land, "will  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



be managed by [DNR] for wildlife purposes," and is "hereby classified as Wildlife  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



Habitat."   SEACC argues  that  H.B. 201 incorporated page 27, creating a statutory  

                                                                                                                                                                                        



mandate that the No Name Bay land grant selection be managed as wildlife habitat,  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



apparently in perpetuity.  DNR and the Trust Authority respond that § 40(a)(2) referred  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



to the list only to designate the parcels identified as lands to be conveyed to the mental  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



health trust.  They argue that because the No Name Bay land grant selection was not  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



identified as a parcel to be conveyed, § 40(a)(2) does not apply to mandate the land grant  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



selection's future management.  

                                                                            



                                The  court  persuasively  concludes  that  the  various  land  lists  were  

                                                                                                                                                                                                



incorporated  into  H.B.  201  for  specific  purposes.                                                                         But  this  leaves  unanswered  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



necessary statutory interpretation and the meaning of the No Name Bay land grant  

                                                                                                                                                                                                



selection listing on page 27.  We interpret statutes by "look[ing] to three factors:  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



language of the statute, the legislative history, and the legislative purpose behind the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



                19  

                                                                                              

                                Ch. 5, § 40(a)(2), FSSLA 1994.  



                                                                                                  -37-                                                                                                    7478  


----------------------- Page 38-----------------------

                                            20  

 statute."                                            Section 40(a)(2)'s language clearly refers to land to be "designated as mental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



health trust land," as does the Other Lands List's title.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Section 40(a)(2) makes no                                                                                                                



 specific mention of lands not to be conveyed to the Mental Health Trust Authority.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 The  



parties do not address H.B. 201's legislative purpose, but its purpose indisputably was                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



resolving the mental health trust litigation and reconstituting the trust with existing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



 original mental health land grant property and other State assets necessary to true-up the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



reconstitutedtrust. Althoughsettling                                                                                                                                                              themental                                                healthtrustlitigationinvolved                                                                                                                                trade-offs  



 about which lands were and were not to be conveyed to the Trust Authority, H.B. 201                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



ultimately was concerned with reconstituting the mental health trust, not with mandating                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



permanent ownership and use of lands not going into the trust.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 And nothing about                                                            



H.B.  201 suggests                                                                              it specifically mandated that DNR do everything in its power to ensure                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



the No Name Bay land grant selection resulted in an actual land conveyance to the State                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



under Statehood Act § 6(a).                                                                                        



                                                                       Is the court holding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that H.B. 201                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



mandates: DNRcannot,                                                                                                            under any possible circumstances (andeven                                                                                                                                                                                             with publicnotice),   



make an otherwise lawful disposal of the land grant selection?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                DNR never can change                                                                   



the classification or management scheme for the No Name Bay parcel, whether as a land                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



grant selection or as land if ultimately conveyed to the State?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Only the legislature                                 



 (through specific new legislation), and not DNR under its statutory land management                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



responsibilities delegated by the legislature, can authorize an otherwise lawful disposal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



 or classification change for the No Name Bay parcel, whether as a land grant selection                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 or as land if ultimately conveyed to the State?                                                                                                                                                                                                       Or whatever interest the State may hold                                                                                                                                                      



in   the   No   Name   Bay   parcel   must   be   classified   and   managed   as   wildlife   habitat   in  



                                    20  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                                                       Pederson v. Barnes, 139 P.3d 552, 559 (Alaska 2006) (quoting  W. Star  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1050 (Alaska 2004)).  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                            -38-                                                                                                                                                                                                                   7478  


----------------------- Page 39-----------------------

perpetuity regardless of what future legislatures or land managers may think is in the                                                                                                       



 State's best interests?     



