Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions

Touch N' Go
, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother.


You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Villars v. Villars (7/19/2013) sp-6797

Villars v. Villars (7/19/2013) sp-6797

        Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC  REPORTER . 

        Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

        303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, e-mail  


OLGA H. VILLARS,                                   ) 

                                                   )   Supreme Court No. S-14416 

                        Appellant,                 ) 

                                                   )   Superior Court No. 4FA-07-02606 CI 

        v.                                         ) 

                                                   )   O P I N I O N 

RICHARD J. VILLARS,                                ) 

                                                   )   No. 6797 - July 19, 2013 

                        Appellee.                  ) 


                Appeal   from     the  Superior   Court   of   the  State  of   Alaska, 

                Fourth   Judicial   District,   Fairbanks,   Douglas   Blankenship, 


                Appearances:       Olga     H.  Villars,   pro   se,  Solana   Beach, 

                California, Appellant.       Richard J. Villars, pro se, Marrero, 

                Louisiana, Appellee. 

                Before:    Fabe, Chief Justice, Carpeneti, Winfree, Stowers, 

                and Maassen, Justices. 

                MAASSEN, Justice. 

                CARPENETI, Justice, concurring. 


                Olga Villars sued her former husband, Richard Villars, for his failure to pay 

spousal support during the year 2010.  Following a trial at which both parties appeared 

telephonically and pro se, the trial court ruled that the amount Richard owed Olga had 

to be reduced to account for (1) the smaller size of her household while her daughter was 

----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

living with Richard, (2) the lower federal poverty level in California, where Olga had 

moved,   (3)   the   substantial   contributions   for   support   Olga   received   from   her   second 

husband, and (4) Olga's earned income.           On appeal, Olga challenges these rulings and 

certain aspects of the trial procedure.      Because we find that the trial court clearly erred 

in its calculation of the amount of support contributed by Olga's second husband, we 

remand for further consideration of this issue while affirming on all others. 


        A.       Facts 

                Richard and Olga were married in December 2004 in Kiev, Ukraine.  Olga 

moved to Alaska in July 2005 with her minor daughter, Linda, to be with Richard.  As 

Olga's immigration sponsor, Richard filed an INS Form I-864 affidavit of support, in 

which he agreed to maintain Olga and Linda "at an income that is at least 125 percent of 

the Federal poverty guidelines."1 

                Richard and Olga divorced on January 12, 2009.               Their divorce decree 

incorporated   Richard's   support   obligations   under   his   I-864   affidavit   and   calculated 

monthly payments based   on   the federal poverty level for a two-person household in 


                On February 22, 2009, Olga and Linda moved to California.                There Olga 

married George Nasif on October 18, 2009.  Olga's daughter Linda moved to Louisiana 

to   live   with   Richard   from   December   2009   until   June   14,   2010,   under   a   temporary 

guardianship agreement. 

        1       An INS Form I-864 affidavit is required of certain immigration sponsors 

by 8 U.S.C.  1182(a)(4)(C), 1183(a) (2012).            See Barnett v. Barnett, 238 P.3d 594, 

597-98 (Alaska 2010). 

                                                 -2-                                  6797 

----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

                Olga's home life was unsettled during 2010, the only year at issue here. 

She   and   George   maintained   separate   residences   for   much   of the   year; at one   point 

George secured a restraining order against her.   Olga was evicted from her apartment in 

April and moved into a motel, where she lived for several months until moving into 

another apartment with George and Linda.  Olga's marriage to George was annulled in 

November 2010. 

                Richard did not make any support payments to Olga for the first eleven 

months   of 2010.       Olga filed a motion in Alaska to enforce the divorce decree,   and 

Richard made payments for December 2010 and January 2011 pursuant to a temporary 

support order.  His obligations for the first eleven months of 2010 were resolved at trial. 