                               Absent an explanation of the court's statutory interpretation of H.B. 201,         



 the   court   fails   to   make   its   case   that   the   superior   court   erred   by   granting   summary  



judgment dismissing SEACC's H.B. 201 claim.                                                                   When H.B. 201 went into effect, time                                        



                                                                                                                                                                                                21  

had long since expired for Alaska to select additional mental health trust grant lands.                                                                                                               



 Because the No Name Bay land grant selection was placed on the list of property not to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                



be conveyed to the Trust Authority to reconstitute the mental health trust under H.B. 201,  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



 there likely was no reason for any party to think the land grant selection, or the land  

                                                                                                                                                                                          

 itself, later might make its way to the trust.22                                                         But the later 2004 federal Alaska Land  

                                                                                                                                                                                        

 Transfer  Acceleration  Act23   paved  the  way  for  State  negotiations  with  the  federal  

                                                                                                                                                                                   



 government and created a newopportunity for the State to select additional mental health  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



 trust  lands;  this  opportunity  was  entirely  separate  from  the  1990s  litigation  and  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



 settlement leading to the reconstitution of the mental health trust through H.B. 201. This  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



 allowed the State to effectively convert its § 6(a) land grant selection of the No Name  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



 Bay parcel for a mental health land grant conveyance under the 1956 Mental Health  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



 Enabling  Act.                       I  agree  with  the  court  that  this  end  result  is  inconsistent  with  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



 settlement embodied in H.B. 201, but that alone does not make the later, unconnected  

                                                                                                                                                                       



 Closeout Agreement a statutory violation of H.B. 201.  

                                                                                                                             



                21             See  Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 84-830, § 202(a), 70                                                                                        



 Stat. 709, 711 (1956).           



                22             Cf. Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. State, 202 P.3d 1162, 1176-77  

                                                                                                                                                                                 

 (Alaska 2009) (concluding legislative land grant to University was unconstitutional  

                                                                                                                                                               

 dedication of funds).   But see  AS 38.50.010, .140 (authorizing DNR to make land  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

 exchanges, some subject to legislative approval).  

                                                                                         



                23             Pub. L. No. 108-452, 118 Stat. 3575 (2004).  

                                                                                                                   



                                                                                              -39-                                                                                       7478
  


----------------------- Page 40-----------------------

                           As we previously have noted, DNR enjoys "broad discretion in deciding                                                     



                                                                                                                            24  

whether to approve a sale, lease or other disposal of state lands."                                                                                                  

                                                                                                                                 The Acceleration Act  



                                                                                                                                                                

represented  a  changed  circumstance,  presenting  DNR  a  new  opportunity  to  select  



                                                                                                                                                                   

additional mental health trust lands.  Because DNR has broad authority to manage state  



                                                                                                                                                        

lands,  and  because  H.B.  201  did  not  clearly  prohibit  the  State  from  an  otherwise  



                                                                                                                     

statutorily allowable disposal of the land grant selection, I conclude the superior court  



                                                                                                                                                       

correctly granted summary judgment dismissing SEACC's H.B. 201 claim.  



                                              

              Oral Contract Issue  



                                                                                                                                                             

                           I agree with the court's conclusion that the superior court correctly granted  



                                                                                                                                                                        

summary judgment dismissing SEACC's oral contract claim.  I conclude this issue is  



                                                                                                                                                                    

resolved entirely by SEACC's superior court assertions and acknowledgment at oral  



                                                                                                                                                                      

argument to us that the alleged oral contract was fully performed by the State placing the  



                                                                                                                                                                 

No Name Bay land grant selection on the list of lands not to be conveyed to the Trust  



                                                                                                                       

Authority to reconstitute the mental health trust under H.B. 201.  



                                                                                                                                                                             

                           SEACC's superior court arguments were based on the affidavit of Tom  



                                                                                                                                                         

Waldo, SEACC's attorney in the H.B. 201 litigation and settlement.   Waldo described  



                                                                                                                        

the State's "proposed concessions" to break the negotiation impasse as follows:  If his  



                                                                                                                                                                       

clients agreed that another specified land parcel would go on the list of lands to be  



                                                                                                                                                               

conveyed to the Trust Authority to reconstitute the mental health trust, the State would  



                                                                                                                                                                     

agree that the No Name Bay land grant selection and two other parcels would not "be  



                                                                                                                                                          

designated as [m]ental [h]ealth [t]rust [l]and" and the No Name Bay land grant selection  



                                                                                                                                                               

"would be classified as 'Wildlife Habitat' under the state land use regulations."  Waldo  



                                                                                                                                                                      

stated that these agreements were "memorialized" on the land lists incorporated into the  



             24           Moore v.             State,   553   P.2d  8,   31   (Alaska 1976),                                  superseded   by statute                     ,  



ch. 257, § 3, SLA 1976,                           as recognized in Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on                                                        

Indigenous Lands                    , 311 P.3d 625 (Alaska 2013).                  



                                                                                  -40-                                                                           7478
  


----------------------- Page 41-----------------------

                                                                                                                               

settlement's enabling legislation.   Waldo stated that his clients decided to make this  



                                                                                                                               

agreement "in the context of the overall settlement agreement."  Waldo concluded that  



                                                                                                                               

the land lists "reflected the final agreement among the settling parties as to the lands that  



                                                              

would reconstitute the [m]ental [h]ealth [t]rust."  



                                                                                                                         

                    During the summary judgment proceedings in the superior court, SEACC  



                                                              

described the alleged oral agreement as follows:  



                                                                                                           

                    The parties agreed that SEACC would support the H.B. 201  

                                                                                                          

                    settlement before the legislature and would not oppose it in  

                                                                                                           

                    court, which SEACCsubsequently performed as agreed. The  

                                                                                                        

                    ACE Intervenors also conceded that [another parcel] could  

                                                                                     

                    become [mental health trust] replacement land.  



                                                                                                         

                              As the quid pro quo, Page 27, which precluded three  

                                                                                                       

                    specific tracts of land  from designation  as [mental health  

                                                                                    

                    trust]   replacement             land,      as    well   as   specifying            their  

                                                                                                       

                    classification and management as wildlife habitat or public  

                                                                                                         

                    recreation land, would be included in the list of "Other State  

                                                                                                          

                    Lands" - but as land not to go to the Trust.   Page 27 was  

                                                                                                   

                    contained both in the list of "Other State Lands" that was  

                                                                                                           

                    ratified in Sec. 40(a)(2), ch. 5, FSSLA (1994), and in the  

                                                                                                             

                     Weiss  Settlement  Agreement,  incorporated  in  Section  2,  

                                       

                    para. 1 . . . .  



                                                                                                                              

SEACC further emphasized in its briefing that the alleged oral agreement had been fully  



                                                                                                                                 

performed:          "the  State-SEACC  contract  was  fully  performed";  "[a]fter  passage  of  



                                                                                                                         

H.B. 201 and SEACC's non-opposition to the Weiss settlement, there remained nothing  



                                                                                                                               

to be done by either SEACC or the State to further perform their contract"; and "all  



                                                                                            

required performances by both parties occurred within one year."  



                                                                                                                     

                    At oral argument to us, SEACC confirmed that the alleged oral agreement  



                                                  

had been fully performed in the 1990s:  



                                                                                                 

                    Q:  What I want to know is, is this oral agreement comprised  

                                                                                                          

                    of anything that's not in the settlement agreement that was  

                                                                                        

                    actually reached by the parties in the Weiss litigation?  



                                                               -41-                                                         7478
  


----------------------- Page 42-----------------------

                                                                                                               

                     A:   No.       The  oral agreement was on the SEACC side to  

                                                                                                     

                     support the legislation, on the State side to come forward  

                                                                                                           

                     with  an  agreed  list  that  would  be  incorporated  in  that  

                                                                                                        

                     legislation.         That  agreed  list  then  went  into  the  Weiss  

                     settlement.  



                                      

                               . . . .  



                                                                                                 

                     A:      The  land  selections  .  .  .  went  into  the  settlement  

                                                                                                      

                     agreement by virtue of the fact that it was an agreed solution  

                                                                                                             

                     between the State, and all of the intervening parties, and the  

                                                                                                  

                     plaintiffs,  and  was  adopted  by  the  legislature.                        SEACC's  

                                                                                                             

                     involvement  in  the  oral  agreement  was  to  negotiate  the  

                                                                                                  

                     acceptable list of lands and to then support it in the legislation  

                                                       

                     and in the settlement agreement.  



                                                                                                          

                     Q:  And everything to do with that oral agreement was done,  

                                                                                                       

                     complete, finito  when that settlement agreement was signed,  

                                                                                    

                     delivered, and sealed back in the 1990s, correct?  



                                                    

                     A:  Everything . . . .  



                                      

                               . . . .  