        B.       Proceedings 

                Trial was held in superior court in Fairbanks in February 2011; both parties 

attended telephonically.   After hearing from Richard, Olga, and George,  the court made 

written findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The court first ruled that Richard's 2010 

support payments should be determined by the federal poverty level in California, not 

Alaska.    The court ruled further that the payments would be determined by the federal 

poverty level for a single-person household, not a two-person household, for the months 

Linda was living with Richard. Finally, the court ruled that Richard's support obligation 

would be offset by the amount of support that George provided to Olga and Linda during 

2010.    With some inconsistencies noted below, George testified at trial that his 2010 

income was approximately $24,000, and that he spent this entire amount to support Olga, 

Linda,   and   himself.   The   trial   court   credited   this   testimony   and   calculated   an   offset 

assuming that all of George's income went to pay all of the family's living expenses. 

Accordingly, the trial court divided George's income evenly between him and Olga for 

                                                  -3-                                   6797

----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

the months Linda was away and among the three of them for the months she was there, 

for a total of $14,202.80 in support from George for Olga and Linda. 

                After a few other minor adjustments - $175 in income that Olga made in 

a few days of work and $275.90 "at minimum" in qualifying support that Richard paid 

toward the end of the year - the trial court found that Richard owed no further support 

for 2010.    Also, although finding that Olga had satisfied any duty to mitigate that may 

have existed by applying unsuccessfully for a number of jobs while living in California, 

the court held that she had a responsibility to "continue seeking employment in earnest" 

or risk losing her "right to payments from Mr. Villars." 

                After the entry of judgment, Olga filed a motion to alter or amend it under 

Civil Rule 59, basing her request on financial records that she had not produced at trial. 

The trial court denied the motion. 

                On appeal, Olga raises many objections to the trial court's findings and 

procedure.     As to its findings, Olga challenges the trial court's decision to account for 

California's lower federal poverty rate and for Linda's absence from the household for 

part of the year when calculating Richard's support obligations. She challenges the trial 

court's use of George's support to offset Richard's support obligation.  She also contests 

the trial court's finding as to the amount of support that George provided.                    Olga also 

argues   that   the   income   she   earned   in   2010   should   not   be   used   to   offset   Richard's 


                Olga contests the fairness of the trial on two grounds.  First, she argues that 

the   trial   court   did   not   provide   her   with   an   interpreter   and   that   she   was   not   able   to 

understand or be understood by the court.            Second, she argues that her opportunity to 

participate in the trial was prejudiced by her lack of a reliable telephone connection. 

                                                   -4-                                    6797

----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                Finally, Olga argues that the court erred by denying two of her motions: 

first,   her   Civil   Rule   59   motion   to   alter   or   amend   the   judgment   based   on   late-filed 

evidence, and second, her motion to strike the trial testimony of George Nasif. 


                We     review    the  trial  court's   findings    of  fact  for  clear   error  and   its 

conclusions of law de novo.2          We will find   clear   error if "after review of the entire 

record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake occurred."3                Richard's 

obligations under the divorce decree and the INS Form I-864 affidavit are both questions 

of   contract   interpretation   and   are   thus   questions   of   law   that   we   review   de   novo.4 

Interpreting INS Form I-864 requires the interpretation of federal statutes, and statutory 

interpretation is also a question of law that we review using our independent judgment.5 

The amount   of   income imputed to Olga to offset Richard's support obligations is a 

question of fact that we review for clear error.6         The denial of Olga's motion to alter or 

        2       Henrichs   v.   Chugach   Alaska   Corp. , 250   P.3d   531, 535   (Alaska   2011) 

(citing In re Protective Proceedings of Q.A. , 193 P.3d 743, 748 (Alaska 2008); Dugan 

v. Atlanta Cas. Cos. , 113 P.3d 652, 654 (Alaska 2005)). 

        3        Wee v. Eggener, 225 P.3d 1120, 1124 (Alaska 2010) (quoting Dingeman 

v. Dingeman , 865 P.2d 94, 96 (Alaska 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

        4       Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc., 265 P.3d 320, 324 (Alaska 2011). 

        5       Barnett , 238 P.3d at 597 (citing Parson v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Alaska 

Hous. Fin. Corp. , 189 P.3d 1032, 1036 (Alaska 2008)). 