                                                                                                        

                     Q:  Why are we here talking about an oral agreement today?  



                                                                                                               

                     A:  We're talking about it . . . because the oral agreement at  

                                                                                                        

                    page 27 specified that the No Name Bay lands would remain  

                                                                                                              

                     with the State, they wouldn't go to the trust, and they'd be  

                                                                                                    

                     managed  as  wildlife  habitat  lands.                        And  that  situation  

                                                                                             

                     continued until 2007 . . . .  (Emphasis added.)  



                                                                                                                                

                     This  makes  abundant  sense:                      The  parties  negotiating  the  H.B.  201  



                                                                                                                                   

settlement  were  concerned  with  the  original  mental  health  trust  lands  available  to  



                                                                                                                                  

reconstitute the trust; the original mental health trust lands unavailable to reconstitute the  



                                                                                                                              

trust; and what other state property would, and would not, be conveyed to the Trust  



                                                                                                                   

Authority to true-up the reconstituted mental health trust. As a result of the negotiations,  



                                                                                                                                   

the No Name Bay land grant selection was placed on the list of property not to be  



                                                                                                                                  

conveyed  to  the Trust Authority  to  reconstitute the trust and  was designated  to be  



                                                                -42-                                                          7478
  


----------------------- Page 43-----------------------

classified and managed as wildlife habitat.                                                                 Any later dispute about what the State was                                                        



required to do with respect to the No Name Bay land grant selection is a dispute about                                                                                                                    



interpreting H.B. 201, not the contours of an alleged oral contract admittedly fully                                                                                                                       



performed when H.B. 201 was effectuated.                                                                     For this reason I respectfully disagree with                                                   



Justice Stowers's separate dissent.                                



                 State Land Issue               



                                 I reluctantly agree with the court's collateral estoppel ruling, effectively                                                                                



barring   the State from challenging whether                                                                      the No              Name Bay land                              grant selection   



constitutes   "state   land[],   or   interests   therein"   under   the   Public   Notice   Clause   of  



                                                                                                                            25  

article VIII, section 10 of the Alaska Constitution.                                                                                                                                                   

                                                                                                                                   But my agreement goes no further  



                                                                                                                                                                                                       

than the No Name Bay land grant selection. The State did not appeal the superior court's  

                                                                                                                                                                                   26  and we have  

                                                                                                                                                                                                            

                                                                                                                                                           

decision in Southeastern Alaska Conservation Council, Inc. v. Pekovich,  



not had occasion to consider whether land grant selections are state land covered by the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                



Public Notice Clause.  Although Pekovich settles the matter for the No Name Bay land  

                                                                                                                                                                                                             



grant selection, it does not establish controlling constitutional law for other land grant  

                                                                                                                                                                                                           



selections.                     This  court,  not  the Pekovich  superior  court,  is  the  final  arbiter  on  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                               



controlling constitutional law.  

                                                                 



                                 In Pekovich the superior court stressed that the Alaska Constitution was  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



ratified before Alaska became a state.  Given that Alaska owned almost no land before  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        



statehood and was relying on prospective federal land grants, the court reasoned that it  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



would make sense for the Public Notice Clause to embrace future federal land grants.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



The court concluded that "interests therein" must include the future interest in grants  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        



                 25              Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 10 ("No disposals or leases of state lands, or                                                                                                        



interests therein, shall be made without prior public notice . . . .").                                                                                  



                 26              No. 1JU-93-00823 CI (Alaska Super. Feb. 11, 1994).  

                                                                                                                                                       



                                                                                                       -43-                                                                                                7478
  


----------------------- Page 44-----------------------

promised to the State and that the State's tentative selection of No Name Bay under                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



 § 6(a) of the Statehood Act therefore must fall within the clause's protections.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       But the   



 State's § 6(a) land grant selection of the No Name Bay parcel was an interest in federal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



 land, not an interest in state land.                                                                                                  The superior court did not grapple with whether or                                                                                                                                                      



why a land grant selection itself is state land for Public Notice Clause purposes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



                                                     As the court noted, our prior decisions unequivocally support the principle                                                                                                                                                                                     



that the Public Notice Clause should be liberally construed to give effect to the framers'                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  27  

 intent of protecting the public's paramount interest in Alaska's land and its resources.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



But it is not so clear that the framers intended the clause to apply to novel contingent  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



property interests. In Pekovich the superior court stressed that the State's future interest  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 in the No Name Bay parcel was not speculative because, after completing procedural  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



requirements, the State would receive tentative approval and equitable title as a matter  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 of course.  This seems a concession that the State did not yet have even equitable title to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



the land when it held a land grant selection not yet tentatively approved by the federal  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



 government.  And Pekovich overlooks the fact that, pending completion of procedural  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                



requirements, the federal government could have removed the No Name Bay parcel from  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 selection under the Statehood Act.  It is well established that Congress retains the right  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

to remove particular tracts from land selection prior to their approval.28                                                                                                                                                                                                                         For example,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



                           27                        See, e.g.                         ,  Moore v. State                                              , 553 P.2d 8, 25 (Alaska 1976) ("[W]e must keep                                                                                                                                



 in mind the constitutional mandate, expressed in [a]rticle VIII, s[ection] 10, to safeguard                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

the public's interest in the disposition of state                                                                                                                               natural resources."),                                                            superseded by statute                                                                ,  

 ch. 257, § 3, SLA 1976,                                                                            as recognized in Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on                                                                                                                                                                             

Indigenous Lands                                                        , 311 P.3d 625 (Alaska 2013);                                                                                            Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth                                                                                                    , 426   

P.2d 1006, 1011 (Alaska 1967) ("[Article VIII] reflects the framers' recognition of the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

 importance of our land resources and of the concomitant necessity for observance of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

 legal safeguards in the disposal or leasing of state lands.").                                                                                                                                                                               



                           28                        See, e.g., Andrus v. Utah , 446 U.S. 500, 519-20 (1980) (holding Congress  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   (continued...)  



                                                                                                                                                                    -44-                                                                                                                                                             7478
  


----------------------- Page 45-----------------------

when passing the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Congress set aside                                                                            



 104 million acres of federal lands for preservation, closing those lands to selection under                                                                   



                                    29  

the Statehood Act.                         



                                                                                                                                                                     

                          A legally valid future interest exists if the grantee may take possession on  

                                                                                              30   But if the grantor may freely revoke  

                                                                                                                                                            

the occurrence of conditions specified in a grant. 

the grant, the grantee has only an expectancy in gaining possession.31                                                                   In the context of  

                                                                                                                                                                      



wills, devises have been described as expectancies that do not create valid property  

                                                                                                                                             



interests during the testator's lifetime, because the testator's property enjoyment should  

                                                                                                                                                             

not be limited by the devisee's claims absent a clear commitment to convey an interest.32  

                                                                                                                                                                           



That reasoning may apply in this context as well; Congress enjoys plenary power over  

                                                                                                                                                                 



the federal public domain prior to a particular parcel's tentative approval and survey  

                                                                                                                                                            

                                                       33   But if that reasoning does not apply, the decision should  

under a land grant selection.                                                                                                                                

                                     



be made by this court.   Whether a mere land grant selection, without the necessary  

                                                                                                                                                      



federal  approval  to  make  the  land  grant  selection  purely  contingent  on  ministerial  

                                                                                                                                                    



             28           (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                

could authorize Interior Department discretion in deciding whether to approve state  

                                                                                                                                                               

selections from federal public  domain  authorized  by  statehood  act in  lieu  of tracts  

                                                                                                                                                    

designated in school land grant); United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 443 (1947)  

                                                                                                                                                         

(affirming  federal  government's  freedom to  dispose  of  school  grant  lands  prior  to  

                    

survey)..  



             29           Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 906(d), 94 Stat. 2371, 2438-39 (1980); see also  

                                                                                                                                                                 

Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2016).  

                                                                                  



             30           RESTATEMENT  (FIRST) OF  PROPERTY   §§ 25, 158 (A                                                   M. L     AW  INST . 1936).   



             31           See   SIMES   & S              MITH, T         HE   LAW   OF   FUTURE   INTERESTS   § 403                                    (John   A.  



Borron, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 2002).               