        6       Lacher v. Lacher , 993 P.2d 413, 423 n.34 (Alaska 1999) (citing Dunn v. 

Dunn , 952 P.2d 268, 270 (Alaska 1998)). 

                                                   -5-                                   6797

----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

amend   a   judgment   is   reviewed   for   an   abuse   of   discretion,7  as   are   the   trial   court's 

decisions regarding the need for an interpreter and telephonic participation.8 


        A.	     The Trial Court Correctly Adjusted Richard's Support Obligations To 

                Account For Olga's Move To California, Linda's Temporary Absence 

                From The Household, And Olga's Earnings. 

                The findings of fact and conclusions of law that accompanied Richard and 

Olga's 2009 divorce decree, and that were made a part of it by reference, incorporated 

Richard's support obligations under the INS Form I-864 affidavit and stipulated that this 

obligation was governed by federal law. Under 8 U.S.C.  1183a(a)(1)(A), Richard must 

maintain Olga and Linda "at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the 

Federal poverty line."  We have interpreted  1183a to mean that "a sponsor is required 

to pay only the difference between the sponsored non-citizen's income and the 125% of 

poverty threshold."9      The "Federal poverty line" in  1183a is defined as "the official 

        7       Nelson v. Jones , 781 P.2d 964, 968 (Alaska 1989) ("Denial of relief under 

Civil Rule 59 or Rule 60 will be overturned on appeal only if the trial court has abused 

its discretion."   (citing  Gregor v. Hodges, 612 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Alaska 1980); Nat'l 

Bank of Alaska v. McHugh , 416 P.2d 239, 244 (Alaska 1966))). 

        8       See Vui Gui Tsen v. State, 176 P.3d 1, 7 (Alaska App. 2008) (observing that 

trial court has "broad discretion as a matter of necessity" in determining what interpretive 

services are required); Carr v. Carr, 152 P.3d 450, 458 (Alaska 2007) ("We review a 

trial court's decisions regarding a party's telephonic appearance for abuse of discretion." 

(citing Richard B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs. , 

71 P.3d 811, 817 (Alaska 2003))). 

        9       Barnett , 238 P.3d at 598-99 & n.13. 

                                                  -6-	                                 6797

----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

poverty line . . . that is applicable to a family of the size involved."10               Accordingly, 

federal courts have held that a sponsor's support obligations must be adjusted downward 

when a family member leaves the household.11              The trial court was therefore correct to 

reduce Richard's support obligations to account for the time that Linda was living with 

him instead of with Olga. 

                The trial court was also correct to adjust Richard's support obligations to 

account for Olga's move to California. The purpose of  1183a is to provide a minimum 

level of support so that the sponsored immigrant does not become a public charge.12 

Failing to take into account changes of location would frustrate this statutory purpose; 

it would provide either a windfall or insufficient support to an immigrant who moved to 

a state with a different cost of living.       The "official poverty line . . . applicable to" the 

sponsored family, for purposes of  1183a(h), is the one in effect where the family is 

physically residing, and where it is paying for the goods and services necessary to daily 


                Olga argues that the divorce decree requires Richard's support obligation 

to be calculated with reference to the federal poverty line for a two-person household in 

Alaska, regardless of whether his I-864 affidavit would require it.   She is incorrect.  The 

decree incorporates the affidavit's duty of support but holds that the duty "is governed 

by Federal law" and that Richard's support obligation "shall be adjusted to match" any 

        10      8 U.S.C.  1183a(h). 

        11      See Nasir v. Shah, No. 2:10-CV-01003, 2012 WL 4342986, at *3-4 (S.D. 

Ohio Sept. 21, 2012); Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 2757329, at *6 

(N.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2005). 

        12      See Wenfang Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422-23 (7th Cir. 2012). 

                                                   -7-                                   6797

----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

changes     in  the  federal  poverty   guidelines.   Where     federal  law   would    require  an 

adjustment in Richard's support obligation, the divorce decree does as well. 

               Olga is also incorrect in arguing that Richard's support obligations should 

not be offset by her 2010 earnings.  Olga's argument directly contradicts our holding in 

Barnett   in   which   we   adjusted   a  sponsor's   support    obligations   by  the  sponsored 

immigrant's earned income.13 

        B.	    The     Trial   Court    Clearly   Erred    In   Its  Calculation     Of George's 

               Contributions Of Support To Olga And Linda. 

               It was Richard's burden at trial to prove the existence and amount of any 

offsets to his support obligation.14    He presented his own testimony and that of George, 

Olga's   second   husband.     George   testified   that   he   "provided   food   and   shelter   and 

transportation during the last year, 2010," to Olga and Linda and that the dollar amount 

of this support was "about 24,000."        He testified that this included the costs of food, 

utilities, maintenance and fuel for Olga's car (which in 2010 was transferred into his 

name), and about six months of hotel bills while he and Olga lived apart. This testimony 

was complicated when he later testified that the figure of $24,000 represented his total 

income for 2010. 

        13	    238 P.3d at 598-99 & n.13. 

        14     See Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1025-26 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 

(finding that because sponsor did not submit evidence that any of ex-wife's student loans 

were forgiven or subsidized by her creditors, the loans did not count as income for offset 

purposes); Cheshire v. Cheshire, No. 3:05-cv-00453-TJC-MCR, 2006 WL 1208010, at 

*6 n.11 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2006) (holding that because value of food stamps could not 

be ascertained, their value could not be deducted from support obligations of  1183a 

immigration sponsor). 

                                                -8-	                                6797

----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                The trial court accepted that George spent $24,000 "on expenses to support 

himself,   Ms.   Villars,   and   her   daughter."    To   determine   how   much   of   this   George 

contributed to Olga and Linda, the court first determined that Olga lived in a two-person 

household (while Linda was living with   Richard) for the first 164 days of 2010, or 

44.93% of the year; and in a three-person household (after Linda returned home) for the 

remaining 201 days, or 55.07% of the year.                The court applied these percentages to 

George's $24,000 in earnings and arrived at $10,783.20 in total household expenditures 

for the first part of the year and $13,216.80 for the remainder of the year. The court then 

divided the total expenditures for each period by the number of people in the household 

during that period, concluding that George provided $5,391.60 in support to Olga during 

the first 164 days of the year and $8,811.20 in support to Olga and Linda during the latter 

201 days of the year, for a total of $14,202.80 in support. 

                The   trial   court,   correctly   applying   the   legal   principles   discussed   above 

regarding the federal poverty guidelines and appropriate household size, determined that 

Richard's total support obligation for 2010 was $16,112.03. Subtracting Olga's minimal 

earnings for the year, the payment that Richard made for December 2010 pursuant to the 

temporary support order, and the amount of George's contributions, the court determined 

that Richard's remaining obligation was            $275.90, and that he had paid that much, "at 

minimum," in qualifying support between June and December 2010.                        The trial court 

concluded, therefore, that Richard's remaining support obligation for 2010 was zero. 

                We believe that the court clearly erred in its analysis.  George testified, in 

apparent contradiction, that (1) he contributed $24,000 to the support of Olga and Linda 

during 2010, and (2) that his entire earnings for 2010 were $24,000, of which some went 

to his own support.      If George contributed $24,000 to the support of Olga and Linda, 

                                                   -9-                                   6797

----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

then Richard's support obligation was more than completely offset, and any error in the 

court's calculation of a smaller amount of support from George would necessarily be 

harmless.     But the trial court instead interpreted George's testimony to mean that he 

"spent   $24,000   on   expenses   to   support   himself,   Ms.   Villars,   and   her   daughter."      If 

George's   entire   earnings   and   expenditures   for   2010   were   $24,000,   then   the   court's 

fractional calculations -   attributing half of that amount to Olga while Linda lived with 

Richard, and two-thirds of it to Olga and Linda once Linda had returned to live with 

Olga - failed to account for the substantial evidence that George's support was sporadic 

and variable due to the significant disruptions in their living arrangements during the 

year.   These features required the trial court to make a more accurate approximation of 

George's actual contributions. 