             32           See id.  

                                   



             33           See supra note 28.  

                                                         



                                                                                 -45-                                                                           7478
  


----------------------- Page 46-----------------------

procedural   steps,   is   state   land   for   Public   Notice   Clause   purposes   remains   an   open  



question.  



              Public Notice Issue           



                           I agree that the Closeout Agreement effected a disposal of the No Name                                                                  



Bay   land   grant   selection   requiring   notice   under   the   Public   Notice   Clause.     I   write  



separately only to emphasize that the State's mere "relinquishment" of the land grant                                                                               



selection may not - as SEACC urges - be a disposal.                                           



                           As   of   2016   about   5.4   million   acres   remained   under   Statehood  Act  



                          34  

entitlements.                                                                                                                                                            

                                Given the State's ability to select more land than remained under its  



                                                                                                                                       35  

                                                                                                                                                                         

entitlement, it had selected significantly more than 5.4 million acres.                                                                     And although the  



                                                                                                                                                                     

Acceleration Act ended the State's ability to make new selections after 2009, the State  

                                                                                                     36   If a mere relinquishment of a land  

                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                                                

still may change the priority of its final selections. 



grant selection is a disposal covered by the Public Notice Clause, then, because the State  

                                                                                                                                                                     



has over-selected land grant opportunities (as allowed by federal law), even the re- 

                                                                                                                                                                        



prioritization of land grant selections would be an effective relinquishment of some land  

                                                                                                                                                                      



grant selections; public notice thus would be required for almost any action the State  

                                                                                                                                                                    



takes with respect to its land grant selections. Perhaps that ultimately is the correct result  

                                                                                                                                                                    



and  consistent  with  a  need  for  public  oversight  of  the  State's  land  grant  selection  

                                                                                                                                                            



management, but this case is not the right vehicle to decide that issue.  

                                                                                                                                  



             34            ALASKA   LEGISLATURE,   STATE   OF   ALASKA  LAND   SELECTIONS   (2016),  



                                                                                                                                                                    

http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=40532;  see   also  

BUREAU OF                 LAND   MGMT., P                 UBLIC   LAND   STATISTICS   5 (2019), https://www.blm.gov/              

about/data/public-land-statistics (showing about 99 million acres had been conveyed                                                                        

under Statehood Act).              



             35            See ALASKA  LEGISLATURE,  supra  note 34.   

                                    



             36            Pub. L. No. 108-452, § 404(b), 118 Stat. 3579, 3594 (2004).  

                                                                                                                                       



                                                                                   -46-                                                                             7478
  


----------------------- Page 47-----------------------

                                                                                           There was an undeniable disposal in this case because the State exchanged                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



its Statehood Act § 6(a) land grant selection - which for purposes of this case is state                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



land - for the federal government's patented mental health trust land grant conveyance                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



to the State for subsequent conveyance to the Trust Authority.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    There is no reason to                                                                                                                        



conclude in this case that mere relinquishment of a land grant selection is a disposal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



 subject to the Public Notice Clause.                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 -47-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      7478
  


----------------------- Page 48-----------------------

STOWERS, Justice, dissenting in part.                         



                        I dissent from Section IV.C.2. of the court's opinion, which addresses                                            

                                                        1    SEACC alleges that in 1994 it entered into an oral  

SEACC's oral contract claims.                                                                                                                       



contract with DNR regarding reconstitution of the State's mental health trust. According  

                                                                                                                                         



to SEACC, it agreed not to challenge the inclusion of a particular tract of land (Leask  

                                                                                                                                               



Lakes)  in  the  mental  health  trust  and  to  support  HB  201  in  testimony  before  the  

                                                                                                                                                     

legislature and in the  Weiss litigation.2                                In exchange for SEACC's support, SEACC  

                                                                                                                            



argues that the State agreed to include certain parcels of land - in particular, No Name  

                                                                                                                                                 



Bay - in the list of lands that would not be conveyed to the trust and to classify and  

                                                                                                                                                     



manage No Name Bay as wildlife habitat.  

                                                              



                        We have outlined Alaska's summary judgment principles as follows:  

                                                                                                                                     



                                    We  will  affirm  summary  judgment  if  there  are  no  

                                                                                                                              

                        genuine issues of material fact and if the moving party is  

                                                                                                                                

                        entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   The non-movant  

                                                                                                             

                        "need not establish that he will ultimately prevail at trial."  