                 George testified that he and Olga lived apart for most of 2010 and paid 

separate housing expenses for much of the time.  At the start of the year Olga was living 

at Quail Point Apartments; George lived there too for a time, but at some point (whether 

in   2009   or   early   2010   is   unclear   from   his   testimony)   he   moved   out   and   sought   a 

restraining order against her. He moved into an apartment on his own and paid rent there 

while Olga remained at Quail Point.   He testified that he could not recall whether he ever 

paid any rent at Quail Point.        He testified that Richard, however, did pay "some of the 

rent and some of the deposit on the apartment at Quail Point," and also that Olga sold off 

"some jewelry, at one point $3,000 worth that she used to pay for rent or hotel rooms," 

though George did not specify which housing she paid for with this money.                          George 

testified that Olga was "in and out of jail" during this time and was finally evicted from 

Quail Point in April. 

                                                    -10-                                   6797

----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                Olga lived in a motel from April until September. George's testimony was 

inconsistent as to the amount of support he provided during this time.  He conceded that 

he "did not pay her bills completely."          He testified that he paid for hotel rooms for a 

period of about six months, at approximately $1,600 a month; he also testified that he 

paid for hotel rooms from the end of May through mid-September (about three and a half 

months); and he also testified that "Olga did pay for a certain amount of hotel rooms 

herself and she was living separate from me and she lived in different hotel rooms and 

paid her own way with her own money. . . .   I don't know exactly, but somehow she paid 

her own way." 

                On September 11, 2010, Olga, George, and Linda moved into an apartment 

at Archstone Del Mar and lived there together until November, when Olga and George 

annulled their marriage. George testified that the money to pay the first few months' rent 

at Archstone Del Mar was borrowed; Olga testified that it was Richard who provided the 

money, in the approximate amount of $2,124. 

                The   trial   court's   equal   division   of   expenditures   assumed   a   stable   and 

consistent living arrangement throughout the year. In such cases the formula used by the 

trial court would likely stand up to appellate review. The evidence in this case, however, 

shows that George supported himself throughout the year while supporting Olga and 

Linda only sporadically.       There appear to have been substantial periods of time when 

they were living apart and George was paying for his own residence but not Olga's. 

There   is   thus   a   significant   risk   that   the   formula   used   by   the   trial   court   overstated 

George's contributions to Olga's and Linda's support. We remand so that the trial court 

                                                  -11-                                  6797

----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

can tailor its decision to the unique facts of this case when calculating the amount of 

support that George provided.15 

        C.      The Trial Proceedings Did Not Violate Due Process. 

                Olga challenges the result below on two procedural grounds:                  her lack of 

an interpreter and the poor quality of her telephone connection.   Although she does not 

cite any legal authority for these arguments, we will treat them as allegations that the trial 

proceedings failed to satisfy due process. 

                First, Olga contends that she had difficulty communicating with the trial 

court and that she should have been provided a Russian interpreter.  She does not direct 

us to any point in the record where she made such a request, but we review the issue for 

plain error.16 

                Whether to appoint an interpreter is dependent on a number of factors, 

including   "[the   party's]   ability   to   understand   English,   [the   party's]   ability   to   speak 

English, the nature of the issues to be litigated, and the anticipated complexity or subtlety 

of the trial testimony."17     These factors are best weighed in the first instance by the trial 

court   in   the   exercise   of   its   discretion. The   record   in   this   case   shows   that   despite 

occasional misunderstandings between Olga and the trial court, she comprehended and 

        15      Because we remand for a recalculation of Richard's support obligation, 

Olga's appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to alter or amend the judgment 

under Civil Rule 59 is moot.   We leave it to the trial court's discretion as to whether, on 

remand, it will consider the evidence that Olga tardily submitted with that motion. 

        16      In re Tammy J. , 270 P.3d 805, 810 n.9 (Alaska 2012) ("[A]pro se  litigant 

who fails to raise an issue below should not be able to raise the issue on appeal absent 

plain error." (quoting Maness v. Daily , 184 P.3d 1, 9 n.25 (Alaska 2008))). 

        17       Vui Gui Tsen v. State, 176 P.3d 1, 8 (Alaska App. 2008) (citing Nur v. 

State, 869 N.E.2d 472, 478-79 (Ind. App. 2007)). 

                                                   -12-                                   6797

----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

reacted to the testimony being given, spoke cogently on her own behalf, and was able to 

make   herself   understood.        On   those   few   occasions   when   the   trial   judge   appeared 

confused by something Olga said, he asked her to repeat herself and she did so.  Her pro 

se   pleadings     do   not   demonstrate      any   significant    difficulty   with   written    English. 

Although we encourage trial courts to assess the need for interpreters for pro se litigants 

even in the absence of any formal request, the record in this case shows no abuse of the 

trial court's discretion in failing to provide one sua sponte. 

                 Second, Olga argues that disruptions in her telephone connection during the 

trial caused her to miss relevant testimony and caused the trial court to misunderstand 

some of the evidence. We reject this argument as well.  Olga initially had trouble calling 

in, but the court did not take any testimony until she had been connected.  A subsequent 

phone disruption occurred during George's testimony, but the substance of the testimony 

was repeated after the connection was reestablished, and Olga was given the opportunity 

to cross-examine, which she declined.18           And although the trial judge on occasion asked 

speakers to repeat themselves because of the erratic quality of the telephone connection, 

there is no evidence that he ultimately   failed to hear or understand any evidence or 



        18       There were also phone disruptions during Richard's discussion of case law 

and    the   trial  judge's    oral  decision.    Neither    disruption    caused     Olga   to   miss   the 

presentation of evidence. 

        19       Olga also contends that George's testimony was improperly admitted and 

should be stricken from the record because he was not a party.                George's testimony was 

plainly relevant to the main issue in the case, the amount of any offsets against Richard's 

obligation of support, and the trial court properly admitted it over Olga's objection. 

                                                   -13-                                    6797

----------------------- Page 14-----------------------


              For these reasons, we VACATE the trial court's order and REMAND for 

findings consistent with this opinion. 

                                          -14-                             6797

----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

CARPENETI, Justice, concurring. 

                I   concur   in   this   court's   conclusion   that   the   superior   court's   "fractional 

calculations," which assigned either half or two-thirds of George's entire earnings and 

expenditures to Olga's support (depending on whether Linda lived with Richard or Linda 

lived with Olga), on the assumption that Olga was living with George, failed to account 

for evidence that George's support was sporadic and variable due   to   the significant 

disruptions in Olga's and Linda's living arrangements.                 But I would not reverse the 

superior     court's   conclusion     that  George's     contributions     were    sufficient   to  offset 

Richard's support obligation if the superior court had made specific findings, based on 

evidence in the record, that the totals spent by George for Olga's benefit were sufficient 

to meet the federal standard when added to other sources of support from Richard. 

                I reach this conclusion because George's testimony, which the superior 

court appears to have accepted, included the declarations that he paid for "about six 

months" or "at least six months" of hotel bills at $1,600 per month for a total of $9,600; 

two months of apartment costs totaling $2,200; 12 months of phone costs at $130 per 

month totaling $1,560; four months of electric bills at $35 per month totaling $140; and 

food either "all through the year" or starting in "March, April, May, whatever" at about 

$400 per month totaling at least $2,400.             Adding even the lower of the sets of these 

figures   to   the   miscellaneous   offsets   found     by   the   court   (Olga's   earnings   of   $175, 

Richard's payments of $1,458, and Richard's support after he relinquished guardianship 

and before the end of 2010 at a "minimum" of $275), the total of $17,808 exceeds the 

amount Richard was required to pay under 8 U.S.C.  1183(a)(1)(A), $16,112. 

                Thus,   while   I   conclude   that   the   record   could   have   supported   findings 

sufficient to support the superior court's judgment, a remand is appropriate to allow that 

court in the first instance to make such specific findings. 

                                         -15-                                              6797

Case Law
Statutes, Regs & Rules

IT Advice, Support, Data Recovery & Computer Forensics.
(907) 338-8188

Please help us support these and other worthy organizations:
Law Project for Psychiatraic Rights