                                                                                                                                     

                        That is, the non-movant is not required to submit evidence  

                                                                                                                   

                        that tends to show that the non-movant could prove its case  

                                                                                                                            

                        by satisfying the relevant burden of proof at trial.  

                                                                                                         



                                    In making this determination, all reasonableinferences  

                                                                                                                  

                        are made in favor of the non-movant. Reasonable inferences  

                                                                                                                 

                        are those inferences that a reasonable factfinder could draw  

                                                                                                                

                        from the plaintiff's evidence.   However, the plaintiff must  

                                                                                                                          

                        present more than a "scintilla" of evidence to avoid summary  

                                                                                                                   

                       judgment;  the  plaintiff  must  present  enough  evidence  to  

                                                                                                                               

                        "reasonably  tend[]  to  dispute  or  contradict"  the  evidence  

                                                                                                                   

                        presented by the defendant.  

                                                       



                                    We  have  indicated  that  we  will  not  engage  in  a  

                                                                                                                                

                        weighing of the evidence on summary judgment; there is a  

                                                                                                                                 



            1           See  Op. at 28-29.     



            2           See Weiss v. State (Weiss II), 939 P.2d 380 (Alaska 1997).  

                                                                                                                     



                                                                          -48-                                                                    7478  


----------------------- Page 49-----------------------

                           "genuine issue" of material fact as long as the non-movant                                     

                                                                                                                                              [  ]  

                           has presented              some  evidence in support of its legal theory.                                           3 



Further, "[w]hen factual disputes exist, the non-movant's version of the facts must be  

                                                                                                                                                                        



accepted as true and capable of proof, and we make no attempt to weigh the evidence or  

                                                                                                                                                                         

evaluate witness credibility."4  

                                   



                           To support its cross-motion for summary judgment, SEACC pointed to the  

                                                                                                                                                                       



following evidence to document its oral contract with DNR:  (1) an affidavit filed by  

                                                                                                                                                                        



SEACC's  former  attorney,  Tom  Waldo,  describing  the  negotiations  and  the  oral  

                                                                                                                                                                    



agreement; (2) the memorandum SEACC filed with the  Weiss II court to support the  

                                                                                                                                                                      



proposed settlement; (3) documentation that SEACC testified before the legislature in  

                                                                                                                                                                         



support  of  HB  201;  and  (4)  a  variety  of  documents  and  communications  by  State  

                                                                                                                                                                  



employees  and  officials  from  1994  to  2012  that  acknowledged  No  Name  Bay's  

                                                                                                                                                                

classification as wildlife habitat pursuant to HB 201 and the settlement negotiations.5  

                                                                                                                                                                           



                           The court holds that because SEACC conceded that "both parties fully  

                                                                                                                                                                   



performed  their  obligations  under  the  oral  contract,  then  the  State  could  not  have  

                                                                                                                                                                  



             3            Alakayak v. B.C. Packers, Ltd.                              , 48 P.3d 432, 449 (Alaska 2002) (alteration                       



in original) (emphases in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting                                                                   Gablick v. Wolfe                  ,  

469 P.2d 391, 395 (Alaska 1970); then quoting                                                    Yurioff v. Am. Honda Motor Co.                                   , 803   

P.2d 386, 389 (Alaska 1990)).                  



             4            Mitchell v. Teck Cominco Alaska Inc., 193 P.3d 751, 757 (Alaska 2008).  

                                                                                                                                                               



             5             SEACC pointed to (1) public notices published by DNR, (2) memoranda  

                                                                                                                                                     

between  DNR  and  the  Alaska  Department  of  Fish  and  Game,  (3)  internal  DNR  

                                                                                                                                                                 

communications, (4) communications between  DNR and the U.S. Forest Service, (5)  

                                                                                                                                                                       

communication between DNR and the Office of the Governor, (6) a record of decision  

                                                                                                                                                            

and reconsideration published by the DNR Commissioner, and (7) the designation of No  

                                                                                                                                                                       

Name Bay as wildlife habitat in a 2000 land use planning process. SEACC also notes the  

                                                                                                                                                                       

supplemental opposition filed by the State with this court in relation to the Chapter 66  

                                                                                                                                               

litigation  where  the  State  asserted  that  it  reached  a  negotiated  settlement  with  the  

                                                                                                                                    

intervenors in the Weiss litigation.  

                                                  



                                                                                  -49-                                                                            7478
  


----------------------- Page 50-----------------------

                                                                          6  

breached   that   contract"   as   a   matter   of   law.     But   some   contracts   create   ongoing  



                                                                             7  

obligations to continue to honor a contract term.                                                                           

                                                                                And SEACC has produced evidence  



                                                                                                                       

showing that the alleged oral contract did just that.  First, Waldo stated in his affidavit  



                                                                         

that the State made an offer to not designate No Name Bay as mental health trust land  



                                                                                                                                     

and instead to classify the property "as 'Wildlife Habitat' under the State land use  



                                                                                                                                        

planning regulations."  Waldo's affidavit suggests that SEACC understood the State to  



                                                                                                                              

be offering to have No Name Bay "classified permanently as Wildlife Habitat." Second,  



                                                                                                                                 

the State documents and communications from 1994 to 2012 acknowledging No Name  



                                                                                                                                       

Bay's classification as wildlife habitat demonstrate that the State did not understand its  



                                                                                                                                  

obligations regarding No Name Bay to be complete after merely including it on the Other  



                                                                                                                                      

Lands List; instead, the State recognized that it was obligated to continue to manage No  



                                     

Name Bay as wildlife habitat.  



                                                                                                                                       

                     While SEACC's evidence may not demonstrably prove the existence of an  

                                                                                                                         8   SEACC  

                                                                                                                             

                                                                                                          

oral contract, SEACC did not need to do so to survive summary judgment. 



presented "some" evidence - "more than a scintilla" - in support of its legal theory,  

                                                                                                                       

and this evidence was sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact.9                                           We draw all  

                                                                                                                                       



           6         Op. at 29.     



           7  

                                                                                                                                    

                     See, e.g., Recreational Data Servs., Inc. v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 404  

                                                                                                                              

P.3d  120,  127-29  (Alaska  2017)  (discussing  nondisclosure  agreement  that  created  

                                                                                                                                      

ongoing  obligation  on  both  parties  not  to  disclose  confidential  information),  as  

                               

amended (Aug. 3, 2017).  



           8         See Alakayak, 48 P.3d at 449 ("[T]he non-movant is not required to submit  

                                                                                                                                

evidence that tends to show that the non-movant could prove its case by satisfying the  

                                                                                                                                      

relevant burden of proof at trial." (emphasis in original)).  

                                                                            



           9          Cf. Meyer v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enf't Div. ex rel.
  

                                                                                                                                     

N.G.T., 994 P.2d 365, 368 (Alaska 1999) (holding "a putative father's sworn denial of
  

                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                     (continued...)
  



                                                                  -50-                                                            7478
  


----------------------- Page 51-----------------------

reasonable inferences in SEACC's favor, and SEACC produced evidence sufficient to                                                                                                                                                           



draw reasonable inferences that (1) the contract                                                                                                                 included a term requiring DNR to                                                                          



manage No Name Bay as wildlife habitat into the future and (2) DNR breached this term.                                                                                                                                                                                                



Because SEACC raised a genuine issue of material fact on both the existence of the                                                                                                                                                                                      



contract term and DNR's breach of this term, I disagree with this court that the superior                                                                                                                                                               



court properly granted summary judgment to the State on the oral contract issue.                                                                                                                                                                                             I  



concur in the remainder of the court's opinion.                                                                           



                     9                     (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

sexual intercourse during the possible period of conception [was] more than a scintilla  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

of  evidence"  despite  "scientific  test  results  claiming  a  99.98%  probability  of  [his]  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

paternity").  Meyer illustrates this court's lenient summary judgment standard, and this  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

court has continued to cite it with approval.  See, e.g., Egner v. Talbot's, Inc., 214 P.3d  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

272, 277 n.7 (Alaska 2009); Estate of Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc., 145 P.3d  

                                                                                                                                                   

533, 537 (Alaska 2006); Alakayak , 48 P.3d at 449.  



                                                                                                                                   -51-                                                                                                                            7478
  

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